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Habitat International 36 (2012) 247e252
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Habitat International

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The operations and effectiveness of public and private provision of solid waste
collection services in Kampala

Mesharch W. Katusiimeh a,b,*, Arthur P.J. Mol b, Kees Burger b

aDepartment of Political Science and Public Administration, Uganda Christian University, P.O Box 4, Mukono, Uganda
bDepartment of Social Sciences, Wageningen University, The Netherlands
Keywords:
Solid waste collection
Privatization
Effectiveness
Kampala
Uganda
Households
* Department of Political Science and Public Adm
University, P.O Box 4, Mukono, Uganda.

E-mail addresses: mkatusiimeh@gmail.com, mesh
W. Katusiimeh).

0197-3975/$ e see front matter � 2011 Elsevier Ltd.
doi:10.1016/j.habitatint.2011.10.002
a b s t r a c t

This paper compares the operations and discusses the effectiveness of public and private sector provision
of solid waste collection in Kampala, Uganda. Household data suggest that the private sector is more
effective than the public sector. Private sector companies provide services like container provision and
providing timely and fixed collection time tables. Contrary to popular perception, fees charged by private
companies are moderate. Public sector clients are charged fees even when the service is supposed to be
free. Clients of private sector providers are more satisfied than those of public sector providers. It is
however, revealed that while public sector serve mainly the low incomes, the private sector serves
mainly the rich. In spite of these notable differences, clients of both public and private sector perceive the
problem of solid waste management (SWM) in Kampala to be very serious. The effectiveness of public
and private sector operations in solid waste collection in Kampala is hampered by corruption and lack of
transparency. Given the situation of open competition for clients involving both public and private sector
in Kampala, it is possible the public sector can operate effectively if they start commercial services
officially like their private sector counterparts. This calls for a formal public-private partnership where
the public and private sector can work together with the public sector dominating poor and marginalized
areas while the private sector concentrates on rich neighborhoods.

� 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction

It is widely acknowledged that most cities in developing coun-
tries face challenges of poor solid waste management (SWM)
resulting into major problems relating to public health and envi-
ronmental pollution. Hardly a month passes without the press
highlighting garbage complaints from city residents and reporting
on heaps of uncontrolled garbage, roadsides littered with refuse,
streams blocked with garbage leading to flooding and the presence
of many illegal disposal sites (Matagi, 2001). The situation is made
worse with rapid urbanization taking place and slums growing at
an alarming rate.

In the 1980s, public sector monopoly of solid waste manage-
ment (SWM) in urban cities was blamed for the mess citing inad-
equate financial resources and lack of management and technical
skills. Public sector monopoly according to the World Bank also
inistration, Uganda Christian

arch.katusiimeh@wur.nl (M.

All rights reserved.
impedes the efficient allocation of resources and obstructs the
functioning of markets (WDR, 2005).

Many analysts of urban environmental infrastructure in devel-
oping countries buoyed by the emergence of the new public
management (NPM) model contended that without the discipline
of competition, the public sector would not provide effective
services. The public sector was criticized for being run under an old
administrative model (the classical Weberian type of administra-
tion) that was characterized as slow, hierarchical, not cost-efficient,
inflexible and not citizen oriented (Hood, 1991). This situation was
further exacerbated by growing mistrust of the people in govern-
ments who were seen as mired in corruption (Doan, 1998).
Dissatisfaction with the quality and reliability of services and the
inefficiencies and even corruption of public sector operators made
private sector participation attractive (Annez, 2006). The thinking
was that privatization would not only solve failures of public
ownership (Shirley & Walsh, 2001), but the public would benefit
from the introduction of private sector management practices
(Stren, 2001).

Many developing countries reshaped their urban systems and
environmental infrastructure policies to reflect the new manage-
ment thinking so as to implement elements of the NPM model.

