

1 **Anthrax Bio-surveillance of Livestock in Arua District, Uganda, 2017-2018**

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21

22 **Abstract**

23 Anthrax, caused by *Bacillus anthracis*, is a widespread zoonotic disease with many human cases, especially in  
24 developing countries. Even with its global distribution, anthrax is a neglected disease with scarce information  
25 about its actual impact on the community level. Due to the ecological dynamics of anthrax transmission at the  
26 wildlife-livestock interface, the Sub-Saharan Africa region becomes a high-risk zone for maintaining and  
27 acquiring the disease. In this regard, some subregions of Uganda are endemic to anthrax with regular seasonal  
28 trends. However, there is scarce data about anthrax outbreaks in Uganda. Here, we confirmed the presence of  
29 *B. anthracis* in several livestock samples after a suspected anthrax outbreak among livestock and humans in  
30 Arua District. Additionally, we explored the potential risk factors of anthrax through a survey within the  
31 community *kraals*. We provide evidence that the most affected livestock species during the Arua outbreak  
32 were cattle (86%) compared to the rest of the livestock species present in the area. Moreover, the farmers'  
33 education level and the affection of people in the village were the most critical factors determining the  
34 disease's knowledge and awareness. Consequently, the lack of understanding of the ecology of anthrax may  
35 contribute to the spread of the infection between livestock and humans, and it is critical to reducing the  
36 presence and persistence of the *B. anthracis* spores in the environment. Finally, we discuss the increasingly  
37 recognized necessity to strengthen global capacity using a One Health approach to prevent, detect, control,  
38 and respond to public threats in Uganda.

39

40 **Keywords:** *Bacillus anthracis*, detection, One Health, Sub-Saharan Africa region, zoonosis, cattle

41

## 42 1. Introduction

43 Anthrax is a zoonotic disease caused by the Gram-positive bacterium *Bacillus anthracis* rods, a soil-  
44 transmitted pathogen found on all continents and reported in several islands like Haiti, the Philippines, and  
45 Indonesia (Carlson et al., 2018). Globally, an estimated 20,000 to 100,000 human anthrax cases occur  
46 annually, particularly in developing countries with poor rural settings (Swartz, 2001). Naturally, the enzootic  
47 cycle of anthrax is characterized by a combination of long-term spore persistence in soil and an obligate-lethal  
48 transmission route of ingestion, primary in herbivorous mammals (Carlson et al., 2018). *B. anthracis* spores  
49 are known to survive for decades in alkaline soil rich in calcium ions which are believed to facilitate  
50 sporulation hence driving landscape-level patterns of spore persistence (Carlson et al., 2018; Hugh-Jones and  
51 Blackburn, 2009). Both livestock and wild herbivores are exposed to *B. anthracis* spores from the soil while  
52 grazing. They become infected and usually return spores to the soil when dead and decomposed (Turner et al.,  
53 2014).

54 Anthrax is a neglected disease, and its global distribution is still poorly characterized (Carlson et al., 2018). It  
55 has been shown that wildlife epizootics may lead to downstream infections in both humans and livestock  
56 (Mukarati et al., 2020). Sub-Saharan Africa is a high-risk zone because wildlife and livestock frequently share  
57 grazing fields in National Parks (Mwakapeje et al., 2018). One particular example is the Queen Elisabeth  
58 National Park in the western region of Uganda where hundreds of hippopotamus scammed to deadly anthrax  
59 in 2004-2005 (Driciru et al., 2018). The sub-Saharan Africa has an estimated population of 16.2 million poor  
60 livestock keepers (Carlson et al., 2019), who stand at high risk of acquiring the disease by occupational  
61 exposure. Human clinical presentations of anthrax, case-fatality rates, and mortality are a function of the  
62 exposure pathway determined by the ecological dynamics at the wildlife–livestock interface (Alexander et al.,  
63 2012). In some regions, such as the West Nile sub-region in north-western Uganda, anthrax is hyperendemic,  
64 and cases follow regular seasonal trends (Ntono et al., 2021).

