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Table of Contents

Editorial Board.....	iii
Acknowledgement.....	vii
Editorial.....	viii
“The Ways of the Past are not all Bad’: Gender, Poverty and Power in the Representation of the Bacwezi”	1
<i>Edward I. Steinhart</i>	
The Bataka Agitation and Resistance in Colonial Uganda.....	12
<i>Frederick Mulindwa</i>	
The Baganda Invasion of Teso, Pallisa and Tororo.....	25
<i>Okalany David</i>	
Performer, Community and the Divine: A case study of the contemporary Buganda oral poetry performance processes.....	43
<i>Suzan Nalugwa Kiguli</i>	
The Phenomenon of Conflicts in Uganda: A Case Study of Kibaale District, 1996 – 2009.....	59
<i>Baligira John</i>	
Historical and Contemporary basis for Sectarian Residential Settlement Patterns in Kaduna Metropolis of Northern Nigeria.....	72
<i>Yohanna Kagoro Gandu</i>	
Method for Intercultural Knowing: A Foundational Philosophy for the Right to Knowledge of and by a Human Person.....	92
<i>Sango A. Mwanahewa</i>	
Culture, sexual values and AIDS risk among the Batooro, Western Uganda.....	114
<i>Charles B. Rwabukwali</i>	
Impact of African Traditional Ethics on Behaviour in Uganda.....	125
<i>Wilfred Lajul</i>	
The ‘Cold War’ Between the Charismatic Movements on the Institutional Churches.....	140
<i>Medard Rugyendo</i>	
Is Uganda an Economic Star Performer?.....	145
<i>John Kigongo E. Mubazi</i>	

Gender, Social Capital and Rural Development in Uganda.....	153
<i>Robert Senath Esuruku</i>	
Inside the Coffee Smuggling Arena: The Amin Regime <i>versus</i> “others” in Uganda, 1973-1979.....	164
<i>Asiimwe B. Godfrey</i>	
Righting Resource-curse wrongs in Uganda: The Political Economy of Oil Discovery and the Management of Popular Expectations.....	183
<i>Julius Kiiza, Lawrence Bategeka, & Sarah Ssewanyana</i>	
Modernity: Foundation for Universal Environmental Degradation.....	204
<i>Kamanzi Adalbertus</i>	
Planning for Lake Tourism Development in Uganda: A spatial and Temporal Analysis of Lake Victoria.....	214
<i>Ayorekire Jim & Nyakaana Jockey Baker</i>	
A Critical Analysis of Religious Pluralism as a factor in the Regional Integration Process and its Implication for Leadership.....	228
<i>Catherine Jendia</i>	
Language Policy for Radio in Uganda and Tanzania: Public Sphere or ‘Public Sphericules’?.....	236
<i>Monica B. Chibita & Njonjo Mfaume</i>	

Acknowledgement

The Department of History, Archaeology and Organizational Studies would like to register its sincere appreciation to the United States of America's Ambassador's Grant which has made this MAWAZO Vol 10 No. 3 September 2011 possible. Besides this MAWAZO volume, the grant was used to set up an Oral History Documentation Centre and research in oral history in Uganda. This volume examines developments in oral history and historical trends in different development sectors in Uganda and other countries in Africa. It is meant to build on the increased importance of historical interpretation and analysis of critical development issues, not only in Uganda, but in Africa as a whole. In this volume, nineteen articles address various historical episodes and accounts of development that range chronologically from pre-colonial history to post-colonial history.

Editorial

Edward Steinhart gives an account of the historicity of the Bachwezi in Uganda. He investigates whether the historical site of Munsa was indeed home to the Bachwezi (the political leaders and pastoral lords of pre-colonial Nyoro or whether it was simply a historical site where the spirits of the Bachwezi were venerated in a royal cult. He presents an interesting reconstruction of the history of the Bachwezi at Munsa.

Fredrick Mulindwa examines the anti-colonial struggles amongst the Baganda. Locating his paper in the Bataka movement riots of 1949, he meticulously analyses how the colonialists gradually and intricately alienated the Bataka from vital segments of Buganda's class structure and society by favoring those Baganda who had collaborated with the British to extend their colonial rule. Regardless of whether the colonialists had done so covertly to appease their collaborators or openly to reduce their power, land would become a salient factor in the struggle for independence throughout Uganda.

David Okalany explores how the Baganda from the Buganda region were used to extend colonial control over eastern Uganda. Specifically, the use of collaborators to expand imperial territory, was beneficial to the British colonial administrators but it had the reverse / opposite impact on the collaborators themselves, as these would be discarded after they / their services had been used.

Susan Nalugwa Kiguli's paper establishes the nexus between the oral poet, the community and the spirit world in Buganda. It discusses how performance is more than simply an event in front of a specific audience: instead, it is a set of intimate correlations between what happens in a performance event and the reality of the world in which a performance takes place.

John Baligira accounts for ethnic conflict in Uganda by specifically focusing on the conflict between the Banyoro the indigenous settlers in the area with the Bafuruki (immigrants) in Kibale district. Giving his paper an instrumentalist perspective, he attributes the ethnic conflict to colonial legacy and to a struggle for resources, especially land. The paper downplays the identity factor as causality and urges the state to address the ethnic conflicts with the urgency these deserve / with the requisite urgency.

Yohanna Kagoro Gandu investigates the settlement patterns in Kaduna in Northern Nigeria. He narrates the historical processes that account for the sectarian nature of urban settlement in this region, which has become the trademark of Kaduna and how these have manifested over time.

Sango Mwanahewa describes the right to knowledge from a philosophical perspective. Drawing on African traditional knowledge, he argues that correct understanding and interpretation of values and rights leads to knowledge of rights, their appreciation, observation, promotion and protection. It is on the basis of this understanding of rights that intercultural learning about the right to knowledge can take place.

Charles Rwabukwali focuses on the cultural attitudes, values and norms regarding sexual behavior among the Batooro, an ethnic group of western Uganda. This constructivist perspective on the role of values, norms and culture in influencing sexual behavior demonstrates one way in which HIV/ AIDs may be transmitted among this ethnic community.

Wilfred Lajul assesses whether and in what ways African traditional ethical value systems influence the behavior of public servants in Uganda. In this paper he establishes that public servants face a dilemma in their professional practice. On the one hand, they have to uphold the ethical principles

that govern their civil service engagements, while on the other they have to fulfill their traditional community obligations. The dilemma is whether allegiance should be owed to the state or to the community? He strongly advocates a mixed approach of ethical education that takes cognizance of both the unique African ethical approaches and the western ethical codes of conduct.