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M.W. Katusiimeh et al. / Habitat International 36 (2012) 247e252248
Reforms implemented in most urban areas in Uganda in the 1990s
were based on NPM principles, especially promoted by interna-
tional donors such as the World Bank. The water and sanitation
reforms in Uganda gainedmomentum along the NPM lines. As early
as the mid-1990s, the Uganda government recognized the limited
capability and capacity of local authorities to provide adequate
sanitation and solid waste management (SWM) to urban commu-
nities (Tukahirwa, Mol, & Oosterveer, 2010). The absence of suffi-
cient funds for them to operate SWM services properly reinforced
the argument for stronger private sector involvement. The desire to
move in this direction was already spelled out in various policy
documents including the influential World Bank sponsored urban
environmental sanitation project (Mugagga, 2006). Privatization is
a key component of reforms introduced in SWM in developing
countries. In Kampala, in order to institutionalize private sector
participation, the Kampala City Council (KCC) solid waste
management Act was enacted in the year 2000. As a result, like in
many other countries in the developing world, the public and
private sector co-exist in SWM. However, despite the active
involvement of both public and private sectors, major problems still
remain as far as SWM is concerned. For instance only 40% of the
garbage that is generated in Kampala is transported to the official
dumpsite at Kiteezi (KCC, 2006). The purpose of this paper there-
fore, is to compare the operations of the public and private provi-
sion of solid waste collection in Kampala and discuss their
effectiveness.

Methodology

Solid waste management (SWM) in this study is meant to mean
solid waste collection. When we refer to the private sector, we
restrict ourselves to the analysis of the private firms that are
formally registered and recognized by KCC.

To compare the operations of public and private provision of
solid waste collection, data collection among clients of public sector
(KCC) and private firms in Kampala was done through a quantita-
tive survey carried out between January and May 2009 in the
divisions of Kawempe and Nakawa. The questionnaire was
administered to 475 respondents. Among the 475 respondents who
responded to the questionnaire, 56% are served by KCC (12%) and
the private sector (44%). The analysis is limited to these respon-
dents. The survey captured the socio-economic characteristics of
respondents, frequency of solid waste collection, perceptions and
satisfaction with present solid waste services, payment dynamics
and services rendered by private and public sector.

Data collection took place through a structured, self-completion
questionnaire to make sure respondents understood the questions
and that no bias occurred in terms of illiteracy or education level. To
ensure representativeness, a stratified random sampling strategy
was followed, in which random sampling of respondents in the
parishes selected involved targeting all income groups. If the
sampled respondent was not available, not interested, or not part of
the target group, the interviewer would move to the next random
sampled respondent in that cluster. Given the difficulty of eliciting
income and expenditure information, low income households were
defined as those that reside in poor neighborhoods characterized
by high population densities. Areas were classified as high income
if they had low population densities and where neighborhoods are
well planned.

Interviews with key participants like the KCC waste managers
(10), managers of private firms (15), workers of both KCC (10) and
private firms (15), the residents especially local council leaders (6)
and opinion leaders (10) were conducted. The aim was to get
explanations on the operations and effectiveness of public and
private sector in SWM in Kampala.
The data through qualitative methods was transcribed and
qualitatively analyzed. Survey data was analyzed descriptively
where we derived frequencies and percentages. We used an inde-
pendent sample t-test to check for the mean differences and to
check whether or not there are significant differences in the scores.

Results and discussion

Public and private sectors operations in SWM in Kampala

For long, Kampala local government had the monopoly of being
responsible for collection, storage and disposal of waste by statu-
tory requirement. Communal containers (skips) were placed in
specific locations for households to bring garbage at any time of the
day especially in rich areas (Mugagga, 2006). However, an insuffi-
cient number of skips were placed in the city which created
a situation that encouraged open dumping in unauthorized places.
Alternatively, households paid individuals (informal collectors) to
transport garbage to the skip in which Kampala City Council (KCC)
trucks would take to the official dumpsite. Informal collectors were
needed because the distance to the skips was quite far and informal
collectors would also dump in unauthorized places as long as no
one was watching.