65 In Uganda, anthrax outbreaks occur sporadically and continuously from different subregions of the country  
66 (Coffin et al., 2015). As a result, the disease has been ranked as one of the most critical zoonosis alongside  
67 Ebola, brucellosis, African sleeping sickness, plague, and rabies, which are prioritized zoonotic diseases  
68 selected to be controlled and maintained at minimum levels (Sentumbwe et al., 2018). Therefore, control of

69 anthrax requires a One Health approach involving both human and animal health stakeholders for cross-  
70 sectoral integration and coordination of activities to prevent, detect, and respond to endemic anthrax in  
71 Uganda.

72 Anthrax still remains a challenge to many farming production systems in Uganda (Vudriko et al., 2021).  
73 Opening infected carcasses by community members in all anthrax hot spot areas and leakage of internal  
74 discharges in the grazing ground occurs, putting at risk the health of a large population of ruminants and  
75 humans in the region. Such activities contribute to spore transformation, transmission as well as  
76 environmental contamination. Uganda faces a scarcity of statistics about bovine data associated with anthrax  
77 outbreaks compared to other countries like Zambia, in which a total of 1,216 bovine cases were reported in  
78 the Zambezi flood plain between 1999 and 2007 (Munang'andu et al., 2012). The lack of information  
79 associated with anthrax outbreaks is attributed to farmers who do not report suspected cases to the veterinary  
80 department in Uganda, making it more difficult to understand the magnitude, impact, and control of the  
81 disease's spread (personal communication).

82 This study aims to identify and confirm the presence of anthrax in biological samples and determine case  
83 fatalities among livestock after a suspected outbreak of anthrax in Arua between 2017 and 2018, a north-  
84 western district of Uganda located in the West Nile sub-region. We also aim to establish the potential risk  
85 factors of anthrax that affect the cattle population in Arua District at the community level. Understanding the  
86 risk factors has important implications for preventing, detecting, controlling, and responding to future anthrax  
87 outbreaks in the region, meeting the requirements of the International Health Regulations (World Health  
88 Organization, 2008) and Global Health Security Agenda (Wolicki et al., 2016).


89

## 90 **2. Materials and methods**

### 91 **2.1. Study area**

92 Arua District (**Figure 1**) is located in the West Nile sub-region of north-west Uganda. In 2020, the population  
93 of the Arua District was estimated at 750,000 habitants (Citypopulation.de, n.d.). It is bordered by other  
94 districts of Uganda (Yumbe, Moyo, Maracha, Koboko, and Adjumani) and the Democratic Republic of the  
95 Congo (DRC) to the west. Because of its localization in a corner of Uganda that borders DRC and South

96 Sudan, the most significant amount of local community activity results from cross-border trade. Agriculture is  
97 the mainstay of the Arua's District economy, with approximately 117,000 head of local Zebu cattle. Rigbo,  
98 Rhino Camp, Ogoko, and Okollo Sub-Countries were the centres of anthrax outbreaks reported in 2018  
99 (Figure 1).



100

101 **Figure 1.** Location of Arua District (purple) in Uganda and detail of hot spots Sub-Countries (pink) of anthrax  
102 outbreaks in Arua District in 2018 (Rigbo, Rhino Camp, Ogoko, and Okollo).

103

## 104 2.2. Data collection from Arua District

105 To better understand the status of anthrax outbreaks and the dynamics among domestic animals in Arua  
106 District, data was collected from community herds of livestock (*kraal*) through surveys in the Arua Sub-  
107 Counties with elevated mortality reports of suspected anthrax outbreaks in livestock between 2017 and 2018  
108 (Rigbo, Rhino Camp, Ogoko, and Okollo Sub-Countries). Data sources were collected from 57 community  
109 herds of livestock from responsible *kraal* leaders. The questionnaire was designed and previously pretested

110 before its usage. Additionally, the district veterinary officer and the Sub-County chief were interviewed about  
111 the anthrax situation.