Medard Rugyendo explores how the charismatic movement has influenced the manner in which worship and praise are approached in the main stream churches in Uganda. He argues that, while the performance of miracles, prophecies and speaking in tongues was experienced in the church centuries ago, the ways in which such things are experienced in the twenty-first century has brought them to the fore and made them more visible particularly in the way they happen. It is against this background that he argues in a non-committal way that, whereas the charismatic movement is good, it has to be nurtured and to grow in a manner that is commensurate with the traditional church approach to worship.

John Kigongo E's study provides a lucid examination of Uganda's economic performance. He argues that Uganda's fragile economic situation can be attributed to its weak budget, dependency on aid and character of investment, which is mainly foreign based. The paper sets an optimistic tone and raises pertinent questions, such as "how can Uganda extricate itself from this precarious economic situation?"

Esuruku Robert Senath reflects on the relationship between gender, social capital and rural development in Uganda. The paper argues that, because social capital is a concept with a long lineage that covers social networks, norms of reciprocity and trust, which are the basis of cooperation and the accomplishment of goals, it is one of the prerequisites of rural development. It is the basis on which the communities negotiate, share resources and are interdependent. This gendered analysis of development concludes with the central argument that women and men are interdependent too and that they are an intimate channel through which social capital has empowered their access to productive resources that foster rural development.

Godfrey B. Asimwe gives an account of the historical growth of the illicit trade in coffee as a result of the economic contradictions that emerged out of the economic war in Uganda in the Amin era. It is discussed how the initiatives to eliminate this illicit trade were highly militarized, ethnicized and, above all, violent. Ironically, it is precisely this illicit trade on which the state's economy had to depend following the embargo that had been declared on Uganda in 1972.

Julius Kiiza, Lawrence Bategeka and Sarah Ssewanyana analyse the potential impact of oil drilling on Uganda's development. They succinctly and empirically demonstrate how systemic official corruption, especially in the negotiation of oil contracts, could in fact reverse the already optimistic view that oil will lead to development in Uganda.

Kamanzi Adalbertus reflects on how human beings have degraded the environment over the centuries, and particularly during recent decades of the 80s and 90s. Drawing on the Baconian and Smithian revolutions, he attributes environmental degradation to modernity. Modernity, he argues, has created a complex web of exploitation that has impacted on the ways in which human beings have exploited nature.

Jim Ayorekire and Jockey B. Nyakaana's article underscores the salient role that Uganda's tourism industry is playing in the development of Uganda as the third highest foreign exchange earner. This paper provides not only an institutionalist view that has strong currency in development but one that diverts attention away from the general development debate that aid dollars are the

main avenue of development. Drawing on the invaluable resources offered by the many lakes in Uganda the authors demonstrate the viability of lake tourism as a potential foreign exchange earner using Lake Victoria as their case study.

Catherine Jendia's paper presents a unique perspective of regional integration. She argues that religious pluralism in the region could foster the mutual coexistence of the member states if appropriately harnessed. She is cognizant of the potentially divisive role that religions can play at intra-state level but emphasizes the subtle role they can play in integration. She thus implores leaders to recognize and utilize this great resource in the creation of a new East African community.

Monica B. Chibita and Njonjo Mfaume provide a comparative analysis of how language policies can enhance the potential of radio in rational and critical debates on issues of democratization. Looking at Uganda and Tanzania, they demonstrate how while in Tanzania the prevalence of a language policy has enabled increased access to information and more participatory debate because of the use of Kiswahili, in Uganda the lack of a policy and a common language has hindered simultaneous national debate on critical issues across the country. Where attempts have been made to engage in debate, such debates have been characterized by insular ethnic undertones.

Dr. Deusdedit R. K. Nkuruziza

Editor

Dr. Charlotte Karungi Mafumbo

Co-Editor

“The Ways of the Past are not all Bad’: Gender, Poverty and Power in the Representation of the Bacwezi”*

*Edward I. Steinhart**

Abstract

In 1996 and 1997 I conducted interviews on the history of the Bacwezi spirit cult at two sites in Kibaale District: Munsa (Series M) and Kasunga (Series K). The interview transcripts are in the possession of the author and the Uganda National Institute for Scientific Research. They are on deposit and can be examined at the Uganda Museum, Kampala.

* *The research for this paper was conducted with the support of Texas Tech University and the cooperation of the Department of History, Makerere University. The author wishes to thank Rev. John Serugo and Dr. Charlotte Karungi Mafumbo for their invaluable assistance in the field and their friendship over the years since. Much gratitude is also due to my interview subjects and their families who made this work possible and made my visits to western Uganda so rewarding.*

Introduction: Possessing Power

My interest was drawn to the Bacwezi many years ago as a result of the controversies over their status as either heroes in the founding of the inter-lacustrine kingdoms of western Uganda and/or spirits invoked by supplicants and adherents through the intervention of spirit mediums. The historical representations of the Bacwezi as founders of the first dynasty and empire of Kitara made these legendary state-building heroes the basis of a pastoral mythic charter of the kingdom of Bunyoro and others in the western region that had informed my earlier researches on resistance and collaboration of the Uganda kingdoms (Beattie, 1971; Nyakatura 1947; Steinhart 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980). Out of that research, I undertook the investigation of state formation as a part of the Evomat (evolutionary materialism) project of Professor Hans Claessen of Leiden University (Steinhart 1978, 1981b). From the beginning of my efforts to place the Bacwezi into a framework of the political evolution of the state, I was aware of my discomfort with the idea that these demi-gods were alternately described as supernatural spirits and as real kings and conquerors (Steinhart 1979; 1980). It was with this in mind that I set out to examine the history and current understanding of the Bacwezi at Munsa and Kasunga in the Kibaale district of western Uganda., where they can be said to have first come to reign and where their spirits are still venerated today. It was through a series of revelations and discoveries, that I became convinced that the Bacwezi had become central to a modern resurrection of spiritual life among the poor and powerless men, women and children of western Uganda (Steinhart 1999).