The strategic framework for reform (SFR) of 1997 however,
proposed that SWM be privatized with private firms collecting
refuse directly from beneficiaries at a fee, KCC subsidizing the low
income areas in the short term and then later withdrawing
completely (KCC, 2002; KCC, 2006). After formal privatization set in
around the year 2000, communal containers were largely with-
drawn. After the pilot refuse collection service was implemented in
order to test the feasibility of contracting services in Makindye
division in 2001, it was recommended to have skip-less refuse
collection service in communities, with skips restricted to institu-
tions and markets (KCC, 2002; Mugagga, 2006). As a result of the
implementation of the policy, the most observable change in the
SWM sector in Kampala is the increased involvement of the private
sector.

Officially, 30 private companies are registered by Kampala City
Council (KCC) to collect waste in any division of the city. Private
companies collect garbage from private homes or institutions and
are paid directly by these home-owners and institutions. Previ-
ously, KCC entered into formal contractual arrangements with
private companies whereby the latter provided services for which
they would be paid from local government sources through con-
tracting. Firms like Nabugabo-Shauri Yako Joint Venture and Bisons
Consult International were awarded contracts in 2001. KCC also
awarded private companies a limited monopoly via competitive
bidding in a defined area for a limited time (franchising). In this
arrangement firms were allowed to charge residents, but KCC
would pay a lump sum to private collectors to meet the costs of
collecting garbage from poor households that cannot afford to pay.
For example, in the central division of Kampala, garbage collection
was taken over by Nabugabo Enterprises. In Kawempe division,
NOREMA and Hilltop private companies were given contracts to
manage the collection of solid waste. In Makindye division,
Homeklin Ltd. was contracted. These arrangements were aban-
doned by KCC due to its lack of capacity to manage the contracting
system and lack of capacity and transparency on the part of private
firms. As a result, Kampala city council didn’t withdraw from
collection of waste as planned. It is still involved in the collection
and transportation of waste to the dumpsite. Records at Kiteezi
dumping site in 2009 indicate that KCC is responsible for 87
thousand (about 27%) tons of garbage dumped compared to the
private sector’s 237 thousand tons (73%). By the time of carrying out
this study, KCC operated alongside the private firms in many ways



Table 1
Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents.

Variable Public sector Private sector

Percentage Percentage

Income category
High income 18 67
Medium income 55 30
Low income 27 3
Educational level
Primary 11 1
Secondary 53 15
Tertiary 36 84
House ownership
Owner 13 46
Tenant 80 47
Government house 2 4
Caretaker 5 3
Quantity of waste (kg)
3e5 15 1
6e10 25 16
Above 10 65 83

Table 2
Frequency of collection of waste from households.

Frequency Public Private

Percentage Percentage

Daily 51 11
Thrice 14 44
Twice 27 31
Once 6 14
Less frequently 2 0

M.W. Katusiimeh et al. / Habitat International 36 (2012) 247e252 249
commercially providing solid waste services to Kampala residents.
Private companies and KCC have widely scattered clients all over
the city openly competing for customers.

Socio-economic and demographic characteristics of respondents

We asked for respondents of their educational status, the
ownership of the house where they stay and the quantity of waste
generated. We also classified their income category (see Table 1
below for details of percentage scores). It was discovered that the
rich, not surprisingly perhaps, are served by mainly private firms
while most of the low income households are served by KCC. There
is a significant difference in the scores for KCC (M ¼ 2.1, SD ¼ 0.7)
and private sector (M ¼ 1.4, SD ¼ 0.5); t (8.5), P ¼ 0.000.

KCC serves the people with relatively little education (primary
and secondary). Private firms serve those with higher education
(tertiary). There is a significant difference in the scores for KCC
(M ¼ 3.3, SD ¼ 0.6) and private sector (M ¼ 3.9, SD ¼ 0.4); t (�8.4),
P ¼ 0.000.

For the estimates of the quantity of waste produced in the
household per week in Kg, we found out that therewas a significant
difference in the scores for KCC (M ¼ 3.5, SD ¼ 0.7) and private
sector (M¼ 3.8, SD¼ 0.4); t (�5.1), P ¼ 0.000. These results suggest
that private firms serve those with relatively more garbage than
KCC confirming earlier results that private firms serve the rich.
Studies show that rich households generate higher quantities of
waste than the poor and that income level is a determining factor
for domestic solid waste generation rates (Boadi and Kuitunen,
2003; Kaseva and Mbuligwe, 2005).