112 Data collected comprised both qualitative and quantitative variables of demographic information of  
113 respondents (name, age, sex, and size of their family), localization (Sub-County, parish, and village),  
114 knowledge about anthrax disease, education received (none, elementary, secondary, or higher education),  
115 ownership of companion animals, and herd size. The data frame also recorded the species affected, the  
116 number of domestic animals and livestock suspected to be infected with anthrax during the outbreaks, and  
117 clinical signs, if any (loss of appetite, fever, recumbency, external bleeding, sudden death, blotting, and *rigor*  
118 *mortis*). Information about human activities that facilitate disease dispersion was also recorded (i.e.,  
119 management of the dead carcasses, opening and skinning the dead animals in the field to consume and sell the  
120 meat, carcass disposal and soil treatment methods, transportation of animal products with dripping blood  
121 discharges to trading centers for sell, and transport means used to carry meat to the selling points).

122 Interviews with the Veterinary Department included records about vaccination status, if any, species affected,  
123 physical control actions (i.e., quarantine and other events which contributed to the persistence or control of  
124 the disease in the area), management or disposal of carcasses, availability of personal protective equipment,  
125 biosecurity measures if any, capacity to the regional veterinary laboratory to handle the diagnosis of anthrax  
126 samples, the level of community reporting of suspected cases, number of reported dead animals that  
127 succumbed to suspected anthrax, and availability of chemicals to disinfect carcasses and burial sites as well as  
128 the availability of emergency fuel for burning dead animals.

129

### 130 **2.3. Anthrax standard case definitions in livestock**

131 During the study, outbreaks were still occurring in which animals were sick, and others died suddenly in the  
132 *kraals* and the field. Therefore, the team decided to collect biological specimens, observe several cases'  
133 conditionality, and develop clinical descriptions for the target population as described below.

134 A suspected case of herbivore anthrax was defined as any case of the sudden death of animals with/without  
135 bleeding from natural orifices such as anus, eyes, and ears (unclotted dark tarry blood), absence of or

136 incomplete *rigor mortis*, and rapid bloating of carcasses. In pigs and carnivores, the main symptoms  
137 suspected of anthrax were local edema and swelling of the face and neck.

138 A confirmed animal anthrax case of required laboratory detection of *B. anthracis* either in smears, rapid  
139 screening test, or bacterial isolation. As a criterion for laboratory diagnosis confirmation, we used  
140 internationally recognized standard diagnostic techniques. The interpretation for anthrax diagnosis in animals  
141 is reported in the Manual of Standards for Diagnostic Tests and Vaccine for Terrestrial Animals of the Office  
142 International des Épizooties (World Organization for Animal Health, 2021). The samples were subjected to  
143 the Active Anthrax Detect (AAD) rapid test lateral flow immunoassay, which has been previously tested in  
144 animal suspected anthrax tissue samples in Namibia with a specificity of 82% and sensitivity of 98%,  
145 showing better sensitivity than the gold standard culture, Laboratory Response Network real-time PCR, or  
146 immunohistochemistry (Kolton et al., 2019). However, additional testing (microscopy) was performed to  
147 confirm the cases.

148

#### 149 **2.4. Collection of biological specimens from the Arua District**

150 In the Arua district, twenty-four (24) biological samples from suspected anthrax cases were collected from  
151 community herds of cattle during the outbreak seasons. Samples comprised of fixed blood smears, pooled  
152 unclotted blood, smoked meat, fresh meat, bovine skin scrapings, ear notch swabs, human skin lesions, and  
153 environmentally contaminated material. Human samples from Arua health centres were submitted to the  
154 National Animal Disease Diagnostics and Epidemiology Centre (NADDEC) to test and confirm zoonotic  
155 anthrax in the affected districts under the One Health arrangement. The AAD rapid test lateral flow  
156 immunoassay and microbiological methods such as Gram staining and polychrome methylene blue staining  
157 (M'Fadyean stain) were used to detect and confirm *B. anthracis*.

158

#### 159 **2.5. Active Anthrax Detect rapid test**

160 Detection of *B. anthracis* in animal tissues was performed using a simple, rapid, and field-deployable kit  
161 provided by InBios to purposely screen and respond to the outbreak faster and reduce the burden of livestock

162 disease. The AAD is a screening assay designed to identify the *B. anthracis* capsular polypeptide  
163 (polyglutamic acid) antigen (Gates-Hollingsworth et al., 2022, 2015; Kolton et al., 2019). Samples were  
164 tested following the manufacturer's instructions. Positive (the wild strain of encapsulated *B. anthracis*) and  
165 negative quality controls (*B. subtilis*) were run alongside the test samples based on immunochromatographic  
166 principles. Test results were read after 15 min. Each cartridge developed test and control lines. For a positive  
167 result, both lines appeared. For a negative result, only the control line was visible. Samples that did not show  
168 any of the lines were repeated. Samples were further confirmed using Gram and M'Fadyean stains.

