The political economy of the fisheries sector in Uganda: ruling elites, implementation costs and industry interests
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Date
2012
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
DIIS
Abstract
This paper sets out to explain policies, implementation arrangements and results
(PIRs) in Uganda’s fisheries sector. Industry actors wanted to be able to
keep up with European standards in order to survive in the chilled and frozen
fillet export industry. They put pressure on ruling elites to support the establishment
of effective hygiene and testing procedures. This helped the fishing
industry succeed to an extent that helped create interests in the status quo. Fishermen,
their dependents, and the fish processors all wanted to maintain a high
level of fish catches. It was politically costly for ruling elites to enforce fisheries
management because strict enforcement was unpopular with fishermen, as
well as with many fishermen and security agents who benefitted from illegal
fishing. Therefore, the success was not maintained: a pocket of efficiency was
established with regard to hygiene and testing, but not with regard to enforcing
fisheries management. Overfishing and the near collapse of the fishing sector
were the results.
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Citation
Kjær, A. M., Muhumuza, F., Mwebaze, T., & Katusiimeh, M. (2012). The political economy of the fisheries sector in Uganda: ruling elites, implementation costs and industry interests (No. 2012: 04). DIIS Working Paper.