In 1996 and 1997, I began field research into the history of the Bacwezi spirit possession cult in Western Uganda (Steinhart 1999). More specifically, I conducted interviews at Munsa and Kasunga in the Kibaale district that was once at the center of the Kitaran 'empire' and the reputed capital of the Bacwezi demi-gods of legend (Dunbar 1965; Nyakatura 1947; Miirima 1999). After decades of neglect, historians and

archaeologists had returned to the study of the historical interpretation of the Bacwezi spirits and kings and their activities in western Uganda. New excavations had begun and reported at the sites of Ntusi, Kibengo, Mubende Hill, Munsa and Kasunga located in the heartland of the so-called 'Bacwezi Empire.' I say 'so-called' because much of the new evidence can be interpreted to call into question the very existence of this ancient political construct and the subsequent understandings of the Bacwezi 'dynasty' and their contributions to the history of the Uganda kingdoms (Robertshaw 1997, Robertshaw and Taylor 1999). In the process of excavation, interview and re-interpretation, the myth of the Bacwezi as a dynasty of superhuman, pastoral conquerors and culture heroes may have been buried. Other explanations have emerged in recent years that are rooted in archaeological and linguistic research (Robertshaw 1999, 1999a and 2001; Schoenbrun, 1998 and 1999). They emphasize the role of gender (Robertshaw 1999; Schoenbrun, 1996; McLean, 1999) in the formation of class and the extraction of a surplus and of environmental and agricultural change in the emergence of complex polities (Robertshaw 2001 ; Schoenbrun, 1998). The Bacwezi have lost their place as state-builders and culture heroes to the newer and more sophisticated interpretations of state-formation. Instead, the Bacwezi spirits, manifesting themselves now as curative, protective and jealous deities, who reside in the ancient places of spiritual power—hills, groves of trees and granite outcroppings—have been resurrected. This modern resurrection of the spirits among both the people of western Uganda and students of Uganda's history is what I will be examining here. More specifically I will review the relationship of the Cwezi cult and *emandwa* mediums to the gendered concepts of spiritual, political and physical power that the Bacwezi spirits embody.

Preconceptions of the Spirit World

I came to the study of the Bacwezi spirit world by way of my studies of the early history of the state in western Uganda and the political

anthropology of state formation that had informed my studies between the early 1970s and the initiation of this research project (Steinhart 1978, 1987). From this perspective the Bacwezi appeared as a masculine, hierarchical and even authoritarian complex of legendary heroes, far removed from what I understood of the meaning and function of religious cults or movements. My object in arranging and preparing to study the Bacwezi site at Munsa was to examine the hypothesis that I had formulated in conversation with archeologists working in the area (Robertshaw 1990; Sutton 1998; Schmidt 1978, 1999; Steinhart and Robertshaw 1988). The hypothesis was that Munsa was **not** a Bacwezi capital site in the sense of it being the residence of political leaders and pastoral lords as the textbooks had told me.

My own reading of the traditions of kingship had called this view into question. Put positively, I hoped that the archaeology and my own interviews would confirm that Munsa was instead a Bacwezi shrine site where in ancient times the spirits of the Bacwezi had been venerated in some kind of royal cult. I believed that the spirits were approached by supplicants in search of some form of blessing or boon. Through the intervention of the spirits the supplicants sought relief from suffering the inexplicable fate of illness, poverty and woe. In a word, I considered that the Bacwezi demi-gods had been assimilated to an ancient religious tradition of spirit possession called *emandwa*¹ in what I understood to be a classic example of a cult of affliction or deprivation (Turner 1968; Lewis 1989; Boddy 1989; Bourguignon 1965; Cf., McClenon 2002 for a view of the place of spiritual healing in the history of human evolution).

My reading of the literature of spirit possession and my focus on the political ramifications of the Bacwezi spirits as euhemerized kings ill prepared me for what I would discover on the ground at Munsa and Kasunga in the heartland of the Bacwezi. I have described

my field experience at some length elsewhere (Steinhart 1999) and will merely outline some of the major, albeit tentative, findings as they become relevant here. To begin, let me briefly say something about what I did not discover at Munsa and Kasunga which I had expected to find.

The Modernity of the Spirits

I had expected to find that the Bacwezi beliefs and practices that I would uncover at Munsa and Kasunga would bear the mark of the ancient origins of that phenomenon. That the “traditional” would stamp its features on the present with clarity and consistency. As it turns out, I would discover only inconsistency or rather variability based in part on the protean nature of both the beliefs and the practices that embody them in western Uganda and the variation created by the history of western thinking about the problems represented by spirit possession and, what Janzen (1994) has called, the “Drums of Affliction.”

I was not unaware that during the colonial era, new spirits representing new phenomena and spiritual powers introduced by colonial rule had been recognized as part of the Bacwezi pantheon (Beattie 1964). However, I had understood this to be a grafting of new spirits onto the tree of Bacwezi spiritual life. What I would come to believe is that the tree itself would be pollarded into new and entirely different shapes by the re-construction of the fundamental conceptions and representations of power as time and circumstances dictated. I would come to believe that the ebb and flow of contemporary beliefs in the spirits have made of them a distinctly modern, colonial and post-colonial manifestation (Behrend 1998; Behrend and Luig, 1999; Ciekawy and Geschiere 1998). This has two serious consequences for my research. The bad news is that what I learned of the contemporary Bacwezi beliefs and practices can only be read back into the past with great reserve and little confidence. Although the names and terms and some of the practices still bear the shapes impressed on them many

¹ On the antiquity of *emandwa* in the region, see Schoenbrun 1998: 243-45.

decades, even centuries ago, their meanings and significance has been re-created and remodeled too often to allow for any extrapolation. The good news is it is possible to examine some of the contemporary changes in belief and reconstruct a modern history of the Bacwezi that show its local and immediate meanings and the significance of the spirit world to the men and women of western Uganda who now inhabit and enliven it.

The Gender of the Spirits World

I had expected to find that in the spiritual domain of the Bacwezi women were both numerically and socially dominant among the adherents and mediums. Instead, I found a rough equality of numbers and an element of patrilineality in the pattern of 'inheritance' of possession by the Bacwezi mediums at Munsu. Moreover, the concentration of possession in one local lineage at Munsu and the competition for control over the shrine site by men at the Kasunga led me to believe that *emandwa* mediumship, like other sources of wealth and power within Nyoro society remained in the male sphere. Certainly control over medicines, esoteric knowledge and the remuneration they produced seems to follow patrilineal and male dominant patterns. (Interview Series M and K, Conducted by the author in 1996-1997.

