Browsing by Author "Mwebaze, Tom"

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    The political economy of the fisheries sector in Uganda: ruling elites, implementation costs and industry interests
    (DIIS, 2012) Mette Kjær, Anne; Muhumuza, Fred; Mwebaze, Tom; Katusiimeh, Mesharch
    This paper sets out to explain policies, implementation arrangements and results (PIRs) in Uganda’s fisheries sector. Industry actors wanted to be able to keep up with European standards in order to survive in the chilled and frozen fillet export industry. They put pressure on ruling elites to support the establishment of effective hygiene and testing procedures. This helped the fishing industry succeed to an extent that helped create interests in the status quo. Fishermen, their dependents, and the fish processors all wanted to maintain a high level of fish catches. It was politically costly for ruling elites to enforce fisheries management because strict enforcement was unpopular with fishermen, as well as with many fishermen and security agents who benefitted from illegal fishing. Therefore, the success was not maintained: a pocket of efficiency was established with regard to hygiene and testing, but not with regard to enforcing fisheries management. Overfishing and the near collapse of the fishing sector were the results.
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    When do ruling elites support productive sectors?: Explaining policy initiatives in the fisheries and dairy sectors in Uganda
    (DIIS, 2012) Mette Kjær, Anne; Katusiimeh, Mesharch; Mwebaze, Tom; Muhumuza, Fred
    This paper explains the differences in ruling elite support for the fisheries and dairy sectors in Uganda. Although production in Uganda has not generally been promoted in any sustained way, ruling elites have to varying degrees supported the dairy and fisheries sectors. The paper shows that the ruling elite initially supported the fishing industry because of industry pressure. They have failed to enforce fisheries management because there are big political costs associated with such enforcement. The dairy sector in the southwestern milk region was initially supported because the ruling elite wanted to build a coalition of support in this region. Coming from the region himself, the president had a keen interest in dairy cattle. The sector was subsequently regulated because the biggest processor put pressure on the ruling elite to do so. Even when the ruling coalition is fragmented, promoting production is possible if there is strong industry pressure and when the initiatives to promote the sector are also seen to help build or maintain the ruling coalition.