

THE UGANDAN JOURNAL

OF MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY STUDIES

PAPERS

The Relationship Between Employee Reward and Job Satisfaction in Uganda Management Institute: An Empirical Study: *Epiphany Odubuker Picho*

Influence of Culture on Decision Making in Organizations: Applying Hofstede's Value Dimensions: *Gerald Kagambirwe Karyeija*

Service Delivery and Performance Management for Development at Local Levels in Tanzania: A Myth or Reality? *Jason Nkyabonaki*

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Introduction

The Ugandan Journal of Management and Public Policy Studies is a multidisciplinary Journal publishing a wide range of articles relating to public administration, management, leadership and public policy, from empirical studies and theoretical orientations to practical application. The Journal reviews books, essays, and research notes that are relevant to both scholars and practitioners involved at all levels of administration and management from various organizational forms including business firms, non-governmental organizations and public institutions and individual networks.

Aim and scope

The Ugandan Journal of Management and Public Policy Studies is a scholarly Journal published to scientifically address the problems, interests and concerns of managers and intellectuals concerned with management science profession. It aims at improving the understanding and practice of management. The Journal is an essential reading, publishing articles from a wide range of authors, both well-established scholars and young scholars. Thus the Journal is an important resource for:

- Management Development Institutions
- Social Science Faculties and Research Institutions
- Graduate students, teachers and other researchers
- Civil service practitioners
- All those people interested in the practice of management and administration

The Scope of the Journal covers fields of management, administration, and public policy. Empirical and practitioners oriented papers and reviews are welcome for the Journal.

New Journal Editors

We are happy to announce to our readership that the Editorial Advisory Board meeting of 7/10/2013 in accordance with section 3, subsection 3.4 of the Editorial Policies and Guidelines approved new Journal Editors whose biography is detailed below:

Chief Editor:

Proscovia Namubiru Ssentamu (PhD)

Proscovia is a senior quality assurance officer and lecturer in the School of Management Sciences at Uganda Management Institute (UMI). She has research interests in higher education, curriculum studies, quality assurance, teaching and learning, teacher training and professional development, and educational evaluation and assessment, in which she has also fairly published. Proscovia has published articles in international referred journals such as the Journal of Comparative Education and History of Education, Journal of Education and Training Studies, Africa Education Review Journal, and Perspectives in Education. She has also peer-reviewed articles for international referred journals. Proscovia has been a PhD external examiner for two Universities in South Africa, taught and co-supervised students at Masters' degree and PhD level. Before joining UMI, Proscovia was a lecturer for 14 years at the School of Education, Makerere University.



Deputy Chief Editor:

Sebastian Bigabwenkya (PhD)

Sebastian Bigabwenkya is a Senior Management Consultant in Human Resource Management at Uganda Management Institute (UMI). Prior to joining UMI, he was a lecturer in the Department of Social Work and Social Administration at Makerere University Kampala. His teaching and research interests are in human capabilities development, human resource management, university teaching and learning processes, and education policy. He has published papers in the Ugandan Journal of Management and Public Policies; and in the Book of Abstracts for e-Learning Africa. He has also supervised over 60 graduate students in writing their master's degree dissertations.



Managing Editor:

Rose Bakenegure Namara (PhD)

Rose Bakenegura Namara is a senior lecturer in Public Policy Management, currently working as a Chief of the Research Centre at Uganda Management Institute. Her research interest areas are in public policy, poverty and social transformation, citizenship and civil society engagements and Development Cooperation dynamism. Rose has published and edited books (Basheka, Karyeija and Namara eds 2012, Namara 2009, and Gomez, corradi, Goulart and Namara eds, 2010), as well as articles in international refereed journals. Rose teaches courses on: NGO management and civil society building, project planning and management, Monitoring and Evaluation, public administration and management, organizational behaviour and research methods. She has supervised graduate students and is an external examiner of Uganda Martyrs University, Nkumba University and Makerere Business School in Uganda.



Editorial Note

The Editorial Team is delighted to release the 7th Volume, Number 1, of the *Ugandan Journal of Management and Public Policy Studies* (UJMPPS). The Journal has six carefully selected and peer reviewed articles covering discourse on management of organizations and the policy-practice dichotomy in public service delivery. The units of analyses range from management of institutions to decision making processes within such institutions.

Picho assesses the relationship between employee reward and job satisfaction at Uganda Management Institute. His review of the literature points to lack of explanation for employee turnover in organizations amidst increasing unemployment specifically in Uganda, triggering him to assess how employee reward as a human resource management function relates to job satisfaction. Using a cross-sectional survey mixed methods design, the study establishes that a moderate positive change in employee reward is related to a moderate positive change in job satisfaction. However, the reward system is not necessarily monetary in nature, but that praise, participation on projects, and leadership are also key rewards. In terms of monetary rewards, what motivates employees at Uganda Management Institute is not the basic salary, but extra pay for extra workload. It is clear from the study that both pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards lead to job satisfaction among employees.

Applying Hofstede's value dimensions, Karyeiya theorizes the influence of culture on decision making in organizations, suggesting a shift from the long term conceptualization of decision making from a quantitative approach to a cross-cultural perspective. He contends that although many scholars agree that culture is an integral aspect of decision making, very few efforts have been made to systematically study it. Therefore, it is no surprise that culture as an explanatory variable is not usually preferred in public administration. To add value to this debate, Karyeiya explores the cultural dimension in relation to three decision making processes, i.e. contextual, strategic and communicative. He uses Hofstede's five cultural value dimensions to carefully reflect on the implications of each dimension to decision making citing examples from Europe and Africa. Despite being subject to several criticisms, including the fact that Hofstede provides little data on sub Saharan Africa, Karyeiya concludes that there are indications that a viable relationship exists between decision making and culture in organizations, and that for each of Hofstede's cultural dimension there is an influence on decision making hypotheses which may be subjected to further empirical investigation.

Through a review of key policies and empirical evidence from other documentary sources, Nkyabonaki interrogates whether service delivery and performance management is a myth or reality for the development at local levels in Tanzania. The author gives a brief historical perspective of Tanzania's Local Government Report Programme (LGRP) of 1988 and analyses whether it lived to its expectations in the education and health sectors. Using the MKUKUT I and II strategies, the author analyses performance management in Tanzania ranging from design to impact aspects. Nkyabonaki concludes that in addition to identified contemporary challenges to improved performance management, there are historical flaws and hindrances in the design and implementation of the policy that render performance management to be a myth for the development of the health and education sectors at local levels. Among these hindrances is interference of the central government and undefined roles of the line ministries, which have

weakened the much needed avenues of stakeholder participation, and consequently led to poor service delivery. This necessitates a revision of the legislative framework and building the capacity of key stakeholders to make service delivery a reality.

Babeiya appraises the relationship between corporate governance and the enforcement of standards within Tanzania's corporate governance framework. Through a review of relevant documents and empirical cases, the author investigates the extent to which the standards organizations protect the rights and welfare of consumers by focusing on whether these organizations fulfill their functions. Babeiya concludes that the sampled standards organizations have not been effective in monitoring and controlling the enforcement of standards, which puts consumers' welfare and public health at stake. Various factors causing the poor performance of the standards organizations are identified and the author recommends need to be addressed in the current infant stages of Tanzania's corporate governance framework.

Karyeija, Basheka and Ndayondi assess the relationship between corporal punishment (physical torture, denying children food for extended periods of time, detention, and assigning children difficult tasks) and students' discipline in Ugandan pre-primary and primary schools. Reasons for corporal punishment vary according to the authors to include late coming, misbehavior, being disrespectful causing devastating physical, emotional and psychosocial effects on the children. It is evident that despite its use, corporal punishment is much more of a violation of children's human rights due to its negative consequences such as physical injuries, death, school dropout, fear and psychological torture than a tool to increase children's discipline. Although appropriate policy and legal framework, for example the Children's Act exists, corporal punishment is still associated with discipline in the Ugandan context and there is need for additional strategies to eliminate corporal punishment.

Mateng'e, Kamugisha, Marijani and Rwekaza explore the feasibility of the policy-implementation dichotomy and its implications on public service delivery in Tanzania. New Public Management (NPM) presupposes that policy-making should be separated from policy implementation if public service delivery is to be improved. The authors use the agencification and public-private partnership models, embedded in the NPM, and the policy-making process based on the Tanzanian experience to explore the feasibility of the policy-implementation dichotomy and its implications on service delivery in Tanzania. As is common in many theory-practice discourses, the authors note that while the policy-implementation dichotomy is desirable for the sake of enhancing efficiency, effectiveness and accountability in the arena of practice, it still remains rhetoric. The authors find the policy-making process highly interactive that the line dividing the role of bureaucrats and politicians is thin.

The cross-cutting theme among majority of the articles in this edition is the presence of elaborate policy frameworks at national and institutional levels. However, there is an implementation gap of these policies – a gap that is affecting the level of public service delivery – and therefore development in the countries where these articles originate.

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The Relationship Between Employee Reward and Job Satisfaction in Uganda Management Institute: An Empirical Study

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Abstract

The purpose of the study was to assess the relationship between employee reward and job satisfaction in Uganda Management Institute. A cross-sectional survey design was used with the target sample size being 118. Purposive, stratified and systematic sampling techniques were used to select respondents. Data analysis involved frequencies and percentages, Spearman rank correlation, coefficient of determination, regression, and ANOVA. There was a moderate positive correlation between employee reward and job satisfaction. The coefficient of determination expressed into percentage determined that employee reward accounted for 29.3 per cent of variation in job satisfaction.

Keywords: Human Resources Management, Reward, Job Satisfaction, Uganda Management Institute.

Introduction

Job satisfaction is a highly studied phenomenon because many experts believe that it has some relationship with labour market behaviour and is likely to influence productivity, work effort and decisions of employees to leave a job (Gazioglu & Tasel, 2002). Organizations have significant effects on the people who work for them as evidenced by how people feel about their work (Spector, 1997). Likewise, employees are also expected to be happy in their work which makes job satisfaction an issue of substantial importance for both employer and employees. Unfortunately, many organizations have failed to include job satisfaction on their priority lists (Gazioglu & Tasel, 2002), perhaps because they have either failed to assess its actual impact or failed to measure it. Despite the emphasis on job satisfaction worldwide, one of the limitations in literature is that it is not yet clear as to how exactly employee reward, as a Human Resource Practice, affects job satisfaction. This study will focus on employee reward and establish its effect on job satisfaction.

Ideas and innovations which had indirect or direct influence on people management date back to the 1780s and through to the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Chronologically, there has been development from Social Reformers' in the 1780s to Welfare or Caring from 1840s to 1902 and then to Employment Management from 1910s to 1920s. This was followed by Personnel Management from the 1920s to the 1940s; in the 1940s to the 1960s it was Specialist Personnel Management; in the 1960s to the 1980s it was Professional Personnel Management and, finally, from the late 1980s to the 1990s and beyond what became Human Resource Management (HRM).

There are two schools of thought about HRM in this respect; the first camp argues that HRM does not suggest anything new but is simply a renaming of the orthodox personnel management function. They contend that HRM is a synonym of personnel management and that it is merely 're-titling' the personnel management function in organizations (Fowler, 1987).

Several expressions have been used to deliver this message. To some writers, HRM is 'traditional personnel administration dressed up' (Sisson, 1990; Hendry, 1995); and it is regarded as either the 'old wine in new bottles' or the 'Emperor's new clothes' (Armstrong, 2007). To others it is 'personnel management re-christened' (Strauss, 1999); a 'wolf in sheep's skin' and the 'epitome of good personnel' (Keenoy, 1990); as well as denoting the 're-labeling' or 'repackaging' of progressive personnel management (Torrington, Hall, and Taylor, 2005). In this school of thought, the concept of HRM is fundamentally indistinguishable from personnel management on the grounds that there is little, if any, substantive difference between HRM and its predecessors, including Personnel Management.

This camp opines that the term human resource management does not give a new meaning to what has traditionally been called 'personnel management', but instead, is used to accommodate or capture the prevailing mood and contemporary fashion (Redman and Wilkinson, 2001). This point is well echoed by Bratton and Gold who posit that the vocabulary of management, like language as a whole, is not immune to fashion, with a growing awareness among practitioners and management scholars of using gender-neutral language, human resource management has been adopted by some to avoid gender-biased phrases such as manpower planning and manpower administration (1999, p.14). In organizations in the developing countries including Africa, the terms 'manpower management', 'manpower administration' and 'personnel' have been used predominantly in the public sector, particularly in the public services for a long time. It is in the recent past that the term HRM was adopted to describe the employee management function.

According to Guest (1989), from the foregoing, HRM, arguably, does not offer anything new; it is simply "good personnel management described in a fashionable way". The supporters of this viewpoint contend that proactive and dynamic personnel practitioners have always applied concepts that are embodied in HRM (Cumming, 1993; Torrington, et al, 2005). In the view of the first camp, HRM is more of an attitude of mind than a new approach (Armstrong, 2007). Supporters of this camp also argue that it is used as a way of "re-conceptualizing and reorganizing personnel roles and describing the work of personnel departments" (Guest, 1987; Storey, 1992). Others claim that the HRM model remains an elusive concept and contains contradictions and paradoxes.

Pessimists view HRM as rhetoric to disguise the consequences of de-regulation and down-sizing: a mask for the less acceptable face of organization culture. The impression one obtains from this perspective is that HRM is not a new distinctive model to managing the employment relationship. According to this outlook, the concept neither offers a completely new management philosophical outlook, nor discards elements of the previous approaches. It essentially builds on approaches that preceded its evolution such as the welfare, scientific management, human relations, industrial relations and manpower planning.

Statement of the Problem

UMI claims equity and fairness, as imperative principles that underlie her human resource management and development objectives, policies and programmes, and further professes an equal opportunity employer that believes in implementing a responsive performance-based reward system to attract and retain highly competent and motivated personnel. It therefore, should be seen to attract, retain, utilize, train and build capacities of human resources, enjoy satisfaction at their job. However, there is significant turnover of staff as review of records on recruitment and resignation reveals that between 2006 and 2012, a total of 21 teaching staff and 17 administrative staff, summing to 38 staff, (out of 175 in 2012), have voluntarily left work; this indicates prevalence of dissatisfaction with work, yet in a country where there is high degree of unemployment. This explains why the researcher was interested in investigating the relationship between employee reward and job satisfaction in Uganda Management Institute

Conceptual Framework

Conceptually, there has been no authoritative definition of best practice that has been agreed upon by academics or practitioners. This leads to a lack of conceptual clarity of the HRM best practice definition. However, several definitions that have emerged that encompass many of the underlying factors of HRM best practice, allowing us to gain understanding of the topic. Johnson (2000) details, “*best practice or high performance work practices are described as HR methods and systems that have universal, additive, and positive effects on organizational performance*” (p. 69). Of the many, how employee reward as a HRM best practice relates with job satisfaction forms the concern of this study.

The aim of employee reward policies and practices is to help attract, retain and motivate high-quality people. Getting it wrong can have a significant negative effect on the motivation, commitment and morale of employees. Looking at rewards as “something that increases the frequency of an employee action” points to an obvious desired outcome of rewards and recognition: to improve performance. Non-monetary recognition can be very motivating, helping to build feelings of confidence and satisfaction (Keller, 1999). In this research, employee reward shall cover how people are rewarded in accordance with their value to an organization. It is about both financial and non-financial rewards and embraces the strategies, policies, structures and processes used to develop and maintain reward systems that affects job satisfaction amongst employees.

Methodology

The researcher used a descriptive cross-sectional survey design because the study intended to pick only some representative sample elements of the cross-section of the population. The study was also cross-sectional because it was conducted across participants over a short period of time. It did not necessitate the researcher to make follow up of the participants. The survey was also preferred because it allowed the researcher to get a detailed inspection of the relationship between HRM and job satisfaction among the staff of UMI. Quantitative and qualitative approaches were adopted. The former enhanced the understanding of the meaning of numbers, while the latter gave precise and testable expression to qualitative ideas. The

employment of both research paradigms allowed methodological triangulation that enhanced the validity and reliability of the study.

The study population was composed of 175 employees, both administrative and academic staff. They are the key players in the running of UMI and, therefore, are conversant with the affairs of the Institute that ensured accuracy of data that was decrypted into information. The sample and sampling technique used are as demonstrated in Table 1 below:

Table 1: Parent Population, Sample Population, Sampling Techniques and the Data Collection Methods

Categories of Respondents	Stratified Categories	Sampling Technique	Methods of Data Collection	Target Population	Sampled Population
Governing Council	Governing Council	Purposive sampling	Interviews	17	06
Administrative staff	Key administrative staff	Stratified sampling	Interviews	09	04
	Other administrative Staff	Purposive sampling	Questionnaires	68	41
Academic staff	Heads of Department	Systematic sampling	Interviews	11	07
	Lectures/ Consultants	Purposive stratified sampling	Questionnaires	35	31
Staff who have voluntarily left	Staff who have voluntarily left	Convenience sampling	Interviews	35	14
Total				175	118

Purposive and stratified sampling techniques were used to select the members of the governing council and the administrative staff. Purposive sampling was used for members of the governing council because they were fewer and they are the policymakers in the Institute, hence, they understood the policies in the Institute; Amin (2005) recommends such knowledgeable people are good for interviews. Stratified sampling was used in order to select administrative staff representative of various departments at the institute in order to give equal opportunity for every category of respondent.

In order to select the representative sample for both the academic and administrative staff, systematic sampling technique was used. This helped to avoid bias during the selection and for reason of comparative analysis. Two separate lists of the administrative and academic staff, each according to their category, were compiled and every n^{th} person on the list was selected from each list. To get the n^{th} for the academic staff, the total number of academic staff was divided by the sample size of academic staff, thus $a/b = c$. Therefore, every n^{th} academic staff on the list was selected (that is, the 4th, 8th, 12th and so forth) until a total of representative sample for academic staff was realized. The same was done for administrative staff. The staff that left the Institute were conveniently sampled since, due to their dispersion, accessibility was uncertain.

Guided by the nature of the problem, the relationship between employee reward and job satisfaction under investigation, the researcher used three types of data collection methods, including, questionnaires, interviews, and documentary analysis that allowed methodological triangulation (Amin, 2005). Information was gathered by administering questionnaires individually to UMI staff and got them filled personally as recommended by Amin (2005). Where required, the researcher offered necessary explanations with reference to the questions. It was more convenient and economical to collect information using the questionnaire survey. It was a suitable method for collecting data from a large sample using this method. Besides, this method was impersonal and it avoided bias, which could develop as a result of interaction between the researcher and the respondent. It ensured some degree of anonymity to the respondents. The respondents felt free to express their views through this method than they would do personally to the researcher. It placed less pressure on the respondents for immediate response because they completed questionnaires at their own time and pace.

The strategic managers were interviewed to solicit information on the relationship between employee reward and job satisfaction among the staff of UMI. Interviewing was a face-to-face interface between the researcher and UMI management, which involved the researcher talking and listening to the UMI management. Interviews allowed pursuance of in-depth information around the topic and were useful as follow-ups to certain responses to questionnaires and to further investigate their response and served the purpose of triangulation (Amin, 2005).

To provide the secondary source of the data, the researcher gathered available relevant Institute records on rewards and job satisfaction. This helped to corroborate findings from questionnaires as well as from interviews and showed how the variables relate.

The researcher, for purposes of triangulation, used three types of instruments, which were developed with the guidance of the objectives of the study, conceptual framework and literature reviewed. These included: structured questionnaires, interviews guide, and documentary analysis guide (Kothari, 2004).

Structured questionnaires containing closed-ended questions were preferred because of the number of subjects, cost, time and the nature of the topic. Thus, data collected using this method was quantitative (Kothari, 2004). One set of questionnaires consisting of sections was administered to both the academic and administrative staff. A section consisted of and solicited information on items about the background; other sections consisted of and solicited information on items about the independent and dependent variables.

The interview guide was a tool, which consisted of open-ended questions. This is preferred because an open-ended question is one that compels a person to volunteer more information. Moreover, open-ended questions develop trust, are perceived as less threatening, allow an unrestrained or free response, and may be more useful with articulate users. The guide consisted of sections on employee reward and job satisfaction. A documentary analysis checklist was drawn in order to guide the researcher on the documentary information required by the study. The checklist was used to request for relevant documents from UMI (Kothari, 2004).

Data are only useful if they are *valid* (i.e., measure what they are supposed to measure) and *reliable* (i.e., collected in the same way by different people and at different locations). To obtain valid and reliable data, the researcher had to determine that the two met statistical requirements.

Accuracy of information was ensured by the use of relevant instruments. The questionnaires adapted from previous studies were subjected to the scrutiny of the supervisors who are experts in the field of research and their recommendations were used to finally formulate instruments that had the ability to solicit the expected relevant data. The administrative and academic staff were administered questionnaires which, after designing, were subjected to rating and the Content Validity Index (CVI) computed using the following formula:

$$CVI = \frac{\text{No. of items rated as relevant}}{\text{All items in the questionnaire}}$$

Table 2: Validity

Raters	Relevant Items	Not Relevant Items	Total
Rater 1	35	14	49
Rater 2	37	12	49
Total	72	26	98

$$\text{Thus, the CVI} = \frac{72}{98} = 0.735$$

The CVI for the questionnaire for both the academic and support staff was 0.735. The recommended validity measure by Amin (2005) is 0.7. Hence, the questionnaires were considered valid for data collection.

The questionnaires were piloted in three similar institutions, namely, Uganda College of Commerce - Pakwach, National Teachers’ College - Muni and Nile Institute of Management Studies – Arua (NIMSA), to ensure reliability. This helped to ensure consistency and dependability of the research instruments and their ability to tap data that answer to the objectives of the study. Raw data from the instruments was subjected to a reliability factor analysis and reliability test from which a CVI was computed as recommended by Amin (2005), and the findings are as tabulated in Table 3 below:

Table 3: Reliability

Variables	No. of items	Cronbach Alpha
Employee Reward	8	0.878
Job Satisfaction	3	0.759

Given that the Cronbach alphas were greater than .07, as recommended by Amin(2005), the items measuring the variables were considered dependable for the data collection.

Spearman rank correlation was used to determine relationships between variables because the variables were accompanied with an ordinal scale. The coefficient of determination was used to determine effect of the employee reward on job satisfaction.

Content analysis was used to analyze qualitative data where all the qualitative data collected through interviews and documentary records were categorized, interpreted and analyzed under their respective themes. These were used to corroborate and triangulate findings obtained through quantitative data analysis.

Findings and Discussions

Using a questionnaire, eight items about employee rewards were presented to respondents at UMI. They were requested to respond to the items using a five response scale with the following options: 1 = Strongly Disagree (SD), 2 = Disagree (D), 3 = Neither Disagree nor Agree (NDA), 4 = Agree (A) and 5 = Strongly Agree (SA). Findings are presented in Table 4. Following the table is the analysis and interpretation of findings.

Findings about employee Rewards

Table 4: Findings about employee rewards

Items about rewards	SD	D	NDA	A	SA	Total
In my organization formal recognition is given for employee efforts to make a difference	17 (23%)	17 (23%)	14 (19%)	25 (34%)	1 (1%)	74 (100%)
In my organization Management recognizes employees whose efforts make a difference	11 (15%)	19 (26%)	13 (18%)	26 (34%)	5 (7%)	74 (100%)
In my organization co-workers and peers recognize employees who are making a difference	8 (11%)	16 (22%)	19 (26%)	28 (37%)	3 (4%)	74 (100%)
In my organization individual team members are recognized equally for their efforts	11 (15%)	22 (30%)	16 (21%)	22 (30%)	3 (4%)	74 (100%)
In my organization there is teamwork spirit and cooperation among co-workers	4 (5%)	8 (11%)	6 (8%)	42 (57%)	14 (19%)	74 (100%)
In my organization my work is valued	6 (8%)	3 (4%)	9 (12%)	48 (65%)	8 (11%)	74 (100%)
In my organization outstanding attendance is recognized and appreciated	11 (15%)	16 (22%)	20 (27%)	15 (20%)	12 (16%)	74 (100%)
In my organization years of service to the institute are recognized	12 (16%)	11 (15%)	16 (22%)	23 (31%)	12 (16%)	74 (100%)

Source: Primary data

Findings show that most of the UMI staff were opposed to two items in Table 4 (that is items 1 and 4) compared to the proportion of respondents who agreed to the items. It is shown that the percentage of UMI staff that opposed the items was 45% to 46%, while the percentage of UMI staff that agreed to the items was 34% to 35%. The percentage of UMI staff that neither disagreed nor agreed to the items was 19% to 21%. Thus, from the analysis it is interpreted that in most cases at UMI, formal recognition was not given for employee efforts to make a difference and individual team members were not recognized equally for their efforts.

Asked, why the staff generally opined that formal recognition was not given for employee efforts to make a difference and individual team members were not recognized equally for their efforts, the findings throw some light on why formal recognition was not given to employees, as exposed

in the following response, “*In most cases it doesn’t make a difference, if not accompanied by other benefits*” (Interview with UMI Top Management official Q, 7 September 2012). In response to the same, a former UMI staff had this to say: “*One is the management and leadership style. Another is, most academic staff feel that they should be administrators and forget their basic assignments*” (Interview with former UMI staff, 6 August 2012). Thus, from these comments it can be observed that management and leadership style, lopsided promotion criteria and excessive ambition of some academic staff for administrative positions seem to be some of the explanatory factors why UMI management is criticized for not formally recognizing its employees. An interview with UMI Top Management official X highlighted another reason why formal recognitions were not given to employees. He pitied the politicking and bureaucracy characterizing UMI and revealed that the current climate was foul. There was a lot of scheming, backstabbing and all sorts of vices. This was due to generational issues. There was conflict between the old and the young generations. The latter would like to overturn things too fast. He also observed that once a while one commended staff, but they did not recognize that as it was a foul in which the institute was caught up. He further revealed that there were unresolved matters. There were issues of promotion. People were worried. Some would like to be promoted but the process was slow, and they felt they were not recognized. For some reason, they had not sorted this out. Some were saying, “If I do well, after so many years, I should be promoted.” UMI also had its share of what goes on around it. The dynamics around were worrying. Due to rapid expansion, there were too many new people who had been brought on board, from outside, but this had affected the culture of the Institute.

Another interviewee also agreed that formal recognitions were not given to employees at UMI. The interviewee highlighted that none of the employee recognitions at UMI was formal but rather informal as shown in the following:

People resign citing too much work. We don’t have a clear cut scheme for paying good performers. However, verbal praises are given. You get them in corridors. When other rewards come, they are indirect for example one may be denied facilitation to go abroad and yet another is facilitated. This is one of the causes of conflict, which started towards the end of 2011, attributing these menacing to the new head (Interview with a Head of Department X at UMI, 7 September 2012).

Another interviewee was supportive of the questionnaire findings that UMI formal recognitions were not given for employee efforts to make a difference. The interviewee responded, thus:

It is true; it is not a common practice to get a formal recognition. In other organization, at the end of year party, the best performers are recognized, but at UMI it is not done. I only saw it once, at the 40th anniversary of the institute, when letters of commendations were issued to the best performers (Interview with member of UMI Governing Council, 7 September 2012).

Asked, whether individual team members were not being recognized equally for their efforts, as revealed by the responses to the survey questionnaires, one interviewee was partially supportive of the findings from questionnaire as he noted that it was difficult to implement equal treatment because managers were human. But he noted that compared to what he heard

was happening elsewhere, the situation was not that bad. Unique contributions would normally shine whether managers liked staff or not. For example, he observed, the ‘Higher Degrees’ was criticized by everybody for personal reasons, but the contribution of the Department at 60 per cent of overall income could not be ignored whether one hated a member of staff or not. All these seemed to confirm the claim of one of the top management X who exposed that there was a lot that was foul in the institute.

In response to the same, a UMI Top Management official Q had this to say:

They are right; there is no mechanism to reward team performance, except in research, project and training. There should be a structured way like in research where two or three contributors are all rewarded, and like in project and training; however, this is not the case in other areas for example working in finance department. That is where the challenge is. (Interview with UMI Top Management official Q, 7 September 2012).

UMI Top Management official X raised the issue of difficulty in treating all employees equally as he had this to say, “Unfortunately, that is a natural tendency. It is very difficult to dismiss it. It is however, mitigated by the systems in place” (Interview with UMI Top Management official X, 5 September 2012). In furtherance, a member of the UMI Governing Council did not mince his words in his response about individual team members not being recognized equally for their efforts as revealed in the following, “There is no equal recognition of teams. You may be on a Committee or in a Department, but only the Heads are recognized.”

This view compares unfavourably with the view of Deutsch (1975) who considers the concept of equality to refer to the rewards that employees receive regardless of the amount of contribution that they provide towards their company. In addition, members of an organization should also receive rewards that are in accordance with their personal need. For instance, employees who have more children may need more holidays to spend time with their family, or more benefits, such as health insurance and discounts or free education for their children.

However, the researcher observes that considering the view of Deutsch (1975) would be far from being practical in a modern contemporary organization that has to have full view of psychological contract. Moreover, from a professional point of view, pricing work is based on a number of factor degrees which, amongst others, include the employee’s job description, the level of education, work environment, working conditions, the number of people an employee supervises, the risks that are involved in the work one performs, level of accountability, to mention but a few. This modern and professional way of determining reward runs contrary to the rules postulated by Adams (1965) who argued that there are three common allocation rules. These include equity, equality and need (Deutsch, 1975). If individual employee’s needs were to be the criterion, then it would not matter how much one outputs for the organization. This kind of situation would only see organizations failing to achieve their objectives. Chen (1995) considers that seniority has to be a fourth allocation; and this factor should serve as a principle of importance. This is important, but it is only one of the many factor degrees.

