Browsing by Author "Katusiimeh, Mesharch"

Now showing 1 - 5 of 5
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    Growing but not transforming: Fragmented ruling coalitions and economic developments in Uganda
    (DIIS, 2012) Mette Kjær, Anne; Katusiimeh, Mesharch
    When the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and its leader, Yoweri Museveni, came to power, they had an explicit agenda of industrializing the economy (Kjær and Muhumuza, 2009). Improved infrastructure and increased production and productivity were the focus. Indeed, Uganda enjoyed a period of sustained economic growth of about 7 percent annually between 1990 and 2006 (Piron and Norton, 2004; Kjær and Muhumuza, 2009), made possible by a stable ruling coalition, macro-economic stability, low inflation (until recently), and relative peace. Poverty declined from 56 percent in 1991 to 25 percent in 20101 However, there has been limited structural transformation in terms of a shift from agriculture to industry. A number of explanations for this could be put forward, whether institutional, policy-oriented or geographical (Selassie, 2008; van de Walle, 2001). None of them, however, explains fully how Uganda, in spite of an initially highly dedicated ruling elite, did not succeed in transforming its economy. For example, Uganda is a landlocked country, but so is Zimbabwe, which is far more industrialized. Similarly, while Uganda certainly has weak institutions, so did other countries that have succeeded in industrializing (Selassie, 2008).
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    New District Creation in Uganda and Local Actors: Passive Recipients or Active Pursuers?
    (Journal of public administration and governance, 2018) Tabaro, Robert; Katusiimeh, Mesharch; Molenaers, Nadia
    From the 1990s, Uganda embarked on a process of subdividing administrative units (districts) as part of the decentralization programme supposedly to bring services closer to the people. Li terature has, however, shown that in most of the cases the process is used as a strategy by the incumbent president Museveni for his political survival. As such, new district creation is seen as a process driven by central political elites. The role of lo cal policy entrepreneurs (actors) has thus been given limited attention. Basing on thirty five elite interviews and document review, we established that local policy entrepreneurs do matter in policy change processes and can at times challenge the position of central political elites. Focusing on the new district of Sheema in western Uganda (split from ‘mother’ district of Bushenyi in 2010), we found out that president Museveni who initially ‘opposed’ the idea of a new district had to finally give in to peo ples’ demands. This was because local policy entrepreneurs in Sheema were determined, eager, highly motivated and smart in strategizing and forming alliances in the pursuit of their goals. But also because the president feared vote loss as demands gained m omentum towards the 2011 general elections.
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    A political economy analysis of domestic resource mobilization in Uganda
    (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), 2017) Anne Mette, Kjær,; Ulriksen, Marianne S.; Kangave, Jalia; Katusiimeh, Mesharch
    This paper is part of a series of outputs from the research project on The Politics of Domestic Resource Mobilization for Social Development. The project seeks to contribute to global debates on the political and institutional contexts that enable poor countries to mobilize domestic resources for social development. It examines the processes and mechanisms that connect the politics of resource mobilization and demands for social provision; changes in state-citizen and donor-recipient relations associated with resource mobilization and allocation; and governance reforms that can lead to improved and sustainable revenue yields and services. For further information on the project visit www.unrisd.org/pdrm.
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    The political economy of the fisheries sector in Uganda: ruling elites, implementation costs and industry interests
    (DIIS, 2012) Mette Kjær, Anne; Muhumuza, Fred; Mwebaze, Tom; Katusiimeh, Mesharch
    This paper sets out to explain policies, implementation arrangements and results (PIRs) in Uganda’s fisheries sector. Industry actors wanted to be able to keep up with European standards in order to survive in the chilled and frozen fillet export industry. They put pressure on ruling elites to support the establishment of effective hygiene and testing procedures. This helped the fishing industry succeed to an extent that helped create interests in the status quo. Fishermen, their dependents, and the fish processors all wanted to maintain a high level of fish catches. It was politically costly for ruling elites to enforce fisheries management because strict enforcement was unpopular with fishermen, as well as with many fishermen and security agents who benefitted from illegal fishing. Therefore, the success was not maintained: a pocket of efficiency was established with regard to hygiene and testing, but not with regard to enforcing fisheries management. Overfishing and the near collapse of the fishing sector were the results.
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    When do ruling elites support productive sectors?: Explaining policy initiatives in the fisheries and dairy sectors in Uganda
    (DIIS, 2012) Mette Kjær, Anne; Katusiimeh, Mesharch; Mwebaze, Tom; Muhumuza, Fred
    This paper explains the differences in ruling elite support for the fisheries and dairy sectors in Uganda. Although production in Uganda has not generally been promoted in any sustained way, ruling elites have to varying degrees supported the dairy and fisheries sectors. The paper shows that the ruling elite initially supported the fishing industry because of industry pressure. They have failed to enforce fisheries management because there are big political costs associated with such enforcement. The dairy sector in the southwestern milk region was initially supported because the ruling elite wanted to build a coalition of support in this region. Coming from the region himself, the president had a keen interest in dairy cattle. The sector was subsequently regulated because the biggest processor put pressure on the ruling elite to do so. Even when the ruling coalition is fragmented, promoting production is possible if there is strong industry pressure and when the initiatives to promote the sector are also seen to help build or maintain the ruling coalition.