For house ownership, there was a significant difference in the
scores for KCC (M ¼ 2.0, SD ¼ 0.6) and private sector (M ¼ 1.6,
SD ¼ 0.7); t (3.3), P ¼ 0.001. These results suggest that most clients
of private firms live in their own houses unlike clients of KCC who
are mainly tenants. House ownership is associated with being rich.

Generally, the results as revealed in the socio-economic char-
acteristics of respondents reveal that private firms target the rich
who have the economic means to pay consistently for their
services. This is an indication that private firms are more effective
in serving the rich. This is not surprising probably as the finding is
in line with those of many earlier studies. For instance, according to
Spaargaren, Oosterveer, Bureen, and Mol (2005), the pressure for
profit maximization forces the private sector to seek rents from
serving mainly the highest income areas or fully paid services
leaving poor and marginal areas or low income people under the
responsibility of under resourced local authorities.

Services provision

We compared the responses of private sector and public sector
clients in respect to service provision particularly in the provision of
containers and frequency of collection of waste from households.

Container provision

85% of KCC clients provide their own containers (mostly self-
provision) while most (65%) clients of private firms indicate they
receive containers from their service providers. The private sector
providing containers can be seen not only in terms of customer care
but also to bind the customer to the provider. Many of the
containers are well labeled especially bins indicating which firm
supplies them to clients. This means that the private sector is more
effective in providing services like container provision unlike the
public sector especially when public sector (KCC) communal
containers (skips) were removed in many neighborhoods in pref-
erence for the door-to-door collection system.
Frequency of collection of waste from households

Respondents were also asked how public and private providers
compare in frequency of garbage collection. There was a significant
difference in the scores for KCC (M ¼ 2.9, SD ¼ 1.1) and private
sector (M¼ 3.5, SD¼ 0.9); t (�3.7), P¼ 0.000. These results suggest
that there are clear differences on frequency of garbage collection
between private firms and KCC. Surprisingly, the majority (51%)
served by KCC indicates that waste is collected daily unlike those of
private firms (11%) contradicting results of similar studies (Obirih-
Opareh & Johan, 2002). Two reasons could explain this difference.
First, KCC has a large majority (38%) of customers that are shop
keepers as compared to private sector’s 22%. The house in which
they live works as a shop at the same time and typically is near the
road or market places with easy access for KCC vehicles that mainly
collect market waste. Second, most low income households, (KCC
mainly serves low income households) have no good waste storage
containers. This fact coupled with the lack of appropriate in-house
storage facilities and the high decomposition rate makes most low
income households dispose of waste daily (Boadi and Kuitunen,
2003). The high income households have onsite storage facilities
and most contract with waste collectors that have fixed collection
time tables. This finding is similar to findings from other related
studies (Kaseva and Mbuligwe, 2005; Okot-Okumu and Nyenje,
2011) (Table 2).
Payments for solid waste collection

All private firm clients pay for solid waste collection unlike for
KCC where 76% of the clients pay. This payment pattern is partic-
ularly strange since KCC officially does not charge customers. The
field interviews, however, indicated that most KCC customers pay
and the money end up with KCC solid waste management



Table 3
Satisfaction with service provision.

Satisfaction with service provision Public
%

Private
%

Frequency of garbage collection from household
Poor 29 6
Moderate 31 27
High 40 67
Satisfaction with vehicles used
Poor 34 20
Moderate 29 37
High 37 43
Frequency of garbage collection in neighborhood
Poor 40 12
Moderate 27 28
High 33 60
Enforcement of the law
Poor 40 65
Moderate 35 16
High 25 19

1 Interview with KCC Solid Waste Engineer July 12th 2007.

M.W. Katusiimeh et al. / Habitat International 36 (2012) 247e252250
supervisors and drivers of their vehicles. This finding could be the
reason why they pay lower fees (M ¼ 22,102, SD ¼ 21,824) per
month compared to private firm customers (M ¼ 31,382,
SD ¼ 18,709) as the service is already subsidized. Both public (68%)
and private (59%) clients consider fees paid to be moderate. When
asked about how often payment to the service providers is done,
both public and private customers indicate once a month. However,
a large percentage of KCC clients pay weekly unlike those of private
firms.