Regarding satisfaction with formal recognition for employees, one interviewee was somehow satisfied but with reservation as shown in the following, “*Letters of commendations have been given, though rarely. In most cases recognitions have been verbal. But when renewing employment contract, people who have done good jobs have fewer challenges (Interview with UMI Top Management official Q, 7 September 2012).*”

A former UMI staff explained more as shown in the following:

In a way, yes I am satisfied. Those who excel in elements that attract additional allowances are paid and on time. The challenge is that academic staff that excel are rewarded with administrative assignments which affect the areas that they perform best in and sometimes they do not become good administrators. This affects talent development especially in line with their original assignments. (Interview with former UMI staff, 6 August 2012).

In support of the above, during the interview with UMI Top Management official X, his response was also a mixture of negatives and positives about how UMI management recognized employees. This is what he had to say:

There is no standing policy. It is more discretionary by management. Some of them are not explicit. However, there is a scheme of service which recognizes those public indicators like publications, research and so on; it takes care of those. Once a while there is commendation letter. For instance, there was a time the Council recognized such performances, but it is rare. Besides, it also goes into the recognition of the renewal of the employees’ contract of service. For renewal of contract of service, rigorous procedures are followed. Appraisal is done by the immediate supervisor, followed by the department, the school (in the case of teaching department), Directorate, Top Management that recommend an employee to the Appointment Board for confirmation of an employee or renewal of contract or its termination. All these are based on evaluation of the employees’ achievements, which implies recognition of the contribution of the employee. However, internal politics is a major contribution of high attrition rate, hence low retention. (Interview with UMI Top Management official X, 5 September 2012).

In an isolated incidence, another interviewee was completely dissatisfied with UMI formal recognition. The interviewee responded that management did not recognize her personnel. Every year they had a Quality Assurance Report which spelt out the best performers. Besides, there was a participant’s evaluation report, but management did not make use of them for purposes of recognition.

Recognition in UMI seemed to be somewhat in existence, unfortunately, merely insouciantly. According to Shore and Shore (1995), employees who are able to experience and receive recognition for their work are also able to have a better perception of their work, their workplace and the people they work for. Thus, there is need for the employer to make an effort in showing the employee that his/her wellbeing is of concern to the organization and the management and that the contribution of the employee towards the organization is

highly valued. This idea is further reiterated by Buchanan (1974) who adds that the recognition of an employee's contributions towards the organization has a positive relationship towards increasing the commitment of the employee towards the organization and its objectives.

In addition, findings show no significant difference among the UMI staff who opposed or concurred to two items in Table 4 (that is items 2 and 7); but the difference was there between these and those who neither disagreed nor agreed. It is shown that the percentage of UMI staff that opposed the items was 37 per cent to 41 per cent while the percentage of UMI staff that agreed to the items was 36 per cent to 41 per cent and the percentage of UMI staff that neither disagreed nor agreed to the items was 18 per cent to 27 per cent. Thus, from the analysis, it is interpreted that sometimes at UMI, management recognized employees whose efforts made a difference and outstanding attendance was recognized and appreciated.

Lastly, findings show that most the UMI staff agreed to four items in Table 4 (that is items 3, 5, 6 and 8) compared to the proportion of respondents who opposed the items. It is shown that the percentage of UMI staff that opposed the items was 12% to 33% while the percentage of UMI staff that agreed to the items was 41 per cent to 76 per cent and the percentage of UMI staff that neither disagreed nor agreed to the items was 8 per cent to 26 per cent. Thus, from the analysis it is interpreted that in most cases at UMI, co-workers and peers recognized employees who were making a difference, there was teamwork spirit and cooperation among co-workers, employees' work was valued and employees' years of service to the Institute was recognized.

Regarding existence of teamwork spirit and cooperation among co-workers, one interviewee acknowledged team spirit and cooperation among co-workers as shown in the following, "*There is team work on the overall because by the nature of the work in UMI, most work are done in team*" (Interview with UMI Top Management official Q, 7 September 2012). However, another interviewee was partially supportive of the findings from questionnaires, acknowledging the existence of high team spirit and cooperation but, at the same time, citing non-cooperation due to politics of workload sharing and management politics. This is illustrated in the following:

There is very high team spirit and cooperation in the institute except in two or three areas. The 'hatred' that exists. Higher Degrees is segregated by other staff- 'individual wars'. The politics of workload sharing; 'about 5 staff share workload to themselves' leaving others with nothing in the workload politics. There are staff that take 5 months without stepping in class because of this. The policy on workload exists but the implementation at the level of Director Programs has failed to work. The other is management politics; the top three do not agree with each other on the direction of the institute. One group is supported by Council. This has affected staffing at that level and the hitches around resultantly beginning to affect the overall performance of the institute. Then the young and the old not appreciating each other. (Interview with former UMI staff, 6 August 2012).

Findings from an interview with a UMI Top Management official X were not very different from the former UMI staff regarding politics at UMI. This was what he held about teamwork spirit and cooperation among co-workers:

The picture is hasty. Some try, but the kinds of foul atmospheres we have these days have undermined it. People are working in cliques. Some are for “Caphas” while others are for “Apolo”, though there is a semblance of team spirit. It will take a while to recover when the leaders will take the spirit of reconciliation. (Interview with UMI Top Management official X, 5 September 2012).

The interview with the member of UMI Governing Council threw more light on the nature of politics undermining team spirit and cooperation among co-workers. In response, he also observed a decline in the spirit and cooperation at UMI as shown in the following:

Yes, team spirit appears to be historical. In a way, people worked together in the past but it is dying due to management and leadership problem. Now people are not sure of each other. They are afraid and suspicious. This has been created by management due to both intrigue and incompetence resulting in lack of being firm; hence the creation of a spying system. (Interview with member of UMI Governing Council, 7 September 2012).

The Head of Department X at UMI also agreed that team spirit and cooperation among co-workers was on a decline but attributed the cause to bad publicity in addition to politicking as shown in the following:

In general, we work in teams for example weekend and up-country programme. However, the team-work spirit is going down due to bad publicity. Staff are not sure of who is who, to the level that some forsake common tea, contrary to a long standing culture of UMI. They also fear that what they speak will be reported...and be labeled ‘Mafia or anti management’. (Interview with a Head of Department X at UMI, 7 September 2012).

Regarding employees’ work being valued, one interviewee, supported by the other were supportive of the questionnaire findings, as the interviewee had this to say, “It may sound contradictory but they are highly valued”(Interview with former UMI staff, 6th August 2012). UMI Top Management official Q also said, “By the nature of work, employees are valued.”. UMI Top Management official X was equally supportive as shown in the following:

UMI highly values employees. As a policy we try to recruit the best, try to retain them through different packages and try to develop them to get the best out of them. Some of them do appreciate this. (Interview with UMI Top Management official X, 5 September 2012).

The Head of Department X at UMI was supportive of the former UMI staff. In response, he had this to say about employees’ work being valued:

They value work by giving salaries, salary advance, one can also get recommendation when one wants a big loan. Promotion (though it has not been forth coming for the last two years, despite, some staff who have qualified for it), transporting dead bodies

of staff to any part of the country, hiring two coaster and carrying up to 60 people, construction of grave, buying coffin and wreath. (Interview with a Head of Department X at UMI, 7 September 2012).

However, the member of UMI Governing Council was completely dissatisfied with the way UMI valued employees' work. He revealed that when staff goes to the outreach center by the institute vehicle, management would like the staff to come back from the centers on the following day, Monday. But when staff goes by hired transports, management would like the staff to come back on Sunday.

During interviews, when respondents were asked whether they were satisfied with employee reward at UMI, one interviewee responded positively, thus; *"It is very difficult to satisfy people; but, comparing with sister organizations, the rewards are worthwhile"* (Interview with UMI Top Management Q, 7 September 2012). In support, a former UMI staff's response was:

While the salary given to staff across the Board may appear less competitive, UMI pays the highest salaries compared to other academic institutions in Uganda. In fact, staff like secretaries earn more than a lecturer at Makerere. Overall I would say UMI staff are paid well. UMI has the highest gratuity scheme around town at 32.5% of the basic salary on top of NSSF contributions. UMI pays better than more corporate companies in Kampala especially for positions below manager level. Lecturers are given research funds, sponsored for PhD's; they fly to present papers et cetera. The extra work load is competitive and paid on time. I would say that the reward system is good. (Interview with former UMI staff, 6 August 2012).

A Head of Department X at UMI concurred with the former UMI staff. The response was as follows:

It is a fair reward, compared to other similar institutions like the universities. It pays more than the universities. It is above average. There are other rewards like leave, gratuity, uniform, corporate wear, business cards, interesting job titles (for example Administrative Assistant instead of Secretary), three weeks off at Christmas time which is not part of annual leave, internet, top leadership have transport, other staff are facilitated with transport as and when work requires. (Interview with a Head of Department X at UMI, 7 September 2012).

According to Chiang and Birtch (2009), rewards that are non-financial in nature, such as the provision of an increase in holidays, and increase in family benefits, contributions towards the employee perceiving his/her workplace as a 'supporting and caring' organization. Johnson (1986) contends that by providing employees with as much rewards as possible, in proportion to their work efforts, employees are able to function more efficiently. The researcher, however, observes that the application of the above seems to pay dividends to the Institute as interview results revealed immense satisfaction with it.

The above response revealed that the reward system in UMI, which is not only monetary, is in consonance with the view of Nelson and Spitzer (2002) who argues that although cash rewards are welcomed by employees, managers should never use this as a tool to motivate their employees to improve their performance levels. Should this happen, there is a chance that the essence of the reward would be forgotten.

According to a study conducted by Ahmad (2010), employees are highly likely to feel 'rewarded' and 'motivated', hence, enjoy job satisfaction when they know that they are able to get fair pay with regard to the amount of work they do. This seems to explain the level of job satisfaction UMI staff experience as revealed by the findings of this study. The researcher is inclined to concur with the view of Ahmad (2010) because, due to seemingly sizable internal feuds which the last one to two year(s) has witnessed in UMI, staff would have been horribly dissatisfied. But against their own recognition that the Institute rewards them better than their counterparts in similar organizations as revealed by both quantitative and interview findings, they are willing to remain in the organization. One of those that can explain this scenario is the view of (Adams, J. S, 1965) with which the researcher concurs.

A UMI Top Management official X was more elaborate about UMI employee satisfaction with rewards where he highlighted some few problems but also had some praise as he contended that:

UMI has a set of constraints. We have to earn whatever we spend. The Government gives only about 5% of our recurrent (425 Million per year). The Council policy is: "show us what you get then we allow you to increase your reward". We have basic pay complemented by allowances like transport, health et cetera; all of which an employee gets as a package is subject to taxes. (Interview with UMI Top Management X, 5th September 2012).

The interviewer wanted to know about overtime and got the following response:

Over and above 42 hours, the Institute treats the rest of the hours as extra workload for which they are paid separately. As a matter of fact, the staff used to fly to teach in the secondary schools, but now they are engaged in the extra workload which earns them more money, depending on hours one has worked extra. (Interview with UMI Top Management X, 5th September 2012).

To the question, "How does this apply to the non-teaching staff?", the interviewer got the following response:

We allow some administrative staff also extra workload. The last review of salaries was done in 2010, through consultancy. UMI pays are good. The least paid staff gets about 500,000/= (Five Hundred Thousand) and the highest has a take-home of about 6,000,000/=. Secondly, another component is gratuity, which is 32.5% of an employee's Basic Pay. (Interview with UMI Top Management X, 5th September 2012).

The researcher wanted to know how gratuity was administered. The response was:

As monthly salaries are paid by 25th day of the month, a separate cheque for 32.5 percent gratuity is paid in the gratuity Account. At the end of 30 months, the gratuity matures and it is paid to the individual. However, the gratuity scheme is a heavy burden on the institute. Thirdly, the institute, pays the 10% National Social Security Fund (NSSF) as required by the law. (Interview with UMI Top Management)

In the circumstances, it was explained that UMI had no pension scheme. On the question of how one assessed the overall reward system, the researcher got the following response:

I must say, from the point of view of the institute, there is good reward. We can only pay what we can afford. UMI emphasizes Human Resource Development. No one is left to develop himself, without support. For teaching staff, the institute puts in a lot of money. There are now many who have now got PhDs with heavy support of the institute as opposed to only one or two who would be PhD holders those days. The basis of this is: getting and keeping the best.

Regarding the terms of employment UMI uses and why that was the case, the same respondent replied:

UMI has embraced employment on contract because employment on permanent basis makes employees slacken in performance. The staff is employed on a five year contract. The permanent employees are untouchable. That is why you see in other institutions the employees are lambasting government, holding it hostage” (Interview with UMI Top Management X, 5th September 2012).

The revelations from this interviewee were corroborated by documentary sources that support the fact that UMI receives very little revenue from the government as illustrated by the three-year Budget Performance Reports. Thus in Fiscal Year 2009/2010 Government of Uganda disbursed to UMI a subvention total of 425,504/= representing 5% of UMI’s total income of 9,202,542 for the year. In Fiscal Year 2010/2011 Government of Uganda disbursed to UMI 420,040,778/= representing 3 per cent and 1,499,997,500/= representing 11 per cent of UMI’s revenue for non-wage and capital development respectively out of the total revenue of 13,355,610,998/= for the year. In Fiscal Year 2011/2012, Government of Uganda disbursed to UMI 279,579,315/=, representing 2 per cent and 1,125,000,000/=, representing 10 per cent of UMI’s revenue for non-wage and capital development respectively out of the total revenue of 11,439,507,728/= for the year. For all the three years, the rest of the revenues were internally generated. This confirms the statement of the interviewee who argued that, “*UMI has a set of constraints. We have to earn whatever we spend. The Government gives only about 5 percent of our recurrent*”. Moreover, admissible evidence revealed that in 2011/2012 Government disbursed only 2 per cent of UMI’s revenue.

Just like other key informants were of the view that UMI staff got the highest salary compared to staff in other similar institutions, interview findings from one key informant were in consonance. In response, the key informant revealed the following: “*There is no problem with employee reward in terms of payment. We may not be getting the highest in the teaching*

profession. However, the little is paid timely on the 24th day of every month”. (Interview with member of UMI Governing Council, 7 September 2012).

Furthermore, documentary analysis revealed that a lecturer in Makerere University earns only about 60 per cent of what a lecturer in UMI earns in a month, let alone the 32.5 per cent gratuity which is unheard of in Makerere and other public universities in Uganda. This confirms that UMI staff are better paid, compared to what is paid to staff in similar institutions; hence, part of the reasons for job satisfaction.

Findings about job satisfaction

Using a questionnaire, three items about job satisfaction were presented to respondents at UMI. They were requested to respond to the items using a five-response scale where 1 = Strongly Disagree (SD), 2 = Disagree (D), 3 = Neither Disagree nor Agree (NDA), 4 = Agree (A) and 5 = Strongly Agree (SA). Findings are presented in Table 5. Following the table is the analysis and interpretation of findings.

Table 5: Findings about employee rewards

Items about job satisfaction	SD	D	NDA	A	SA	Total
In this institute, I feel satisfied with my work	7 (9%)	8 (11%)	9 (12%)	43 (59%)	7 (9%)	74 (100%)
I feel fully involved in the affairs of this institute	10 (14%)	12 (16%)	11 (15%)	35 (47%)	6 (8%)	74 (100%)
I feel I am fully committed to this institute	2 (3%)	4 (5%)	6 (8%)	51 (69%)	11 (15%)	74 (100%)

Source: Primary data

Findings show that most UMI staff concurred with all the three items in Table 5, compared to the proportion of respondents who disagreed with the items. It is shown that the percentage of UMI staff that disagreed with the items were 8 per cent to 30 per cent, while the percentage of UMI staff that agreed with the items was 55 per cent to 84 per cent and the percentage of UMI staff that neither disagreed nor agreed to the items was 8 per cent to 15 per cent. Thus from the analysis, it is interpreted that most UMI staff felt satisfied with their work, fully involved in the affairs of the institute and fully committed to the institute, though a few employees did not feel satisfied.

Testing First Hypothesis

Having presented findings about employee rewards and job satisfaction, the next stage was to establish how employee rewards affected job satisfaction. This was achieved by computing the Spearman correlation coefficient and coefficient of determination. Findings are presented in Table 6, accompanied with an analysis and interpretation.

Table 6: Correlation between employee rewards and job satisfaction

	Job satisfaction
Employee reward	rho = .541 rho ² = .293 p = .000 n = 74

Source: Primary data

Findings in Table 6 indicate that there was a moderate correlation ($\rho = .541$) between employee reward and job satisfaction. The sign of the correlation was positive. Since the correlation does not indicate the percentage variation in the dependent variable caused by the independent variable, a coefficient of determination ($\rho^2 = .293$), which is a square of the correlation coefficient was computed. The coefficient of determination was expressed into percentage to determine the effect of employee reward on job satisfaction. This revealed that employee reward accounted for 29.3 per cent of variation in job satisfaction in UMI.

These findings were subjected to a test of significance, which showed that significance of the correlation coefficient ($p = .000$) was less than the critical significance at 0.05. This implied there was a moderate positive relationship between employee reward and job satisfaction. The moderate nature of the relationship meant that a moderate change in employee reward was related to a moderate change in job satisfaction. The positive nature of the relationship implied that the change in the two variables was linear, whereby better employee reward was related to more job satisfaction and vice versa.

An interview with the Head of Department X at UMI was supportive of the findings from the questionnaire. When asked how employee reward at UMI had affected job satisfaction he responded thus, *“Majority of the staff are satisfied. Rewards are above average, compared to job market. The work environment has been good, but now seem risky and things are likely to go down”* (Interview with a Head of Department X at UMI, 7 September 2012). Similarly, a member of UMI Governing Council was supportive of the findings. The following was the response:

The reward mechanism to a great extent positively affects employee satisfaction, because, despite the numerous challenges, staff are working hard. The 13th cheque is very motivational. It is a policy that in December, employees are paid two salaries. (Interview with member of UMI Governing Council, 7 September 2012).

The UMI Top Management official Q also agreed as follows:

On the overall, UMI employees are satisfied by the reward in the institute. Extra work is paid for. Research work is paid for. Consultancies are paid for. However, the non-teaching staff believe that they do a lot of work but the reward is skewed positively to the teaching staff. (Interview with UMI Top Management Q, 7 September 2012).

However, one interviewee was supportive of the relationship established from questionnaire data but with reservation, as observed, that Salary and benefits are okay. What may affect motivation are other issues such as management and leadership style, lopsided promotion criteria, over-ambitious academic staff, misplaced and sectarian appointments and assignments.

The UMI Top Management official X was supportive on the issue of other factors affecting employee job satisfaction at UMI; but contrary to the UMI former staff, he emphasized how payment affected employee satisfaction at the Institution. This was revealed when he contended that the work method of UMI was very different. For instance, one Doctor found

the work load was very high and had to report to management that he could not continue and he left. In UMI, what drove the employees was not the basic pay, but the extra pay. In some instances, an employee whose basic pay was about 3.5/= million would at the end of the month bag some extra 6 to 7/= million, attracted by extra workload.

Conclusions and Implications

There are other means to reward employees that do not just focus on financial compensation. Some of these include the praise that employees are able to receive from their managers, the opportunity to take on important projects or tasks, and even leadership attention. The latter refers to the treatment of the employees by their managers in such a manner that the employees are also considered to be leaders as well. These three motivators are excellent means to encourage the employee to work harder and produce better performance results. This is largely due to the fact that the well-rewarded employee feels that he/she is being valued by the institute. They are also encouraged to work harder and better if they are aware that their well-being is taken seriously by their employers, and that their careers and self-development are also being honed and taken care of by the institute.

Arising from the findings, it is concluded that in Uganda Management Institute, there are good pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards that have led to job satisfaction among the employees and that make them work harder, although recognitions are intermittent and tend to be informal. Thus, it is a constant and continuous challenge for Uganda Management Institute to work on trying to understand further what factors contribute to improved satisfaction levels of their employees. Aside from working on satisfying its customers, it is crucial that Uganda Management Institute also works on identifying the motivators that boost the performance of its workforce and, in so doing, make appropriate and sufficient offers for its employees.

Note:

This work is part of my Dissertation for Masters in Management Science in Human Resource Management.

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Influence of Culture on Decision Making in Organizations: Applying Hofstede's Value Dimensions

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Abstract

Quite often, the decision making process has been understood from the quantitative approach; highly influenced by, inter alia, game theory, decision trees and linear programmes. Moreover, there is a preoccupation with rational and economic explanations, political dimensions, procedures, and the institutional framework of public organizations. Yet organizations and the people that work in them have emotions, feelings and context. Thus there is the need for analyzing the decision maker and decision making in the cross-cultural context. This paper seeks to draw the relationship between culture and decision making. I explain the process through which policy subsystem arrives at a decision of recommending policy options. The article argues that there is a fruitful intellectual dimension linking culture to decision making an area which is not usually preferred in public administration, on the pretext that culture has limited explanatory power since culture could be broadly considered to mean everything.

Key words: Decision making, Game theory, Institutions, Organizations, Culture, Hofstede

Introduction

A number of studies have been done concerning decision making in organizations. However, most efforts have been geared towards the rational and economic explanations, political dimensions, procedures, and the institutional framework of public organizations. Stewart (1985) remarks that theorists in behavioural and statistical decision making have carried out research within the scope of game theory, whereby the main interest is to analyze rational action. Thus there is the need to analyze the decision maker and decision making in the cross cultural context.

This article presents the argument that culture cannot be ignored as we labor to understand and explain decision making. The value in this idea arises from the thinking that using culture as an explanatory variable is scarce in public administration; on the pretext that culture has limited explanatory power.

Karyeija (2005) contends that decision making may be a result of either one or a combination of these three perspectives;- a) rule - following, b) compromising preferences, c) consensus. I intend to show how culture underlies these three components of decision making. The paper operates on the premise that these three perspectives are present in any decision making process. More so, these perspectives are influenced by different cultures, and in particular organizational culture. Schein (1997, pp.12) offers the formal definition of organizational culture as :

a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group has learned as it solves its problems of external and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.

Organizational culture is closely related to societal culture, and culture may be looked at as weak or strong (Hofstede, 1997). Schein (1985) looked at it from four different dimensions, i.e. a) power distance, b) collectivism versus individualism, c) masculinity versus femininity, and d) uncertainty avoidance. As for Trompenaars (1993) culture is seen from seven dimensions: universalism versus particularism; collectivism versus individualism; neutral versus emotional; specific versus diffuse; achievement versus ascription; attitudes to time; and, attitudes to the environment.

Other scholars have an advanced analysis of culture by drawing the close relationship between organizational culture and administrative culture (Jamil, 1995; Ouchi, 1981; Tayeb, 1988). This paper, therefore, examines not only the relationship between organizational and societal culture, but also explores the impact of culture on the public decision making process. It seeks to understand the process of decision making by analyzing the key actors, and the way they interact to establish policy decisions. Particularly, it explores the cultural dimension to these three formulated decision making processes, i.e. contextual, strategic and communicative.

At the same time, it is understood that there are basic features that define particular cultures. For example, Munene, Schwarz and Kibanja (2005) note is the need to examine how the basic features of the African culture influence decision making. They further suggest that there is sufficient evidence to show that the African culture emphasizes hierarchy, embeddedness and mastery, in contrast to egalitarianism, autonomy and harmony. As such, African decision makers stress reliance on formal rules and superiors in reaching decisions, as predicated by their cultural profile. Therefore, culture may either enhance the effectiveness of decision making or frustrate it.

Organizational culture became a prominent paradigm in the early 1980s triggered off by scholars such as Ouchi (1981). They suggested that culture was very important to organizational performance and that organizational culture could be managed to improve a company's competitive advantage. Emphasis was moved from the technical and functional aspects of management to the interpersonal and symbolic aspects of management that required in-depth, qualitative studies of organizational life.

From the above discussion, it is clear that culture could be critical to decision making. Jamil (1997) notes that although cultural theories argue that organization variables such as decision making, learning capacity, power and authority relations, loyalty group orientation and motivation, innovation and change are culture-specific, not culture-free, they contrast with theories which stress universality of organization structure and behaviour across cultures.

Conceptual Framework

Karyeiya (2005, pp. 46 - 48) proposes and analyses possible modes of decision making. He argues that people interaction is an integral part of decision making. He further notes that

when rules are followed, decisions tend to reflect prime objectives. Secondly, decisions reflect compromise; and thirdly, they reflect consensus. This paper draws a further relationship of how culture can influence these decision making patterns. Although many scholars agree that culture is an integral aspect of decision making, very few efforts have been made to study it systematically such as Hofstede (1997), Schein (1985) and Trompenaars (1993) did. Instead, it is taken for granted or handled as a residual category (Melberg, 1997).

Culture affects decision making through the broader context of the nation's culture and through culturally based value systems which affect each individual decision maker's perception or interpretation of what is going on. The extent to which decision making is influenced by culture varies among countries. The ways that culture influences an individual's decision can be studied by looking at the variables involved in each stage of the rational decision-making process. These stages are: (1) defining the problem, (2) gathering and analyzing relevant data, (3) considering alternative solutions, (4) deciding on the best solution, and (5) implementing the decision. It is however imperative, at this point, to have an understanding of what a decision is.

Meaning of Decision

A decision is a course of action, a position or judgement reached following a game or contest. It is a solution to a problem. Decision making involves human associations, events, and words, leading to, and including, any conclusion for a programme or policy. A decision results from one of the following; a) identifying relevant goals, b) searching for alternative courses of action, c) evaluating alternatives, or d) selecting the best course of action (Anderson, 1983; Blankenship and Miles, 1968). A decision is choice, goal discovery and avoidance of failures.

Value systems influence the overall approach that decision makers from various cultures take to their task. Particularly, I wish to apply Hofstede's cultural dimensions to elaborate that a country's orientation influences the level at which decisions are made. Since the decision-making procedures described above concern a group and not an individual, this paper will dwell more on how broad value systems influence decision making amongst organizations and policy-making bodies.

What is culture?

Culture, as a concept, is both complex and elusive. However, a number of scholars have made attempts to define it variously and, at times, vaguely. Some have even argued that the concept has come to mean everything and nothing (Diagne and Ossebi, 1996). This definition from UNESCO well illustrates this particular point:

Culture is a ...set of distinctive, spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or a social group. Other than arts and the humanities, it covers modes of life, fundamental human rights, value systems, traditions and beliefs (UNESCO, 1982:3).

Such and related definitions have been dismissed as incapable of allowing systematic conceptualization, in favour of an approach that provides concrete variables (Gilbert, 1989; Segall, 1984). Further still, Jahoda (1984), and Munene et al (2005, pp.44) contend that this approach is

problematic because of the sheer number of potentially relevant variables and the absence of a theory for understanding their interrelations, organizing them, and choosing among them.

According to Tayeb (1988, p.42) “culture is a set of historically evolved learned values, attitudes and meanings shared by members of a given society”. Hofstede (1997) refers to culture as the collective programming of the mind, which distinguishes the members of one group or category of the people from another. Fays (2003) considers culture as “... a complex set of shared beliefs, values and concepts which enable a group to make sense of its life and provides it with directions on how to live”. Fays posits that in order to understand human behaviour; we must pay particular attention to the inner logic which orders the various elements that comprise the social system as a whole.

Therefore, culture could mean shared views, perceptions, beliefs, values, and practices that characterize a given society. Taken a step further, culture provides the tools and the environment for learning how to function in society (Geertz, 1975; Vygotsky, 1978), the how and the why (Hofstede, 1997). People reproduce their culture as they learn how to function, and transform their culture as they learn why they should function in particular ways.

A lot of studies have been carried out concerning culture in order to come up with clear variables. Some of the major ones that have sought to identify a comprehensive set of cultural value dimensions are Hofstede (1997), Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) and Trompenaars (1993).

Decision making approaches in Organizations

This section attempts to draw a relationship between actors and how they arrive at decisions. The underlying assumption is that for a decision to take place, people must interact, and the way they interact determines the nature of the decision established. Karyeiya (2005) notes that when rules are followed, decisions tend to reflect prime objectives. Secondly, decisions reflect compromise and, thirdly, they reflect consensus. The difference between compromise and consensus is that actors give different reasons as to why they adhere to a compromise, and identical reasons as to why they adhere to a consensus (Habermas, 1996).

Patterns of communication within a decision-making body can be partly explained through rationality. Rationality may be defined as action based on reason, good sense, values, desired ends, openness to argumentation, and an assumption on how we view the world. There are three types of rationality: contextual, strategic and communicative. These forms of rationality inform communication processes, especially in the context of decision making (Eriksen and Weirgard, 1993; Zey, 1998).

Contextual rationality refers to actions that are compatible with norms. We can only know what is rational through situational and normative contexts of action. Contextual rationality is based on rule following. It responds to the question: what is appropriate?

Strategic rationality refers to action oriented towards maximizing goals or preferences. It is based on means-ends calculus, taking other actors' strategies into consideration. The basis of discussion is threats and promises, and the negotiation strategy is either competition

or cooperation. It also exhibits instrumentalism where purposive-oriented actions within predictable and stable environments are done. The standard is the degree to which actors choose the best means to achieve some preconceived goals. It is based on calculation and the concern is to solve problems effectively.

Communicative rationality proposes that people coordinate actions through significant symbols and mutually respecting validity claims. People argue in relation to inter-subjective standards of truth, rightness and sincerity. Actors reach a consensus and judge reasonable choices through the force of better argument (Eriksen & Weirgard, 1993, pp.8 -23).

From these forms of rationality, I propose three processes to help understand the nature and structure of interaction between actors and their decisions; a) contextual rationality goes with rule-following-oriented decision making, b) strategic rationality goes with compromise-oriented decision making, while c) communicative rationality goes with consensus-oriented decision making. When the rule-following process is dominant, decisions reflect context and specific objectives. The dominance of compromise orientation reflects narrow preferences. While the consensus inclination produces a well-reasoned decision.

Rule-following decision making: From this perspective, decision making occurs according to objectives and by following rules, procedures, and routines (Scott, 2003, pp.27). This mode of decision making could be explained by contextual rationality, which is concerned with fairness and justice. Actions are compatible with norms, and rationality is perceived by relating an action to the situation and normative context. Rules decide the type of participants: who will do what and what kind of resources to be deployed (March and Olsen, 2003). Rules are responsible for shaping and modifying an actor's interactions. Rules help allocate time and give occasion on how to express dissent. It can be emphasized that the nature of rules determines a decision. Different rules shape decisions differently. The outcome is likely to reflect objectives.

