Common Ownership of Public Goods

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorHalonen-Akatwijuka, Maija
dc.contributor.authorPaÖlis, Evagelos
dc.date.accessioned2023-03-09T19:07:37Z
dc.date.available2023-03-09T19:07:37Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.description.abstractWe analyze ownership of public goods in a repeated game focusing on common ownership. Under common ownership an owner’s access to the public good cannot be restricted by other owners. We find that under common ownership both the value of the relationship and the gain from deviation are high. Common ownership can provide the best incentives for cooperation when the value of the public good cannot be increased much by maintenance investments or the maintenance costs are sufficiently convex. We argue that these conditions are satisfied in Ostrom’s field studies of irrigation systems and common lands.en_US
dc.identifier.citationHalonen-Akatwijuka, M., & Pafilis, E. (2020). Common ownership of public goods. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 180, 555-578.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.10.002en_US
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681
dc.identifier.urihttps://nru.uncst.go.ug/handle/123456789/8145
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherJournal of Economic Behavior & Organizationen_US
dc.subjectPublic goodsen_US
dc.subjectCommon pool resourcesen_US
dc.subjectProperty rights theoryen_US
dc.subjectRelational contractsen_US
dc.titleCommon Ownership of Public Goodsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
Common ownership of public goods.pdf
Size:
437.95 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Common ownership of public goods
Download
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
license.txt
Size:
1.71 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description:
Download
Collections
Social Sciences