Satisfaction with service provision

In this study, satisfaction was used as a proxy for quality of
services provided. Customer satisfaction is seen as a key perfor-
mance indicator in any business and to measure effectiveness of
services rendered. Thus it was important to ask Kampala residents
to compare and contrast their level of satisfaction with the present
situation of SWM. First, the perceptions of both private and KCC
clients are compared on SWM problems in the neighborhood as
this may have an effect on the general satisfaction of services
rendered. There were no significant differences in the scores for
KCC and private sector for all three variables tested (solid waste
collection, littering of solid waste and nuisance of transfer points).
Results suggest that both public and private firms’ customers
perceive the problem of solid waste collection, illegal piles of waste
to be very serious. In a related question, both KCC and private firms
clients indicated mainly personal health and littering of waste as
the most urgent problem related to SWM.

Satisfaction with the present situation of SWM

As already noted, we asked Kampala residents to compare their
level of satisfaction with the present situation of SWM in terms of
frequency of garbage collection from their households, vehicles
used, frequency of collection from the neighborhood and enforce-
ment of law. In terms of frequency of garbage collection from their
households, there was a significant difference in the scores for KCC
(M ¼ 3.1, SD ¼ 1.1) and private sector (M ¼ 3.8, SD ¼ 0.8); t (�5.1),
P ¼ 0.000. These results suggest that clients of private firms are
more satisfied than clients of KCC. This tends to confirm the earlier
observation that a characteristic of low income people (mostly
served by KCC) is to dispose of their waste daily and not necessarily
collected by KCC all the time. When not collected by KCC, it is
dumped in the illegal sites in the neighborhood and left there to rot
and become a nuisance. This observation is in line with the Auditor
General (2008) report that faults KCC for irregular solid waste
collection in many poor neighborhoods and markets causing
pollution and health problems. In terms of satisfaction with the
vehicles used, there was no significant differences in the scores for
KCC (M ¼ 3.0, SD ¼ 0.9) and private sector (M ¼ 3.3, SD ¼ 0.9); t
(�2.0), P¼ 0.040. These results suggest that clients of both KCC and
private sector are not satisfied with the vehicles used. This result is
because of the use of uncovered trucks that litter garbage and the
use of old vehicles and those unsuitable for waste collection. Clients
were also asked about their level of satisfaction with the frequency
of garbage collection in their neighborhood. There was a significant
difference in the scores for KCC (M ¼ 2.9, SD ¼ 1.2) and private
sector (M ¼ 3.7, SD ¼ 1.0); t (�5.1), P ¼ 0.000. Results suggest that
private sector clients are more satisfied than their public sector
(KCC) counterparts as regards to frequency of collection in the
neighborhood. In terms of satisfaction with enforcement of law to
ensure compliance with the solid waste management ordinance,
there was no significant difference in the scores for KCC (M ¼ 2.7,
SD ¼ 1.1) and private sector (M ¼ 2.2, SD ¼ 1.2); t (2.6), P ¼ 0.011.
These results suggest that clients of both private and public sector
indicate that issues of enforcement by KCC to ensure compliance
with the solid waste ordinance are not taken seriously. They are in
agreement that KCC has not done a good job (see Table 3 below for
percentage scores). This finding is in linewith the Auditor General’s
report on solid waste management in Kampala. According to the
Auditor General (2010), KCC largely failed to establish a solid waste
management system to manage garbage collection from 2002
through 2007. The report notes the failure to conduct solid waste
management awareness, enforcing the solid waste management by
laws like failure to punish those who illegally dump waste, super-
vising and monitoring the activities of private agents licensed to
collect waste and, lastly, ensuring that solid waste is transported
properly and conveyed to official dumpsites. In all the variables
tested those served by private sector are more satisfied than their
counterparts (clients of KCC).
Explanations

Data above show that generally private sector services are more
appreciated compared to their public sector (KCC) counterparts. In
spite of that observation, household data reveals the situation of
solid waste management in Kampala is still a great concern. This is
backed up by official statistics from KCC that show that service
coverage of solid waste collection services is at 40% (KCC, 2006).
Interviews with solid waste managers of private firms and KCC
managers reveal corruption and lack of transparency as the main
reason as towhy solid waste collection is not performing effectively
despite the public and private sectors being actively involved.