Allison (1999, p.14) argues that decisions are organizational outputs. Organizations come up as a response to problems. They are designed to handle specific problems and in order to perform tasks; members have to be well coordinated. Standards of procedure are developed for sectors to do what they ought to do. Organizational routines, rules and standards of procedure constrain behaviour and optimal choice to achieve efficiency. Organizations strive for legitimacy and status. As people within organizations interact, organizations develop a distinct culture that shapes individual behaviour. Organizations derive their preferences from within themselves. They are aggregations of interests where problems of cooperation and collective accountability are resolved.

March and Olsen (2003) argue that the logic of appropriateness is rule-based. Rules are followed and roles fulfilled while an individual is taking action. The logic of appropriateness is contextual; actors emphasize social obligation in specific situations. Behaviour is intentional and action stems from necessity. One relies on intuition rather than calculation to take action. Intuition is informed through training, education, socialization and experience. Choice is based on morality and obligation. This is a clear manifestation of cultural underpinnings in decision making.

Decision makers may maintain consistency between behaviour and a conception of self in their roles. This provides an opportunity for actors to execute standards of procedure, fulfil role expectations, satisfy commitments, and define virtue and truth (March and Olsen, 1976, pp.10 -12). Actors develop the ability to conform to prevailing rules and inter-organizational influences. Interest groups emerge and foster cliques or other interactions responsible for informal structures and new power centres. Organizations relate to the environment geographically and also with the sector involved. In order for a decision to be rule-following, the actors require an identity to make collective decisions. The ultimate situation is to create a “we” feeling. Membership is based on shared values; and since values are a cornerstone of culture, the role of culture cannot be underestimated.

Compromise-oriented decision making: This process is characterized by division of labour, threats, sanctions and rewards. This process may be partly explained by instrumental rationality which denotes that actions are purpose-oriented. Actors choose options by evaluating likely consequences for what they stand for. Lipset (1960) cited in March and Olsen (2003), claims that decisions result from calculations designed to maximize given preferences. Decision making is a narrow-interest-gaining process which could be viewed as a composition of groups pursuing particular interests where each group attempts to impose its preferences with none determining the final goal (Scott, 2003, p. 296).

Decisions are driven by preferences and expectations about consequences. Behaviour is wilful, reflecting an attempt to make outcomes fulfil subjective desires, to the extent possible. The actor chooses among alternatives by evaluating their likely consequences for personal or collective objectives, conscious that other actors are doing likewise. Actions and outcomes are products of rational calculating behaviour designed to maximize a given set of preferences. However, one may ask a question as to where preferences actually come from. As Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky (1990, p. 63) noted, it is culture that teaches people what to prefer and what to abhor. Decision makers are motivated to act according to the consequences of their pretences. Key questions an actor asks him/herself are: What are my alternatives? What are my values? What are the consequences of alternatives to my values? In the final analysis an actor chooses alternatives with the best consequences (March, 1989, pp.23).

The second aspect of the compromise-oriented decision making is based on bargaining and negotiation. The typical outcome of bargaining is a compromise. Compromise is established by giving and taking. None of the parties get exactly what they want, but each regards the result as better than no agreement. How much the various actors have to deviate from their opening position depends on the strength of their bargaining power (Eriksen & Weirgard, 1993; Rintala, 1969, pp.326 – 332).

According to Allison’s third conceptual model, governmental politics, an actor pursues a single strategic issue. Decisions result from interactions of competing preferences and bargaining games. These games include coalition building, actions and speeches. Actors play according to various conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals. Decisions do not follow single choice but haggling (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, p.225).

For one to clearly explain why certain decisions are taken, it is of great value to identify games and players, coalitions, bargains and compromises, and convey some feel of the confusion within their deliberations. Decision makers have specific preferences that determine priorities, perceptions, and positions. Action channels and not peoples' positions matter (Eriksen & Weirgard, 1993). Decisions are affected by the way in which they are framed and put on the agenda, by the nature of actors, and their numerical strength. Actors possess preconceived ideas based on their mother organizations. Mother organizations have clear tasks, missions and preferences (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, pp.282). These organizations also have distinct cultures. There could be better or worse cultures, stronger or weaker cultures, and the right kind of culture will influence how the organization behaves.

However, despite the agreement on the agenda and policy choices, conflicts emerge and cannot be ignored. Symptoms of conflicts may include vacillation, feelings of uncertainty, and emotional stress. Stressed actors resort to defensive avoidance by exaggerating favourable consequences, downplaying unfavourable consequences, and denying uneasy feelings (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, pp. 283-285). This scenario is well captured thus:

Society deals with the fact that time only runs one way; that is we are all caught in the reality of past, present and future, and we have to live with the reality because the future is unknown and always will be. Some societies socialize their members into accepting this uncertainty and not becoming upset by it...such societies can be called weak uncertainty avoidance society...other societies socialize their people into trying to beat the future...such societies can be called strong uncertainty avoidance societies...Because the future remains essentially unpredictable. (Hofstede,1983, p.81).

Consensus-oriented decision making: In the third process an agreement is reached through consensus. Consensus denotes free discussion, purposeful deliberation, discourse, as within the logic of communicative rationality. Buzan(1981, p.236) claims that consensus-based decision making means consent that does not involve recourse to voting. Consensus is a process for group decision-making. It is a method by which ideas of an entire group are collected and synthesized to establish an acceptable decision. Collective ownership of a decision and trust, are promoted as a better solution is sought.

Decisions are based on arguing. Arguing, which dominates communicative action is diametrically opposed to power-based interaction patterns that dominate strategic action. In a pure bargaining process, power is the only asset that matters. Bargaining is the device that exchange signals about power resources available to participants. Agreement is established as a compromise, dependent on external conditions of a bargaining situation (Eriksen & Weirgard, 1993, p.11; Gehring, 2003, p.71).

Communicative action is affected exclusively by speech. A communicative utterance is true by corresponding to a state of affairs in the objective world; it is right by appealing to legitimate norms in society; and it is sincere by accurately representing the inner state of a speakers' subjective world. The only way to find reasonable solutions to practical questions is through a free discussion among concerned actors without force, so that the better argument

prevails. An argument must be subjected to public scrutiny and an actor must be able to apply a norm as equal to him as to others (Tonheim, 2003). In the event that there are many parties involved, members must be able to represent their interests appropriately. All actors must have opportunity to speak and be heard. There should be no form of discrimination about who should talk and who should not talk, or about who should be listened to and who should not.

Gehring notes that for a speech act to be effective, it must have valid contents, and provide reasons to support a claim (Gehring, 2003, p.73). Convincing reasons replace sanctions that accompany strategic action. Rationality in communicative action denotes the provision of convincing reasons for one's claims, and not the best pursuit of one's preferences. Claims must be subjected to public scrutiny and the actor must be able to defend his choice against criticism. Conflicting validity claims are resolved through the creation of a common conviction based on reason. This process of allowing collective judgment is discourse. In a discourse, actors agree on the criterion for judging conflicting validity claims and engage each other until at least one party changes his/her original position to achieve consensus. Within a discourse, the power to convince others relies immediately on the free compulsion of the better argument (Gehring, 2003, p.74).

However, in itself, discourse does not validate claims. The driving force of communicative action is to convince others on the basis of reasons, and not threats or sanctions. It is also not concerned with power and its dispensation. Therefore, by applying communicative rationality, actors obtain a standard based on common interest and not individual preferences. Individuals represent various interests and have to be involved in the decision-making process.

A variety of actors ought to have sufficient information on the subject matter. Information should be shared, available to all and sufficient to make reasonable presentations. Deliberations must be carried out according to good reasons for better arguments to prevail. Whatever issues actors raise should be scrutinized and assumptions critically investigated. Actors must speak sincerely and honestly; and ought to be in a legitimate position to do so; they ought to speak comprehensibly and factually. Finally, consensus must be sought. The decision will be consensual to the degree that the above conditions are met. The closer actors are to meeting these conditions, the more likely communicative action is achieved. An attempt to approximate deliberations to a communicative process helps ensure that decisions take into account important knowledge and perspectives.

The above described decision-making patterns may lead into two general categories: incremental and radical decisions. Incremental decisions are close to the existing and past decisions. On the other hand, radical decisions are new and novel. It is therefore imperative to analyze how the three patterns of interaction relate to incremental and radical decision making.

Incremental and novel decisions

Incremental decisions

To be incremental suggests adding a little to the existing /past decision or adjusting the previously made decision. This implies that the amount of change involved is low. The new decision will not have a fundamental departure from the previous one. Second, the level of available knowledge and information is equally low and “decisions thus arrived at are usually only marginally different from those that exist, thus, changes from the status quo in decision-making are incremental” (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p.171). Incremental decisions are characterized by small-scale and less risky policy options because the constraints on decision makers are high.

The instrumentalism perspective claims that decision making is determined by time. Previously made decisions are crucial determinants of present policies. Incremental decisions work on the logic that the future is a linear function of the past. This means that policies are heavily constrained by past commitments. In addition, policy making is understood as the application of rules and standards of procedure which are hoped to reduce complexity, calculation and uncertainty (Lane, 1993, pp.73). Within incremental decision making, actors continually build out from the current situation by small degrees. Lindblohm (1965) suggests that there are two reasons why decisions are incremental: a) it is easier to continue the existing pattern of distribution, rather than impute new values through bargaining; b) the standard operating procedures tend to promote the continuation of existing practices.

Incremental decisions are criticized for lacking goal orientation because they “have us cross and recross intersections without knowing where we are going” (Forester, 1984, p.23). Still, conservative ideas emerge because of the restraint to have new ideas. Further, it promotes undemocratic practices by confining decision making to a small group of people. Lastly, it focuses on short-sighted decisions that can be of negative consequences to society in the long run (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p.172). However, despite the above-mentioned short-comings, incremental decisions exist and policies may reflect these tendencies.

Novel decisions

On the other hand, novel decisions may be referred to as radical or revolutionary. Lindblohm (1965) argues that with revolutionary decisions, there is a high level of available knowledge. This means that actors have a lot of information concerning the subject matter and are therefore not prisoners of the past as is the case in incremental decisions. Second, the level of change from earlier decisions is high. New options are radically different from the old ones. They may not even have traces of the old and existing decisions.

Novel decisions are characterized by new options and major changes. Because of low constraints there is a high chance of having large-scale, high risk options. One may therefore ask: So what would a novel decision-making process look like? To begin with, novel decisions emphasize cooperation and not competition. Actors use competition not to win or dominate; but rather, to generate the best option that is agreed upon by all the actors involved. In addition, cooperation recognizes that it is not necessary to attack another’s efforts in order to do your

best. Within group interactions, cooperation allows the group's best to be better than the sum of its parts. Novel decisions may enable actors to cope with future challenges. They create standards on issues on how to do things when such actions are unavailable.

While taking novel decisions, actors seek to understand another's point of view. By appreciating each other's points of view and focusing on the common good, a new perspective emerges. This process involves creativity, synthesis, open-mindedness, trust, better communication and understanding. Dominance of ideas and individuals is also minimized through participatory democracy, information sharing, and equal access to power. Access to power means that leaders are accountable and share skills and information. As such, any or all of the members can fill any of the leadership roles, and therefore cannot be easily dominated. Dominating attitudes and controlling behaviour is not tolerated because actors show respect and expect to be shown respect (Lindblohm, 1965).

Every actor is motivated to do their personal best to reach decisions which are in the best interest of society. Posturing and taking sides is not evident in the decision-making process. Conflicts would be seen as an opportunity for growth, expanding people's thinking, sharing new information, and developing new solutions which include everyone's perspectives. The policy subsystem enables actors to participate, conflict is freely expressed, and decisions are established in the best interest of everyone involved.

The Influence of Culture on Decision Making: an application of Hofstede value dimensions

In order to link culture with decision making, this paper assumes that culture has a vital, although not exclusive, influence on decision making. Hofstede notes that values are the core of culture. They are feelings which lead an individual or group to prefer a certain state of affairs against another. As such, therefore, they both constrain and determine the decisions a given community takes. Given the confusion and controversy brought about by the definition of culture, this paper shall mainly focus on the Hofstede framework.

Hofstede's Value Dimensions of Culture

Hofstede suggests that five cultural value dimensions could be derived from the ways members of a particular society typically cope with societal problems. He calls these dimensions: power distance; individualism/collectivism; uncertainty avoidance; masculinity/femininity; and short-term/long-term orientation. While widely employed, the Hofstede dimensions have been subject to several criticisms, including the fact that he provided little data on sub Saharan Africa.

His dimensions could be summarised thus: power distance is the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organisations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. Individualism stands for a society in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family. Collectivism is the opposite of individualism, and stands for a society in which people, from birth onwards, are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which through people's lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.

Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations. Masculinity stands for a society in which emotional gender roles are clearly distinct: men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focussed on material success; women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life. Femininity on the other hand, stands for a society in which emotional gender roles overlap: both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender and concerned with the quality of life. Long-term orientation stands for the fostering of virtues oriented towards future rewards, in particular perseverance and thrift, whereas short-term orientation stands for the fostering of virtues related to the past and present -- in particular, respect for tradition, preservation of "face" and fulfilling social obligations (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, pp.399-444).

Individualism/Collectivism and decision making

With this dimension, one can note that it is not only behaviour that is influenced by this dimension, but also decision structures may be constrained by it. Gaenslen (1986) proposes that an emphasis on either individualist or collectivist value orientations will affect the level and attention given to the structural aspects of group composition and forum for decision making. He asserts that individualists will pay less attention to such aspects, often even placing them to chance, whereas collectivists should lay greater attention to such details and expend much more time and energy on making sure they uphold the expected norms.

In his study of the Czech and Slovak policy making bodies, Sobotka (2003) found that among the Czechs, decision-making procedures are left to chance and emphasis is placed on task rather than on social relationship. On the contrary, for the Slovak commission, when dealing with unexpected problems they appear to pay more attention to decision forums and group composition, with social relationships playing an important role in decision making. He also found out that within the Slovak body, there was competition because

this conforms to expectation, since group harmony is not a priority within individualist orientations. Instead, individuals are free to act as advocates for opinions and budget allocation and conflict resolutions should occur through argumentation, persuasion and the competition of contending viewpoints (Sobotka, 2003:p.10).

He also concludes that amongst the Czech, conflict is acceptable; whereas conflict is downplayed amongst the Slovak as an indication of the emphasis on harmony within the organization that is consistent with a collectivist value orientation. Actually, Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) remind us that the general norm amongst people from a collectivist bias is to maintain harmony and avoid direct confrontations, whereas speaking one's mind is a characteristic of an honest person.

A number of implications may be drawn from these illustrations: first of all it seems that the individualist culture emphasizes decisiveness, speed and individual selection of alternatives. The other influence is on the decision-making style. In instances where conflict avoidance is high (collectivist cultures), there is a possibility that the decision-making style will be strategic. This is because within the strategic mode of decision making, there is a lot of negotiation and show of power, and such kind of decision making is heavily influenced by

tendencies towards the collective dimension. On the other hand, in the case of low conflict avoidance, there is a tendency for the decision-making style to be consensual, because the individual is free to speak his / her own mind and sees it as an issue of honesty. It may be noted that management is management of individuals and decision makers are trained to be honest in sharing feelings as opposed to the collectivists who prefer management of groups (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, p.104).

As far as the institutional decision-making process is concerned, one may argue that it is highly influenced by the individualist kind of culture. According to Hofstede and Hofstede (2005, p.104), hiring and promotion decisions are supposed to be based on skills and rules only, and the following of rules and set procedures is the hallmark of institutional decision making. Decision makers have a high affinity for taken-for-granted-scripts, rules and classifications (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, pp.155 - 157; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991).

Collectivism will affect the need for stable relationships between negotiators. For example assuming two parties are negotiating, in a collectivist setting, the new negotiator will take long to be accepted whereas in the individualist culture progress will be less hindered.

Power Distance and decision making

Power distance denotes attitudes towards authority, where there is an extent to which there is willingness amongst members of a culture to accept unequal distribution of power. It is also related to conformity and its opposite, encouragement of intellectual independence and a readiness to challenge alternative interpretation. In terms of decision making, cultures with low power distance allow for disagreements and competition of ideas. Multiple opinions have opportunity to be explored and consultative decision making takes place in a collegial atmosphere. This tendency will most likely promote consensus-oriented decision making, where one or more actors are convinced by an argument or mutually adjust to each other's views in order to reach an agreement (Eriksen & Weirgard, 1993, pp. 10 - 11).

However, on the other hand, cultures that exhibit high power distance are highly centralized. Decision-making processes are a preserve of those at the top; subordinates are reluctant to participate in decision making and organizations are very hierarchical. The decision making responsibility is therefore generally left to those in the higher echelons of the organization. The superiors take decisions and subordinates are just involved in implementation. Conflicts are not resolved; instead attempts are made to suffocate them.

In his study, Sobotka (2003) found that among the Czech, there were high levels of responsibility and participation, which is an indication of small power distance. Power distance in terms of negotiation will affect the degree of the control and decision-making structures and the importance of the status of the negotiators. Therefore, if it is a culture, it will influence the strategic decision-making process in way that the underdogs will lose in case the decision is about getting a compromise. Compromise may be a strategy to settle differences by consent through mutual concessions. It involves horse-trading to overcome conflict and struggle. It involves power. It is politics. In societies with high power distance, therefore, it is much more likely that they will lose in the conflict since they will allow the powerful to prevail (Rintala, 1969, p. 255).

Munene et al (2000, p.347) also found out that the emphasis on hierarchy and embeddedness at the expense of egalitarianism and autonomy values in Africa is expressed appropriately in decision making only with the consent of superiors, which is the most strongly preferred decision-making mode reported by managers in Uganda and Zimbabwe. They further discovered that African managers tend to be reluctant to consult their juniors, although there may be some variations. This therefore indicates that areas with high power distance tend to favour the concentration of power in a few hands, and especially at the top.

Uncertainty avoidance and decision making

This dimension is concerned with how different cultures solve the problem of uncertainty, ambiguity and the accompanying anxiety. According to Hofstede and Hofstede (2005), societies with low uncertainty avoidance have few (and general rules) and standards of procedure characterizing organizations. However, communities with high uncertainty avoidance have authority vested in rules and standards of procedure that are many and precise throughout the organization. This is because laws and rules try to prevent uncertainties in the behaviour of other people. In their study on African managers, Munene et al, also discovered that

African managers will often seek guidance from their superiors and from formal rules and procedures. A tightly organized hierarchical system embodies and expresses hierarchy and embeddedness values and to follow the formal guidelines that constitute the role expectations shared by all organizational members. (Munene et al, 2000, p.346).

Hofstede & Hofstede further observes that people from strong uncertainty avoidance cultures may come across as busy, fidgety, emotional, aggressive and suspicious; whereas people from weak uncertainty avoidance countries may give the impression of being dull, quiet, easygoing, indolent, controlled and lazy (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, p.172). These levels of emotionality also affect the decision making procedures. One may conclude that a person who is aggressive and suspicious will prefer to have decisions taken through clear procedures so that there is evidence of what transpired in contrast to a person with low uncertainty avoidance. This is because the person from the low uncertainty avoidance is likely to trust the other partner and will be more willing to listen to the alternative views than the person from high uncertainty avoidance. It is also probable that one who seems indolent will process information differently from a fidgety and busy person. This in turn affects how they take decisions: the former is likely to take time making decisions and will tend not to be very strict with deadlines as opposed to the latter.

Such conditions are most favourable for the institutional mode of decision making because it is all about rules, and the type of rules used have an impact on the decisions taken as well. The decision maker's behavior is driven by rules. Actions are seen as matching of a situation to the demands of a position in society. Actions are based on what the actor is supposed to do and the self-awareness of one's role (March & Olsen, 1989).

Another possibility is that decision making which is rule-based gives decision makers limited room for discretion as opposed to an arena of general rules. More so, there is a likelihood that a subordinate will agree with a decision taken whereas he is not convinced about it and,

worse still, does not express his disagreement. Hofstede and Hofstede go on to say that under weak uncertainty avoidance, societies' results are attributed to a person's ability and there is a fast acceptance of new technologies like the internet. This implies that an individual's contribution is well recognized in the decision-making process than in the strong uncertainty avoidance circumstances where results are attributed to luck. This may serve as a motivator for the innovative and creative decision makers and, at the same time, decision making across geographical boundaries may be easier and cheaper to conduct amongst the weak uncertainty avoidance situations because of the ease in adapting new technologies (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, p. 181). This cultural dimension is consistent with characteristics of a consensus-oriented decision-making strategy which leads to novel decisions.

Hofstede actually identifies that in organizations where there is strong uncertainty avoidance, there is tendency to focus on decision content and experts for answers whereas weak uncertainty avoidance cultures focus on decision process and generalists and common sense for answers (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, p.188). This may indicate that in the former, there is systematic decision making and a decision is influenced by those who have expertise and therefore participation is limited to knowledge of the subject matter; whereas in the latter case, the chance that a logical and sensible argument may affect the decision-making process is high. In terms of the earlier perceived decision-making modes, it highly influences the strategic mode because it involves power relations. In this case, the powerful are the knowledgeable and the experts; whereas in the weak uncertainty avoidance cultures, the chances for consensus-oriented decision making to flourish is high because it is the force of the better argument through generalists and common sense. This means that the most logical and acceptable proposal is likely to be taken instead of insistence on experts. It is therefore indicative of a contextual structure that will support the consensus-oriented decision-making style to prevail.

Masculinity/Femininity and decision making

This value dimension may not provide much insight into how culture affects decision making. However, a few assumptions could be made since it deals with assertive behaviour versus modest behaviour. Hofstede notes that in masculine cultures conflicts are resolved by a good fight where the best man must win, whereas in the feminine cultures there is a preference for resolving conflicts by compromise and negotiation (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, pp.143). Implications to decision-making are such that within the feminine culture, there is a tendency to seek consensus and work-related decisions are made to favour better livelihoods; whereas in the masculine societies, the decision-making mode is characterized by decisiveness and aggression, where it is the logic of the strongest that takes the day. Therefore the possibility of having a feminine culture tolerate the force of the better argument is high, and hence a promising atmosphere for the consensus-oriented decision-making process, and the opportunity for novel decisions to arise.

Masculinity will affect the need for ego-boosting behaviour and the sympathy on the part of negotiators and the superior. A study of decision making in a leading Dutch firm led consultants to criticize its decision-making style for being intuitive and consensus-based, which in actual sense shows that such a firm is feminine-oriented (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, p.269). Munene et al also noted that there was a stronger reliance on colleagues at one's

level amongst African managers and those cultural values generally affected what managers chose to ignore, overlook and take aboard by virtue of the cultural blinders (Munene et al, 2000). This further indicates that the masculine-oriented culture supports more of the strategic decision-making strategy. With strategic decision-making processes, it is more about struggle where the mighty take it if they can manage to do so.

Long-term and short-term orientation and decision making

Institutional and strategic decision-making styles may lead to incremental decisions and the consensus-oriented decision-making style may lead to novel decisions (Karyeija, 2005, pp. 31 - 33). Given that assumption, there is need to underline how incremental and novel decisions may be influenced by culture.

According to Hofstede, in short-term-oriented cultures, the results of the past period are very important. Present decisions are dependent on past decisions, and therefore decision-making processes are path dependent and, by implication, incremental. Incremental decisions usually provide little improvement and the standards of procedure encourage such a situation. Therefore, the cost of short-term decisions in terms of pecuniary considerations, myopic decisions, work process control, hasty adoption and quick abandonment of novel ideas is high (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, pp.219). Therefore, this cultural belief system leads managers to be judged by results of decisions that may have been taken by others in the past. This may have dire consequences for the decision-making process and decisions made thereof because incremental decision-making is understood as the application of rules and standards of procedure which are hoped to reduce complexity, calculation and uncertainty (Lane, 1993, p.73). This draws us to the understanding that as a cultural dimension, uncertainty avoidance will affect the level of tolerance of ambiguity and trust in opponents who show unfamiliar behaviour, and also the amount of structure and procedure during negotiations. Therefore, in settings with high uncertainty avoidance, there will be a high tendency to rule application in the decision-making process.

Novel decisions are usually a reflection of consensus and free will in the decision-making process. It is therefore probable that the feminine culture may have a great influence on this kind of decision-making style. Therefore we might also find that weak uncertainty avoidance will lead to this kind of decision making because such cultures actually find emphasis on rules 'horrifying'.

Key Observations and Implications

There are three key lessons that can be learnt from this study. First, that culture is a very important explanatory variable as far as decision making processes are concerned. Individuals' ability to establish decisions and implement them is largely connected to the different cultural backgrounds. This in turn has a bearing on their expectations, norms and values, which then translates into the kind of decisions that they make. For instance, people with high uncertainty avoidance will tend to come up with decisions that try to minimize the likely negative consequences arising out of the decision. They will tend to come up with decisions that incline to create more rules, procedures guidelines and institutions, while those with low uncertainty avoidance will tend towards emphasizing behavioral change.

Second, we also learn that when decision makers are coming up with a decision, the context within which they are deciding triggers the cultural norms and values that they espouse. The effect of this is that while dealing with information, they are not operating as robots, who are predicted with precision based on their cultural profile, but they are reflective, based and within a particular context. As they reflect, their reflections are influenced by their cultural profile and the extent to the prevailing circumstances triggers the expectations, norms and values to the mind of the decision makers.

Last, the forms of interactions between individuals in the decision among process create a platform whereby the cultural profiles either converge or diverge. These forms of personal interaction result into particular normative actions and responses. The actions and responses are either made to elicit support or win a debate. But whichever way it takes, frames of mind represented publically by individuals through ideas and arguments they propound is very relevant in decision analysis and culture researcher.

Conclusions

This paper has been concerned with two broad issues, i.e., a) to examine the extent to which societal culture is isomorphic to organizational culture, and b) to draw a relationship between organizational culture and decision making. Though the analysis is largely theoretical, there are indications that a viable relationship exists between decision making and culture in organizations. An empirical study on the subject may not only shed more light on the subject matter, but may also reveal that decision-making styles, and decisions themselves, differ from one organization to another, not only because of leadership, age, technology, etcetera, but maybe also due to the diverse organizational cultures.

From the above discussion, we have noted that there are some types of decision-making styles which may be adopted by decision makers at whatever level. However, it is also imperative to note that, among other things, cultural profiles constrain and influence the art of decision making and decisions taken thereof.

The paper has also demonstrated that for each chosen cultural dimension, based on the dimensions by Hofstede, there is an influence on decision making. This implies to us that for an organization, members find themselves developing a shared cultural value system, which in turn influences the way they think and make decisions. It is also pertinent to note that these values are a reflection of the dominant cultural values in society. Therefore since decisions are products of thought processes and these thought processes are dependent on schema and scripts embedded within the minds of decision makers, it plausible to suggest that culture has an important, albeit contributory, role in influencing decision making in organizations.

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Service Delivery and Performance Management for Development at Local Levels in Tanzania: A Myth or Reality?

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Abstract

Tanzania's Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP) of 1998 aimed at improving the delivery of quality services to the public. The main strategy is decentralization, which is being implemented through decentralization by devolution. The effective decentralization of Government and the reform of Local Government are part of the foundations of change in the education and health sectors. The reform programme includes devolution of roles and authority by the Central Government by transferring political, financial and development planning authority to Local Government Authorities (LGAs); freedom to make policy and operational decisions consistent with the laws of the land and Government policies, without interference by the Central Government institutions; and, LGAs being responsible for the efficient and effective delivery of social and economic services to the people (URT, 1998). The link between development and devolved performance management is anchored on Stigler's menu, that is, the closer the government is to the people the better it works (Liviga, 2009). This refers to the fundamentals of democratic practices such as citizens' capacity to own the agenda of development and their ability to monitor the actions and inactions of the individuals holding public offices on their behalf. The article thus, through review of literatures, examines the Tanzanian Government's implementation of its decentralization by devolution (D-by-D) policy, and the impact of the output on performance management in service delivery and development landmarks. The historical factors of centralization tend to create the flaws in the design and implementation of D-by-D in most Central Government ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs). It is concluded that performance measurement for development at local levels is a myth.

Key words: Decentralization, Devolution, Development, Performance, Management

Introduction

Tanzania, from independence, has endeavoured to promote development through various macro- economic policies. The period following independence experienced a remarkable policy and ideological shift from inherited capitalist structure to socialist ideology. Socialism was considered as a Mecca from ignorance, disease and poverty the malignant enemies so pronounced by the father of the nation, Mwalimu J. K. Nyerere. These concerted efforts achieved the mission through transforming the country's economic and socio-political status to a level that is admirable.

The current period can be mentioned as a continuation of the previous period. However, recent years have seen the development and implementation of a number of overarching development policies that envisage more comprehensive provision of social services that would reach all citizens, including the poor, as a fabric of addressing the three mutually supportive enemies pronounced at independence.

The basic argument is that the local government reforms in Tanzania would not attain the service delivery function for performance management to realize grass-root development unless decentralization by devolution is attained and the MDAs are willing and committed to transferring authority and resources to LGAs. In that regard, the discussion starts in Part one by looking at Tanzania's experience with service delivery and performance management for development under a devolved system in the sectors of education and health. The idea is that by looking at the chronology of events a clear understanding of how the decentralized service delivery will contribute to the development of local communities. Then the discussion focuses on the ongoing reform initiatives by looking at the success and challenges of the first phase regarding service delivery and performance management (LGRP I, 2000 - 2008) and the rationale for the second phase (LGRP II, 2008 – 2013) in the promotion of the same.