I had also expected to find that female mediums and adherents were more likely to be possessed by female spirits or at least some consistent nexus between female deities/mediums and the treatment of infertility and other gender-specific 'female' problems. However, I found no such connection. In fact, I found no such regular correspondences, hierarchies or symmetries. No hierarchy of local, regional and inter-ethnic spirits was manifested at Munsu. I had hoped to find local spirits, such as might be attached to the particular site. I had supposed that at the local level I would find "the spirits of the hill," a frequently used phrase used in expressing the spiritual presence at Munsu. And beyond that, and exercising more power, I would find a pantheon of 'national' spirits of departed

kings, the Bacwezi, and perhaps even a few superpowers representing elemental and nature spirits which might transcend the Bacwezi or Kitaran culture area. At one time, I even hoped to find a functional division of labor among the spirits in which certain diseases or disorders were the specialty of certain spirits and their adherents and mediums, those who had been attacked and cured of that particular malady. I found no such regularities, neither a regular hierarchy of powers, geographical specificity or functional ministries. Instead all appeared to be fluid and lacking in coherent system or ordering.

Much to my surprise, I found that the Bacwezi spirit pantheon, manifested locally at Munsu and Kasunga, was overwhelmingly male with both male and female adherents being possessed by male spirits. Indeed, the male spirits seemed to be considered more powerful, dangerous and capable of conferring more significant benefits on their adherents than female deities. And the diagnosis of how a spirit might have chosen to possess his/her host seemed to have little to do with the gender or other physical attributes of the host. To my surprise and consternation, the powerful spirit of the hunter deity called Irungu, a decidedly male spirit, had taken possession of a boy of eight. It was this phenomenon of the possession of a young boy, not yet of the age of reason, still living within his father's home and under his mother's discipline, that caused me to begin to rethink the nature of spirit possession as conceived of by the Banyoro of western Uganda.

The Puerility of Poverty

One final observation on my preconceptions: I had expected the arena of spirit mediumship and activity to be gendered female in some fairly obvious way (Berger 1976, 1995; Schoenbrun 1996 and forthcoming). At least, I expected some kind of gender complementarity to be manifested in the ritual and symbolism of the *emandwa* at Munsu. In contrast to these expectations, I found the Bacwezi spirits to be distinctly male in as much as gender appeared

to be significant. That is to say that even the female mediums seemed to operate within an idiom or discourse of masculinity (Interviews M and K series). The voice of authority in which the spirits spoke, even when speaking through a female host, was a masculine voice speaking within a framework of male ‘controls.’

The recent work of Treitel (2000) on the occult in turn of the century Germany provides an interesting parallel to the Cwezi experience. She has found that, although her mediums were most frequently female, they were controlled by male authority figures. The German mediums had the power to channel supernatural and spiritual forces when in a trance state that could be induced by hypnosis. This control appeared in the form of both male hypnotists, who controlled the onset and duration of the trance states and of the male “control spirits” who possessed them when entranced and spoke through the female host in a male voice (Treitel, 2000). In Munsa and Kasunga, where the role of the hypnotist is absent, it is the male figure of father, husband, uncle or brother through whom the female (and juvenile) mediums are approached. Moreover, it is the female medium’s membership in a patrilineage that appears to be crucial to their selection by the spirits as their host bodies (Interviews M and K Series).

Rethinking Gender and Spirit Possession

Does this mean that we have to abandon a gendered analysis of the spirit world of the *Emandwa*/Bacwezi at Munsa and throughout the region? Clearly this is not my prescription. Examining gender as a key factor in the construction of a spirit world may not lead us to what we may have anticipated based on earlier studies and more general notions about male and female spheres and functions. It may, however, still prove fruitful in allowing us to rethink the nature of power and its possession. First of all, we must come to recognize that the key markers of gendered power and the struggles over the possession of those powers still operates within a discourse of masculinity (Hopkins

1970 and nd; Karp 1989). Wealth, whether of the traditional variety, including cattle, land, children and wives and their fertility, are still conceived of in terms of masculine possession and disposition. And new sources of wealth and power such as cash, jobs, education and forms of property (houses, cars, radios, etc.) are still accumulated and manipulated within a male sphere and discourse. Indeed, both “modern” and “traditional” forms of wealth, power and well-being are avidly sought by those who approach the spirits in search of healing and protection. In contrast, it is the absence of these attributes of power and wealth that appears to be gendered female (Interviews M series).

Let me be a bit more explicit: both male and female adherents and mediums are empowered by the intercession of the spirits. Whether male or female in form, these spirits are gendered powerful, productive and skillful. The adherents/host themselves are gendered female and are seen when possessed to be mere conduits for male power. An entire complex of symbols and signs of male power/female powerlessness are suffusing with the rituals and discourses of *emandwa* spirit possession. This is true whether we consider the traditional or modern measures of personal and family power and wealth.

This became manifest when I considered the central revelation of my 1996-97 field research: that the most powerful spirit manifesting itself at Munsa, chose to do so through the body of a small, pre-pubescent boy (Interviews M series). His very lack of power, potency, and fertility, that is to say, his puerility, made him suitable as a host for the powerful Irungu spirit. It also made him gendered female. He lacked all those aspect and accoutrements of power that (adult) men possess: sexual potency, property, status, education, respect, and wealth.

Women and boys, old men and the infirm, struggle for and attain some element of power when they are “knocked” by the spirits. The very puerility of their situations, defined not just as the status of a boy but by childishness, even silliness, can be compensated for by their

possession of the spirit. The ability of mediums/adherents to use their ritual power to attract a following and to control scarce resources has been seen as a means towards the accumulation of political power. This power could rival and mimic the power of chiefs who controlled more tangible resources of power such as land, cattle and women. Indeed, spirit possession cults like *Emandwa* and *Nyabingi* have been seen as a confrontational and alternative idiom of power in the inter-lacustrine area (Robertshaw 1999: 59-60; Berger 1976, 1981, 1995; Freedman 1979; and Feerman 1999).

A number of important features of the gendered operations of the Cwezi cult and its historical relationship to political power appeared to emerge from interviewing and re-interviewing both educated and non-literate members of the community at Munsa and of Kasunga. I was able to establish that there were systematic differences in what the Bacwezi meant to be the two classes within the local community. For the educated elite, a picture of the Bacwezi as dead kings and heroes, who had governed, departed and left their mantle of authority to subsequent generations of dynasts, was very much the received knowledge, accepted wholeheartedly and repeated with complete conviction (Interviews M/2; M/3; M/4; M/17, 8 Sept. 1997; M/18, 8 Sept. 1997; and K/4, 14 Sept. 1997).²

For these uniformly male informants, Kateboha, the builder of the earthworks at Munsa, had been assimilated to the Bacwezi cohort of fourteenth century monarchs and pastoral conquerors as one of their territorial rulers. Munsa and the nearby caves on Semwema hill represented, for these informants, a military citadel from which Kateboha and his soldiers ruled the surrounding territory and defended themselves from attack. His strategy and tactics were those of a pastoral chief defending his territory and his personal attributes were highly human. These attributes

included an obsession with his daughter's honor and his inability to control her sexuality, leading to his lamentable overthrow (Interviews M/18 and M/20, 9 Sept. 1997, Lanning 1959 and Ggomotoka 1950). Collectively, this version of Munsa's history is a thoroughly patriarchal and monarchic mythology, suitable to the political and cultural traditions of the pastoral kingdoms which had arisen in western Uganda since the fifteenth century.

