Browsing by Author "Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija"

Now showing 1 - 7 of 7
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    Can Technological Change Weaken the Robustness of Common-Property Regimes?
    (Cambridge University Press., 2022) Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija; Pafilis, Evagelos
    We examine the effect of technological change on the incentives to cooperate in the provision of common-pool resources (CPRs). We focus our analysis on CPRs that require investments in improvement and maintenance, such as irrigation systems. We find that major technological improvements, such as replacing a primitive irrigation system with a modern system, risk compromising cooperation as the temptation to freeride on other farmers’ investments is increased. By contrast, minor technological improvements within an existing irrigation system, such as strengthening water diversion devices, do not hinder incentives to cooperate. In our analysis, an irrigation system can be well-managed for a long period of time during technological progress when changes are minor. When technology changes are major, cooperation can be maintained if the community is patient and initially their discount factor is well above the critical level for cooperation. However, when the threshold is reached, any further major technological improvement will lead to a breakdown of cooperation and collapse of investments in the irrigation system.
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    Common Ownership of Public Goods
    (Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2020) Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija; PaÖlis, Evagelos
    We analyze ownership of public goods in a repeated game focusing on common ownership. Under common ownership an owner’s access to the public good cannot be restricted by other owners. We find that under common ownership both the value of the relationship and the gain from deviation are high. Common ownership can provide the best incentives for cooperation when the value of the public good cannot be increased much by maintenance investments or the maintenance costs are sufficiently convex. We argue that these conditions are satisfied in Ostrom’s field studies of irrigation systems and common lands.
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    Coordinating Public Good Provision by Mediated Communication
    (American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2021) Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija; Park, In-Uck
    We examine a setup where two agents allocate a fixed budget between public goods in two areas. The agents may be biased to one area, which is their private information. Without communication, the funds are allocated inefficiently, resulting in gaps and duplication in public good provision. Direct communication between the agents is ineffective and cannot resolve the coordination failure even when the potential biases are negligible. Coordination can be improved by a mediator who filters the information communicated by the agents. Our results can throw light on how to improve coordination of humanitarian aid by an appropriately designed information management system.
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    Location and Ownership of Public Goods
    (Economics Letters, 2014) Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija; Pafilis, Evagelos
    We introduce location choice for the public good in the property rights framework. We find that it can be optimal to separate location from ownership.
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    Mixing Private and Public Service Providers and Specialization
    (Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol., 2005) Gersbach, Hans; Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija
    We analyze the reform of public sector welfare services such as education. In this paper we compare a mix of private and a public service provider with full privatization. In both cases the suppliers specialize in serving particular customer types. In the mixed institution the government sets the public fee such that service quality does not deteriorate and the price of the private supplier is anchored at comparatively low level. Under full privatization, however, prices escalate to the highest possible level. As a consequence, consumer welfare is higher with a mixed institution – unless the proportion of low-cost customers is high. The mixed institution can also accommodate wealth constraints of customers to some extent.
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    Organizational Design, Technology and the Boundaries of the Firm
    (University of Bristol, 2004) Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija
    Focus - specialization and specific technology - improves productivity but leads to more dependency and opens a door for power problems. We analyze how organizational design and the choice of technology interact with the allocation of ownership in minimizing the holdup problem. We find a novel motive for job rotation: rotation reduces holdup problems in an integrated firm. We also show that holdup problem in specific physical capital is removed in the integrated firm while holdups in specific human capital remain. Furthermore, ownership gives incentives to focus human capital on the firm.
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    Ownership of Cultural Goods
    (University of Bristol, 2017) Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija; Pafilis, Evagelos
    We examine the return of cultural goods to their home country. The cultural good can be unified or separated into two countries. We show that nonintegration and separation of the cultural good is initially optimal when the host invests in the restoration of the cultural good and his unique restoration skill makes him an indispensable trading partner. The return of the cultural good to its home country and shift of ownership becomes optimal when the restoration stage is over and the host’s investment changes to human capital, which reduces the spillover from his investment, and technological changes make him a relatively dispensable trading partner. Alternatively, the cultural good can be returned due to changes in the valuation of the cultural good. The return can be triggered when unification is efficient but it is possible that the return is triggered even when separation is efficient.