Theoretical and Methodological Issues

Although it is tempting to conceptualize devolution as the antithesis of centralization, in reality, the two are multidimensional, multilevel, processual (Hur, 2006), and dialectically related. Understanding the latter illuminates discussion on the former and vice versa. The model of decentralization in Tanzania is premised on a form of performance management informed by two notions of power: neo-liberal and post-Marxist (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). Neo-liberals conceptualize devolution in terms of promoting service proximity to the citizens to achieve efficiency, effectiveness, economy, equity and equality, in which power is a generalized attribute deployed for collective benefit; while, on the other hand, using a relational and conflictual notion of power, post-Marxists see devolution as the way of centre talking the talk without walking its talk (Mohan & Stokke, 2000).

The policy of decentralization in Tanzania takes a comprehensive form under the Local Government Reform Programme (URT,1998). Within this model of decentralization, flexibility, multi-disciplinary teams and multi-skilling decentralization in publicly-funded services are key to improved performance (Burns et al, 1994). The important link here is that decentralization is seen as having the potential to improve organizational performance through localization and organizational change, usually conceptualized as smaller independent organizations rather than simply as sub-units of larger bureaucracies.

In short, according to Pollitt et al (1998: pp.1) [decentralization is] “*a miracle cure for a host of bureaucratic and political ills*”. Academics with a taste for post-modernism would no doubt refer to it as an attempt at a meta-narrative – a conceptual and linguistic project designed simultaneously to supersede (and therefore solve) a range of perceived ills within the previous discourse of public administration. Moreover, Bossert's (1998) view is that there are two key questions that need to be asked about decentralization (pp.150).

1. Does decentralization improve equity, efficiency, quality of services, health outcomes and democratic processes?
- 2 .And, if it does, which forms, mechanisms and processes of decentralization are most effective in achieving these outcome and output objectives?

Similarly, Saltman Bankauskaite and Vrangbaek (2003) reveal that: It has not been customary to assess the outcome of decentralization in the light of health gain, equity, quality

of care and consumer choice. Bossert (1998) in particular has been critical of the fact that there is a lack of an analytical framework to study how decentralization can achieve goals. In the organizational and management literature, conceptual frameworks have tended to relate to structure, process and outcome (Sheaff et al, 2004a; Donabedian, 1980) or input, process and outcome (Hales, 1999). What these frameworks do is allow an analysis of the factors that relate to organizations. It is useful, therefore, to draw on these frameworks to help identify what is being decentralized. For example, it is possible to see finance as an input and commissioning as a process. The efficient use of resources and effective commissioning should produce better health outcomes. While such a conceptual framework is also not without problems, it does provide a way of separating different activities and policies.

Devolution as a process, includes political participation for collective decision-making and shared leadership” (Perkins & Zimmerman, 1995, p. 570), while as an outcome; it may refer to skills such as resource mobilization, perceived control, and accessibility to community resources, pluralism... (Perkins & Zimmerman, 1995, p. 570). This article examines the extent to which decentralization has been able to realize the above in respect to organizational performance. It is argued that for organizational performance in service delivery to become meaningful, power must be shared between the centre and the local authorities. The more power that is shared, the greater the possibility to realise meaningful change (Hur, 2006). The views are shared by Emerson(1962) whose theory of power relations, and Gergen’s (1995) relational theory of power, to develop the ideas on decentralization and theory and practice.

Viewed from this perspective, service delivery in a devolved pefromance system for local development may be construed in terms of power relations (Gergen, 1995) between the centre and local authorities. The local level is a social space where individual citizens and other actors organized as private sector, community-based groups, government officials, politicians and professional organizations navigate, interact or engage in various forms of relationships, or on-going processes of human interchange (Gergen, 1995) using various forms of capital such as social, cultural, human, natural, symbolic, financial and political (Flora and Flora, 2008).

In order to answer the research question, this article relied on extensive review of policies and laws such as the Constitution, Local Government Act (LGA), Local Governmet Reform Programmes (LGRP I and II) and the D by D policy of 1998. The above policies were examined in order to measure the impact of devolution of service delivery to local development. I interrogated the relevance and appropriateness of these policies against the practice of the central government in which the local authorities have not been able to enjoy the autonomy as stated in D by D policy (Liviga, 2009; Kessy, 2009). This way, I was able to discern the weakness in the policies and shed light on the mechanisms and dynamics underlying performance in service delivery for local development to be a myth. As far as implementation is concerned, the study relied on review of existing literature and other anecdotal evidence.

Findings from the review of policies were supplemented by empirical evidence from other documentary sources on the topic and its facets. Although devolution has its associated risks, I was keen not to generalize the findings from other literature to the situation in Tanzania. Yet, combined with empirical evidence from Tanzania, the findings on the education and health services in a devolved system clearly explicate the problem of devolution policy in theory and practice in Tanzania.

Performance management in a devolved system

From 1996, the government of Tanzania decided to take initiatives to address the problems of underperformance in local governments by preparing the Local Government Reform Agenda (LGRA) whose policy intentions were outlined in the Policy Paper on Local Government Reforms issued in October 1998. The Policy Paper became the official guiding policy regarding local government reforms and decentralization by devolution (D by D). The main purpose of the reform was to improve the quality and access of public services provided through or facilitated by local government authorities.

The Government's vision is to have a local government system in which Local Government Authorities are largely autonomous institutions, free to make policy and operational decisions consistent with the laws of the land and government policies;

Strong and effective institutions underpinned by possession of resources (human and financial) and authority to perform their roles and functions; Institutions with leaders who are elected in a fully democratic process; Institutions which will facilitate participation of the people in planning and executing their development plans and foster partnerships with civic groups; Institutions with roles and functions that will correspond to the demands for their services; and institutions which operate in a transparent and accountable manner. (Mushi, 2001).

In the context of the above-given litany of devolution pledges, there are some numerable decentralization concerns for performance management and development. It is an acknowledged fact that the best government is that government closest to scrutiny and control by citizens. Local governments in any country, including Tanzania, form one of the levels that people can directly get involved and participate in formulation of development plans, make by-laws, decide on priority issues to include in development projects, identify and tackle challenges collectively as well as call for leaders to account for their actions or inactions at the community level. Local governments also play a key role in service provision at the grassroots level. They are assigned to deliver certain services in various sectors including agriculture, education, health, infrastructure (For example, construction or repair of feeder roads), land and water. In the context of Tanzania where about eighty per cent of the people live in rural areas, where delivery of basic services is less developed compared to urban areas, the importance of local governments cannot be overemphasized.

There is an integral functional relationship between improved service delivery and poverty reduction at local level. This fact has also been acknowledged by the Government of Tanzania that has through its Local Government Reform Programme (2008 – 2013) noted the critical role Local Government Authorities can play in the development process.

This alignment is clearly vindicated in the overall programme strategy embedding four core elements as follows:

First, remove political, institutional, legal and policy impediments to D by D, and thereby create an enabling framework to empower LGAs; Second, develop the capacity

of LGAs and thereby empower them to take effective advantage of the enabling D by D framework; Third, enable the *wananchi* (citizens) at all levels to participate and demand transparency and accountability in the devolved systems for allocation and use of public resources, and in planning and delivery of public services, socio-economic development and poverty reduction; and Fourth, install institutional and organisation systems and mechanisms, and develop leadership and management capacity at all levels to ensure effective implementation of the programme (URT,2009).

It is worthy a mention that local governments cannot yield their expected role and perform their functions if they are not capacitated to undertake those functions. In this regard, devolution is inherently an important strategy to empower local governments if they are to be transformed into competent and strategic leaders and coordinators of socio-economic development, accountable and transparent service delivery and poverty reduction interventions in their areas of jurisdiction. For instance, ward schools have been constructed by local communities through their local authorities. The construction has proven a great success due to accountability of funds in revenue and expenditure. In this regard, the demand side has revealed some strength in local development planning, monitoring and evaluation. This is a fruit of D by D.

Performance management for development on service delivery has in turn made the LGAs enhance capacity and facilitate mobilization of the private sector and other non-state actors to contribute to local development and service delivery (Kessy, 2008).

Indicators of a devolved performance management through MKUKUTA I and II Development Strategies

The purpose of having Local Government Authorities is, in the words of Article 146(1) of the United Republic of Tanzania constitution, “to transfer authority to the people”. Local Government Authorities have been given power to participate and to involve the people in the planning and implementation of development programmes within these respective areas and generally throughout the country. Every Local Government Authority has a constitutional mandate and obligation:

- To perform the functions of Local Government in its area
- To ensure the enforcement of law and public safety of the people; and
- To consolidate democracy within its area and to apply it to accelerate development of the people.

For the purpose of promoting development at the local communities’ level, the Minister responsible for Local Government has been mandated to subdivide the area of every district, town, municipality or city council into wards, which are also the electoral areas for the election of councilors representing the Ward in the Council. The number and size of the wards varies from council to council depending on population densities, size of the council area and geographical characteristics of the district, town, municipality or city in question. The ward is an administrative area for supervising implementation of council development programmes and service delivery and for coordinating activities of villages and neighborhoods within the ward.

Tanzania's National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP), commonly known by its Kiswahili acronym, MKUKUTA, resulted from the review of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) Paper. These strategies crop from the broad Tanzania's Development Vision 2025, especially with an increased focus on equitable growth and governance targets on poverty reduction outcomes which are consistent with, and indeed in many cases go in tandem with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

MKUKUTA I and II are profoundly based on extensive social inclusiveness which range from the central and local government, parliament, civil society, faith-based groups, private sector, districts and villages, and development partners. MKUKUTA envisages the principles of national ownership, political commitment to democratization and human rights, maintenance of macroeconomic and structural reforms, building on sector strategies and cross-sectoral collaboration, strengthening local partnerships for citizens' engagement in policy dialogue, harmonization of aid, equity and sharing of benefits, sustainable development, decentralization, and mainstreaming cross-cutting issues.

According to the 2007 Public Expenditure Review (PER) update for the health sector, the overall allocation to the health sector has increased from Tshs 499.6 billion in 2006/07 to Tshs 682.6 billion in 2007/08. Within this, the allocation to regions has increased from Tshs 24.6 billion in 2006/07 to Tshs 82.5 billion in 2007/08. Councils' allocations have increased from Tshs 142.0 billion in 2006/07 to Tshs 181.9 billion in 2007/08, with allocation for Comprehensive Councils' Health Plans from US\$ 0.5 to 0.75 per capita.

In 2010 the Government of Tanzania (GoT) allocated Tshs 1,205.9 billion an increase from Tshs 787.2 bn in 2009/10. In light of promoting the health sector, the government has adopted the process known as 'Opportunities and Obstacles to Development' or 'O and OD' as a preferred approach to participatory planning, thus making the process start at the lowest levels of governance and community as well. Participatory monitoring has also been introduced to ensure that the framework is adhered to by all stakeholders. The monitoring framework encompasses the following sub-systems:

- Public Expenditure Tracking System (PETS) which involves communities and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs); and
- Participatory Service Delivery Assessments (PSDA). This is going beyond 'following the money' to look at whether the allocated expenditure is having an impact.

Despite efforts made by the government to improve service delivery at the local level for improved performance management to promote development, there are notable impediments which entail the following:

- Access to information;
- Communication barriers complicated by the language used in policies, plans and reports;
- Harmonization of various participatory processes;
- Awareness of rights and obligations, and
- Capacity constraints at individual and organizational levels, particularly at the lowest levels of a town / village's structure, the mtaa (urban) and kitongoji (rural).

The selected devolved services of health and education and levels of performance management

Health sector

The health facilities face inadequate staff and this implies more time in seeking and securing health services to the citizens instead of engaging in production for wealth creation. Most of the districts have faced the problem of health workers due to poor infrastructure such as transport, electricity, clean and safe water which are not attractive to personnel settlement. Moreover, the ratio of patients to health staff and beds is quite high and the motive towards poverty reduction seems hard to achieve given such operational environment in health sector.

Moreover, continuing resource shortages for the health sector induced the government to reintroduce private health practice for profit in 1991, after it had been restricted since 1977. The aim is that private services complement health care services provided by the government. The aim of the 2001 National Health Policy is to ensure fair, equitable and quality services to the community. Furthermore, the policy aims at empowering communities and involving them in health service provision. However, most of the existing health centres are operating without adequate space for maternal and child health services. People living in rural areas and those in poverty remain disadvantaged both in terms of service uptake and outcomes. In an attempt to expand the coverage of health facilities throughout the country and bring services closer to the people, the new 2007 Health Policy directs the establishment of a dispensary in every village, a health centre in every ward and a district hospital in each district.

The recently designed Primary Health Sector Development Programme (PHSDP), 2007-2012, seeks to address some of the dominant constraints facing the health system: infrastructure at the primary level; shortages of skilled human resources for health; short supply of essential equipment, pharmaceuticals and medical supplies; poorly functioning referral systems including the absence of emergency transport and communication systems; and, inadequate financial allocation to the sector. Accordingly, the following seven programme components have been designed: District Primary Health Care Systems; Human Resources for Health; Maternal Health; HIV and AIDS; Malaria; Tuberculosis; and Institutional Arrangements.

The National Health Sector Strategic Plan (NHSSP) aims to enable the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW) to critically examine and identify areas that are core to its mandate and to strategically allocate the resources available to priority areas, i.e. those with the greatest impact, in line with MKUKUTA and other national policy frameworks. It is critical for the government to continue implementing the 2007 policy with the notion of proximity of services with such inadequate health staff.

One of the studies by (URT,2009) has found that there is a problem of record keeping regarding the health facilities equipment. In most health centres surveyed in various districts, around 35 per cent had no proper records regarding various matters inquired. This creates some potential of doubt whether poor record keeping can stimulate development under a devolved system of service delivery.

Indicators of Child Immunization statistics have improved significantly. According to the Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) statistics from the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW), coverage of DPT-HB3 for 2006 stood at 87 per cent - exceeding the MKUKUTA target of 85 per cent. Indeed, the rate for each of the last five years (2002-2006 inclusive) has been at or above the MKUKUTA target – a commendable achievement. The Tanzania 2007-2015 strategic plans for health have incorporated the recommendations of the Global Immunization and Vision Strategy (GIVS), such as increasing and sustaining national and district-level immunization coverage, ensuring access to quality vaccines, and strengthening health systems. By 2015, Tanzania aims to raise the level of national immunization coverage among children to 90 per cent.

User fees were introduced in Tanzania at the hospital level in 1993, as part of the broader package of reform referred to as the Health Service Fund. Further charges were introduced in 1999 through the drug revolving fund at hospital level with subsequent rolling out of the Community Health Fund (CHF)/TIKA. Currently, user fees are charged in practically all public hospitals and have also been introduced at lower levels of facilities, namely health centres and dispensaries. The rolling out of user fees in primary facilities is happening in tandem with the rolling out of the Community Health Fund.

Moreover, waivers and exemptions were supposed to protect the poor from the negative effects of cost sharing and user fees in vital services such as health and education. In health, for example, children under five, pregnant women, and people suffering from chronic diseases were theoretically entitled to free medical care in all public health institutions. Institutions were expected to exempt those classified as poor. This can be considered as a good practice. This practice intends as well to reduce maternal deaths by encouraging pregnant women to register and give birth at the health facilities.

However, exemptions of the above categories have been mere lip service as the poor have continued to dish out even the little that they would have saved for investment to pay for the services that are basically subsidized under the common basket. The problem has been malpractices and misbehaviour of the health sector personnel who decide to sell drugs in the neighbourhood at the expense of the poor. This is exemplified by Nkyabonaki (2008) when he commented that doctors and nurses have developed the culture of demanding for “something small” which not only deteriorates the service provision but also increases the burden to the poor. It is contended that the poorest households that are often excluded from using health facilities when they most need them should pay user charges that entail costs including transport, time spent, as well as unofficial costs such as bribes and payment for drugs and supplies.

Therefore, services provided under a devolved system are facing some inherent constraints which impede the poor from accessing quality services. Hence, it is natural that without addressing such constraints, it will be very difficult to create and harness the potential of growth for poverty reduction. An unhealthy body is unhealthy mind: thus the poor continue to be engulfed in absolute poverty. MKUKUTA policy is a landmark for the country's endeavours to develop. By promoting the essentials of good governance under the tiers of people's participation and accountability of the power wielders both at macro and micro

levels, the efficacy of the budget to serve the poor is realized. Literature portrays that mostly the processes of performance management are not transparent for the community's scrutiny. Community engagement in service sector provision would not only increase efficiency but also promote performance and sustainable development as projects are innovated, established and run by the community.

The author views the devolution of health services to the community level to be increasing the voicing of the poor people to demand for quality services at least at the theoretical level. Citizens and local politicians (councillors) do not have any vigour to resist the forces of local and central government elites.

Education sector

The education sector is among the priority areas of MKUKUTA which are premised to lead on poverty reduction. The major assumption is that illiteracy cannot lead one to see the invisible opportunities which are only possible through the developed think tanks in schools. Following that assumption, Tanzanian government has endeavoured to promote education at all levels in order to maximize the potential of its human resources. MKUKUTA has objectively defined the key indicators for the education sector as follows:

- Universal access for boys and girls to quality pre-primary and primary education achieved (NER to 100 per cent for pre-primary and primary);
- Access to lower and upper secondary for male and female students increased (NER to 45 per cent for lower secondary and 5 per cent for upper secondary);
- Primary school survival rate for boys and girls (Std I to Std VII) improved;
- Secondary school survival rates for boys and girls (Form 1 to 4; Form 5 to 6) improved;
- Improved pass rate for boys and girls at primary and secondary schools;
- Improved primary and secondary school transition rates;
- Quality teachers trained, deployed, and retained to achieve recommended qualified teacher-student ratio at all levels (Primary=1:45 and secondary=1:25)

The MKUKUTA priority areas are benchmarks which call for all stakeholders in the sector of education to harmonize their concerted efforts towards quality education, which ultimately will result in poverty reduction. The good governance norms demand for the shared responsibility between the government, CSOs and private sector for sustainable development. Along such thinking the sector has tremendously made vertical progress in the promotion of secondary education. It is revealed from the study that most schools are fairing well by having infrastructures which support the provision of education. Around 60 per cent of schools fared well to be having a source of power in most districts. Electricity is a every important component, particularly for science and technological studies. Thus, without such a utility it would be difficult for students pursuing science and technology to learn by doing. Yet, having electricity is one thing and doing scientific experiments is another thing. For instance, it is perturbing to see that in some schools electricity is available but they do not have laboratories for science subjects and those who have these laboratories face shortage of equipment. Hence, the education authorities should ensure the school laboratories are well equipped to promote the scientific learning.

It is observed from available evidence that the absence of adequate teachers' houses in some schools accounts for some students' failure in their final examinations. The overall argument was that conditions that forced most teachers to walk long distances to school reduced their efficiency. It has been widely commented upon that "*teachers are tired before teaching sessions*". This is interpreted that without a proper housing policy for teachers, effective performance and teaching efficiency will take long to achieve.

Moreover, most schools have no libraries and, above all, do not have laboratories. Without the libraries, it is difficult to inculcate the culture of self-learning and entrepreneurship. It would greatly promote national development if students were made to learn by doing through availability of modern school laboratories and libraries. MKUKUTA target of promoting school performance to a desirable level still has a chance if the government is committed to invest in libraries and school laboratories. Around 89 per cent of schools had no libraries and laboratories (URT,2009). Even the remaining 11 per cent which had libraries and laboratories were dissatisfied, particularly with the equipment available. The quality of education can only be achieved if the learning environment is made conducive in terms of ensuring physical infrastructure is in place. Therefore, performance management should be in tandem with well-established infrastructure that can be used to gauge performance of education officials and targets of education.

For instance, there is a developed yardstick of measuring quality of education to be against two measures, that is, students passing level in form IV exams and teachers' qualifications. It is observed that around 73 per cent of students who sat for the exams from 2006 to 2010 in some districts failed in their final examinations. Of the remaining percentage of 27 per cent that passed, it is only 3 per cent that passed at the levels of Division I and III while the rest fell in Division IV. The main reasons given for such mass failure include lack of qualified teachers as most teachers seem to be "*licence teachers*", and even those who are qualified are still too few to cater for the teaching needs. Hence, performance management at the local level is difficult given the entire ecology of public decision making.

The anecdotal evidence from the studies shows the deteriorating trends of quality education to be attributed to various factors and reasons which entail the learning environment that is unfriendly and the nature of the society. It is construed that parents are not responsible to make follow up of the academic progress of their children. The decadence in performance therefore should not be a burden to one side but the entire society. Performance management thus is not one-way traffic; rather it is two-way traffic as the local government authorities and the communities should all play their part to achieve the target for a particular service in order to achieve development.

The planning processes at the primary and district levels do not seem to align due to budget constraints which face the councils. It is not by default but rather by design that the districts incrementally adjust to the available resources with renewed intensity. The LGAs are victims. The budgetary constraints facing schools have led to the perception of performance management being a myth in Tanzania. School projects such as construction of classrooms, libraries and laboratories have not been accomplished on time or at all due to the grave differentials of amounts requested and remitted by the central government. Hence, it is difficult to demand for accountability, given such context of service delivery.

Assessment of Local Communities to manage Development Strategies

The main objective of LGRP was to improve the quality and access of public services provided through or facilitated by local government authorities (URT, 1999). It was further stated that the goal would be achieved through the reorganization programme and would have two components:

- a shift of responsibility for managing and providing services from central to local authorities; and
- increase efficiency by reorganizing the district administration and reorganization allowing the councils greater freedom in organizing their activities and managing their personnel.

Two assumptions were made by the government regarding the reform process. One was that transferring responsibilities of managing funds and personnel from the central government to the councils, delivery of social services would improve. The second assumption was that by making the councils directly responsible for self-financed service provision, the councils would be more active in mobilizing local resources in order to finance their programs.

In this regard, the main goal of the reform programme remains to increase local communities' accountability and responsibility for their own development. This was expected to be achieved through:

LGAs ability to hire their own personnel in consultation with Prime Minister`s Office-Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG)).Increased local autonomy over expenditure facilitated by a system of block grants; Restructuring is making them effective and efficient in service delivery; and changed central-local relations (URT, 1998).

However, in order to fully implement the reforms, it is essential that all relevant legislations are harmonized with the decentralization policy. Incomplete legal harmonization across sectors, LGAs revenue assignments and persistent governing by directives from the central government were persistent under reform 1. It can therefore be concluded that the strategy to institutionalize D by D in the government was not adequately embedded across MDAs and LGAs due to a number of reasons including lack of knowledge on vision, reluctance and fear of devolution and policy and legislative bottlenecks (URT, 2008). The following are some of the indicators of LGR bolt and nuts:

Flaw design

Flaw of design transcends all other areas of local authorities' territory. The constitution provides for the establishment of the local government authorities without defining them as autonomous and therefore they keep on dancing to the tunes of central government/national government, as they have been found to have a subordinate position through being dependent on central government for finance to manage local affairs. The practice has been for the central government to direct and mostly to show to the public that the problems of local governments are generic to local government themselves. However, according to Kabagire (2006) the underperformance of local governments is not due to lack of political commitment alone and effort on the part of

PMO-RALG, but is due in part to the sheer scale and complexity of the undertaking. It must be said that it is also due in part to the reluctance, or at least the lack of enthusiasm in central government and the sectors for harmonization and the changes involved. Therefore, the flaw of design has embedded the elements of performance mismanagement for local development.

Fiscal decentralization

The principle of LGAs earning the right to greater autonomy was extended in 2005 to development grants, where the government, through the Local Government Capital Development Grant (LGCDG) system, provides discretionary capital development grants to LGAs on a formula basis, but only where they have met some governance-related minimum conditions, and certain performance criteria.

The principle of LGAs earning the right to greater autonomy or additional development funds through performance provides an incentive to LGAs to improve their financial performance, and this brings us to the issue of LGA's financial management capacity.

The pillar of the financial reforms is Local Revenue Sources. To have a fully devolved system of local government, it is essential that the LGAs have robust revenue sources that will finance improved local service delivery as well as encourage accountability to the local taxpayers. Failure to ensure such revenue sources for local government means that LGAs rely solely on central government grant transfers, and this effectively de-links local leaders from their electorate, weakens accountability and concern for cost-effectiveness. The Local Government Finance Act No.10 of 1982 (RE 2002) further provides unsustainable sources of revenue to Local Governments such as (a) rents collected from public houses or buildings owned by district/urban councils; (b) fees charged for registration of marriage contracted within the district/urban councils; (c) all moneys derived from the service levy payable by corporate entities at the rate not exceeding 0.3 per cent of the turnover net of the value-added tax and the excise duty; and (d) all monies derived from the registration of taxicabs and commuter buses plying within the area of the urban authority. The resources derived from these sources, therefore are not only unreliable and difficult to collect, but also their expenditure has to be approved by the Minister for Regional Administration and Local Governments (Kessy, 2008; Ngware and Haule, 1992). Such robust sources have not been available hitherto and this has created a vacuum in terms of the local authorities managing performance systems for development. The monitoring of performance of their authorities is not a concern to the local communities as they know for sure who sponsors and who delivers the services. Hence, the communities' poor service delivery outcry always awaits the central government's officials political visits.

Human resource decentralization

Autonomy for local government authorities over human resources is considered an essential element of the decentralization process. Indeed, the literature on decentralization internationally often considers the lack of such autonomy as the 'Achille's heel' of devolution, as centrally controlled and transferred civil servants have no personal stake in the success of devolution. Yet central governments are often reluctant to let go of the power and patronage potential of centrally appointing and managing all key public service staff in the country (Mniwasa and Shauri, 2009).

The Government of Tanzania's policy on local government reform in this area is clear and unambiguous, and is worth re-stating here. Government's policy on administrative decentralization involves "de-linking local authority staff from their respective ministries". It goes on to state that LGAs "will be fully responsible for planning, recruiting, rewarding, promoting, disciplining, development and firing of their personnel. The councils will be the appointing authorities and employers for all local government personnel (including teachers, health staff, agricultural staff etc.)". LGAs will "employ the Council Director, the department heads and will adopt staffing plans and budgets."

However, the passing of the Public Service Act No. 8 of 2002, and the Public Service Regulations of 2003 effectively curtailed progress in this regard, and indeed, in some respects, reversed it as under LGRP I, PO-PSM, the Ministry of Public Service still retains authority to approve LGAs recruitment process and the Treasury retains the power to approve LGAs new personnel based on availability of funds to pay for their salaries. Additionally, there are dual personnel at the local level whereby district directors and heads of department are employees' of the central government. Therefore, the local politicians face difficulties to hold accountable the harbingers of the master in this regard. Therefore, performance management of the human resources under the unit command of central government in the local council remains a myth.

According to Liviga (2009), these problems are real and the solutions may work but the policy document does not state the real causes of non-compliance by central government to D by D. It may therefore mean that the LGRP II strategy will be addressing the wrong issues. He goes on to say that the fundamental problem for non-compliance by central ministries and agencies to the vision of LGRP lies in the two contradictory values Tanzania pursues in relation to decentralization. These values entail the need for the central leadership to widen its political space for effective control of national activities and, the need to also widen the political space of local communities for purposes of empowerment and participation (Mushi and Baregu, 1990 as quoted in Liviga, 2009).

When close examination of these two values is made, one appreciates that there is a will to allow participatory governance but, at the same time, there is an inherent need to strengthen the central control. This lukewarmness portrays a conflictual relationship between political pronouncements, policies and strategies clearly stressing community empowerment and decentralization of power and resources while behaviour-wise central government encroaches on the power in practice. This is what Robert Michels (1915) calls an '*iron law of oligarchy*' to the original goal. According to Liviga (2009), ministries and central government agencies have also been hiding behind the fact that LGAs do not have capacity to handle increased resources and functions/roles. This is equal to blaming the victim instead of the perpetrator (Kessy, 2008). Lack of capacity in LGAs is the result of Central Government's own actions such as top-down changes which create uncertainty and unknowns to the actors in local and central government. Therefore, LGRs and PSRPs cannot achieve the goals, as some actors are afraid of changes.

According to a study done in 2007 at national, regional and local level, evidence of numerous initiatives aiming at strengthening the capacity of the people to exercise their rights as citizens was found (REPOA, 2005). Some CSOs such as REPOA and others are directly engaged in training and capacity-building activities within the institutional context of

decentralization. Other CSO initiatives are focused on building regional and local capacities for participation and lobbying. In general, the participatory approach of CSO projects and programmes such as those visited in the Kongwa District (LVIA) or in the Bukoba and the Muleba Districts (Swissaid and FOGOTA), which aim at empowering villagers by building up and supporting their self-help organizations, are laying an important groundwork for participatory and transparent local government.

Governance

The cardinal goal of LGRs has been widening space for awareness creation, ethical conduct for councillors and staff, citizen participation and accountability. The governance outcome addresses citizens' participation in planning, M and E and the demand side of accountability as crucial for performance management. The initiatives were geared towards promoting active participation of civil society in local development and enhancing citizen participation through existing forums of the LGAs and through partnership between LGAs and CSOs. Modest but tangible progress is reported, across the governance outputs, including public awareness raising and gender mainstreaming (URT, 2008).

The biggest challenge remains participation in planning and enhancing demand-driven side of accountability. For this, the government has tacitly admitted, for example, that women are marginalized and their interests and roles ignored when village plans are integrated into district-level plans; people's participation is minimal in the preparation of systems and formats of planning; and Opportunities and Obstacles for Development (O and OD), the official planning methodology for Local Government Authorities is disregarded as plans move up (URT, 2009). In the same vein, Kikula (1995) had observed that district plans are rarely comprehensive and integrated. Not all actors, particularly the poor, are reflected in the plans.

These remaining challenges form the core of the LGRP II planned interventions. The question therefore is: will the goal and objectives as set in the LGRP II be realized given the policy and legal framework that is currently in place? Will the service delivery initiatives cater for performance management at the local level in this second phase of D by D implementation?

Way Forward

The following are the recommendations for service delivery and performance management at the local levels for realizing growth and development as follows:

Firstly, LGAs should be treated as governments with full powers and authority in their areas of jurisdiction. CG to deal with LGAs based on government-to-government principle; the latter should not be seen or regarded as field implementing agents of central government policies and priorities at the expense of local development needs and priorities. This has been sounded by some observers of the local government system for quite some time (Shivji, 2009) but relevant authorities have not heeded the call.

