Browsing by Author "Pafilis, Evagelos"

Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
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    Can Technological Change Weaken the Robustness of Common-Property Regimes?
    (Cambridge University Press., 2022) Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija; Pafilis, Evagelos
    We examine the effect of technological change on the incentives to cooperate in the provision of common-pool resources (CPRs). We focus our analysis on CPRs that require investments in improvement and maintenance, such as irrigation systems. We find that major technological improvements, such as replacing a primitive irrigation system with a modern system, risk compromising cooperation as the temptation to freeride on other farmers’ investments is increased. By contrast, minor technological improvements within an existing irrigation system, such as strengthening water diversion devices, do not hinder incentives to cooperate. In our analysis, an irrigation system can be well-managed for a long period of time during technological progress when changes are minor. When technology changes are major, cooperation can be maintained if the community is patient and initially their discount factor is well above the critical level for cooperation. However, when the threshold is reached, any further major technological improvement will lead to a breakdown of cooperation and collapse of investments in the irrigation system.
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    Location and Ownership of Public Goods
    (Economics Letters, 2014) Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija; Pafilis, Evagelos
    We introduce location choice for the public good in the property rights framework. We find that it can be optimal to separate location from ownership.
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    Ownership of Cultural Goods
    (University of Bristol, 2017) Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija; Pafilis, Evagelos
    We examine the return of cultural goods to their home country. The cultural good can be unified or separated into two countries. We show that nonintegration and separation of the cultural good is initially optimal when the host invests in the restoration of the cultural good and his unique restoration skill makes him an indispensable trading partner. The return of the cultural good to its home country and shift of ownership becomes optimal when the restoration stage is over and the host’s investment changes to human capital, which reduces the spillover from his investment, and technological changes make him a relatively dispensable trading partner. Alternatively, the cultural good can be returned due to changes in the valuation of the cultural good. The return can be triggered when unification is efficient but it is possible that the return is triggered even when separation is efficient.