Formal Contractual Governance Mechanisms, Contract Contingencies, Inter-Organizational Trust, Supplier Opportunism and Outsourcing Performance
MetadataShow full item record
The purpose of this study was to explicate the influence of formal contractual governance mechanisms, contract contingencies, inter-organizational trust and supplier opportunism on outsourcing performance. This research was prompted by reports of increased poor outsourcing performance characterized by poor quality of services provided, incomplete and substandard work, failure to deliver on agreed schedules, increased user complaints and contract violations in Uganda’s public sector. Anecdotal evidence attributes poor outsourcing performance to lack of clearly designed formal contractual governance mechanism, failure to handle contract contingencies, lack of inter-organizational trust and existence of high levels of supplier opportunism. Hence this study was guided by the following research question: Do formal contractual governance mechanisms, contract contingencies, inter-organizational trust and supplier opportunism influence outsourcing performance? Cross sectional and quantitative survey data drawn from 612 contract managers in Uganda’s public sector (i.e. ministries, commissions and government parastatals) revealed that formal contractual governance mechanisms, contract contingencies, inter-organizational trust and supplier opportunism are significant predictors of outsourcing performance. Results of this study have managerial and theoretical implications that are presented in this paper.