In sharp contrast, among the unlettered men and women of Munsa and Kasunga, the Bacwezi were superhuman, spiritual entities whose exploits partook of the supernatural (Interviews M/6; M/8; M/12, 13 Aug. 1997; M/14, 6 Sept. 1997; M/15, 6 Sept. 1997; M/19, 9 Sept. 1997; M/24, 13 Sept. 1997 and M/25, 16 Sept. 1997).³ They often appeared as lights or fires in the night, manifesting themselves as illness and affliction to those who would become their adherents and mediums. They were jealous, demanding and vengeful deities, plaguing those who ignored or abused them by hurling down misfortune and poverty, illnesses and deaths on their families from their palaces and places of power (such as Munsa and other sacred hilltops) with all the pettiness and wrath of the Greek gods of Olympus.

At Munsa itself since the 1980's, a range of Cwezi spirits had "landed on" those they chose to be their mediums, selecting especially, but not exclusively, members of the *BaNvubo* (Hippo) clan and within it, members of the *Baltwara* lineage. No fewer than twopaternal uncles, a brother, 13 who practices as a traditional healer in Buganda, two sisters and, of course, the current juvenile medium 17 have received the call to serve the spirits and the gift of healing (Interviews M/9; M/11; M/5; M/14; M/16; M/19; M/24; and M/25). Mostly the call came as some incurable (by western medicine) disease or disorder such as infertility in women and behavior problems in school as in the case of the incumbent medium: trances,

² Photographs taken to document these interviews provide visual evidence of the elite standing, reflected in the sartorial splendor of these informants. Photographic evidence is in the possession of the author and the Uganda Museum.

³ Again photographic evidence shows a markedly more modest style of dress among these non-elite informants whose portraits were collected as part of the interview process.

rages and fits (Interview M/11). In the case of one female medium, Catherine, it had come as serious physical illness (Interview M/24). For, another, it had been a pregnancy that lasted six years (Interview M/14).⁴ For these uneducated and impoverished individuals, the spirits who possessed them were extremely dangerous when ignored, but when ‘pleased,’ they offered ‘luck,’ fortune, fertility and increase, in a word prosperity, which they themselves as mediums, depending on the strength of their possessing spirit’s gifts, might pass on to others.

The class divisions noted in the interview data reflected the division in educational level rather than adherence to the local communions of the Christian churches, either Roman Catholic or Anglican. Indeed, even the most “traditional” and active Bacwezi adherents were also committed members of their local churches. Nonetheless, there is evidence that the local church representatives harbor a virulent antagonism to Bacwezi worship and healing ceremonies (P. Robertshaw, Personal Communication, June, 1995, July, 1996 and e-mail, 31 March 1998).

Finally, the Bacwezi spirit possession praxis is the locus for a gendered struggle. The internal struggle of the adept with the controlling spirit (manifested as sickness or disorder), the struggle to control and accommodate the superior power of the deity that possesses and controls them, mimics the external struggle for power and control over wealth, traditional or modern, that their possession by and control over the spirit make possible. The process of spirit possession is doubly empowering: it empowers the spirit by making it possible for the spirit to act in the world. The spirit will show generosity and offer benefits when pleased and will send disease and harm when he is troubled. Possession also empowers the possessed, enabling the host to share in the superior powers of the spirits, to dispense cures and good fortune, fertility and

well-being. Mediums are empowered to collect the real material and cash rewards of providing this service to others afflicted by the spirits. In some exceptional cases, spiritual power exercised on behalf of the secular authorities can bring temporal power as well. A legendary example of this is that of the *Emandwa* ‘priestess,’ known as Kibubura.⁵ Kibubura was the third of three sisters to hold the position of diviner for the Abagabe of Nkore. They were originally sent by Omukama Kabagea of Bunyoro from her home area in the heartland of Bunyoro, they were settled at Ibanda on the northern frontier of Nkore’s territory. A palace was built for them and to all intents and purposes they appeared to exercise chiefly as well as spiritual power at Ibanda. There they remained through the reigns of Mutambuuka and Ntare V, performing *emandwa* possession ceremonies, songs and dances, until the colonial era brought Omugabe Kahaya to the throne and Christianity to the court. Kahaya and Kibubura were both baptized in the Anglican Church and would both remain prominent supporters of the Church in colonial Ankole. What is most remarkable about this is not the conversion of Kibubura to Christianity, but her ability to convert her spiritual *cum* secular power under the *abagabe* to the title and authority of a sub-county (gomborora) chief under the British, a position she would hold from 1902 until 1940. After her death in 1952, her legendary status as the female chief led to the naming of an important secondary school in Ibanda after her. Then and now, the accumulation of (female gendered) spiritual authority had the distinct prospect of bringing rich rewards on the (male gendered) temporal and political levels.

In conclusion it must be noted that the experience of Kibubura was exceptional in colonial times. Chiefly, status was gendered male along with all the other attributes of power and authority, even when a woman held such authority. Thus, by gendering poverty as female and power as male,

⁴ Asked by my research assistant, Dr. Charlotte Karungi, to explain this phenomenon in naturalistic terms, I suggested a long period of amenorrhea, probably due to inadequate diet and poor general health, followed by a successful pregnancy.

⁵ See Interview with Bishop Yoram K. Bamunoba, 23 September 2003 and his “Diviners for the Abagabe,” *Uganda Journal* 29, 1(1965): 95-97.

distinct limits were placed on the ability of the Bacwezi spirits and their mediums to become what so many believe they were originally: conquerors and kings, rulers in the secular world of men.

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The *Bataka* Agitation and Resistance in Colonial Uganda

*Frederick Mulindwa**

Abstract

This paper highlights the colonial appropriation of Bataka land and the dashing of their aspirations. Embedded in tradition and conservatism, it was remarkable how the injustice turned them into one of the most persistent opponents of the colonial establishment. At first, bewildered by the loss the Bataka started to organize until the 1949 riots when they reached the peak of their struggle. But the colonial set up conspired to ensure that no redress was ever made. This was essentially a colonial phenomenon which the Bataka intended to correct while the British were still in control. This perhaps, partly, explains why the movement lost hope once independence was attained. This study however sheds light as well on a shrewdly conceived cover of the colonial contempt of the African cultural values by projecting the controversy as a struggle between modern developmental orientated forces vis-à-vis backwardness and reactionary elements.