169

## 170 **2.6. Gram staining method**

171 The samples were tested following a previously validated protocol for the Gram staining method. Both thick  
172 and thin smears were prepared on labelled clean glass slides and allowed to dry by air and on a heating block  
173 for 2 min. With the addition of crystal violet stain for 1 min, then flooded with mordant iodine for 1 min.  
174 Followed by decolorizing the sample with 70% acetone-alcohol, the tissue was stained with dilute carbol-  
175 fuchsin as a counterstain. All excess stains were washed off with clean tap water, dried, and examined at room  
176 temperature under magnification  $\times 100$  with a light microscope using immersion oil. For quality control,  
177 known internal quality controls strains of wild *B. anthracis* and gram-negative *Escherichia coli* were  
178 examined alongside samples.

179

## 180 **2.7. The M'Fadyean stain**

181 Samples were also assessed by the M'Fadyean staining method (M'Fadyean, 1903). Briefly, thin and thick  
182 smears were prepared using coverslips on a clean glass slide. The specimens were dried at room temperature  
183 and fixed with potassium permanganate (40g/L) solution for 10 min. Then, the smears were covered with  
184 Löffler's polychrome methylene blue for 1 min, and the excess stain was removed using tap water. The slides  
185 were wiped with soft tissue and allowed to dry at room temperature under a biosafety cabinet. Samples were  
186 examined with a light microscope using immersion oil at  $\times 100$  magnification. For quality control, known  
187 prepared positive control smears of a wild strain of *B. anthracis* and negative controls (*B. subtilis* Sterne  
188 strain) were examined.

189

## 190 **2.8. Statistical methods and data analyses**

191 *Kraals*' survey data were analyzed using the *survey* package (Lumely, 2020) in R (R Core Team, 2019).  
192 Descriptive statistics for continuous and categorical variables were determined. Additionally, subpopulation  
193 analyses were performed, associations between variables were determined using the Wald test, and multiple  
194 linear regression models were conducted, including several predictors to the variable "knowledge of anthrax"  
195 and "anthrax outbreaks in people". Statistical significance was set at  $p < 0.05$ . Data were expressed as mean  $\pm$   
196 standard deviation unless otherwise stated.

197


## 198 **3. Results**

### 199 **3.1. Arua District kraals survey findings**

200 Data from *kraals* surveys were obtained in 6 villages (Agera, Ndara, Owodromati, Pasumu, Payawe, and  
201 Tumawe) located in the Rigbo, Rhino Camp, Ogoko, and Okollo Sub-Counties of the Arua district. Some  
202 community members concealed information for fear of restriction from trade and consumption of their beef.  
203 All the responsible *kraal* leaders (57 individuals) were males with an average of  $34.6 \pm 12.1$  years (minimum  
204 19 years, maximum 70 years).

205 We recorded 6,781 animals, including cattle, goats, sheep, pigs, and dogs, with an average number of cattle  
206 herds of  $119 \pm 71.5$  animals. Of the total of animals, 5% were reported sick with clinical signs compatible  
207 with anthrax (339/6,781), with a case fatality rate of 66.4% (225/339). Clinical signs compatible with anthrax  
208 include sudden death (49%), *rigor mortis* (44%), fever (44%), external bleeding (39%), loss of appetite  
209 (37%), blotting (32%), and recumbency (26%). More than a quarter of the dead animals were abandoned in  
210 the bush (31.1% - 70/225) without any disinfection or proper elimination method of the carcasses. Of the total  
211 animals reported dead, 86.2% were cattle (194/225), 8% were goats (18/225), and 5.8% were sheep (13/225).  
212 Pigs and dogs were not affected by the anthrax outbreak. However, 40 people were affected: 20 people in  
213 Payawe, 12 people in Ndara, 5 people in Owodromati, 2 people in Agera, 1 person in Tamuwele, and 0 people  
214 in Pasumu.