First, senior KCC officials in Kampala were reluctant to embrace
fully the agenda of privatization by arguing that outsourcing of
solid waste collection service providers was expensive and that
local firms did not have the necessary human, technical and
financial resources to provide a better service than had been
provided by the public sector (Golooba-Mutebi, 2003). Some senior
KCC officials still hold this view. While this might be true, inter-
views reveal that KCC officials are also motivated by a desire to
continue their benefits from the chaos under a public run SWM,
which allows for rent seeking.1 When solid waste collection was
partially contracted out in 2003 (a partnership between KCC and
Bisons Consult), the partnership was undermined by KCC with
irregular and delayed payments and inaccurate assessments that
led to the underpayment for the company’s services. The company



M.W. Katusiimeh et al. / Habitat International 36 (2012) 247e252 251
eventually withdrew from the contract2. While this could be
attributed to lack of financial resources by KCC3 to pay the
contractors and lack of capacity in form of monitoring staff having
few transportation resources, telephones ormobile communication
equipment, most respondents, including KCC officials, attributed
this to the ‘sabotage’ of the new reforms, especially the contracting
out method of solid waste collection, in order to create ‘rent
seeking’ opportunities where the officials could benefit. This point
is given more credence by the failure of KCC to get out of the
business of solid waste collection and transportation, as was
planned initially (KCC, 2002). KCC reneged on its promise to
contract out service delivery to private firms, and only focus on
supervising operations. This is especially so with money continuing
to be allocated for solid waste collection.

Second, the activities of waste management are funded through
the annual budget allocation and the official policy is that KCC
doesn’t charge user fees directly from the residents. While this is
sometimes adhered to, often times KCC collectors especially ‘refuse
supervisors’ charge residents at lower rates compared to their
private collector counterparts. KCC still dominates solid waste
collection in certain areas and most surprisingly in neighborhoods
with rich settlements. In fact KCC and private firms collide some-
times especially where they work in the same area.4 Those resi-
dents who prefer KCC say its services are cheaper than those of the
private companies. This hidden and unfair competition demoralizes
private sector service providers5 developing feelings of uncertainty
on their part and holding back for fear and doubt about KCC’s
intentions.

Third, a number of private garbage collectors such as BINIT,
NABUGABO, UPDEAL, NOREMA, HOME CLEAN, and ESKOM are
operating without permits from KCC (Auditor General, 2010).
Although known to the divisional authorities, they had not signed
agreements with the council for allowing them to operate. Despite
the absence of the signed contracts, Kawempe division, by June
2007 had an outstanding amount of Shs.225 million (USD 98,597)
payable to contractors (Auditor General, 2010). In early 2008, the
same companies signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
with Kawempe division to collect solid waste on very unclear
terms. For instance, it was not clear who was to meet the costs of
waste collection, how much the private collectors would be paid as
a result of the work done, and based onwhat indicators the division
shall monitor and evaluate the performance.6 The MOUwas agreed
upon and signed without making their details available to the
council and without the involvement of the solid waste engineer.7

Lack of transparency in the award of contracts has the potential to
demoralize those who could have beenwilling to invest to improve
solid waste management in the city.

Forth, as a result of lack of transparency, there is lack of trust
between the major players in the SWM business (public sector,
private sector and the general public). The private sector is suspi-
cious of KCC intentions and found KCC unreliable8, while on the
2 Interview with Bisons General Manager, 12th March 2008.
3 As argued by one of the KCC officials and some private sector company

managers.
4 Minutes, Public Health Department MIN PHC 36/07/2004.
5 Interview with KCC Solid Waste Engineer July 12th 2007.
6 Solid waste engineer-Kawempe’s letter to the Senior principal Assistant Town

Clerk Kawempe division on the MOU between NOREMA (U) Ltd AND Kawempe
division July 8, 2008.