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Introduction

Whilst the term *Bataka* (plural) or *Mutaka* (singular), a derivative from the word *ttaka* (land) traditionally in Buganda simply connoted land ownership, it was used symbolically in the resistance under review, as a rallying point by focusing attention on the key point of contention namely, land alienation. Arising out of the 1900 Agreement, the *Bataka* grievances became overtime the long standing symbol of colonial injustice and a constant embarrassment to both the British and Buganda governments throughout the colonial period. In fact, the persistence of the *Bataka* struggle came very close to turning into a movement. The aggrieved *Bataka* were the first group in Buganda to question critically the system as conceived by colonialism.

This paper highlights the colonial appropriation of *Bataka* land and the dashing of their aspirations. Embedded in tradition and conservatism, it was remarkable how the injustice turned them into one of the most persistent opponents of the colonial establishment. At first, bewildered by the loss, the *Bataka* started to organize until the 1949 riots when they reached the peak of their struggle. But the colonial set up conspired to ensure that no redress was ever made. This was essentially a colonial phenomenon which the *Bataka* intended to correct while the British were still in control. This perhaps, partly, explains why the movement lost hope once independence was attained. The study however sheds light as well on a shrewdly conceived cover of the colonial contempt of the African cultural values by projecting the controversy as a struggle between modern, developmental orientated forces vis-à-vis backwardness and reactionary elements.

The Roots of the Controversy

The key *Bataka* grievance was the feeling that their interests had been overlooked in the 1900 Agreement. Much of the traditional land had been given away to the new Bakungu beneficiaries. Some of the *Bataka* who were also clan heads felt slighted with the emergence

of the *Bakungu*¹ whom they regarded as mere upstarts. Their wrath was particularly directed against the Katikkiro, Sir Apollo Kaggwa, since he was the leading embodiment of the new forces.

Initially, Kaggwa and the British simply ignored them. But with the investiture of Kabaka Chwa after his coming of age in 1914, he soon showed himself sympathetic to some of the *Bataka* aspirations. The Kabaka's reactions were possibly in part, an attempt to assert himself after a long period of Kaggwa regency. Chwa reasonably suggested that those *Bataka* who could prove that they had lost their traditional land should be allocated mailo estates. Then he went on, "these new land grants could... be exchanged voluntarily for their *Bataka* estates if the present owners were willing"¹. Kabaka's position greatly encouraged the *Bataka* who now adopted a new name, the Federation of *Bataka Bamasiga*. However, perhaps fearing to set a precedent for all sorts of claimants, and unwilling to have the *Bataka* on their bandwagon of beneficiaries, the Lukiiko dominated by Kaggwa rejected Kabaka's proposals. But the *Bataka* and anti-Kaggwa forces buoyed by the Kabaka also became more adamant. They had in their ranks some of the articulate members of the Lukiiko. Using these as their spokesmen, they had inside information on the land settlement which was turned into political ammunition against Kaggwa;

They publicly proclaimed (for example) that when the Lukiiko was to embark on its land allocation duties each Ssaza Chief was ordered to prepare a list of persons in possession of land in terms of article 13 of the Uganda Agreement. The Lukiiko scrutinized these lists, examined applications, and adjudicated in many disputes and issues. They argued that many people did not recognize the meaning of freehold land tenure and therefore did not press their claims, or if overlooked, did not take the matter up. The Lukiiko had given weight only to the most senior *Bataka* who were mostly chiefs. Therefore

¹ Bakungu in Luganda basically means chiefs. But in this context the *Bakungu* connoted a new elite collaborating with the British which arose out of colonialism and foreign religion affiliations.

these senior *Bataka* acted with the chiefs and were in clan terms, disloyal. These arguments helped to identify chieftaincy as the enemy. (In addition) they were well calculated to appeal to the (peasantry)... for example; they identified a common poverty and abuse at the lands of the chiefs who were also landlords. In a manner of speaking the traditional identification of the clan system with rural life was given an additional focus. This focus was based on mutual deprivation of *Bataka* and Bakopi by the hierarchy.²

This mobilization strategy of isolating the chiefs so as to increase the pressure on them and the colonial government to reconsider the problem filed when the latter decided in 1926 to side with the Lukiiko.³

Early Agitation – 1920s: the *Bataka*'s role in the removal of Kaggwa

The same year 1926, when the British upheld the settlement also saw the downfall of Apollo Kaggwa as a consequence of strained relations with the colonial authorities. The sanctity of the settlement and the model in this case was however, preserved by the determination on part of the British to contain the *Bataka* aspirations. By unraveling the settlement to accommodate the traditional legitimacy of the *Bataka*, there was a danger of their upstaging the Bakungu collaborators thereby threatening the colonial arrangement. There was therefore, a convergence of interests between the British and Buganda leadership to check the *Bataka* agitation.

The *Bataka* struggle at this time therefore assumed an anti-Kaggwa posture as well. It also attracted younger men aspiring for office who saw the "Kaggwa Oligarchy" as the stumbling block and other not-so-younger malcontents who resented his long incumbency. Moreover, the young Kabaka was humiliated by the rejection of his decision and this further taxed the relationship with his seasoned Katikkiro. Earlier, in 1922, the *Bataka* Association headed by the Mugema (A very important personality in traditional Baganda hierarchy. Among other

duties he crowned and installed new Kabaka) and decidedly anti-Kaggwa had been formed to articulate the struggle. Within the colonial administration, the old timers who had worked closely with Kaggwa were gradually replaced by new comers whose loyalties to him were questionable. One of such new comers was a former insurance agent who had entered the colonial service to become the Assistant District Commissioner of Kampala. This man of such diminutive physical and intellectual stature, whom Kaggwa ignored, was to precipitate the Katikkiro's downfall.