215 A quarter of the responsible *kraal* leaders knew about anthrax (24.6% - 14/57), whereas 75.4% lacked  
 216 knowledge of the disease (43/57) (**Figure 2**). More than one third of the responsible *kraal* leaders were  
 217 illiterates (38.6% - 22/57), 21.1% received primary education (12/57), 36.8% received secondary education  
 218 (21/57), and 3.5% received higher education (2/57). The statistical analysis showed that the knowledge about  
 219 anthrax disease was associated with the education level ( $p < 0.001$ ). Almost the totality of the responsible  
 220 *kraal* leaders within the population knowing about anthrax received secondary education (92.9% - 13/14),  
 221 representing the 61.9% of the total population that received secondary education (13/21). The remaining 7.1%  
 222 of the people knowing about anthrax received primary education (1/14), representing the 8.3% of the total  
 223 population that received primary education (1/12). Receiving secondary education was statistically significant  
 224 to knowing about anthrax disease ( $p < 0.001$ ). Additionally, higher knowledge about anthrax disease was  
 225 found in the Payawe and Ndara villages (located in the Rhino Camp and Ogoko Sub-Counties, respectively;  $p$   
 226  $< 0.05$ ) and, interestingly enough, were the villages in which more cases of affected people were reported (20  
 227 and 12 people, respectively;  $p < 0.01$ ).



228

229 **Figure 2.** Knowledge about anthrax associated with the education level of responsible *kraal* leaders. Asterisk  
 230 indicates the education level statistically significant to knowing about anthrax disease.

231

232 The practice of eating dead animals is widely spread in these communities-89.7% of the communities  
 233 consumed the meat of dead animals (51/57). More than half of the dead carcasses were opened for meat

234 consumption (57.3% - 129/225), and 12.9% were skinned (29/225). The source of infection in people was  
235 contact with livestock (50%) and contact with contaminated meat or animal products in local markets (50%).  
236 Villagers transported contaminated meat to the local markets shipping beef on their backs (21.7%) and  
237 motorbikes (78.3%) without any protective clothing. Type of transportation means of contaminated meat was  
238 not associated with anthrax outbreaks in people ( $p > 0.05$ ).

239

### 240 **3.2. Arua District Veterinary Department interviews**

241 Arua District Veterinary Department is faced with numerous challenges attributed to a lack of resources to  
242 contain the spread of the disease in the region. The district lacked information, education, and communication  
243 materials for educating communities about the signs and risks of disease and preventative measures. Records  
244 from the Department revealed numerous challenges surrounding the outbreak in 2017-2018. Vaccines were  
245 not available to prevent and protect community livestock from spreading anthrax in the district. Additionally,  
246 quarantine and law enforcement procedures to limit the movement of livestock in and out of the district were  
247 weak. From the community, carcasses were opened for consumption. During the outbreak, the district  
248 technical response team lacked personal protective equipment to handle carcasses, appropriate chemicals such  
249 as soda ash and fuel to burn the carcasses. The wrong depth of the pit dug to bury carcasses (about less than 6  
250 feet), and no biosecurity measures taken to contain the spread of spores enabled scavengers like dogs to  
251 disturb the burial sites in the search for beef.

252 The community's level of reporting diseased animals was very poor, and the data provided was not significant  
253 enough for proper planning. It is believed that more animals died due to suspected anthrax, but reports at the  
254 center show that only 125 cattle, 9 sheep, and 16 goats died of suspected anthrax. In addition, because of  
255 logistical challenges in the Veterinary Department, no real-time surveillance was conducted to establish the  
256 scope of infection and respond timely. The regional veterinary laboratory in Arua lacked laboratory reagents  
257 to test, detect, and confirm anthrax in real-time. Samples were collected and shipped to NADDEC and  
258 Uganda Virus Research Institute for a conclusive laboratory diagnosis. In Pawor Sub-County, Odupi, and  
259 Rhino Camp 65, 30, and 29 cattle were reported dead, respectively.