Secondly, redefining functions and roles of central agencies including ministries *vis a vis* LGAs as would be provided and made clear in the Constitution.

Thirdly, consider relocation of the authority to oversee implementation of LGRP from Prime Minister`s Office-Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG) to the Chief Secretary; or elevate the PMO-RALG to the same status as Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MoFEA).

Fourthly, the Regional Secretariats (RS)should be reoriented and capacitated to play their new role of backstopping LGAs, linking LGAs with ministries and other actors in the development process including the general public, civil society organizations and the private sector.

To achieve the intended outcomes from these interventions, the capacity of the PMO-RALG is critical in implementing the LGRP envisioned on (D by D). The main responsibility would lie in the offices of the Permanent Secretary, Deputy Permanent Secretary and Director of Local Government. These offices need to have the necessary capacity (personnel, technical, managerial and political clout) to be able to manage the reform. They need to have the support of technically competent and well versed staff in D by D.

Conclusion

The article set out to analyze service delivery and performance management for development under a devolved system, zeroing on the education and health services in Tanzania. The central argument that has guided this article is that local government reforms in Tanzania strategically pursued under D by D would enhance local ownership and invariably improve service delivery as monitoring the performance is closer to the local communities (URT,1998).

It is an acknowledged fact that the best government is government that is closest to the scrutiny and control by citizens. Local governments in any country including Tanzania, form one of the levels that people can directly get involved and participate in formulation of development plans, make bye-laws, decide on priority issues to include in development projects, identify and tackle challenges collectively as well as call for leaders to account for their actions or inactions at the community level. Local governments also play a key role in service provision at the grassroots level. They are assigned to deliver certain services in various sectors including agriculture, education, health, infrastructure (For example, construction or repair of feeder roads), land and water. In the context of Tanzania where about eighty per cent of the people live in rural areas where delivery of basic services is less developed compared to urban areas, the importance of local governments cannot be overemphasized (Liviga, 2009 and Smoke, 2003).

However, the reality of reforms as regards local government in Tanzania is cosmetically done. There is a political will but political and bureaucratic commitment to ensure devolution of powers and resources to local communities for performance management and local development is in shambles (Litvack and Bird, 2002).

The evidence from the studies done on local government and local development vindicates that devolution has not significantly improved the organizational performance in terms of service delivery in the health and education sectors (Shivji, 2004). The central government has tended to pronounce decentralization by devolution policy as a panacea for improved performance at local levels in order to stimulate rapid development. Nevertheless,

the central government has at the same time endeavoured to recentralize its devolved powers using the strategy of not transferring the powers as per policy provision.

It is put forward with certainty that unless certain constitutional, legal and institutional matters are also addressed and made part of the reform process it will be difficult for local communities to realize development potentials as locals will not participate but rather will be participated. It is noted through an analysis of Tanzania's experience with decentralization that LGAs have had a chequered history and, most importantly, that the central government's tendency to centralize has weakened these avenues of participation. Mogella (2003:110) describes local government in Tanzania as a system in distress.

It is also noteworthy that improved service delivery at local level is an important instrument in reducing poverty and enhancing equitable growth. This fact has also been acknowledged by the Government of Tanzania that has through its Local Government Reform Programme (2008 – 2013) noted the critical role Local Government Authorities can play in the development process (URT, 2009).

There are still eminent challenges in terms of the legislative framework which is not yet D by D-compliant and there are interruptions of devolution of Human Resource Management (HRM) and financial management from the central government. These are fundamental problems inhibiting successful implementation of local government performance management initiatives (APRM, 2009).

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Corporate Governance and the Enforcement of Standards: An Appraisal of Standards Organizations in Tanzania

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Abstract

This article debates the enforcement of quality standards within Tanzania's corporate governance framework. The article probes into whether the continuing increase in the number of organizations responsible for monitoring and enforcing quality standards of consumable and non-consumable industrial products (also referred to in this article as standards organizations) has an impact on protecting the rights and welfare of stakeholders (consumers). Specifically, the article examines the extent to which these organizations have been effective in carrying out their prescribed functions. Using documentary review, the article concludes that Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (EWURA), Tanzania Bureau of Standards (TBS) and Tanzania Food and Drugs Authority (TFDA) have not been effective in monitoring and controlling the enforcement of standards, a situation that puts consumers' welfare and public health at stake. Such ineffectiveness is attributed to a number of factors such as lack of adequate financial and human resources, weaknesses in the synergies among standards organizations, poor networking with other stakeholders and weak legal framework that deprives these organizations of some of the powers to make final decisions. Finally, the article emphasizes that any successful attempt to effectively enforce standards in Tanzania has to address these challenges.

Key Words: Counterfeit Goods, Standards Organizations, Consumers' Welfare, Corporate Governance

Introduction

This article reviews the role of standards organizations in maintaining good corporate governance in Tanzania. The article argues that while it is important for the government to create a conducive business environment for producers and importers of different products which are supplied in the domestic market, it still has an obligation to ensure that the rights and interests of the citizenry are protected. Using the stakeholder theory which calls for corporations to adhere to the core principles of corporate governance, the article looks at the extent to which standards organizations in the country have facilitated adherence to the requirements to produce and supply quality-standard products for domestic and external consumption. In this theory, a stakeholder is regarded as any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives (Haslinda & Benedict, 2009).

As Kumar (2010) argues, stakeholder theory encourages managers to pay attention to all constituencies that can affect the value of the firm. This concern is also reflected in the principles of corporate governance of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). One of these principles emphasizes that corporate governance frameworks should recognize the rights of stakeholders established by law through mutual agreements and encourages active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders (Mallin, 2010). It is on

this basis that initiatives to ensure that corporations carry out their functions diligently have been devised.

One such initiative is the establishment of the organizations for monitoring and enforcing standards both nationally and internationally to ensure that consumable and non-consumable goods supplied in the domestic market have the required quality standards. Focusing on the Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (EWURA), Tanzania Bureau of Standards (TBS) and Tanzania Food and Drugs Authority (TFDA), the article analyses the effectiveness of these organizations in supervising the enforcement of standards in Tanzania. Being the main bodies responsible for enforcing standards in the country, their selection for review was triggered by the fact that despite their presence, the public continues to express concern over the problem of substandard and counterfeit goods. The main question that this article attempts to answer is: “Why does Tanzania continue to suffer from the problem of substandard goods despite an existence of numerous standards organizations?”

In the course of analyzing the role of standards organizations, this article also uses a power-authority formulation as part of the analytical framework. The term power in this context is construed as the ability to bring about intended effects and it involves elements such as rewards or punishment (Russell, 1938, as cited by Hague & Harrop, 2007). The term is therefore associated with the ability to influence or compel others to act in a particular way. On the other hand, authority is understood as the rightful use of power and is conferred by a rule and exercised in accordance with rules (Coxall & Robins, 1992). The main argument of this article is that the ability of standards organizations to create a good corporate governance space largely depends on the extent to which these organizations have both power and authority to enforce prescribed standards. The choice of this analytical framework rests on the view that, in some contexts, the establishment of control organizations, especially in Africa, does not encompass giving them enough power to play their prescribed roles.

A conceptual overview of corporate governance

Corporate governance is very broad and thus has different meanings to different organizations (Haslinda & Benedict, 2009). Etymologically; the term ‘corporate governance’ originates from ancient Greek and Latin. In Latin, the word *corpus*, which comes from the Latin verb *corporare*, means body and thus a corporation is construed as a body of people or a group of people authorized to act as an individual (Mensah, Aboagye, Addo & Buatsi, 2003). On the other hand, the word *governance* is derived from a Greek word *gubernatio* meaning management or government. Therefore corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined (Mensah et al, 2003).

Corporate governance is concerned with the processes, systems, practices and procedures that govern institutions. It is therefore a set of processes and structures for controlling and directing organizations and also constitutes a set of rules, which govern the relationships between management, shareholders and stakeholders (Haslinda & Benedict, 2009). There are two perspectives of corporate governance. The first one links corporate governance with management control and the protection of shareholders. The second one sees corporate governance as dealing

with the processes of appropriate management of a company's resources to the satisfaction of all stakeholders, namely: shareholders, management and workers as well as all groups of persons that come into contact with the firm in its day-to-day activities (Mensah et al, 2003). Basing on this brief conceptual overview of corporate governance, this work examines the functioning of standards organizations in Tanzania, using the second perspective of corporate governance mentioned above. The focus of this study thus goes beyond internal relationships within the organization as described in the first perspective of corporate governance to examine the effectiveness of external control mechanisms for ensuring that other stakeholders (consumers) are not affected by the activities of various firms.

A General Overview of Corporate Governance in Tanzania

Like many other developing countries, corporate governance culture in Tanzania is still in its formative stages. It can be recalled that the pre-liberalization era marked a state-centred framework that did not grant freedom to corporations, both private and public, to perform their functions without being closely monitored by the State (Swai, 1995; Samoff, 1981; Picard, 1980; Kahama, 1986). This control was characterized, among other things, by instances of politicization (Mallya, 1988; Mukandala, 1988; Mwase, 1985). However, this control had a positive implication in terms of protecting the rights of the consumers as advocated for by the stakeholders' theory. This was mainly because, as the state was the main actor in terms of production of goods and delivery of services through public parastatals, it was easy to monitor and ensure the quality of consumables. It is worth remembering that during this time the productive processes were geared towards serving the public, especially the poor people. This determination was bolstered by the country's adoption of the socialist ideology whose effective execution began after the 1967 Arusha Declaration.

Nonetheless, since the adoption of liberal policies marked by the growth of the private sector and the coming of foreign investors, the manner in which corporations perform their duties has significantly changed. This is demonstrated by the decreasing role of the state in managing public parastatals. As a result of this change, the government decided to take various measures in order to establish a more effective corporate governance framework which, apart from setting a conducive environment for the production process as a means to steer economic growth, ensures that the rights of stakeholders (the consumers) are protected. One of those measures was the creation of the Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC) in 1992 to monitor the privatization of previously state-owned corporations.

The formation of PSRC went hand-in-hand with the establishment of the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) whose responsibility is to coordinate and facilitate both local and foreign investment. Together with the above initiatives, the government of Tanzania also introduced the Business Environment Strengthening Programme (BEST) in 2005. This programme aimed at reducing the burden on businesses by eradicating procedural and administrative barriers, improving the quality of services provided by government to the private sector including commercial dispute resolution and enhancing the capacity of the private sector to advocate for and demand a better business environment (Bamwenda & Mlingi, 2005).

Some notable achievements can be identified since the government embarked on these corporate governance reforms. The first one is the expansion of the banking sector. For instance, currently there are 29 registered commercial banks in Tanzania and there are

also seven registered regional banks in the country. Similarly, by July 2012 there were 211 registered bureaux de change (Bank of Tanzania, n.d). Furthermore, foreign investment in the country, particularly in sectors such as mining and tourism is expanding rapidly. For instance, as per 2010 statistics, there were 705 registered tourism operators. In addition, as a result of corporate governance reforms, the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE) continues to expand and the number of listed companies at DSE is currently 17. Other achievements stemming from corporate governance reforms are enumerated in Tanzania's economic survey of 2009 which shows that there has been an increase of economic projects in all sectors of the economy. That survey, for instance, shows that a total of 572 projects were registered; of which 284 were owned by local investors, 149 were owned by foreign investors, while 139 were joint venture projects. The report also indicates that in 2009, manufacturing activities attracted more investors, with 183 projects worth Tshs. 654,472 million and employment opportunities to 14,143 people (United Republic of Tanzania [URT], 2010).

There are also company-specific achievements. For instance, before privatization Tanzania Breweries Company Limited faced critical problems such as obsolete machinery, low quality of products, difficulty in obtaining raw materials, just to mention a few. However, after privatization, the performance of the company both in terms of productivity and profitability has significantly increased (Joseph, 2003). Some of the recorded achievements in the period between 1993 and 2003 include: increase of production capacity from 4.2 million crates per year in 1993 to 12.2 million in 1998 and close to 20 million crates in 2002; increase in barley production from 6,000 tons to 18,000 tons per year; improvement in the beer market from 40 per cent in 1994 to more than 84 per cent in 2003; and, increase in profit from Tsh 11,285 million in 1995 to Tsh 31,022 million in 2003 (Joseph, 2003).

Other positive development stemming from corporate governance reforms was the establishment of a regulatory framework that led to the birth of standards organizations such as EWURA, the Bank of Tanzania, the Fair Competition Commission (FCC), the Surface and Marine Transportation Regulatory Authority (SUMATRA) and TFDA and other specific laws such as the Companies Act of 2002. This also involved the reinvigoration of TBS to cope with these changes. The rationale behind the regulatory framework is to ensure that the operations of corporations are guided and sanctioned by laws so as to ensure that, among other things, the rights of all categories of stakeholders are protected. The discussion that follows, therefore, reviews three standards organizations – EWURA, TBS and TFDA and focuses specifically on the extent to which they have succeeded in ensuring promotion and protection of consumers' rights in Tanzania through supervision and enforcement of quality standards.

Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority

Tanzania's Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (EWURA) was established in 2001 with the responsibility of technically and economically regulating the electricity, petroleum, natural gas and water sectors. Its duties and functions are provided for in the Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority Act No. 11 of 2001, Cap 414. Section 6 of this Act outlines the main duties of the Authority which include: promoting effective competition and economic efficiency; protecting the interests of consumers; protecting the financial viability of efficient suppliers; promoting the availability of regulated services to all consumers including low

income, rural and disadvantaged consumers; enhancing public knowledge, awareness and understanding of the regulated sectors including the rights and obligations of consumers and regulated suppliers, the ways in which complaints and disputes may be initiated and resolved; and, taking into account the need to protect and preserve the environment (URT, 2001).

The functions of the Authority are provided for in Section 7 of the same Act, and they include: to issue, renew and cancel licences; to establish standards for goods and services; to establish standards for the terms and conditions of supply of goods and services; to regulate rates and charges; to make rules; to monitor the performance of the regulated sectors in relation to levels of investment, availability, quantity and standard of services, the cost of services, the efficiency of production and distribution of services; and in the case of petroleum and natural gas, to regulate transmission and natural gas distribution. Other functions of EWURA include: to facilitate the resolution of complaints and disputes; to disseminate information about matters relevant to its functions; and, to consult with other Regulatory Authorities.

Since its establishment, EWURA has realized some achievements particularly in protecting consumers through the regulation of fuel prices. The authority has been regularly publishing indicative prices for fuel which specify price limits of petroleum products. This has to some extent curbed unpredictable price increase and cartels that characterized the fuel market prior to this arrangement. It is worth noting that before EWURA's intervention, there were outcries from the public over the unstable fuel prices which seriously affected the consumers in terms of paying much for fuel but also led to regular increase of fares for passengers. This intervention was thus a timely response, which did not only help in ensuring economic stability, but also helped in protecting the rights of consumers as advocated for by the stakeholders theory.

However, a mere publishing of indicative prices seems not to have been enough in addressing the question of fuel prices. This is because while the authority issues indicative prices, it does not consider fuel stocks by the time new prices are announced. As a result, new prices apply to stocks that were bought at different rates. While this practice sometimes affects fuel dealers, it has a serious effect on the general public, and this is especially the case when fuel prices go down. It has been a common practice that when EWURA announces the decrease of fuel prices, the country or some regions suffer from shortage of fuel as dealers tend to hold their stocks while anticipating prices increase in the forthcoming indicative prices to be issued by EWURA. As a result, regular change of indicative prices has been favouring the dealers who happen to have larger stocks of fuel.

Notwithstanding that positive role of controlling fuel prices, EWURA remains generally weak, a situation which also suggests the limitation of the country's corporate governance framework. Its weaknesses are reflected in various aspects as discussed below. One of the areas where the authority seems not to perform well is the handling of the adulteration of fuel. Following the persistent tendency of unethical fuel dealers to dilute petrol with kerosene, there was growing public demand for immediate action from respective authorities to curb the problem. This resulted in the decision by the government to increase tax on kerosene, which due to its low prices, was being used to dilute diesel and petrol. As a result of that decision, EWURA significantly raised kerosene prices, believing that this was going to serve as a deterrent to adulteration of petrol and diesel. This decision proved detrimental to the

majority of Tanzanians, especially those living in rural areas, who depend largely on kerosene. For instance, following the increase of tax on kerosene, there has been an abrupt increase of its prices from around TShs 1,600 to more than TShs 2080 per litre. A clear picture of the rise of fuel prices is provided in Figure 1 which shows that the once huge difference in prices between kerosene and petrol has significantly been decreasing. Using Dar es Salaam, Mwanza and Kigoma as illustrative cases respectively, the figure indicates that while the difference in prices between kerosene and petrol in February 2010 was almost TShs 400 in the three regions, the figure that was almost the same in June 2011, that difference decreased significantly to less than TShs 200 in June 2012. That difference came to an end in the indicative prices starting from 2 January 2013 as, according to the new indicative prices issued by EWURA, the price for kerosene was higher than that of diesel. As per those prices, one litre of petrol in Dar es Salaam cost TShs 1,993, that of diesel was TShs 1,967 and that of kerosene was TShs 1,973. In Mwanza, one litre of petrol was sold at Tshs 2,142, diesel TShs 2,117 and kerosene TShs 2,122. In Kigoma, petrol was sold at TShs 2,223, diesel Tshs 2,198 and kerosene TSh 2,203.

While the price for kerosene continues to surge, it is important to note that only 14 per cent of Tanzanians have access to electricity as, for instance, access to electricity in rural areas is only one per cent (United Republic of Tanzania, 2003). Although recent figures suggest an increase in the percentage of people with access to electricity, still limited access to power is recorded. The National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction II suggests that the percentage of rural access to electricity by 2010 is six per cent whereas that of urban areas is 18 per cent. It is thus obvious that the majority of Tanzanians still depend on kerosene for both cooking and lighting. With this price hike, it is obvious that the majority of people are highly affected.

Note: In each of the three years indicated in the table, the three bars show kerosene and petrol prices for Dar es Salaam, Mwanza and Kigoma regions respectively.

Source: Compiled by the author using EWURA's indicative prices.




Figure 1. Kerosene prices versus petrol prices from 2010 to 2012

While ordinary citizens seem to be the victims of the increase of fuel prices, very little was heard about the perpetrators of adulteration. It was as if this practice was done by ghosts whose identity and whereabouts could not be established. There was no keen interest from responsible authorities to apprehend and prosecute those involved in adulteration as the best solution appeared to be that of increasing kerosene prices. The worst reality of the decision to increase kerosene prices is that there has not been any initiative to subsidize those people, especially in rural areas who, due to their situation of destitution, cannot afford the high prices of kerosene. This situation is in sharp contrast to what is advocated for in the stakeholders' theory which advocates for taking care of the interests of all categories of stakeholders.

There are various reasons that can explain the weakness of EWURA. While factors such as limited financial resources, corruption and lack of adequate skilled human resources partly explain the weakness of this authority, the main reason for EWURA's inefficiency is the failure of existing laws to grant finality to the authority. For instance, section 7-(3) of EWURA Act provides that in the performance of its functions, the Authority shall not award or cancel a major or exclusive licence having a term of five or more years without prior consultation with the minister and the relevant sector minister. Section 7-(4) of the same Act further states that the minister may, from time to time as occasion necessitates it, give to the Authority directions of a specific or general character on specific issues, other than in relation to the discharge of the regulatory functions, arising in relation to any sector, for the purposes of securing the effective performance by the Authority of its policy, functions and compliance with the code of conduct. Lack of finality is also reflected in Section 19 (1)-(2) of the EWURA Act which, despite granting the authority the power to hold an inquiry, still gives the responsible minister the power to influence the modality of holding such inquiry. Section 19(3) provides that the minister may specify a time within which the authority shall submit its report on the inquiry and that, if so, the authority must submit its report to the minister within that time.

The implication of this power arrangement is that it deprives EWURA of the authority and autonomy to discharge its functions without influence from superior powers. Contrary to the ethos of New Public Management, which advocates for autonomy for managers so that they can be innovative, EWURA stands as an authority whose powers are subjected to hierarchical control and thus is in some instances not able to issue final decision. For instance, there were many appeals from the public that those companies that would be implicated in fuel adulteration should have their contracts cancelled by EWURA, but such cancellation was not witnessed. Nonetheless, as section 7-(3) & (4) of the EWURA Act states, the authority cannot cancel all types of contracts without an approval from the minister. All these provisions clearly show that while EWURA has authority to enforce quality standards, it does not have power to make final decisions on some categories of issues that might affect consumers' rights.

Tanzania Bureau of Standards

The Tanzania Bureau of Standards (TBS) was established under the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing by an Act of Parliament, the Standards Act No.3 of 1975 as the National Standards Institute and became operational in April 1976. The Bureau was established as part of the efforts by the government to strengthen the supporting institutional infrastructure for the industry and commercial sectors of the economy. Specifically, TBS was mandated to undertake

quality control measures for products of all description and promote standardization in industry and commerce. The National Standards Institute was subsequently renamed Tanzania Bureau of Standards through an amendment No.1 of 1977.

TBS has many functions as stipulated in section 4-(1) of the Standards Act of 2009. These functions include: to undertake measures for quality control of commodities, services and environment of all descriptions and to promote standardization in industry and trade; to make arrangements or provide facilities for the testing and calibration of precision instruments, gauges and scientific apparatus, for the determination of their degree of accuracy and traceability by comparison with standards approved by the minister on the recommendation of the Board, and for the issuance of certificates in regard to them (URT, 2009).

Other functions of TBS are: to make arrangements or provide facilities for the examination and testing of commodities and any material or substance from or with which, and the manner in which, they may be manufactured, produced, processed or treated; approve, register and control the use of standard marks; to grant, renew, suspend, vary or cancel any license issued for the use of any standards mark; to assist industries in setting up and enforcing quality assurance and environmental management systems procedures; to prepare, frame, modify or amend National Standards; encourage or undertake educational work in connection with standardization quality assurance, metrology, testing and environment; to assist the government or any other person in the preparation and framing of standards; to co-operate with other government agencies, representatives of any industry or any other statutory corporation or person with a view to securing the adoption and practical application of standards and to provide for the inspection, sampling and testing of locally manufactured and imported commodities with a view to determining whether the commodities comply with the provisions of the standards Act or any other law dealing with standards relevant to those commodities.

TBS is also mandated to act as the custodian of the National Measurement Standards of Weights and Measures and, from time to time, adjust, replace or cancel any standards where the adjustment, replacement or cancellation is necessary for the maintenance of conformity to the international standards. Other functions of the Bureau are: to collect, publish and disseminate literature and other materials on standardization and other related subjects and to provide facilities for the members of the public to have access to the materials; to carry-out, promote or assist in research or standardization and related subjects; to co-operate with regional and international organizations in all matters related to standardization and quality assurance and represent the country in such matters; and, lastly, to publish from time to time updated versions of the National Standards for the quantities and units of measurement to be used, which shall be in conformity with the latest version of the International System of Units.

An appraisal of TBS in supervising the enforcement of standards shows that the Bureau has shown strengths in some areas. One of those strengths is that it issues quality certificates to products manufacturers. Most of local manufacturers have been using the Bureau's mark (TBS) to prove to the customers that the products they manufacture are in accordance with the prescribed standards by the Bureau. In other instances, TBS has been conducting inspections (though not comprehensive) to retailers, suppliers and manufacturers of various categories of products. For instance, on Friday, 22 February 2013, the Fair Competition Commission (FCC), the Tanzania Bureau of Standards

(TBS) and the Police Force, conducted an investigation in roofing sheet factories in Dar es Salaam following growing complaints from consumers over the questionable quality of goods produced by some factories. During this exercise, the inspection team observed non-conformity to product quality standards at Dragon Roofing Sheets Factory and thus factory owners were ordered to meet all quality standards before resuming production (FCC, 2013). The observed weaknesses during that inspection included: producing goods without product information such as a batch number; anti-corrosion/rust coating material used; and, ascription to the manufacturer such as a logo or manufacturer's identity. Also, it was observed that the factory was selling products without any quality assurance certification from TBS (FCC, 2013). This was a positive intervention which portrayed the bureau's readiness to ensure that the rights of stakeholders (consumers) are protected. Likewise, it at least showed the functioning of the country's corporate governance regulatory framework, especially on the aspect of the relationship between the bureau and FCC on one hand; and the consumers of factory goods on the other. That relationship is depicted by the fact that the conducted inspection was a response to peoples' outcry over production of substandard goods. The other positive indicator of the functioning of TBS, stemming from this inspection is the ability of the bureau and FCC to impose sanction on the producer and the order for conformity to standard requirements. This is in sharp contrast with the way EWURA has been handling the control of fuel prices and fuel adulteration as we earlier indicated.

Nevertheless, the strengths of the Bureau do not outweigh its weaknesses which seem to affect its ability to effectively monitor and control the enforcement of standards. For instance, TBS does not have the power to compel all producers to obtain quality certificates before they start rendering their services. This weakness is providing a leeway for manufacturers to opt not to submit their product samples to TBS especially for goods manufactured outside the country. Mtui (2006) argues that TBS issues its quality mark on only certain categories of products that are within its mandate. These are products that are locally made and the imported ones for which TBS has standards and their manufacturers have applied for a TBS mark. Mtui (2006) also explains that those products for which TBS does not have standards are tested using a product certification scheme which uses foreign standards. According to Mtui (2006), a batch certification scheme used for imported products that do not bear a TBS mark has proven ineffective because there are various types of substandard imported products that get into the market as a result of a poor standards verification system. This ineffective control system compounds smuggling of counterfeit goods especially from China. For instance, in 2010 more than 101 containers packed with counterfeit products were caught.

The above weakness reduces the Bureau's status to a mere organ whose main responsibility is to issue certificates and not to monitor the quality of products. In a society that is very sensitive to consumers' welfare, getting a standards certificate is an obligation, not an option. Thus, giving latitude to manufacturers to decide whether to get a TBS mark or not implies lack of sensitivity about consumers' wellbeing. One of the consequences of granting manufactures the power to decide on the use of a TBS mark is that the Bureau is forced to incur expenses to pay for media adverts that are meant to entice and encourage manufacturers to submit the samples of their products to the Bureau for verification. In an effective corporate governance framework, there ought to have been a law requiring all manufacturers to submit samples of their products prior to putting them in the market or beginning bulk production.

Another weakness of the Bureau is that it does not have an effective monitoring mechanism that can ensure that the samples submitted to TBS for verification are the same ones that are supplied to the market. As a result, there have been public outcries that some of the products such as bottled drinking water that bear a TBS mark are substandard. The implication of this concern is that some unethical manufacturers are using TBS mark to give cover to their substandard goods.

The failure of the Bureau to effectively perform its prescribed functions is attributed to various factors. One of those factors is lack of adequate skilled human resources to undertake regular nationwide inspections. As pointed out earlier in this essay, one of the functions of the Bureau is to undertake inspections as stipulated in Section 24-(1) of the Standards Act which provides that inspectors may at all reasonable times enter any premises where there are suspicious commodities, take samples of such commodity, material or object; inspect the manufacturing process; and require any information from the inspected person. This is, however, difficult to carry out due to lack of human resources. For instance, contrary to the provisions of the Standards Act of 2009 which provides that inspectors are supposed to visit manufacturers for inspection at least twice a year, TBS inspectors were in 2006 conducting few inspections. The Bureau was visiting upcountry producers only once a year while those in Dar es Salaam were visited twice a year due to the limited number of inspectors (Mtui, 2006). For instance, by 2006 the Bureau had 24 inspectors with the responsibility of inspecting all manufacturing companies and importers in the whole country (Mtui, 2006). The situation has not changed since and the Bureau continues to face the same problem.

Due to few human resources, TBS has no upcountry branches and only operates from Dar es Salaam as reflected in the Bureau's organizational structure that only includes units, directorates and sections without any zonal or regional branch offices. EWURA also does not have regional or zonal offices in its organizational structure. The structure only contains the board of directors at the top, followed by the director general, procurement management department, communications and public relations and seven different divisions. It is only TFDA whose organizational structure is composed of four directorates and five zonal offices.

Like EWURA, TBS also suffers from limited autonomy. Apart from having many functions, the Bureau is deprived of its prescribed autonomy. For instance, Section 31 of the Standards Act provides that the Minister may give the Board directions of a general or specific nature and that the Board shall give effect to every direction given. The weakness of this provision is that it is too general and takes for granted that every direction issued by the minister is in public interest. Given the persistent and rampant corruption in Africa which in certain instances involves governing political elites, there is a possibility that the Minister may use this provision to further his/her selfish needs.

Lack of autonomy is also reflected in the limited power for the Bureau to determine the penalties to be imposed on culprits as provided for by the 2009 Standards Act. Section 27-(1) of this Act provides that where a person contravenes any of the provisions of the Act for which no specific penalty is provided, commits an offence and on conviction, shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not less than two years or to a fine not less than fifty million shillings and not exceeding one hundred million shillings or to both. Section 27-(2) further provides that on a second or subsequent conviction of any person for an offence committed under the

Standards Act, that person shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of not less than three years or to a fine of not less than fifty million shillings and not exceeding one hundred million shillings or to both.

The penalties stipulated above are sometimes not enough and might instead act as a catalyst to unethical behaviour which might have adverse effects on consumers. As most of illegal businesses, such as importing and selling counterfeit goods are lucrative and involve billions of money, imposing a penalty of fifty or one hundred million Tanzanian shillings is very low compared to the profit the dealers get from this business. For instance, in a joint operation against counterfeit goods that was carried out in collaboration between TBS and Fair Commission Competition between July 2011 and December 2012, a total of 313 containers packed with counterfeit products worth Tshs 324,700,000 were seized (FCC, 2013). These figures show a huge difference between the proposed penalties and the value of substandard goods. It is therefore obvious that dealers in these goods can easily pay fines whenever caught without necessarily eroding their capital. The Bureau should have been given more power to suggest appropriate penalties (to be enacted into law) depending on the nature of the cases, together with an understanding that imposing harsh penalties might at least send a warning signal and serve as a precedent to other dealers in that business. Lack of this latitude puts the rights of consumers at a great risk as trade in substandard goods remains uncontrolled. In the power-authority axis, it can be established that the bureau has no adequate power to pursue illicit trade in standard goods.