Postlethwaite knew the Assistant District Commissioner of Kampala, the new comer, differed from the preceding British Administrators by looking at the Buganda model with a more critical eye. Furthermore, he showed that the model was not sacrosanct. He was moved by the plight of the peasantry who suffered oppression and abuse at the hands of chiefs. Small and inexperienced, as Kaggwa was a seasoned, military man, and administrator; critical and intrusive, as the Katikkiro was jealously protective of the settlement; Postlethwaite's appointment served notice of the new colonial chapter with the Baganda. He clashed with Kaggwa over the latter's lack of accountability on a number of issues such as forced labour. On his part, the Katikkiro saw this as an affront to his dignity. Matters were further complicated by the widening rift between the Kabaka and his indomitable Katikkiro. For example, in 1922, Chwa complained to the Governor about Kaggwa's manipulation of the Lukiiko, as if this was out of the ordinary. He further complained that Kaggwa influenced the body's behaviour and those decisions that the Katikkiro disagreed with were kept in abeyance. That he also set the agenda for the Lukiiko by virtue of his strategic control of what was brought into the Lukiiko for deliberation. The Kabaka also complained that the Katikkiro interfered in the appointment of chiefs, usually favouring contemporaries and relatives. He also resisted moves to retire his contemporary chiefs and allies. The exasperating Chwa finally

noted that “from the very first day on which His Majesty, the King of England confirmed me as Kabaka of Buganda we have not ceased to disagree as to our duties”²⁴

This feud between the Kabaka and his Katikkiro fundamentally symbolized a generational conflict as the young Kabaka came into his own and the aging Katikkiro resisted efforts to infringe on his authority. Ironically, there was a convergence of both the British and *Bataka* sympathies with the Kabaka’s position even as their motivation diverged.

With the Kabaka and some of the British administrators’ joining the anti-Kaggwa crusade, the old warrior’s days became numbered. By attacking Kaggwa’s control of the Lukiiko, Chwa for a time appeared as a champion of the *Bataka* cause to reform the Lukiiko by injecting in fresh blood. By 1925, when Sir William F. Gowers became Governor, the relationship between the Kabaka and his Katikkiro on the one hand, and the Katikkiro and the colonial administration on the other, had become untenable. The British saw that the time for action to rectify the situation had come.

The pretext for action came over a conflict related to beer permits. The issue revolved around the need to curb drunkenness in Kampala and hence the issue of permits.⁵ It was a relatively simple argument which normally would have been resolved quite easily. But the British decided that time had come to “drop the pilot”, the Katikkiro, and they used the combative Postlethwaite to do so. The reason was that the conflict in a nutshell, ultimately boiled down to further encroaching jurisdiction over Buganda affairs by the colonial administration as represented by Postlethwaite and a stubborn resistance to such attempts personified on this occasion by the Katikkiro. Whilst both parties agreed to the need to curb drunkenness, Postlethwaite’s insistent and arrogant attitude infuriated the proud Katikkiro. Postlethwaite then addressed himself to the administration of Buganda which Kaggwa saw as an intolerable interference. With the differences between the two men

now apparently irreconcilable, the Governor intervened on the side of Postlethwaite. Kaggwa was forced into a humiliating climb-down which ultimately also saw his resignation in 1926. In the same year, the grand old man died.

The removal of Kaggwa realized a number of objectives. The British with the support of the Kabaka had now a clear field to recruit younger and more amenable men, most of whom were already prominent in the anti-Kaggwa movement. The *Bataka* were also jubilant to see the downfall of their key protagonist. But the resilience of the Buganda model showed through this crisis as the younger men quickly and enthusiastically replaced the “Kaggwa oligarchy” with the full support of the Kabaka. However, the removal of Kaggwa, even as it opened opportunities and possibilities for some people, was not a democratization process. For example, whilst the British and the Kabaka welcomed the *Bataka* support in their struggle with Kaggwa, the *Bataka* aspirations were quickly dashed and ignored once the old man was safely out of the way.

The *Bataka* Question and the Gathering Political Storm: 1930s

The *Bataka* agitation nonetheless persisted. Apart from the *Mugema*, who suffered deportation and exile as his crusade for the *Bataka* cause took on an increasingly anti-British flavour, the other effective leaders of the agitation also suffered under the colonial heel. Outstanding among these was James Miti and the most controversial, Ssemakula Mulumba. James Miti was a former *Muganda* Katikkiro in Bunyoro whose dedicated life to the *Bataka* struggle was to end in jail where he died. As a senior *Mutaka* of the Genet clan, Miti was concerned about the consummation of the alliance between the chiefs and the British which he saw as the culprit for the neglect of the *Bataka* aspirations. After his retirement, he took on the *Bataka* issue with increasing gusto by trying to forge an alliance with the Bakopi (peasants). His role in the rise of Kiganda nationalism was substantial. Miti’s house at Bulange continued to be the meeting

ground for the *Bataka* agitators even after his death in British jail after the 1949 riots.

Ssemakula Mulumba, on the other hand, was recruited to the organisation “as the proper person to represent the *Bataka* in England”.⁶ Thanks to his bombastic utterings from there, the colonial government after the 1949 riots even attempted to link the *Bataka* party with communism! But on a more serious note, Mulumba playing on the ignorance of *Bataka* depleted their finances to enjoy a carefree life in Europe.

The 1930s saw attempts by the organization to widen its appeal and effectiveness as Apter noted:

Some features of clan organisation were put to the service of a loosely knit and fluctuating political organisation which identified more and more with Kiganda nationalism. A wider use of the term *Bataka* to include all Baganda, a more populist but also more conservative and nationalist meaning became widespread. Less and less parochial and somewhat defensive group, the *Bataka* became more of a peasant's party wronged, proud and traditionalist. They reserved a higher and prior right, based on custom, to evaluate the actions not only of chiefs but of the Kabaka himself⁷

This organisation with a long standing genuine grievance caught the attention of those enlightened Baganda who were discontented with the status quo. Notable among these was Ignatius Musaazi, at the time a young, budding politician still grappling for an issue on which to mobilize the people against colonial injustices. When Musaazi founded his first political organisation called *Baana ba Kintu* (sons of Kintu) with two objectives, namely as a channel of merchants and farmers complaints to appropriate authorities and secondly, to get rid of the Buganda government headed by Katikiro, Nsibirwa, the leading members of the organisation were *Bataka*. Among these “... were influential members of old families and were also sons of chiefs, giving both a stature and authority to the organisations themselves”⁸

Musaazi's interest in African commerce and trade was a long standing one while many of the *Bataka* had a strong attachment to land and farming. On the other hand, the wish for the demise of the Nsibirwa government on part of Musaazi stemmed essentially from two motivations. First, his quest for democratization saw the Buganda government as the embodiment of colonial autocracy. Secondly, he still shared with some old families and chiefs a familial and sympathetic resentment over the manner in which the Kaggwa leadership had been replaced by the incumbent one.⁹

As for the other hard core *Bataka* members of the organization, the Nsibirwa government represented the perpetuation of the status quo which continued to ignore their grievances. To Musaazi, these *Bataka* provided a loyal body of support for his political battles, and to the *Bataka*, Musaazi, educated, and articulate as he was, could provide leadership for their cause. The joint political ventures undertaken by the *Bataka* and Musaazi were a marriage of convenience, with views sometimes convergent and at other times divergent, but each party attempting to use the other for its own ends.