260

### 261 3.3. Tested samples

262 From the 24 samples submitted to NADDEC during the outbreak (**Table 1**), 19 samples tested positive  
263 (79.2%) on Gram and polychrome methylene blue stains. Positive samples demonstrated Gram-positive dark  
264 blue rods with a capsule on gram stain and polychrome methylene blue-stained large blue rods surrounded by  
265 red amorphous capsules characteristic of *B. anthracis* and numerous chains of non-sporulated rods. Under the  
266 light microscope, the observed positive smears demonstrated an uneven distribution of square-ended Gram-  
267 positive rods ranging from low to high intensity (+ to +++) of sporulated and non-sporulated Gram-positive  
268 rods. For the ADD rapid test (**Table 1**), 12 samples tested positive (50%).

269

270 **Table 1.** Summary of human and animal tested samples using three diagnostic methods during the suspected  
271 anthrax outbreak in Arua District (2018).

Sample Type	Tested samples	Positive cases		
		GS	PMB	AAD
Bovine fixed blood smears	9	6	6	0
Bovine pooled unclotted blood	3	3	3	3
Smoked meat bovine	1	1	1	1
Fresh meat bovine	2	0	0	0
Bovine skin swabs	1	1	1	1
Bovine ear notch swabs	5	5	5	4
Environmental samples (blood on grass)	2	2	2	2
Human cutaneous swab	1	1	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>19 (79.2%)</b>	<b>19 (79.2%)</b>	<b>12 (50%)</b>

272 GS: Gram staining; PMB: polychrome methylene blue stain; AAD: Active Anthrax Detect rapid test.

273

### 274 4. Discussion

275 In domestic animals and people, anthrax is particularly common in parts of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa,  
276 where control measures in the livestock sector remain inadequate (Antonation et al., 2016). Anthrax is a  
277 notifiable disease in Uganda, and it is a disease of public health and veterinary importance (Republic of  
278 Uganda - Ministry of Health, 2021). However, Uganda has a national surveillance plan for anthrax developed

279 in 2018 with the support of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations - Uganda purposely  
280 to control anthrax in the country (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2018).

281 The disease remains endemic with high incidences of anthrax in livestock and is one of the listed priority  
282 zoonotic diseases of public health and veterinary importance in Uganda (Vudriko et al., 2021). Despite annual  
283 anthrax outbreaks in animals, there is a weak surveillance system in the animal sector, which has led to  
284 underreporting and failure to detect early cases for immediate intervention. In 2019, this was evident in the  
285 community herds surveyed in the Arua District. *Kraal* leaders reported 339 livestock infected with anthrax,  
286 and 225 were reported dead in Arua District for a single year.

287 Keeping livestock for livelihood in agricultural communities is a common practice in Arua District. However,  
288 animal husbandry practices in this community do not consider preventing animal diseases like anthrax. In  
289 Arua District, animals graze extensively, and others spend 24 h in the field, where they may frequently  
290 contact contaminated soil and decomposing livestock carcasses. Additionally, political and war pressures in  
291 the Republic of South Sudan triggered the movement of people with their livestock to settle in Rhino Camp,  
292 in Arua District. This may have contributed to the unquantified risk of introducing animal diseases in Uganda.  
293 Moreover, no measures were put in place to screen the foreign livestock for possible epidemics, which may  
294 increase the risk of animal diseases, including anthrax outbreaks. Similarly, the risk of disease transmission  
295 between the indigenous and foreign livestock is likely to occur because all livestock share one drinking water  
296 point: river Nile banks and grazing fields.

297 Particularly, cattle were mentioned and linked to cutaneous anthrax human infections in the district. The 69  
298 human cases reported with cutaneous anthrax in Olujobo health center were linked to livestock farming and  
299 behavioral risks of shipping beef on their backs and motorbikes to trading centers without the protection of  
300 their bodies using any protective clothing, except using their bare hands. The susceptibility to anthrax  
301 infection varies depending on the host species, where cattle are known to be the most devastated species,  
302 followed by goats and sheep (Fasanella et al., 2010). A similar situation was noticed in Arua District between  
303 2017 and 2018. According to the district veterinary officer and the community surveys, more heads of cattle  
304 died of anthrax than goats and sheep.