Tanzania Foods and Drugs Authority (TFDA)

According to Section 5-(1) of the Tanzania Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Act of 2003, TFDA is the regulatory body for the products regulated under the TFDA Act. The main functions of the Authority include: to regulate all matters relating to quality and safety of food, drugs, herbal drugs, medical devices, poisons and cosmetics; to regulate in accordance with this Act, the importation, manufacturing, labelling, marking or identification, storages promotion, sell and distribution of food, drugs, cosmetics, herbal drugs and medical devices or any materials or substances used in the manufacture of product; to ensure that evidence of existing and new adverse events, interactions and information about pharmaco-vigilance of products being monitored globally, are analyzed and acted upon; and to ensure that clinical trials on drugs, medical devices and herbal drugs are being conducted in accordance with prescribed standards (URT, 2003).

Other functions of the Authority as provided for in Section 5-(1) of the TFDA Act include: to foster co-operation between the Authority and other institutions or organizations and other stakeholders; to approve and register products regulated under the TFDA Act, manufactured within or imported into, and intended for use in the United Republic, to examine; to grant, issue, suspend, cancel and revoke certificates and licences or permits issued; to appoint inspectors and order inspection of any premises; to promote rational use of drugs, medical devices and herbal drug; to establish and maintain the Tanzania National Formulary and Tanzania Pharmacopoeia; and, to provide the public with unbiased information on products regulated under this Act.

Section 5-(1) of TFDA Act further provides that other duties of the Authority include: to prescribe standards of quality in respect of products regulated under the Act, manufactured or intended to be manufactured or imported into or exported from the United Republic; to promote, monitor and ensure successful implementation of the provisions of TFDA Act; to attend to and, where possible, take legal measures on complaints made by consumers against manufacturers of products regulated under this Act; and; to do such acts or take such measures as are, in the opinion of the Authority, necessary or expedient for the prevention of health hazards to consumers which may result from the consumption or use of low or bad quality products regulated under TFDA Act (URT, 2003).

Apart from those functions, TFDA is granted powers by Section 6 of the Act to: enter or remove any name from any register prescribed under this Act or, subject to such conditions as the Authority may impose, restore it thereto; hire and terminate services; and condemn and order destruction or disposal in any way any product regulated under TFDA Act found to be unfit for its intended use (URT, 2003).

Looking at both the powers and functions of TFDA, it is clear that like TBS and EWURA, it has some areas where it has had a better performance. One area where the Authority has performed well, especially in recent times, is the control of substandard drugs. In collaboration with the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, some pharmacies with out-dated and substandard drugs have been closed. This has also involved the closure of some private hospitals deemed to be operating below minimum standards. The *Business Times* newspaper shows that the rate of substandard drugs in Tanzania has fallen from 13percent a decade ago to 3.7 per cent. Likewise, in the first combined INTERPOL-World Health Organization (WHO) operations against counterfeit pharmaceutical products in Tanzania and Uganda that took place between 29 September and 5 October 2008, more than 100 types of fake products were seized. The operation targeted pharmacies, warehouses and illicit markets. Some of the confiscated drugs were anti-malarial, cardiac, anti-fungal, multivitamin, hormonal and skin medicines (Interpol, 2008).

Despite these achievements, the above-mentioned numerical figures do not suggest a substantial decrease of counterfeit medicine as cases of illicit drugs are still rampant throughout the country. This is testified, for example, by *the Citizen* newspaper, echoing TFDA's findings which indicate that half of substandard human drugs entering Tanzania are said to be fake (the Citizen, 2012). The situation is even worse in rural areas as dealers in counterfeit drugs take advantage of porous borders and weaknesses in inspection to ferry such products to remote villages. Similarly, complaints over questionable quality of varieties of foods and beverages are ubiquitous in Tanzania.

Various reasons explain the weaknesses of TFDA. Like, TBS and EWURA, TFDA suffers from inadequate funds and shortage of skilled personnel. This is despite having five zonal offices. This problem was reiterated by TFDA Director General in his speech to the Ministry of Health, where he indicated that in 2012, the authority had 186 staff working at TFDA headquarters and in zonal offices. He insisted that this was far below the needed manpower of 354 employees (TFDA, 2012). This means that the authority has a deficit of 168 staff. As substandard drugs are prevalent across the country, dealing with the problem through zone offices stands to be

inadequate. Given the country's big geographical size, with more than 25 administrative regions and 113 districts, that number of staff is not enough to effectively protect more than 44 million consumers. The nature and magnitude of the problem calls for more presence of the authority throughout the country at least up to the district level and not at the zonal level as it is currently the case. Limited presence of the Authority is also made worse by inadequacy of equipment such as mobile laboratories. For instance, According to TFDA Director General, the authority lacks laboratory equipment known as Gas Chromatography coupled with mass spectrophotometer (GC-MS) which would be important in enabling TFDA to identify and quantify pesticide residuals in food (Al Itrah Broadcasting Network Television-IBN TV, 2013). Government's commitment to supply the Authority with adequate working tools remains limited. As a result, the Bureau is sometimes forced to depend on donations. For instance, in June 2012, TFDA received five mini-lab kits for drug testing from Merck Company based in Germany.

Like TBS, the problem of low penalties seems to also act as a catalyst for continuation of illegal trade in substandard and counterfeit drugs. For instance, section 99-(3) of TFDA Act provides that any person who deals, sells, offers or exposes substandard products commits an offence and is therefore liable to a fine of not less than one hundred thousand shillings and not exceeding one million shillings, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to both such fine and imprisonment. Similarly, section 123- (1) provides that any person who commits an offence under the TFDA Act for which no specific penalty is provided shall be liable upon conviction to a fine not exceeding one million shillings or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or both such fine and imprisonment. All these penalties are very low and partly contribute to the persistence of the problem. As Table 1 shows, the cumulative annually estimated average market value of counterfeit products that fall in the category of goods to be regulated by TFDA such as pharmaceuticals and medical equipment; cosmetics and detergents, foodstuffs, alcohol and bottled drinking water is Tshs 36 billion. Basing on this lucrative nature of counterfeit products, imposing the proposed penalties does not only continue to put the welfare of the consumers at risk, but also exposes the weakness of the country's corporate governance regulatory framework. The obvious weakness is that the system is not proactive enough in devising control measures that can at least help to reduce the magnitude of this business.

As table 1 indicates, there are twelve (12) main counterfeit products in Tanzania. These include: industrial equipment and raw materials whose estimated range of market value is between 20 to 300 billion Tanzanian Shillings (Tshs) and estimated average market value of 160 Billion Tanzanian shillings; agricultural inputs with an estimated range of market value of 10 to 150 billion Tshs and estimated average market value of 80 billion Tshs. Other counterfeit products are vehicle spare parts that have an estimated range of market value of between 20 to 100 billion Tshs and average market value of 60 billion Tshs; electronic equipment and appliances with an estimated range of market value of 20-50 billion Tshs and estimated average market value of 35 billion Tshs, and cosmetics and detergents whose estimated range of market value is 14-50 billion Tshs and their estimated average market value is 32 billion shillings.

Also included in the list of counterfeit products are pharmaceutical and medical equipment that have an estimated range of market value of 6 to 30 billion Tshs and estimated average market value of 18 billion Tshs; and clothing and apparel that have an estimated range of

market value of 5-20 and estimated average market value 13 billion Tshs. Other counterfeit products are plastic products that have estimated range of market value of 5-20 billion Tshs and estimated average market value of 13 billion Tshs; building materials whose estimated range of market value is 1-5 billion Tshs and estimated market value of 3 billion Tshs; foodstuffs that have an average range of market value of 1 to 4 billion Tshs and estimated average market value of 3 billion Tshs. The two remaining main counterfeit products in Tanzania are chemicals whose estimated range of market value is 1 to 4 and estimated average market value is 3 billion Tshs; and alcohol and bottled drinking water with estimated range of market value of 1 to 2 billion Tshs and estimated average market value of 2 billion Tshs.

Table 1: Counterfeit goods and their estimated market value

<i>Sn</i>	<i>Main Counterfeit Products</i>	<i>Estimated Range of Market Value (Bill TZS)</i>	<i>Estimated Average Market Value (Bill TZS)</i>
1	Industrial equipment and raw materials	20 - 300	160
2	Agricultural inputs (Dursban, Gladiator, Blue copper, Red copper, Dithane, Cobox, etc)	10 - 150	80
3	Vehicle spare parts (Tyres, batteries, bearings, tubes, engine parts, etc)	20 - 100	60
4	Electronic equipment and appliances (TVs, radios, cassette recorders, computers, wire cables, pirated music etc)	20 - 50	35
5	Cosmetics, detergents (creams, lotions, toothpastes (Whitenedent, Colgate, Close-up)	14 - 50	32
6	Pharmaceuticals & medical equipment (drugs, surgical gloves, scissors, blood pressure machines, etc)	6 - 30	18
7	Clothing and apparel (khanga, shirts, athletic shoes, etc)	5 - 20	13
8	Plastic products	5 - 20	13
9	Building materials (wire cables, door locks, bulbs (Phillips)	1 - 5	3
10	Foodstuffs	1 - 4	3
11	Chemicals (industrial and domestic)	1 - 4	3
12	Alcohol and bottled drinking water (wine, beer, Konyagi, Uhai)	1 - 2	2

Source: (URT, 2008)

Conclusion

The above discussion has shown that Tanzania's corporate governance framework is still at its infant stage in terms of acting as tool for protecting consumers. Despite the fact that there have been some positive interventions to protect consumers from the effects of substandard goods, the degree of consumers' protection remains low. This is contrary to the emphasis by the stakeholders' theory on the importance of protecting the categories of stakeholders from being negatively affected by the activities of the firms. The article has demonstrated and cited some empirical cases which show the persistence of multibillion-shilling illegal trade in substandard

goods, despite the existence of various standards organizations. The article also has identified various factors that are attributed to the failure of these organizations to monitor and enforce standards on different categories of products. These include shortage of financial resources and skilled human resources, inadequacy of equipment, weak synergies and networks, weak legal framework and unclear division of power between these organizations and other actors such as ministers.

The Way Forward

On the basis the above observation, the article makes some recommendations on what needs to be done to ensure that the country's corporate governance framework effectively protects the consumers.

The first recommendation is that for the country's corporate governance framework to be in a position of effectively protecting the consumers, emphasis should be put on promoting more synergies among TFDA, EWURA, TBS and other regulatory bodies. As the above discussion has shown, all the reviewed organizations are characterized by many weaknesses which suggest that none of them can perform its presupposed duties independently and effectively. This situation thus calls for joint efforts among these organizations in monitoring and enforcing standards on the goods that are within their mandate. Given the nature of the economy that has allowed for a proliferation of producers and importers, there is a compelling need for teamwork among these organizations to ensure that consumers are protected. Establishing these synergies does not seem to be a difficult task as laws establishing these organizations recognize the significance of cooperation. For instance, Section 5-(2) of the TFDA Act provides that in the performance of its functions, the Authority shall maintain a system of consultation and cooperation with other organizations dealing with the same business.

There have been efforts to ensure cooperation among these organizations but they still seem inadequate in ensuring more and effective protection of consumers. One of joint efforts among these organizations is the creation of an interdepartmental task force to monitor the enforcement of standards after the amendment in 2007 of the Merchandise Marks Act of 1963 and the passing of Merchandise Marks Regulations in 2008. The members of this task force came from the Attorney General Chambers, Tanzania Revenue Authority, Tanzania Police Force, Tanzania Bureau of Standards and TFDA (Mkono, Kameja & Mrema, 2009). Similar recent cooperative initiatives involved TBS, FCC and the Police Force as earlier indicated in this article.

In addition to synergies, it is imperatives that current corporate governance measures aiming at protecting consumers adopt a networks model. As Stephen Osborne (2006) argues, New Public Governance (NPG) which is a contemporary paradigm of public administration sees networks as a very effective tool in attaining the goals of the organization. Public administration and management is thus said to be characterized by a pluralist and plural state with multiple interdependent actors and multiple processes of policy making. While supporting Osborne's thesis, this article maintains that it is important for the fight against substandard and counterfeit goods to be anchored upon a networks theory that calls for joint efforts among stakeholders. In this case, government bodies need to work hand-in-hand with other actors such as the general public, the media and civil society organizations.

While cooperation among standards organizations is poor, the situation is even worse with other actors such as the general public and civil society. The study by the United Republic of Tanzania in 2008 identified low level of networking among the above categories of stakeholders (URT, 2008). This has consequently resulted in a frail role of civil society organizations in advocating for the enforcement of standards. In spite of the fact that there is an influx of counterfeit goods in the Tanzanian market, there are no strong civil society organizations playing a watchdog and advocacy role in ensuring that consumers are protected. Most of standards organizations have been collaborating with local government authorities (LGAs) and the Police Department in conducting some operations against substandard goods, with little consideration of other stakeholders. However, given the fact that LGAs and the Police are preoccupied with their core functions, they cannot effectively participate in fighting substandard goods.

What is, however, clear is that substandard goods cannot be eliminated through seasonal operations that are carried out in only some parts of the country. Any success is thus anchored upon an interplay of roles among all types of stakeholders, starting from the general public who need to be educated about the nature and effects of these goods, to increased cooperation among all stakeholders. Failure to have a firm network thus gives room for the persistence of illicit commodities. This observation is supported by the Fair Competition Commission and the Confederation of Tanzania Industries whose estimate in 2008 was that almost 40 percent of all electrical equipment were counterfeits and that as a result Tanzania incurred losses of between 15 and 25 per cent of total domestic revenue due to counterfeit imports. Similarly, CTI's study of 2008 showed that between 15 and 20 per cent of goods circulating in the domestic market were counterfeit products.

Efforts to protect consumers need to also involve the rationalization of the legal and regulatory framework. The legal framework that is guiding the operations of standards organizations in Tanzania needs to be rationalized as it currently affects the functioning of these organizations. As the above discussion has demonstrated, one of the weaknesses of this framework is its failure to grant these organizations the power and authority to make final and binding decisions without subjecting them to the controls of politicians. This is, for instance, provided for by Section 7-(3) and (4) of the EWURA Act which limits the authority of the Bureau in decisions related to the enforcement of contracts. Such provisions clearly indicate that standards organizations are not autonomous, especially in decision making. These organizations thus need to be given powers to enable them to carry out their duties properly and more effectively. Such measures have to include, *inter alia*, the power and authority to determine and propose appropriate penalties and sanctions (to be enacted into laws) against producers of and dealers in substandard goods.

Furthermore, the rationalization of the legal framework needs to ensure that new laws on counterfeit and substandard goods complement each other in addressing this problem. This recommendation stems from the fact that the failure of the legal framework to suggest appropriate sanctions has partly played part in the persistence of trade in substandard goods which have adverse effects on consumers. Lack of complementarity among these laws was also echoed by the chairperson of Confederation of Tanzania Industries (CTI) who pointed out that Tanzania has many laws and policies on fake goods which have persistently been unable to curb the problem of counterfeit products.

Furthermore, as the above discussion has indicated, all standards organizations are suffering from lack of capacity, especially in terms of human resources. Most of these organizations are understaffed and they thus fail to expand the scope of their operations. For instance, as per TBS website, the bureau has 151 staff who are supposed to take care of all standards-related issues nationwide. By whatever standards, this number cannot cater for millions of Tanzanians prone to the effects of substandard goods. Limited number of human resources was also evident at EWURA, as by December 2011 the authority had only 97 staff, which was two staff less than the approved EWURA establishment of 99 staff. Although EWURA might look well staffed in terms of available staff and the approved authority's staff establishment, these figures suggest the weakness of the country's corporate governance framework. With this number of staff, it is very unlikely that, for instance, the bureau can closely monitor fuel adulteration countrywide where more than 113 administrative districts ought to be served by the authority. Suffice it, therefore, to underline the fact that the authority's approved staff establishment is very unrealistic. It is on this basis that EWURA and TBS have no upcountry branches, a situation that forces them to operate mainly from Dar es Salaam. This situation creates a compelling need for more efforts in equipping these organizations with adequate skilled staff that can enable them to effectively fulfil their mandates and obligations in all parts of the country.

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Corporal Punishment and Students' Discipline in Uganda's Schools: A Literature Review

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Abstract

This paper examines the adoption of corporal punishment in managing student discipline in pre-primary, primary and secondary schools in Uganda. Corporal punishment as the intentional infliction of physical pain has long been used as a method of changing behaviour. It includes caning, hitting, shaking or slapping a child either with a hand or an object. This article is based on review of literature. It discusses cultural beliefs, teachers' personal life experiences, family programming (internalization) and wider fundamental problems in the education system like poor training of teachers as arguments for the use of corporal punishment. The article concludes that despite its use, corporal punishment is a violation of children's human rights due to its negative consequences like physical injuries, death, school dropout, fear and psychological torture. Particular emphasis should therefore be put on formulation of appropriate policy to emphasize the use of positive discipline as a strategy for the elimination of corporal punishment in schools in Uganda.

Key words: Corporal Punishment, Discipline, School Children's Human Rights, Uganda.

Introduction

It has been variously and widely debated whether corporal punishment actually contributes to the discipline of pupils. Through a literature review, this article examines this logic with a view of assessing the causal linkages between corporal punishment and students' discipline. The article uses the experiences from Uganda's context. It first examines the theoretical framework for the arguments. It then addresses itself to assessing the various forms and types of corporal punishment used in Uganda's schools. The paper briefly describes the methodology, and then turns to assessing the justification for corporal punishment and its effects. The paper then discusses the possible strategies for the elimination of corporal punishment and policy implications.

Background to corporal punishment

Globally corporal punishment was used on children in homes and students in schools (Barnen, 1998). The attitude of teachers and parents in using corporal punishment, especially caning or spanking, before 1840s was largely influenced by religious morals based on the belief of "spare the rod and spoil the child". However; after World War II the human rights charter was signed in 1948 by 61 member countries of UN guaranteeing the protection of human rights. This was followed by various legislations against torture and the use of corporal punishment in homes and schools in the USA, Britain, Germany, France and other developed economies of the Northern hemisphere as noted by Richards (1987).

Corporal punishment has been banned in some countries through legislation. In countries like Canada, Norway and Sweden, it is criminal to beat children or harass children in homes and at school (Straus, 1994). This has been complemented by the emergence of a number of human rights movements and civil society organizations aiming at protection of vulnerable people (Willow, 2009).

In a 2011 baseline survey by the African Network for the Protection and Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect (ANPPCAN) Uganda Chapter of 1,015 children from 25 public and private primary schools in Acholi, Lango, West Nile and Central regions, 81 per cent of respondents reported having been beaten at school. Of those who had been beaten, 73 per cent had been by a teacher, 15 per cent by students' leaders and 12 per cent by their parents or guardians. Children were also punished by being denied food for extended periods of time, locked up in rooms, assigned difficult work and forced to kneel in front other children at school. Eighty-two per cent (82%) of children had seen their friends being caned. The study, conducted in April 2011, also involved 52 professionals including teachers, head teachers, Parents Teachers Association members, police, government and non-government experts in the education and child protection fields at district and national levels. A 2011 report by Human Rights Watch documented corporal punishment of students in schools as well as among prisoners in Uganda – including beating with batons, canes, sticks, whips and electric cable and wire, despite the prohibition of corporal punishment in the Prisons Act (2006).

Children are sometimes detained with adults in prisons, even though this is prohibited. The report calls for efforts to end the use of corporal punishment and prosecution of persons who inflict it. A 2010 African Child Policy Forum report on violence against children with disabilities in Uganda, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Senegal and Zambia documented a very high level of corporal punishment. Nearly a thousand 18-24 year-olds took part in the study across the five countries, reporting on their experiences as children. In Uganda, 87 per cent of the sample had experienced at least one type of corporal punishments during their childhood. The most commonly experienced type of corporal punishment was being hit, punched, kicked or beaten. Across all five countries, more than half (54 per cent) of those who had been physically beaten said they had suffered broken bones, teeth, bleeding or bruising; 2 per cent had been permanently disabled; 215 required medical attention; 13 per cent had to miss school or work; and 20 per cent needed rest at home. For all five countries, the majority of respondents with physical, visual and intellectual disabilities experienced physical violence more than 10 times. The report recommends prohibition of all corporal punishment, including in the home, as a way to minimize the risk of violence against children with disabilities.

A survey of 500 young women in Uganda aged 18 – 24 years concerning their childhood experiences of corporal punishment, undertaken by the Africa Child Policy Forum and published in 2006, found that 94.2 per cent had been subjected to corporal punishment. Beating with an object was found to be the most prevalent form of corporal punishment (85.8 per cent). Prevalence figures for other forms of corporal punishment were 55 per cent for punching, 26.8 per cent kicking, 47.8 per cent hard work, 20.4 per cent being choked/burned, 9 per cent having spicy/bitter food put in mouth, 18.2 per cent being locked or tied up, and 52.8 per cent being denied food. Girls were found to be most vulnerable to beating with an object when aged 10-13 years (57.1 per cent), and to being hit/punched when aged 14-17 years (44 per cent).

Experiencing the violence more than ten times was likely in the beating than other types of corporal punishment. Most beating with an object was carried out by male teachers (48.5 per cent), followed by fathers (43.4 per cent) and mothers (42.9 per cent); and in 57.3 per cent of cases, medical attention was required. Most hitting/punching was carried out by fathers (22.9 per cent), followed by mothers (17.1 per cent) and brothers (15.6 per cent), and with medical attention required in 21.1 per cent of cases. At school, girls were told they were beaten for being late, for misbehaving, or being disrespectful (Stavropoulos, 2006).

In research by Save the Children UK focusing on deprivation and criminal behaviour and carried out in Uganda in 2002, 116 children who had been convicted of theft and children at the national rehabilitation centre, aged 10 – 19 years, and 71 parents/guardians were interviewed. The prohibition of caning in the juvenile justice system under the Children's Statute was perceived as a weakness by 14 per cent of parents. The research confirmed that despite the law, children were tortured and beaten in police stations. Fifty-two per cent (52%) of parents said they normally disciplined their children by caning (Kakama, 2002).

On the same subject, a 2002 study which included interviews with orphans living with guardians (often family members) reported that orphans experienced corporal punishment daily to monthly, including slapping and caning with sticks and logs. The orphans reported experiencing more frequent and severe corporal punishment than children, including the children of their guardians. Orphans were also spoken to more severely than other children. The motive for the severity and frequency of punishments was understood by the children to be "the guardians' anger and frustration about having to care for the orphans when their resources were limited". In-depth research into children's experiences of violence against them was carried out in 2005 using a range of methods to look at the opinions of 1,406 children aged 8-18 years (719 girls, 687 boys) and 1,093 adults (520 women, 573 men), including parents, teachers and community leaders, from five diverse districts. This included the administration of 1,000 questionnaires to children (in and out of school), of which 777 were valid returns, and 900 questionnaires to adults, of which 755 were valid returns. Other methods were focus groups, narrative role play, journal writing and interviews. Almost all children (98.3 per cent) reported experiencing physical violence at home and school. The most common forms were caning, slapping and pinching; followed by burning, locking up, tying up and other (e.g. kneeling, slashing grass, cleaning latrines), all more common for boys than girls except slapping, pinching and others.

Theoretical framework

This article tackles corporal punishment in Ugandan schools basing on two theories of public administration - the Institutional theory or Neo-Institutional theorem advanced by Walter Powell and Holland Taylor (1996) and the Principle agent theory advanced by Stephen Ross and Lane (2000). The institutional theorem argues that human behaviour within institutions ought to encompass formal rules, norms and values. Schools in Uganda, as public and private institutions, have formal rules and regulations that ought to be obeyed by students, teachers and support staff for the success of public education programmes as noted by Ssekamwa (1992). However, the great question of the day is: If formal rules are broken, how should the culprits be handled? According to the institutional theory, they should be reprimanded according to what the rules and penalties say.

This debate is also underpinned by the principle agent theory advanced by Stephen Ross and Lane (2000). The theory explains the relationship between parents, government, teachers and students in the management of discipline. The theory is concerned with motivating one party to act on behalf of the other to achieve objectives of public administration in service delivery (Zahra, 1999). In the aspect of managing the discipline, behaviour and learning of students, teachers are agents of parents and the state (Larzelere, 1996). If the students break school rules and regulations, the teacher (the agent) ought to administer corrective measures on behalf of the parent.

Two key features define corporal punishment: physical violence against children and the concept of punishments in response to wrong doing (UNICEF, 2011). Violence is at the extreme end of a range of punishments that are inflicted on children not only by teachers but also by parents (Tang, 1998). The issue of fundamental children's human rights enshrined in the 1995 Constitution of Uganda Cap 34 and article 19 of the UN Convention of Children. Elsergany (2010) categorizes corporal punishment into two major forms, namely – physical corporal punishment that inflicts pain on the body like canning and slapping, and psychological or non-physical punishment that leads to low self-esteem like verbal abuse. Benator (2011) defines physical corporal punishment as the infliction of physical pain on the body of a human by beating, hitting, spanking, paddling swatting and canning. Ugandan school teachers often apply canning as a method of discipline. Jones (1999) looks at physical corporal punishment as any punishment in which physical force is used and intended to cause some degree of pain or discomfort, however light. This involves hitting, smacking and slapping children with a hand or with an implement, whip, stick, belt, shoe, wires and a wooden spoon. Torkasi (2002) highlights physical corporal punishment to involve more dangerous forms like shaking or throwing children, scratching, pinching, burning, scalding or forced ingestion like washing children's mouth out with soap or forcing them to swallow hot spices. Non-physical or psychological punishments are those ones that are cruel and degrading like those that belittle, humiliate, denigrate, threaten, scare and ridicule the child – like locking a child in a room with backing dogs, locking a child in a pond compartment that houses crocodiles or undressing a child in school or abusing a child publicly in school using degrading words. Non-physical punishments have long-lasting psychological torture on children's lives as noted by Smith (1995).

Methodology

Documentary analysis has been used as the main method of information gathering and building arguments in this article. Extensive literature review of various documents on corporal punishment as a means of disciplining students globally, in Africa and in Uganda inform this article. Existing literature from textbooks, newspapers, magazines, journals and internet websites have been deeply analyzed and harmonized to put together this article. Some information and arguments are based on a wealth of personal experiences as a teacher and school administrator for eighteen years. Some of the findings have been extracted from research findings of other scholars, documentaries and reported cases of child abuse through corporal punishments from government departments, like criminal records from Uganda Police. The article is therefore based on literature review.

Findings

In Africa, especially, the belief in beating children in homes as a means of instilling discipline has been around for centuries (Naker, 2007). Some adults in Africa have long believed that if children do not fear them, they will disrespect elders and behave in away contrary to African culture (Ssekamwa, 1989). The adults in Africa believe that by instilling fear in children they can mould children's value systems and teach them to appreciate their heritage as argued by Naker (2007). Corporal punishment in schools and homes in Africa is also justified based on the belief that without pain, there is no gain (Barnen, 1998). Many adults have been told through their lives that learning occurs when associated with pain. Schooling teaches people to believe that without the threat of a stick or public rebuke, they will become lazy and fail to exert effort required to learn new things (Vergas, 1999). Some teachers in the African set-up believe that good teachers are always in control of their students and, as a result, they have learnt from their environment that the only acceptable way of relating with children is to exercise power over them or control them and make them comply to teachers wishes (UNICEF 2011).

Whereas legislation has helped to reduce and abolish the use of corporal punishment in schools in the developed world like USA and Europe, Uganda depicts the contrary. The use of caning in Ugandan primary schools, especially in the rural areas, is alarming, and sometimes leads to permanent disability and even death (Natukunda, 2006). Despite the ban on corporal punishment by the Ministry of Education and Sports in 2006, teachers and school managers have continued to use corporal punishment in schools. A circular released by the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Education and Sports in 2006 to all Heads of Schools stated:

Corporal punishments for students in schools and colleges must stop forth with. This applies to meting out any other form of punishment or act that may cause injury, damage, defilement or disfigurement to the human body. The use of a cane as disciplining machine shall not be used innursery and infant classes at this tender age. childrenought to be brought up in love and care rather than inbrutality, violence or sadism.

Despite such a directive, why have teachers continued to mete out corporal punishment to pupils? Interestingly for Uganda's case, most educators enter their professions because they want to help students learn. They donot intend to harm children by administering corporal punishment as noted by Ssekamwa (1992). Various arguments have been advanced to justify the continued use of corporal punishment as given below.

Many teachers and adults argue that they were beaten and learnt how to behave better. Teachers argue that they were beaten and humiliated as children and it did them no harm (Payne, 1989). Furthermore, teachers argue that beating helped them learn right from wrong and it showed that the adult who punished them loved them and cared for them (Mandell, 2009). Actually the Bakigaand Banyankole of western Uganda culturally believed that beating of children and wives was a sign of great love for them, as noted by Tibanyenda (1975). Therefore, there is no doubt that teachers bred in such cultural context and environment will

eventually use beating or caning as a means disciplining the students they teach! Many adults and teachers in Uganda say that a light slap or a few canes are useful ways to quickly resolve a conflict and to show children that they made a mistake as noted by a report by Human Rights Watch (1999). As long as the punishment does not cause physical injury, many teachers see nothing wrong with it (Manirul, 1999). Teachers and adults in Uganda argue that they use corporal punishment as the last resort (Ssekitoleko, 2007). They believe that it is important to retain corporal punishment as the last resort and serves as a powerful deterrent and allows a way out of a conflict where all else has failed (Pinheiro, 2006). When nothing else works, a stick is necessary as noted by Pablo (2010).