7 In the minutes of the meeting of the Education, Sports and Health Policy
Committee, the solid waste management engineer submitted the requirements and
proposals that were under looked.

8 Several interviews conducted with private sector managers reveal that it is
because of KCC breaking promises and not living to their word in the contracting
business.
other hand, the private companies hope to benefit from secrecy,
have not been transparent to reveal their incomes and expenditures
to KCC, which is one of the reasons given as towhy KCC stops paying
and subsidizing private contractors9. The public (consumers of
services), are also not always cooperative especially when it comes
to paying for solid waste collection and assisting law enforcers in
dealing with those who litter solid waste or who fail to abide by the
solid waste laws and regulations. Sometimes, local council leaders
have sabotaged enforcement work by the private firms claiming
theywere not consulted10. The relationship betweenprivatefirms is
also not good as cases of unfair competition between rival firms,
especially between Nabugabo Enterprises, Global Investments
Limited and Bin IT, sometimes end up in physical fights and court
cases11. The Town Clerk of Kampala sometimes resorts to putting up
a public notice warning private garbage collectors and the general
public that KCC had no running contract with any private garbage
collecting firm and no private collector should claim to have exclu-
sive rights of collecting garbage in any part of the city. Situations like
these increase operating and transaction costs because of the
uncertainty in the business of solid waste management.
Conclusions

Themain objective of the research which underlies in this paper
was to compare the operations and discuss the effectiveness of
public and private provision of solid waste collection. The case of
Kampala, with regard to public and private provision of solid waste
collection, reveals that problems and challenges continue over the
state of solid waste management as evidenced by the perception
that the problem of SWM is still very serious. Yet, in general, results
from this study confirm the belief that the private sector is more
effective than the public sector. The results further confirm the
suspicion that private sector providers mainly serve the rich. The
private sector clients aremuchmorepleased than their public sector
counterpartswith the services provided. However, the effectiveness
of solid waste collection is hampered by corruption and lack of
transparency involving both the public and the private sector.

This study generates the much needed data to suggest planning
and policy recommendations for Kampala and other cities with
similar conditions. Given the situation of competition, it is possible
the public sector can operate effectively too if they officially start
commercial services. The challenge is how to maintain cost
recovery among the poor without leading them to opt out of the
services with disastrous consequences for the environment.
Tailoring private sector participation to socio-economic circum-
stances, deepening efforts to promote competition, and introducing
mechanisms to ensure that low income households have access to
affordable services may be the solution to the problems in
providing services in low income countries. This calls for a formal
public-private partnership where the public and private sector can
work together with the public sector dominating poor and
marginalized areas while the private sector dominate rich
neighborhoods.
9 Interview with KCC Engineer July 12th 2007.
10 In the minutes of the Education, sports, and health policy committee, members
pointed out that the garbage contractors instituted guards to control careless
dumping but they were not known to the local leaders and they couldn’t work
because of that as local leaders refused to cooperate with them.
11 John Eremu & James Kabengwa reports in the New Vision 25th February 2009
which was confirmed in interview with the manager of the private firm, Great
Waste and Recycling Foundation, that a row over private firms on accusations of
sabotaging each other’s operations had an effect of putting on hold the importation
of 20 modern garbage trucks over allegations that Nabugabo Updeal intends to
burn them.



M.W. Katusiimeh et al. / Habitat International 36 (2012) 247e252252
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	The operations and effectiveness of public and private provision of solid waste collection services in Kampala
	Introduction
	Methodology�
	Results and discussion
	Public and private sectors operations in SWM in Kampala
	Socio-economic and demographic characteristics of respondents
	Services provision
	Container provision
	Frequency of collection of waste from households
	Payments for solid waste collection
	Satisfaction with service provision
	Satisfaction with the present situation of SWM�
	Explanations

	Conclusions
	References