305 Cattle tend to pull pasture directly from the ground with their roots, unlike sheep or goats, which browse on  
306 shrubs on off the ground level (Hornitzky and Muller, 2010). Therefore, cattle are most likely to ingest high  
307 doses of the encapsulated bacteria from potentially contaminated soil compared to browsing ruminants.  
308 Humans have a moderate susceptibility to the infection, while pigs and carnivores are more resistant to the  
309 deadly spores (Epp et al., 2010). According to these results, our survey data showed that pigs and dogs were  
310 not reported to be sick or dead due to anthrax outbreaks. However, dogs may act as instrumental in  
311 scavenging on the carcasses and spreading the infectious agents mechanically to clean areas.

312 The most accepted philosophy for browsing animal infection in Africa is that blowflies feeding off the  
313 carcasses move to rest on the leaves of nearby trees and shrubs and deposit anthrax spores on these leaves (De  
314 Vos, 1994). Browsing animals become infected after feeding on contaminated leaves. Additionally, biting  
315 flies are suspected of transmitting anthrax amongst wild animals and playing important roles in the wild  
316 epidemics (Hugh-Jones, 2016), making it difficult to halt the infection in the susceptible population if flies are  
317 heavily involved in the spread of spores. In Arua District, a similar scenario of decomposing bodies of  
318 livestock on the scene was heavily surrounded by active flies, making it difficult to halt the spread of spores  
319 to the clean environments. Furthermore, seasonal variations of anthrax transmission and unreported livestock  
320 deaths in the district may also contribute to the persistence of the outbreaks (Ashkenazi-Hoffnung et al.,  
321 2009). A discussion with a local area leader in Pasumu village revealed that many sudden deaths of animals in  
322 the region occurred but were not reported to the veterinary authorities. Animals fell sick, lost appetite, failed  
323 to respond to treatment, blood started oozing out of the nostrils, and finally died. In Ndara village, 13 animals  
324 were lost in December 2018, and one of the handlers of beef, a 17-year-old boy, developed skin lesions 4 days  
325 after carrying meat on his back.

326 Due to ignorance of the risk and custom, some community members exhumed dead animals and admitted that  
327 the common method of carcasses disposal was consumption since it is taboo to bury animals. As a risk factor,  
328 the digging process may expose the anthrax bacterium, which can further cause a spread of the contaminated  
329 soil extensively by blowing wind and lead to fresh outbreaks in the area (Ravenel, 2008). Due to a lack of  
330 proper disposal practices and resources, other cattle keepers decided to abandon dead animals in the bush.  
331 These carcass disposal methods were contrary to appropriate burning procedures, followed by disinfection of

332 the site, which are better and more efficient mechanisms to reduce the chances of spore survival and further  
333 outbreaks in the affected areas (Mwakapeje et al., 2017).

334 The community's lack of awareness and knowledge is a risk factor that contributes to the spread of diseases.  
335 Our data identified that educational status and previous contact with the disease are associated with the  
336 knowledge of anthrax. This could be because education impacts on information access and capacity to  
337 comprehend health messaging. Furthermore, the previous contact with the disease may increase awareness of  
338 avoiding contracting anthrax. Therefore, education is the cornerstone to expanding the knowledge of anthrax  
339 among the farmers' population and preventing its spread. These findings are supported by a study conducted  
340 in Ethiopia, in which education background and knowledge of anthrax were associated with better anthrax  
341 prevention practices (Mesfin et al., 2021). Other factors include sex (females had better anthrax prevention  
342 practice than males), time spent arriving at the nearby clinic, and attitude towards anthrax prevention (Mesfin  
343 et al., 2021).