Hyder (1998) argues that euphemisms are frequently used to justify corporal punishment. Teachers in Uganda have continued to distance themselves from the reality of what they are doing in an attempt to distinguish “deserved” punishments from abuse. In English, for example, smacking, spanking, cuffing, lapping, clapping, paddling are termed as “six of the best” and are all terms that blur the fact that adults are actually hitting children as argued by Qasem (1998). But when we look at children’s description of corporal punishments “little taps” and “gentle slaps” are not little or gentle when you are a victim, as advanced by Payne (1989). Cultural programming or internalization has accelerated the use of corporal punishment in schools (Barnen, 1998). Whereas some countries like Spain and Uganda have **outlawed** corporal punishment in schools, citizens continue to justify corporal punishment in homes. Interesting to note is that the reasons that are publically accepted or banning it in schools seem un-acceptable when it comes to introducing a ban within families. The Ugandan Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development intended to amend the Children’s Act 2006 to ban corporal punishment in school, communities and homes. Parents in Uganda do not agree with the proposal to ban corporal punishment at home as Jabo (2011) observed quite a number of parents in Uganda would be willing to support the ban of corporal punishments in schools and communities, but not in homes. This is because, he argues, that the teacher might not have an emotional attachment to a child but a parent does and when a parent uses corporal punishment, it is done with good intentions.

Teachers in Uganda claim that corporal punishment is traditional, cultural or backed by religious doctrine and this makes the roots of its justification in their personal history – the process through which it was legitimized during their childhood as noted by Vargas (1995). Naker (2007) contends that corporal punishment in schools is often associated with wide problems in the education system. Teachers are frequently poorly trained, underpaid and undervalued in Uganda (Ruzindana, 2012).

Kavuma (2012) blames the competition for good grades between Ugandan primary schools as another force behind use of caning during classroom instruction. Liberalization of Uganda’s education system since 1986 saw the increase in the number of private schools. These schools compete for prominence in terms of top grades in national examinations. Kavuma noted that teachers in privately-owned primary schools in Uganda have widely held the assumption that good performance in school requires the use of corporal punishment, as the comment below reveals:

Parents' pressure often results in children being subjected to corporal punishments which is meant to be an incentive to do better. In addition to any violence by parents to pressurise children to perform, they may also be punished by teachers to perform. The main criteria for teacher's supervision /evaluation system are based on whether the curriculum has been completed and how many of the students scores good marks in the final exam. Failure to perform better than others in regular class work, homework and tests under a system which is observed with ranking invites frequent and systematic use of canning pupils to perform well. (Kavuma 2012:16)

The use of corporal punishment may also be triggered by other factors like over-crowded classrooms, untrained, overworked and stressed teachers who vent their inadequacy and frustrations on pupils, as noted by the Human Rights Watch (1999) report on Uganda and Kenya on primary school teachers' performance. The report noted that it is rather hard for committed teachers to retain control over large classrooms and some of the teachers end up supplying their services into supplemental income producing schemes like coaching and extra lessons than into teaching and then administering corporal punishments to those who failed to pay for extra help.

Perhaps the most extreme rationale for teachers to use corporal punishment was given by a Ugandan head teacher in West Nile in a survey by UNESCO (2007) who said that banning corporal punishment would be like sending a boxer into the ring with one hand tied at the back. The implication behind this statement is that teachers are in conflict with students and, in some contexts, the culture of the classroom violence has indeed developed to a level where older students are physically abusing teachers. But, on the other hand, corporal punishment demonstrably feeds this culture of violence.

Forms of corporal punishment in Ugandan schools

Ssekitoleko (2007) argues that whereas the Psychological Non-physical punishments are rarely used in Ugandan schools, apart from verbal abuses, physical punishments dominate the list of corporal punishments exemplified by caning, spanking, pinching, slapping, hitting and scratching and that this physical violation of children's human rights is a daily occurrence in pre-primary, primary and secondary schools in all the regions of Uganda. Ssekamwa (1989) noted that corporal punishment in African families in general, and Ugandan families in particular dates as far back or are as old as mankind. With the advent of missionary education in Uganda in 1896, followed by training and recruitment of African – Native -- teachers, caning became part of instilling discipline in students with slogans like "spare the rod and spoil the child". Although the phrase "spare the rod and spoil the child" is not a biblical text, there is no doubt that it reflects meaning of biblical proverbs on child rearing. These passages from the Book of Proverbs read, "He who spares the rod hates his son but he who loves him is diligent to discipline him" (Proverbs 13:24 King James Version). "Folly is bound up in the heart of a child but the rod of discipline drives it far from him" (Proverbs 22:115, KJV). "Don't withhold discipline from a child. If you beat him with a rode he will not die. If you beat him with a rode you will save his life from hell." Proverbs 23:13,15, KJV). Probably this can explain the basis of strict and harsh disciplinary measures in missionary-founded schools in Uganda.

Effects of corporal punishments on children

Corporal punishment leads to ineffectiveness in discipline. Gershoff (2002) argues that even if it was proved that physically pushing children was effective, would that make it any less a violation of their rights? No amount of research would alter the fact that such behaviour is wrong and a breach of human rights. Durrant (1999) noted that balance of research evidence is clear, Corporal punishment has some effectiveness in securing the “immediate compliance” more effective than other methods. But paradoxically this easy solution for teachers is not to their long-term advantage. Children may comply with adults’ wishes immediately after being hit but research suggests that young ones frequently do not remember why they are hit and children will only refrain from misbehaviour if they face an eminent threat of being punished as noted by (Romeo, 1996). Save the Children UK- Uganda Chapter (2001) consulted children in Northern Uganda about corporal punishment and recorded over 40 adjectives describing what corporal punishment felt like, i.e. Hurt, sore, scared, upset, unloved, terrified, worried, lonely, sad, angry, alone, abandoned, afraid, cross, frightened, sick, stunned, threatened, annoyed, bad, physically abused, hateful, emotionally hurt, unhappy, terrible, ashamed, disliked, confused, embarrassed, resentful, neglects, over powered, humiliated, grumpy, disappointed, painful, miserable, intimidated, uncared for; unwelcome, heartbroken, bullied, depressed, shocked.

This list brings home to use the ineffectiveness of corporal punishment. None of these Northern Ugandan children used adjectives like “wiser” or even “sorry” to describe how they felt after being hit. In the same survey, children noted that corporal punishment has terrible consequences, as Grace Akello, aged 16, wrote:

Parents and teachers now days have taken this advantage of giving extra strokes over a very small issue instead of just correcting them in a polite manner as though the children were not theirs, you know what, children will end up hating their parents and teachers.

Corporal punishment has physical consequences in terms of physical injuries. Straus (1994), argues that as the effectiveness of corporal punishment decreases with use, so its severity must be systemically increased. Parents and teachers as they become desensitized to what they are doing and frustrated by the diminishing returns, move from light slaps to hard blows. Children many suffer injuries arising from corporal punishment that needs medical attention; leave permanent damage and even cause their death. UNICEF (1999), contends that evidence from different countries reflects the nature and severity of harm that can be inflicted. A questionnaire sent to 600 primary schools in the Northern province of Pakistan elicited 62 reports by head teachers of injuries arising from corporal punishment in school, including children being knocked unconscious, bleeding, broken limbs, damaged eyes and stitches. Human Rights Watch (1999), reported that in Kenya school pupils reported being beaten with canes more than a metre long; and a Kenyan girl said, “The teacher was very angry because some girls failed a test, so the teacher gave the girls a choice, three slaps from his hand or ten strokes with a cane. The girls choose the three slaps, he hit her face three times, very hard leaving her mouth bloody and knocking out two teeth.” Such treatment is unquestionably a form of child abuse. But because child abuse has traditionally been kept in a separate category from corporal punishments, there

has been surprisingly little research into the connection between the two. Centre for Effective Discipline US (2001), reported that an American review of 66 cases of child abuse concluded that child abuse most often occurs as an extension of disciplinary actions which at some point and often inadvertently crossed the ambiguous line between sanctioned corporal punishment and unsanctioned child abuse. The same report shows that over a thousand children died from abuse in the United States in one year alone – 1999.

Corporal punishment has emotional and psychological consequences. Research findings by Durrant (1999), show many harmful psychological consequences for children who are physically punished, both in long and short-term. Evidence from five research studies of the effects of corporal punishments on American children shows that it increases the risk of children developing major social and psychological problems such as physical violence and depression as noted by Straus (2000). The strongest, usually unintended message that corporal punishment sends to the mind of a child is that violence is acceptable behaviour, that it is alright for a stronger person to use force to coerce a weaker one. So it is no surprise that a major consequence of corporal punishments in childhood, increases proportionately with its severity is aggression and criminal and anti-social behaviour in childhood and later adulthood, as noted by Gunnoe (1998). As Elizabeth Wobuya, a 17-year-old Ugandan student wrote in an essay commemorating the 10th anniversary of the UN Convention on the Rights of a Child, “Though many of these parents/ guardians and teachers punish to reform, they end up punishing to deform” (Save Children UK, 2000).

Hyman (1997) noted that children’s developing minds are damaged by violent treatment. Corporal punishment takes its toll of children’s long-term mental health and happiness. Research findings by Dayton (1994) point to a correlation between corporal punishments and depression, low self-esteem, negative psychological adjustment and poor relations with parents and teachers. A research study by Ellison (1996) on the Caribbean Island of St. Kitts examined whether the cultural acceptability of corporal punishment reduced its negative effects. It found out that children who regarded beatings as acceptable methods of upbringing were psychologically harmed just as much as those who did not. Brezina (1998) observed that corporal punishment does not include punishments that solely cause emotional pain. However, corporal punishment invariably includes an element of emotional punishment because it humiliates children, invades personal integrity and underlines their perceived inferiority.

Children frequently cited corporal punishment as a reason for dropping out of school alongside factors such as poverty and gender discrimination. Barnen (1998) noted that in Ethiopia corporal punishment lead to school dropout and quoted an Ethiopian student describing how his teacher punished him in front of the other students by putting a pencil between his fingers and squeezing his hand. “It was not the pain that hurt me, but the feelings of humiliation I underwent when my classmates laughed at me. That was the last day for me to be at the gate of that school.” Research findings by Human Rights Watch (1999) in Kenya shows that Kenyan children, left with little remedy against corporal punishment, in many cases respond to injuries and severe punishment by transferring from abusive schools or by dropping out of school. Elton (1989) argues that even less severe forms of punishment damage children’s education. Children learn through exploring, questioning, trying things out. They need the freedom to experiment, to think for themselves and take risks where discipline is not maintained through fear.

Teachers justify corporal punishment as being good for the pupils' discipline and learning. But there is no evidence that the absence of corporal punishments leads to poor scholarship or out-of-control pupils. Examination of the school records of corporal punishment reveals that it is often the same pupils who are reportedly beaten for these same offences. A UK government inquiry into discipline in schools shortly after the UK banned school corporal punishment found that there was no evidence of corporal punishment being an effective deterrent but rather that standards of behavior tended to be worse in schools which made more frequent use of corporal punishment than those that did not. (Elton 1989).

Fundamentally, corporal punishment would be inconceivable within any education system that was genuinely based on the rights of the child. An education system that supported teachers to build a relationship of trust with children, enabling children to question, challenge, analyze and learn for themselves, and encouraged equal respect for each after would have no place for corporal punishment which can only undermine the very basis of this approach to teaching and learning. Corporal punishment has consequences for parents, teachers and society. People usually think that the effects of corporal punishment only apply to children who experience it; but parents, teachers and society are affected too. Many parents and teachers use corporal punishment because they have no other resources to solve the conflict and then they feel bad that they have done it. Guilt and violence perpetuate the difficult family contexts that led to the conflicts in the first place (Harding, 1989). Corporal punishment also helps to perpetuate an inter-generational cycle of violence in societies. For instance, of more than 103 teachers in Cameroon who admitted caning their students, 99 affirmed that they had themselves suffered violence as children and pupils (Miller, 1999).

Corporal punishment is a violation of children's human rights. The worldwide use of corporal punishment seems to contradict the fact that children are "people the same as us", humans with human rights. People justify behaviour towards children that they would never justify for themselves as adults, such as beating someone when he or she behaves in an undesirable way. In fact adults hit children because they cannot do it and many societies accept and support it, but corporal punishment ends when children grow up, when abuse of power is no more acceptable. Historically, it seems that children will be the last group to be protected in law from corporal punishment. In previous eras, the beating of wives, servants, prisoners, soldiers and slaves was legally and socially acceptable. Now there are few countries where such practices are lawful. Only where children are concerned do we seem blind to their rights as fellow human beings. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) explicitly protects children from all forms of physical violence (Article 19) and from inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment (Article 37). It requires school discipline to be consistent with the child's human dignity and in conformity with the present convention (Article 28.2).

Although some gross violation of children's rights through corporal punishment is reported in the media, to police and other authorities, many more cases of corporal punishment are not reported at all because of such factors as remoteness of hard-to-reach areas, ignorance of the population about opportunities for redress and weak child protection structures. The structures for redress and protection in Uganda still face immense challenges, resulting from inadequate financial and human capacity, as noted by Ayebazibwe (2010).

Strategies for elimination of corporal punishments

Hindberg (2007) observes that some people argue that it is wrong to discuss alternative corporal punishment because this loses the point that corporal punishment is a fundamental breach of human rights just as it would be wrong to discuss alternatives to torture! While this may be theoretically correct, the practical evidence is that most teachers, parents and care-takers are desperately interested in knowing how to discipline children without violence. They do not like hitting but, in many cases, see no alternatives as noted by Vargas (1995). There is need to develop new attitudes towards children as a means of eliminating corporal punishment. Gershoff (2002) emphasizes that it is fundamental to improve teachers and parents' access to educational materials, tools and resources. It is also important to generate debate from a positive perspective, avoiding blame and guilt.

Teachers must be aware that corporal punishment is neither the right (it is actually children's right not to suffer it) nor is it justified by their educational responsibility to educate and thus discipline children. This means that it is a measure that cannot be justified under any circumstances, as noted by Hyman (1997). Harding (1989) argues that giving up corporal punishment does not mean giving up discipline; children need clear limits and guidance on what is right and wrong, and abandoning the shortcuts of violence is likely to produce better disciplined children. Teachers need to see clearly that there is always an alternative and this can be found if corporal punishment is no longer considered as a possible tool for meting out discipline as advanced by Jones (1999). People who work or live with children all day and who do not use corporal punishment have clearly understood the point that corporal punishment is not an option (Jensen, 1999). Whereas there is a range of alternative punishments available, the real trick is to adopt a different approach that acknowledges children's evolving capacities, and affirms their good behaviour rather than punishes their bad behaviour.

Knuston (1994) noted that a critical component of a new attitude to children is involving children themselves in finding solutions to difficulties. Schools and education systems that respect children as partners and collaborators rather than passive receptors or potential troublemakers will find that they become more peaceful and productive (Larzelere, 1996). Practical education programmes for teachers and parents, government's encouraging widespread debate on broader aspects of the subject – what we want from our children, how they best develop, where violence comes from and how we can move towards more friendly societies should be the way forward. The Gulbenkian Foundation (1995) identified four principles for alternative approaches to corporal punishment as follows: 1) expectations of and demands made on children should realistically reflect their maturity and development; 2) all discipline should be positive and children should be taught social values and behaviours including, in particular, non-violent conflict resolution; 3) non-violence should be clearly and consistently preferred and promoted; 4) adults should take responsibility not only for protecting children from violence done to them, but also for preventing violence done by them. Brenner (1998) suggests that positive discipline should replace corporal punishment. Positive discipline is about guiding children's behaviours by paying attention to their emotional and psychological needs. It aims to help children take responsibility for making good decisions and understand why those decisions were in their best interest. Positive discipline helps children learn self-

discipline without fear. It involves giving children clear guidelines for what behaviour is acceptable and then supporting them as they learn to abide by these guidelines.

Kakama (2002) noted that when necessary, positive discipline includes non-violent consequences for poor behaviour. It uses consequences that replace the experience of humiliation with the following; 1) considering the effects of one's behaviour; 2) identifying alternative and preferred behaviours; 3) demonstrating understanding of why a preferred behaviour is important; and 4) making amends for harm done to others or the environment. This approach may require students to engage in writing essays, making apologies or performing chores in this classroom – any activity that makes them stop, think and demonstrate their intention to act differently in the future, as noted by (Olson,1988). Positive discipline does not reward children for poor behaviour. It provides children with an opportunity to grow as individuals by understanding their mistakes and appreciating how appropriate behaviour can bring them positive experiences and opportunities, as noted by Naker (2007).

Many teachers agree that when they discuss or read about positive discipline, it makes sense but when they attempt to practice positive discipline on day-to-day basis, it becomes harder to understand. They are able to eliminate physical violence from their responses, such as no longer using a cane but still feel dependent on other humiliating punishments. Schnelder (1996) identified four principles of positive discipline that teachers can follow. That a disciplinary response should be, 1) relevant to the misbehaviour; 2) proportional to the offences; 3) focused on correcting the behaviour, not humiliating the student; and 4) aimed at rehabilitation (learning from mistakes) not retribution (pay back). Following the four principles of positive discipline, Braden (1990), Lazerlere (1996), Newman (1983) and Schneider (1998) agree that there are four categories of positive discipline responses.

Use reflection for minor day-to-day problems such as coming late to school and being disruptive in class. A teacher could ask the children to think about their misbehaviour by using one of the following techniques like imposing a time-out and this would involve asking children to either leave class or sit in a quiet place for 10 minutes to think about their behaviours. To be released, they would have to articulate what they did wrong and how they would avoid repeating the same mistake. This should be done firmly but without humiliating the kid. Letter writing is another, and this could involve asking children to apologize to the wronged person and ask for forgiveness.

A teacher could impose an appropriate penalty. Penalties within a positive discipline approach include the following: physical work such as slashing grass or cleaning the school compound in a designated area; withdrawal of privileges such as children not being allowed to go out during recess or play games during school; and, additional time at school (detention) such as children remaining for an extra half hour after school to reflect on what they did wrong.

Another alternative can be reparation for offences that cause damage to a third party such as hitting other students, bullying younger children, damaging property or fighting and causing general disorder, in school. A teacher could insist that a child undertakes public reparation such as the following: the child apologies to the entire school; if feasible, the child contributes towards replacing or repairing the damage such as erecting the fence, chopping wood or

repairing a wall (based on the capacity of the child). The child receives a written notice in the school disciplinary records and commits to reform. The school may also involve parents in preventing a repeat of the behaviour.

The last resort approach can be used for persistent and serious offences such as violating other students or serious damage to the school property or reputation. The head teacher could take action as last reports using interventions such as the following: summon and discuss with parents the possible next steps as a warning to the child; implement a time-limited suspension with a written warning and referral to a counselor or probation officer; as a very last resort, refer this case to the director of education with a specific recommendation for expulsion from school including the involvement of a probation officer and an action plan for the next step to help the child.

Policy, managerial and practical implications

Legal reforms and public education as a policy needs implementation to protect human rights of Uganda's school children. There is need to invoke Article 24 of the 1995 Constitution to protect every person including children from torture and inhuman punishment. The Children Act, section 5 (2) emphasizes the protection of children from discrimination, violence and abuse. Uganda's Penal Code Act Cap 106 sections 81 and 228 state that any person that assaults another person causing actual bodily harm is guilty of misdemeanor. The Education Act of 1970 under Uganda Government Standing Orders, chapter 127, empowers the Director of Education to deregister a teacher guilty of misconduct. These policy commitments are intended to ensure that children's rights are protected --particularly children's rights to access an education in a safe environment.

At a global level, more and more countries are introducing legislation to protect children from corporal punishment. Ugandan children are amongst the 42 percent of the world's child population who are legally protected from corporal punishment as noted by Naker (1007). Uganda's challenge is to ensure that all the children enjoy this protection in reality rather than just on paper. This implies that resources in terms of effort, money, sensitization and legislation must be committed by the Uganda Government and development partners to make it a reality.

UNESCO (2007) recommends that states, including Uganda, should adopt a time-bound Plan of Action as a policy to: Research the existence and extent of corporal punishment of children in schools and all forms of day care establishments, there is need to identify the causes underlying the use of corporal punishment in schools. There is need to review the existing legislation to ensure effective prohibition of corporal punishment and other in human and degrading treatment in homes, schools and day care centres.

There is need for the Ministry of Education and local authorities to review complaint procedures and remedies for children who suffer violent treatment or punishments in schools and homes. This implies that resources be set aside by the state to establish counselling centres with qualified personnel. There is need for a policy to investigate complaints and exercise disciplinary procedures, dismissal or prosecution of teachers who mete out corporal punishment. There is need to ensure that legal reforms are implemented through the education system, with the help of clear policies prohibiting corporal punishment and clear guidance on

handling classroom situations. There is need to ensure that teachers and school leaders receive training on children's rights, especially the right to physical integrity and human dignity and the alternative methods to corporal punishment.

There is need for a policy to include children's rights within the school curriculum, in particular the right to physical integrity and protection from all forms of violence. There is need to identify key stakeholders within the community and stimulate the collaboration of children, parents, leaders, the media community and religious leaders in generating wider awareness-raising debates. There is need to ensure the development of parenting education courses, information and materials on child-rearing practices and positive non-violent forms of discipline as noted by Willow (2009).

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Search for Improved Public Service Delivery in Tanzania: Is the Policy-Implementation Dichotomy an Elixir?

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Abstract

New Public Management (NPM) presupposes that if public service delivery were to be improved, policy-making should be separated from policy implementation. Although attempts to distinguish policy-making from implementation can be traced back to the classical writings of Woodrow Wilson and Frank J. Goodnow, among others, advocacy for the distinction appears to have rejuvenated as one of the defining elements of contemporary public management reforms under the aegis of the NPM discourse. Using the agencification and public-private partnership (PPP) models, embedded in the NPM, as well as the policy-making process based on the Tanzanian experience, we explore the feasibility of the policy-implementation dichotomy and its implications on service delivery in Tanzania. We argue that such a dichotomy is more pronounced in theory than in practice. While the policy-implementation dichotomy is desirable for the sake of enhancing efficiency, effectiveness and accountability at the practical level, it nevertheless remains more of a wishful thinking. Drawing on the Tanzanian policy-making experience, we find policy-making to be a highly interactive process such that the demarcation between the precise role of bureaucrats and politicians is blurred.

Key words: Public Service Delivery, Policy-Implementation Dichotomy, and Accountability

Introduction

Beginning in the late 19th century, the absence of a clear separation between policy-making and implementation started to be viewed as a hurdle for efficient and effective public service delivery. To deal with this problem, Woodrow Wilson and Frank Good now spearheaded a scholarly movement for the separation of the two domains. Thus, the genesis of the policy-implementation dichotomy and its underlying logic owes to Woodrow Wilson's (1887) classical work. In his article, Wilson recognized the complex nature of government activity and called for a systematic study of how government business was being administered (Henry, 2007; Shafritz & Hyde, 2008; Dwivedi & William, 2011). Although Wilson did not concern himself specifically with the relationship between the political and administrative spheres, he is credited for setting the path that has had an enduring impact on the development of public administration both in terms of theory and practice (Henry, 2007).

However, it was not until 1900 that the urge for a distinction between policy-making and policy implementation became more pronounced following Goodnow's (1900) work. In Goodnow's view, "politics has to do with policies or expressions of the state will", whereas administration concerns itself "with the execution of that will" (Shafritz & Hyde, 2008:29). This attempt to distinguish the political functions from the administrative ones is what later came to be referred to as the politics-administration dichotomy (Peters & Pierre, 2003; Henry, 2007; Shafritz

& Hyde, 2008). The politics-administration dichotomy emphasizes the role differentiation between members of the political wing and those of the administrative machinery of government (UN, 1998). While echoing Goodnow's view, for example, Kelman, cited in Maynard-Moody and Herbert (1989) argued: "elected officials (politicians) should remain the primary source of policy ideas and choices with administrators, in theory, responsible for translating these ideas and choices into practice" (p.137). Kelman's cautionary use of the phrase "in theory" appears to emphasize the ideal roles of politicians and technocrats to be policy-making and implementation respectively. Practically, however, the role of administrators in the policy process may (and quite often it does) extend beyond the confines of implementation. The dichotomization of politics-administration is also implied in Hughes' distinction of administration from management. According to Hughes, public administration as an activity is primarily concerned with the execution of "policies derived from others" – notably *politicians* (Hughes, 2003:6, emphasis added).

We use a qualitative approach to show that despite attempts to maintain a policy-implementation dichotomy as an elixir for inefficient and ineffective service delivery, as embedded in the New Public Management (NPM) thinking, there are instances that suggest that the context in which such separation is implemented significantly determines success or failure. The article is mainly based on documentary sources. It is informed by a review of the literature including journal articles, books, government reports and newspaper reports. It is divided into six sections. Section two provides the conceptual framework within which an understanding of the term policy and the thrust of NPM are offered. Section three reviews the literature with particular focus on the divide among scholars about the separation or non-separation of policy from implementation. In so doing it highlights the circumstances in favour of either case. Section four presents the implications of the NPM movement for service delivery in Tanzania with particular reference to agencification and PPP models and their application. We also invoke the policy-making process in Tanzania in the fifth section to demonstrate how bureaucrats, who are regarded as policy implementers, tend to influence policy at both the formulation and implementation stages. The final section offers some concluding remarks.

Conceptual Framework

A Policy defined

A policy may be described as a general principle or rule to guide decisions and achieve a rational outcome(s). Such a description may be adequate for ordinary usage. However, in the context of public administration and public policy, a more informative definition is needed to properly put our discussion into a clearer picture. Anderson (2006) defines policy as a relatively stable, purposive course of action followed by an actor or a set of actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern. This definition too does not distinguish decisions and actions undertaken in a private sphere from those undertaken in a public realm. Our conception of a policy in this article is one that focuses on public policy. A public policy is understood as a purposive course of action designed to guide the decisions and actions of government in solving problems of a public nature. A problem may be regarded as a 'public problem' only when a significant number of people are involved; to the extent that many people in society are affected by that problem and hence warranting the expenditure of public resources in addressing it (Dye, 1981).

In the public arena, the policy would ideally be a means for citizens to hold public institutions accountable for their actions concerning issues of public interest. However, this is not always the case as the policy processes are often quite complex. On the one hand, policy-making is seen as an objective logical process by policy-makers who are expected to act rationally and dispassionately in the quest for solving problems facing society. These, in our context, may include social and economic services to the citizenry.

On the other hand, ideas for policies may originate from individuals, communities, parents, organizations, public or private institutions and other interest groups such as Trade Unions, Chambers of Industry, Commerce or Professional Associations, Farmers Organizations, development partners and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). These ideas are then worked up to become policies. But in the narrow distinction of policy-making from implementation, only politicians are regarded as the source of public policies (Kelman, 1987). It is from this perspective of attempted distinction that we now turn to the NPM advocates.

The New Public Management

Despite being challenged by many modern scholars of public policy and administration as “a fictitious dichotomy” (Peters & Pierre, 2003:3), the emergence of the NPM movement in the 1980s appears to have resuscitated the notion that policy and implementation are distinct spheres. The NPM movement that started in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom and later spread to other countries generally aimed at improving ways of organizing government business, managing public service delivery and redefining the role of the state in line with market-oriented efficient, effective and responsive systems (Larbi, 1999; Hughes, 2003). Hood (1991), who coined the term ‘new public management’, summarizes the main thrust of NPM into seven precepts as shown in Appendix 1. Meanwhile, the ensuing discussion examines the arguments for or against the policy-implementation separation.

Arguments for or against Policy-Implementation Separation

There are contending views regarding the policy-implementation dichotomy. Some argue that if service delivery were to be improved, policy-making must be separated from implementation (Major, 1989; Mather, 1989). To illustrate this position Mather’s argument, for example, is particularly relevant: “This contract model separates the political process of determination of objectives and specification of services from their delivery, removing conflict of interest, which occurs when those specifying a service are also its deliverers” (Mather, 1989 quoted in Stewart, 1996:33).

Yet others are skeptical about this position arguing that while the separation can lead to improvement of service delivery, oblivion of the context may lead to problems if the policy-implementation dogma is taken to be the universal panacea for problems related to service delivery (Stewart, 1996). To be sure, Stewart argues, “the separation of policy-making and implementation will not prove the elixir that will resolve many of the problems of public management... It should be seen as one approach rather than the sole approach” to managing public services (Stewart, 1996:40). This means that improvement of service delivery cannot be guided by just ‘one best way’ across the board. Hence, the appropriate approach is one that is context-driven.

The diverse species of collective action and/or rational choice theory assume, at root, that individuals are largely self-interested and seek to maximize net benefits (personal benefits minus personal costs). Niskanen's assertion that public servants are budget-maximizers was a particularly powerful statement of the case (Niskanen, 1973). Because public servants can form an alliance with politicians to the extent that budget expansion is conceived as a victory for both, bureaucrats and politicians can collaboratively hide the costs and benefits of the services that they produce. Peters (1987) shares this view. In advancing this position, he adapted the "Village Life" model of Helco and Wildavsky in his explanation of how politicians and bureaucrats may collude in the policy-making process. According to the model, bureaucrats at the higher echelons and politicians are conceived as relatively sharing values and goals, hence they coalesce to defend the status quo against 'intruders'. Similarly, Dunleavy (1991) has pursued this argument in his bureau-shaping model. He argues that senior officials are really interested in maximizing just the direct running costs of the agency and the funds available for contracting suppliers, and have less interest in maximizing the programme budget encompassing resources passed on to other bodies for them to spend. Thus, it might be in the interests of these officials, the argument runs, to relinquish direct management of some activities as this releases them from responsibilities while allowing them to continue to increase the budgets that matter to them personally.