344 In the wildlife sector, sporadic anthrax outbreaks occurred in and around Queen Elizabeth National Park,  
345 where anthrax collectively killed over 500 wildlife, particularly hippopotamus and small herbivores and 400  
346 domestic animals (Coffin et al., 2015). Comprehensive studies in the tropical rainforest of Africa revealed that  
347 *B. anthracis* is accountable for widespread incidences and persistent mortality among domestic herbivores  
348 and wild mammals for 3 decades with significant losses (Hoffmann et al., 2017). With the presence of Ajai  
349 Game Reserve in the Arua District and zero control of environmental contamination, there is a likelihood of  
350 anthrax spilling over to the wildlife herbivores in the future. In this case, grazing animals may acquire the  
351 disease by ingesting spores when grazing over sites where previous victims died and deposited the spores in  
352 the environment. For instance, licking of bones (pica or osteophagia) in search for minerals like calcium from  
353 animals that died of anthrax may result in cases or outbreaks in the wildlife (Lafferty and Chapman, 2014).

354 Failure of livestock vaccination programs in enzootic districts is a risk factor for livestock and wildlife  
355 herbivores (Rao et al., 2019). Vaccination of susceptible animals is one of the options to confer protective  
356 immunity and preserve animal health (Rao et al., 2019). From 2015-2019, no livestock vaccination was  
357 conducted as a predisposing factor, which may also have contributed to the growing number of anthrax  
358 fatalities among cattle. Due to poverty, livestock owners could not afford to buy their own vaccines because

359 of a high cost of a single dose, which ranges from US\$8 to US\$19, which is another risk factor that paves the  
360 way for continuous anthrax outbreaks in the region unless government or donor organizations step in to  
361 support the district.

362 Only in 2020, the Food and Agricultural Organization of United Nations - Uganda, supported the district of  
363 Arua with 30,000 doses of anthrax vaccine (personal communication). Livestock, including cattle, goats,  
364 sheep, and pigs, were vaccinated against anthrax and black quarter. The vaccination targeted animals in high-  
365 risk areas where refugees and host communities reside, including Omugo, Odupi, Invepi, and Uriama, all in  
366 Terego County. Due to high population livestock density, many animals missed out on the vaccination due to  
367 inadequate quantity of the vaccine doses provided. Another category of farmers ignored taking their animals  
368 for the vaccination exercise. According to the Veterinary District officer, the vaccine served only 50% of the  
369 targeted livestock population, leaving another 50% of the population without protective immunity against  
370 future anthrax outbreaks.

371 Due to quarantine and trade barriers associated with livestock diseases, including anthrax, animal keepers  
372 were afraid to disclose households with infected livestock. Therefore, prompt identification and early  
373 response interventions were affected. Secondly, concrete data to establish the actual burden of the disease was  
374 next to impossible. Strengthening regional level laboratory capacity for anthrax is critical for the early  
375 identification of an outbreak. There is a need to strengthen laboratory surveillance at the regional level and  
376 timely detection of anthrax. Awareness in the community is vital for the locals to understand forms of  
377 anthrax, species affected, impact and disease presentation. The importance of reporting to the Veterinary  
378 Departments is paramount in controlling the spread of the disease and reducing human infections as well as  
379 livestock mortalities.

380

## 381 **5. Conclusions**

382 This study identified and confirmed the presence of anthrax in biological samples after a suspected outbreak  
383 in Arua District. The cattle population was more affected by anthrax than any other reared species included in  
384 the study, such as goats and sheep. Lack of awareness among cattle owners and community concerning the  
385 nature, the transmission of anthrax from animals to humans, scarcity of the livestock vaccine, social norms,

386 cultures, environmental factors, and poverty were the key drivers that may have contributed to the spread of  
387 anthrax in livestock, as noted in this study. The grazing system where cattle are not controlled and monitored  
388 may easily promote the transmission and maintenance of anthrax outbreak cycles in the Arua District's  
389 grazing field and other Uganda districts.

390

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399

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408 editing: Michael Omodo, Jaume Gardela, Doreen N. Gonahasa, Musa Sekamatte, Mariadeg ArGouilh, and  
409 Jean-Paul Gonzalez.

410

#### 411 **Ethics approval**

412 The field and laboratory outbreak investigations were conducted in accordance with the Ministry of  
413 Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF) and World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE)  
414 requirements for responding to and managing Animal disease outbreaks in Uganda. The primary intent of the  
415 investigation was public health control, as did not require ethics committee approval or written consent of the  
416 farmers.

417

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