It is clear from the preceding discussion that bureaucrats are perceived to use their monopoly of information on the costs and consequences of service provision to protect their own interests rather than to provide better services. This agency problem in Niskanen's (1973) view can be resolved by ensuring that service delivery is always separated from the policy-making as this would help to break up the self-serving bureaucracy. By contrast, Dunleavy (1991) is skeptical about a mere separation of the policy-making from implementation. He cautions that even when this separation is made possible, the self-seeking motives could still prevail on the part of the senior officials who see more glory and less hard work in a policy advice role with less operational responsibilities. The thesis in both cases is that since public bodies are particularly prone to capture by the incumbent officials, distinguishing between what the agency should do (policy) and how it will do it (implementation) is a key strategy for reducing this risk. The foregoing discussion recognizes that there is a possibility for politicians and bureaucrats to collude in the policy process for purely private motives. When this is the case, accountability to the citizens will likely suffer. In order to avoid or at least minimize this risk of 'capture', it is imperative, the proposal goes, to adopt a role differentiation strategy.

The capture argument presupposes that separation of policy-making from implementation tasks will reduce the risk that policy is being made to justify the preferences of favoured groups, which, in this case, might be the existing service providers. Perfunctorily examined, the policy-implementation separation appears to have a strong justification in that it seeks to counteract self-interests. In reality, however, the choice might be between the devil and the deep blue sea, meaning that the fear of capture by providers might be providing an excuse only to conceal a more pernicious capture by others. Given the fact that there is no shortcut to checking the quality of policy before implementation begins, there are chances of a policy drifting from the purpose for which it was intended during the course of implementation. Analysts have argued that this time lag provides room for the policy providers to push through

policies that fit in with their ideological or business aspirations (Stewart, 1996). Boston (1995) suggests that this may be one reason why, even at the zenith of managerialist obsession in New Zealand during the early 1990s, policy advice was contracted out less in practice than might have been expected. Stewart (1996) proposes certain conditions under which separation of policy from implementation can be made possible or otherwise. It is to an exploration of these conditions that the ensuing discussion turns.

Conditions for policy-implementation dichotomy

The conditions for a dichotomous policy-implementation depend on various factors. In Stewart's (1996) view, for such dichotomy to happen there has got to be a clear specification of the policy to be executed. This is simply meant to offer an elaborate guide for implementation. There are several approaches to this end, including the use of well-specified service contracts through competitive tendering and a framework of agreements. Accordingly, Stewart makes the following eight assumptions if policy-implementation separation is to prevail: (i) policy is specified in advance of action; (ii) policy is specified in sufficient details such that it anticipates all the eventualities, but this too, no matter how desirable it may be, remains unrealistic as policies can never be specified to cover all uncertainties; (iii) policy is specified in ways that can be assumed to apply for a given period of time; (iv) policy is specified in terms that can be monitored to ensure effective implementation; (v) issues of policy are not raised by the process of implementation, however, in practice policy reviews are not uncommon and they tend to be informed by implementation experiences; (vi) the making of policy does not require advice from those engaged in implementation, again this assumption is far divorced from practice; (vii) a clear demarcation exists between policy-making and implementation so that accountability can be ensured; and finally, (viii) the implementation of a particular policy activity in its operation and its impact can be separated from other activities (Stewart, 1996:36).

It is clear from the foregoing that Stewart recognizes that there are certain areas of service delivery in which the policy-implementation separation does not work. Invoking Kettl's (1993) work on the varying nature of service contracts in the government of the United States of America, he argues: "the reality is that these assumptions will hold to a greater or less extent for different services" (Stewart, 1996:36). Experience shows that contracting out such services as gardening and landscaping, catering services, license processing, street cleaning and garbage collection, and the like, may not only be relatively easier but also, in some categories of service, produce expected results than, for example, contracting out railway services and electricity generation and supply (Kettl, 1993). In Tanzania, for example, the delivery of such services as garbage collection, collection of parking fees, cleanliness in streets and government offices, public schools, hospitals, universities, and agencies have largely been contracted out to private companies since the 1990s (Nkya, 2004; Njunwa, 2007).

On the contrary, attempts to apply public private partnership (PPP) arrangement in managing the Tanzania Railway Corporation (TRC), which is a state-owned corporation, for example, have proven difficult. To be sure, in October 2007 the government of Tanzania entered into a PPP agreement with the Rites Company of India that allowed the privatization of TRC with a majority of 51 per cent shares going to Rites leaving the government with 49 per

cent of the shares. This privatization led to a change of name from TRC to Tanzania Railway Limited (TRL). The move to privatize TRC was meant to, inter alia, allow the government more space to deal with policy issues, leaving the day-to-day management to TRL. Contrary to expectations, TRL could not deliver what it promised and her contract had eventually to be terminated. *This Day* newspaper reports that after the takeover by the RITES, TRL's performance actually became worse than before the privatization exercise. For instance, in 2008 it reviewed its performance targets from an estimated one million tonnes of cargo to be carried in that year to 650,000 tonnes. However, by the end of 2008 TRL had managed to carry only 450,000 tonnes of freight compared to 600,000 tonnes transported by her predecessor, TRC, in 2006 (*This Day* newspaper, Thursday 5, 2009).

From the foregoing discussion it may be argued that the nature of PPP in such areas as garbage collection, cleanliness of streets and other public offices, and fees collection, etc. seems to be different from PPP in railway services, for example. While the organization and delivery of the former is relatively less complex with notable success, probably due to less capital investment required, the latter has proven far difficult to handle. Therefore the assumption that 'one-size-fits-all,' often celebrated by NPM, tends to disregard these unique situations hence being unable to resolve inefficiency and ineffectiveness that the policy-implementation dichotomy seeks to address.

Implications of the NPM for Service Delivery in Tanzania

The NPM movement has had significant implications for service delivery in Tanzania. Illuminating the influence of NPM in the management of public affairs, Hughes notes: "The tasks involved in the public sector are now considered more managerial, requiring someone to take responsibility for the achievement of results, instead of being regarded as administrative with public servants merely following instructions" (Hughes, 2003:2). In order to ensure that public sector managers were more effective in achieving results a number of measures were proposed under the aegis of NPM. These included the creation of Executive Agencies (EAs), the adoption of the Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) in service delivery, among others. In the next section, each of these approaches will be discussed to ascertain their impact in service delivery in Tanzania.

Agencification in Tanzania

The concept of 'agencification' (some call it 'distributed governance') is one of the defining features of the NPM and possibly its most frequently adopted and far-reaching policy proposal (Moynihan, 2006). Agencification is simply a term used to denote the tendency among governments to create EAs. These EAs, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), are "arm's-length agencies contracted out of the (government) department, which are given managerial autonomy and flexibility in budgeting and human resources management" (OECD, 2005 cited in Lee & Moon, 2010:431). There is much controversy over the definition of agencies but a consensus has emerged that an 'agency' in terms of agencification concerns an organization that (i) is structurally disaggregated from the government and (ii) operates under more business-like conditions than the government bureaucracy (Talbot & Pollit, 2000). Agencies can, for example, have a different financial

system and personnel policies, although the degrees of financial, personnel, and management autonomy vary per (type of) organization (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). NPM reformers saw these EAs as a good elixir for the inefficient service delivery (ibid).

There are diverse models of the agencification process. The OECD proposes three basic criteria that commonly characterize the NPM version of agencies (OECD, 2002):

- i. Structural disaggregation and/ or creation of tasks-specific organizations;
- ii. Performance contracting, some form of performance targets setting, monitoring and reporting;
- iii. Deregulations of control over personnel, finance and other management matters.

Despite the wide adoption of the agencification model in both developed and developing countries, evidence reveals the mixture of both success and failures. For one to better understand the issue of executive agencies in Tanzania, the knowledge of the impact that the NPM movement has had on public administration worldwide is important. The argument that rule-based bureaucratic controls and regulation stifle efficient and effective performance in public service delivery is mainly rooted from the NPM movement that swept across nations.

The United Republic of Tanzania (URT) is one of the countries that implement NPM-based reforms in line with the doctrine that policy-making should be separated from implementation. One of the features of the Tanzanian public sector reforms is the formation of EAs. These EAs were envisaged to be relatively small and autonomous government units with the resources and power they need to deliver goods and services in the most efficient and effective manner. Section 4(2) of the Executive Agencies Act No .30 of 1997 is illustrative: “in the performance of its functions, an Executive Agency shall observe the following principles:

- (i) To provide its services to its customers and the public in the most efficient and effective manner
- (ii) To manage its affairs in a business-like and cost-effective manner and in accordance with modern management practices and techniques and, in particular, to apply to its operations the best standards of financial management and accounting
- (iii) To ensure that its operations are designed to provide the best services to its customers and to maintain a high degree of responsiveness to their needs (URT, 1997).

This development was expected to enhance customer-oriented service provision and facilitate a performance-centered culture in the government with increased autonomy for agencies in terms of flexibility in resource use. That is to say, less hierarchical and political influence on their daily operations was expected, hence allowing them more managerial freedoms.

The pace at which these EAs are formed is relatively high. For example, between 1999 and 2001 alone, 12 agencies had been established (Ngowi, 2008). By December 2004, 20 EAs had been formed in Tanzania (URT, 2005). This number had increased to 29 by June 2009 (URT, 2009). Whether or not the objectives for which EAs were established have been met is a question that has received mixed responses. A study done by the government of Tanzania in 2005 covering 20 EAs, for example, evaluated the performance of EAs since their inception in 1999 to 2004. The study indicates that some EAs registered quantitative

improvements. For instance, revenue collection trends significantly improved; levels of service delivery increased; staff became more professional and better educated as compared to previous trends. It concluded, however, that there was no evidence of improvement in the quality and/or effectiveness of service delivery (URT, 2005). This may be attributed to the government's (the principal) inability to monitor the performance of these EAs and reluctance to grant them autonomy. In his speech, Tanzania's Prime Minister Mizengo P. Pinda, once noted that the monitoring of EAs by parent and central ministries was weak, in part, due to an unclear accountability and performance framework (URT, 2009). A related issue germane to EAs is the degree of their autonomy and control from the government. The question that is often raised is: how can autonomy and control be balanced?

While, on the one hand, the government is expected to grant more autonomy to the EAs to allow the managers (the agent) to manage (i.e. keeping its hands off), it retains the oversight role of ensuring that the latter perform to expectations (i.e. keeping its eyes on). Striking a balance between the two has often proven difficult, at least, at the level of practice resulting into further subversion of the agencies' independence. It must be noted that history provides us with mixed messages about setting up new organizations to evade general problems of governance in the public sector. First, it is very difficult for any public organization to be completely insulated from relations with other public organizations. Except when agencies are entirely the clients of donors, they will depend on ministries of finance and other central organizations for some services or approvals. Second, it is certainly difficult to create a lasting performance culture in the agencies, at least for a short time, in the midst of a non-performing government. Third, if corruption or patronage is pervasive in government, then setting up a new agency may not resolve the problems of inefficiency and ineffectiveness. Whenever power is redistributed, as it is when a new organization is created, certain quarters' interests are being affected, and they will react and may probably attempt to halt the change being introduced. This can be seen at two levels, namely: administrative autonomy and financial resources.

In the former case we draw on recent developments in Tanzania to illustrate the relationship between EAs and their parent ministries, a subject to which the next paragraph will shortly turn. As regards the question of resources, it is worth noting that autonomy goes with resources. If there are no adequate resources there can hardly be autonomy. Suffice it to remind ourselves of the old adage: the one who pays the piper calls the tune. Since most of the agencies still depend on the central government and donors for their budgets, a talk of autonomy, while desirable, in practice remains more rhetoric than real.

Moreover, it was not until recently that the permanent secretaries of the parent ministries were sitting on the boards of these agencies. While this was ideally meant to ensure effective oversight of these agencies by the principal, it ended up seriously undermining the autonomy of the former. Some decisions had to be approved first by the central government before their implementation. In the same vein, the agencies are sometimes subjected to expenditures typical of boondoggle through controversial orders by respective ministries. The infamous David Jairo's saga is illustrative. On 18 July 2011, during the Tanzanian parliamentary session in Dodoma, it was alleged that Mr. David Jairo, the then Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Energy and Minerals had directed over 20 agencies and/or institutions under his ministry

to contribute a total of TSh. 1billion. Each agency was expected to contribute TSh.50 million towards what was described as “finalization of preparations and tabling of the ministry’s 2011/12 budget in Parliament in Dodoma”. Among the agencies that were directed to remit the money to that effect were the Tanzania Electricity Supply Company (TANESCO), Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC) and State Mining Corporation (STAMICO), Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (EWURA), Rural Energy Agency (REA), among others. Following the revelations, the parliament formed a Select Committee to investigate the matter. According to the findings of the parliamentary probe committee, the whole exercise was not only illegal and full of corrupt practices but it also created unnecessary financial burden for the contributing agencies (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania, 2011). Worth emphasizing here is that the Jairo saga illustrates the extent to which safeguards to ensure autonomy and independence of agencies are lacking. It only helped to uncover the practices within the government that still undermine the executive agencies’ autonomy.

Similarly, the creation of EAs without adequate safeguards may not necessarily lead to improved quality of services on a sustainable basis. The Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA), for example, was set up in 1996 in order, inter alia, to insulate the tax administration regime from the direct political interference by the Ministry of Finance in its day-to-day operations. These reforms went hand-in-hand with significant increases in salaries of tax officials “without parallel increases for the rest of the public sector” (Fjeldstad, 2003:169). It was believed that this would lead to improved performance in revenue collection in Tanzania. It is noted that by 2005 the average EA employees received a salary 57 per cent higher than their public service counterparts (URT, 2005).

However, after the initial successes, the rate of revenue collection fell and there was evidence that bribery and internal rent-seeking rose again. This implies that although good pay is important for motivational purposes, one must be cognizant of the fact that man is complex to the extent that higher salaries alone may not be the elixir of inefficiency. A multidimensional approach is necessary. To be sure, Fjeldstad asserts: “the assumption that higher salaries would boost productivity over time was most likely also exaggerated” (Fjeldstad, 2003:171). He further reasons that for many workers, higher salaries may simply have resulted in larger obligations to family networks and perhaps even a net loss for the staff concerned, leading to greater incentives to augment income by rent-seeking.

Moreover, the concept of an executive agency, which separates executive functions from the policy-making role, is not clear to Tanzania’s bureaucrats. The determination of the services transformed into agencies is still influenced by power game within the government bureaucracies. The so-called ‘powerful ministries’ that officially supervise the agencies, continue to exercise enormous control over them. For example, it was envisaged that the executive agencies would draw out their schemes of service and decide on their salary scales. To-date, most of the agencies have not been able to adequately raise their own funds, hence their budgets and plans are still under the ministries votes. The implication is that the central government remains the main source of their salaries. Accordingly, the choice of an executive officer of these agencies is still done at the pleasure of either a permanent secretary or the president, and this erodes their autonomy. It was moreover expected that, with agencification of programmes, agencies would perform their own recruitment and selection. However, the

employment of these agencies' staff is still guided by the Public Service Act under a centralized system that allows the Recruitment Secretariat, an organ of the central government, to do the recruitment.

Public-Private Partnership

Another manifestation of the attempt to separate policy-making from implementation revolves around the concept of Public-Private-Partnership (PPP). This is premised on the notion that creating synergies between the public and private sectors would improve the delivery of public services, making service delivery more economical and at the same time qualitatively better. There are several forms of PPP. The underlying argument is that policy-making and service delivery are distinct tasks and that each benefits from the additional attention it receives if it is not competing for management time with the other (Stewart, 1996). What this means is that service providers should concentrate on efficient production and delivery of quality services, whereas policy-makers concentrate on setting and monitoring the standards of those services (Pollitt, Birchall, & Putman, 1998).

In Tanzania the most common partnership models have been contracting out and outsourcing. It is common knowledge that most government departments at both the central and local governments levels provide services through private companies under contractual relations whereby the former sets the standards of, and pays for, the services and the latter produces and delivers the services. This typically illustrates, at least in practice, the separation of the policy-making from implementation. However, such a separation may not only be difficult to find but it may also result into problems mainly arising from either vested interests of politicians and businessmen who may be operating behind the scene or inability of the service provider to deliver the service. We invoke two examples from Tanzania to illustrate this point.

First, we use the partnership between the government of Tanzania and a South African-based Net Group Solutions Company (NGS) to demonstrate an instance of questionable performance. In December 2001 the government of Tanzania signed a contract with the NGS to manage the state-owned electric company TANESCO. Unhappy with the government's decision to award the NGS a management contract, TANESCO workers pledged to oppose the new management on grounds that TANESCO was a sensitive public institution upon which the country's economy depended, thus, it could not be managed by a small company like NGS (Matiku, Mbwambo & Kimene, 2011). However, the government, convinced that the new management would turn around the performance of TANESCO, used its notorious anti-riot police wing, the Field Force Unit (FFU), to contain the workers' resistance. In May 2002 NGS took over the management of TANESCO. In 2006 the government through the Minister of Energy and Minerals declined to renew NGS' management contract on what was apparently described as drastic declining of "both financial and technical performance" (Matiku, et al, 2011:201).

Second, in 2006 the government in its effort to deal with power blackouts that appeared to be chronic in the country at the time, contracted a USA-based Richmond Development Corporation (RDC) to deliver gas turbines (100MW). RDC promised to deliver the power

equipment within 150 days ending in October 2006 (Matiku, et al, p. 201). However, the deadline passed with RDC unable to honour its promise; turning into a scandal. In November 2007 a parliamentary select committee was constituted to investigate the manner in which RDC won the contract to supply power to TANESCO and whether or not it actually had the capacity to deliver. It was revealed that RDC was ‘a pocket company’ because it had allegedly not been registered in USA as it claimed. Following this revelation and the recommendations of the parliamentary probe committee, two senior cabinet ministers including the then Prime Minister, resigned in February 2008. The resignation of these ministers was prompted by allegations that they had a stake in the RDC which dubiously gave the company an advantage despite lacking the capacity to actually deliver the service (Mateng’e, 2012). Sansa (2010) describes such practices as *predatory alliances and solidarity*. He asserts:

This is characterized by the deepening convergence of the political, public service and economic elite into networks of informal personal connections of private accumulation that take place within and outside the state apparatus. The mutual dependencies are organized through negotiation logic, guided by the principle of mutual protection against corruption fighters and defending interests based on informal connections, patronage considerations and infiltration of these groups’ interests into the policy process (p. 174).

For an easy understanding of the rhetoric of the policy-implementation dichotomy, the following section discusses the policy-making process in Tanzania.

The Policy-making Process in Tanzania

In the context of the governance model, public policies are seen as a product of collaborative effort between the government and non-governmental organizations as well as the private sector that partner together to formulate and implement policies (Adger & Jordan, 2009). Viewed this way, ideas for policies may originate from multiple actors who are defined as stakeholders. These may include individuals, communities, parents, business groups and organizations, public or private institutions, and professional associations, just to name a few.

It is, however, important to stress that bureaucrats do the drafting of the policy documents. It is at this stage that the policy content is significantly shaped by these bureaucrats. More often than not, the drafting is done in a language that may not be easily accessible to the general public, or the stakeholders may not have been given enough time to digest and consult those that they represent before giving their views. A good example is the Constitutional Review Bill that was passed by the Tanzanian Parliament in November 2011. Earlier, in April 2011, the government sent the bill to parliament for deliberation and approval. This decision was challenged by opposition parties, activists, and the general public on account that the bill was written in English, and hence limited ordinary people’s participation in its initial deliberations. The majority of Tanzanians are fluent in Swahili, which is a national language. Heeding to the public outcry parliament rejected the bill so as to allow members of the public to provide more inputs. The government translated the bill into Swahili language and gathered stakeholders’ views before sending it back to parliament for the second time (Tarimo, 2011). A further limitation of this approach is that there is no way of ascertaining that stakeholders’

views have actually been incorporated in the final document, or if they have been incorporated, that actions will match the policy.

At the national level there are macro or grand policies that cut across various sectors, sector policies as well as sub-sector policies. Examples of macro policies may include the Tanzania National Development Vision 2025, the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP), the Five-Year Development Plan, to name but a few. These provide the overall framework for the formulation and implementation of other (sector) policies (Mattee, 2007). Cross-cutting policies, on the other hand, are those that involve multiple ministries or sectors. To be sure, the National Land Policy, the National Environmental Policy, and National Health Policy are just a few examples of cross-cutting policies. Although many actors are involved in the formulation of these policies, such organs as the President's Office, the Vice President's Office, the Prime Minister's Office, ministries and departments play a central role in the process (URT, 1997).

Sector ministries, in contrast, are responsible for the formulation as well as monitoring the implementation of both sector policies and sub-sector policies (Mattee, 2007). In so doing, multiple actors are involved at various stages. These actors range from teams of technical people within and outside government to representatives of various stakeholders. At the initial stages of the policy formulation process, for instance, the ministerial task forces under the supervision of the Policy and Planning Divisions are often formed to work out the details of policy proposals. These task forces are made up of technical people drawn from various institutions and organizations including local government authorities, research and training institutions or think tanks, NGOs, as well as the private sector and farmers' organizations (ESRF, 2004). It is worth noting that a department within a sector Ministry may also formulate a sub-sector policy within the ambit of a sector policy on a given issue should a need arise. Such sub-sector policies may include the Crops policy, the National Food Security Policy, and the Livestock Policy. The formulation of sub-sector policies follows the same procedures as sector policies (Mattee, 2007).

Once the policy paper has been considered at the ministerial level, sector and sub-sector levels, it is sent to another higher level of technical team namely, the Cabinet Secretariat composed of technocrats and operates in a form of committees. Before the policy paper is transmitted to the Inter – Ministerial Technical Committee (IMTC) the respective Cabinet Secretariat Committee examines the extent of stakeholders' involvement, the economic, social, financial and legal implications of the policy paper as well as its feasibility. Having passed this level, the policy paper is forwarded to the IMTC, which comprises all Permanent Secretaries from all government ministries (URT, 1997). The Chief Secretary, who is also the Head of the Civil Service, chairs the IMTC sessions (ESRF, 2004). Based on the recommendations of the IMTC, the respective minister presents the policy paper to the Cabinet for further consideration and final approval.

What the Tanzanian policy-making model implies is that the policy-making process involves multiple actors but with some room for bureaucrats to mould the policy content given their technical know-how and incumbency leverages. Once the policies have been approved, bureaucrats interpret the policies, offer advice, implement and report to their principals. This

ability to interpret policies, indeed, allows them to exercise significant influence over policy during implementation. Lipsky (1980) elucidates how bureaucrats mould policy in the course of its implementation. He argues that policy implementers should not be regarded as simply 'cogs in the process' but rather ones with substantial ability to shape policy outcomes. Arguably, because of the role that they play in the policy process it could be said that technocrats actually make policies not simply at the level of implementation but also at the very formulation stage. This is especially true for a country like Tanzania where, despite efforts to decentralize service delivery to lower tiers of government, the central government is still directly involved in policy implementation as we have shown earlier in our discussion of railway and electricity services. The foregoing provides us with important insights that reiterate the view that although there has been a desire, at least among NPM reformers, to revive and maintain the policy-implementation dichotomy, unless such desire matches the context it remains unfeasible.

Conclusion

It is now in order to conclude that although the policy-implementation dichotomy continues to dominate the debates about how best to organize the public sector in a way that ensures accountability in the delivery of public services, it remains rhetoric. This debate has roots in the works of classical scholars in the field of public administration including Woodrow Wilson, Frank J. Goodnow and Leonard White, among others. Central to these scholars was the attempt to reverse the spoil system in the American political system in which political patronage took preeminence over meritocracy in the administration of the civil service, thus affecting the effective functioning of the latter. But later, a generation of scholars offered an antithesis to the debate noting that any attempt to separate policy-making from implementation was bound to fail. Their argument is anchored on the premise that the interactive nature of the policy-making and implementation activities makes it too impractical to treat the two as clearly distinct "beasts in a nation's social zoo" (Henry, 2007). To this group belong such scholars as Michael Lipsky, B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre, Lindblom (1980), among others.

It was not until the emergence, on the scene, of the NPM movement that the policy-implementation separation resurfaced in the public management discourse. Through a review of the literature we have briefly examined the contending views regarding the applicability of the policy-implementation dichotomy. In so doing, the article has borrowed examples from Tanzania, particularly in the areas of agencification, public-private synergies and policy-making process, to argue that much as there are concerns about accountability in the delivery of public services, a clear separation between policy and implementation remains elusive.

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Appendix 1: A summary of the NPM doctrines

S/N	DOCTRINE	MEANING	TYPICAL JUSTIFICATION
1	'Hands-on professional management' in the public sector	Active, visible, discretionary control of organizations from named persons at the top, 'free to manage'	Accountability requires clear assignment of responsibility for action, not diffusion of power
2	Explicit standards and measures of performance	Definition of goals, targets, indicators of success, preferably expressed in quantitative terms, especially for professional services	Accountability requires clear statement of goals; efficiency requires 'hard look' at objectives
3	Greater emphasis on output controls	Resource allocation and rewards linked to measured performance; breakup of centralized bureaucracy-wide personnel management	Need to stress results rather than procedures
4	Shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector	Break up of formerly 'monolithic' units, unbundling of U-form management systems into corporatized units around products, operating on decentralized 'one-line' budget and dealing with one another on an 'arms-length' basis	Need to create 'manageable' units, separate provision and production interests, gain efficiency advantages of use of contract or franchise arrangements inside as well as outside the public sector
5	Shift to greater competition in public sector	Move to term contracts and public tendering procedures	Rivalry as the key to lower costs and better standards
6	Stress on private-sector styles of management practice	Move away from military-style 'public service ethic,' greater flexibility in hiring and rewards; greater use of PR techniques	Need to use 'proven' private sector management tools in the public sector
7	Stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use	Cutting direct costs, raising labour discipline, resisting union demands, limiting 'compliance costs' to business	Need to check resource demands of public sector and 'do more with less'

Source: Hood (1991:4-5)

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Certificate in Supervisory Management Skills for Central and Local Government Officers	November 10 -21,2014: Kampala
Leadership and Organisational Management for Chairpersons and Sectoral Secretaries of Local and Urban Authorities	February 3 –5 2014: Kampala
Basic Philosophy Of Public Service Administrative Communication	March 10 – 12,2014: Kampala
Senior Public Officers Development Workshop	November 3-4,2014: Kampala
Public Service Induction Programme	March 17- 21,2014: Kampala
Public Service Effective Leadership in Competitive Times	March 17-18,2014: Kampala
Information Technology and Public Governance	March 17-28,2014: Kampala
Files and Records Management in the Public Sector	May 5-8 2014: Kampala
Policy Making in Government Institutions Workshop	May 26-28,2014; November 3–5, 2014: Kampala
Education Leadership and Governance	February 17-21,2014: Kampala
Public Policy Analysis and Programme Evaluation	February 17 – 21, 2014: Kampala
Public Sector Procurement and Contract Management	November 10-14,2014: Kampala
Programme and Project Management for Public Officials Workshop	March 24-26,2014: Kampala
Management of Meetings in Local Governments	May 5-6, 2014; June 23-24 2014: Kampala
Public Speaking Workshop	June 23– 24, 2014: Kampala
Managing the School/College Finances	May 19-22,2014: Kampala
Public Values, Ethics and Integrity of Public Servants	April 14 – 15 2014: Kampala
SECRETARIAL TRAINING	
The changing role of a Secretary	June 16-20, 2014; November 17–21, 2014: Kampala
Effective Administrative Assistant	May 4 – 8, 2014; September 15 – 21,2014:Kampala
Front Office Management	12-16-May 2014, 13- 24 October 2014;Kampala
Communication Skills For Secretaries	March 24-28, 2014;November 3 – 7, 2014: Kampala March 3-14 2014 Mbarara March 17-21, 2014: Gulu November 3 – 7, 2014 Mbale
Public Financial Management For Non-Financial Managers	February 10-14, 2014: Kampala
Office Orientation for Administrative Assistants	10 - 14 February 2014 9- 13 June 2014, Kampala

RECORDS MANAGEMENT	
Basic Records Management	March 10-21, 2014: Kampala 11 – 22 August 2014: Gulu 11 – 22 August 2014: Mbale October 13 – 24 2014: Kampala

HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT-RELATED SHORT COURSES

Course	Date to be run	
	Afternoons	Weekends
Principles of Health Care Management	January 30-February 19, 2014	March 3-April 4, 2014
Health Policy and Planning	February 20-March 12, 2014	April 6-May 5, 2014
Health Law and medical Ethics	May 14-June 4, 2014	July 6-August 3, 2014
Managing People in Health Care Organisations	June 5 - 26, 2014	August 9-Sept 6, 2014
Hospital Management	June 27- July 17, 2014	September 7-October 5, 2014
Quality Management in Health Care	July 18-August 1, 2014	October 11-26, 2014
Managerial Accounting and Financial Management in Health Facilities	July 18-August 1, 2014	October 11-26, 2014
Materials Management and Inventory Control in Health Facilities	August 4-18, 2014	November 1-16, 2014
Project Management for Health Care Practitioners	August 4-18, 2014	November 1-16, 2014

PUBLIC POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT

Course	Target group	Proposed Date
Public Policy Analysis and Programme Evaluation	All heads of policy planning units in central governments plus all those active in public policy agenda setting	February 17-21, 2014
Economic Analysis and Public Policy	All heads of policy planning units in central governments plus all those active in public policy agenda setting	February 18 – 11 March, 2014
Public Policy Evaluation and Governance	Policy Unit Heads and Planners at central and meso /local levels of government and all those involved in non-state sector advocacy work	April 25 – 16 May, 2014
Politics of Public Policy implementation	All heads of policy planning units in central governments plus all those active in public policy agenda setting	May 17-31, 2014
Negotiation skills and EAC Integration	All heads of policy planning units in central governments plus all those active in public policy agenda setting	May 17-31, 2014

SECURITY GOVERNANCE COURSES

Strategic security management and Leadership skills	February 3-March 1, 2014; October 13-November 7, 2014: Kampala
Managing Custodial Security	February 3 -March 28, 2014; October 27-November 21, 2014: Kampala
Providing preventive security service	November 10- Dec 2014; February 17-March 14, 2014: Kampala

All the Security Governance courses can be Tailor made.

CONTACT US

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