THE YEARS OF UNREST (1939-49): the *Bataka* issue and political awakening

All these pent up pressures and anxieties in Buganda broke into open struggles as a consequence of a succession of important events in which all the important players in the kingdom had a stake. The *Bataka* question became intricately woven in these currents and those that followed namely the succession dispute; the “Namasole Affair” in 1941; the Makerere and Mulago Land disputes of 1944 and the riots of 1945.

a. Succession dispute

In 1939, after an uneventful tenure, Daudi Chwa died. Throughout his rule, Chwa was never able to overcome the inferiority complex which he had acquired under the domination of Apollo Kaggwa. Later in life, he became a semi-recluse leaving the administration to his

chiefs. This led to intense rivalry and intrigue within the hierarchy. To make matters worse, a mini-succession struggle followed, centered on two princes, namely Mutesa and Mawanda. Although the elder of the two, Mawanda had the disadvantage of being born outside wedlock, times had changed so much that a largely Christian hierarchy was prepared to use Christian ethics to determine legitimacy! On the other hand, though of questionable leadership abilities, Muteesa was favourably looked upon as a promising pro-British protégé. As Muteesa was still a minor, regency at this time entailed power and resentment as Apter noted:

... with the death of Daudi Chwa and the appointment of a 15-year old Kabaka, the power of the regency which was vested with the three Buganda Government ministers gave power to (them) ... which had not been exercised since (the time of) Sir Apollo Kagwa. ... this intensified the struggle to get rid of (Katikikiro) Nsibirwa and *Omuwanika* Kulubya (Treasurer)...¹⁰

The two leaders were seen by their opponents as the embodiment and continuation of the colonial status quo represented earlier by Apollo Kagwa. They were therefore anathema to the *Bataka*. Other opponents feared their becoming too powerful in the Kagwa mould to remove. Yet others like Musaaazi, in addition to the above resentments, also did not like them assuming the mantle of Kagwa whom they were accused of having undermined. As the battle lines were being drawn, another controversial issue broke loose.

b. The “*Namasole* Affair” (1941)

The enemies of Nsibirwa administration had their first chance to confront it in 1941 due to the so-called “*Namasole* Affair”. It came about when Chwa died in 1939. He left behind a relatively young widow, the *Namasole*, the mother of Muteesa. In 1941, this youngish widow caught the eye of a handsome commoner, a certain Kigozi, who was ready to marry her. The Baganda were incensed because it was a custom that a *Namasole* should never marry

again. There was uproar throughout Buganda and tremendous pressure was exerted on the leadership to stop the marriage.

However, Muteesa, the Kabaka, the Christian Katikikiro and other leading personalities, in spite of the pressure to the contrary from the populace, came out in support of the *Namasole* on Christian grounds. She got married. Here again was a manifestation of that struggle between values which are Christian and essentially European in outlook vis-à-vis a more traditional, conservative emphasis which had characterized most of the colonial and post colonial history of Buganda. The malcontents of the succession dispute and other ambitious young men used this opportunity to intensify their venom against the Mmengo administration. Another important result of this crisis was the straining of the relationship between the Baganda and the church. By siding with *Namasole*, the Protestant Church had come to be regarded by the populace as another elitist component in collusion with the hierarchy and the British in perpetuating the status quo.

In the end, Nsibirwa was forced to resign as Katikikiro and only then did an uneasy calm descend on Buganda again. An inquiry instituted by the colonial administration to look into the crisis found the beleaguered chiefs innocent. The result was that many of the ring leaders of the agitation, including some *Bataka*, were deported. Nonetheless, significant achievements had been registered.

Wamala, a leader of peasant origins, was appointed Katikikiro in 1941 after leading a successful campaign against Nsibirwa in the wake of the *Namasole* affair. For the first time in Buganda history, the peasants had their own leader at the helm. But Wamala faced formidable challenges. First of all, the rest of the Nsibirwa establishment, which he had to work with, was still in place. The release of Musaaazi from jail, where he had been sent for his part in the agitation, soon after Wamala's ascendancy to Katikikiroship, was a timely replenishment to the new leader's constituency.

The Katikiro's apparent strength as a "popular" leader was actually his second problem. He had to take into account a usually illiterate and uninformed public opinion whose fickleness ultimately drove him into confrontation with the colonial government, a venture in which he was supported by an organization called the *Bakopi Bazzukulu*, common people. The *Bakopi Bazzukulu* were allied to the old *Bataka* Association led by James Miti, and the two later merged into a reformed *Bataka* Party in 1946.¹¹

c. The Makerere and Mulago Land disputes (1944)

Flushed with victory over Nsibirwa, the opposition quickly capitalized on the Makerere and Mulago land disputes in 1944 in an attempt to get rid of Kulubya as well. Kulubya had been the Nsibirwa government representative on the de la Warr Commission of 1938 which, among other things, had recommended the acquisition of land around Makerere and Mulago hills for school and hospital utilization respectively. As a forward looking man, Kulubya enthusiastically endorsed the recommendations. However, by deliberately distorting the facts about the issue, Kulubya's opponents were able to project him in bad light in the eyes of the populace. For instance, a Luganda pamphlet termed *Buganda Nyaffe*, Buganda our motherland, played on that long standing Buganda fear of losing their land by insinuating that the land appropriation in the two cases would ultimately lead Uganda down the Kenya path.¹² Nonetheless, the land had been bought by the Administration from the reluctant and suspicious owners who would have preferred just to lease it as was the practice in Buganda. The Kulubya opponents used this opportunity to make it appear as if he was the main moving force behind the whole transaction. Consequently, he was seen as dangerous by both the aggrieved parties; the land owners and the alarmed populace. His enemies were happy with this shift of public opinion and knew that the time was fast approaching for the showdown.

This situation however was fast becoming untenable as Apter observed;

With Wamala becoming more and more intransigent in the face of Protectorate Government pressure, relations between the Buganda and Protectorate governments rapidly reached an impasse.¹³

This provoked a backlash on the part of the British who felt that their colonial arrangement with Buganda was being undermined. Wamala was forced to resign. But Kulubya's opponents who read the move as a British play to elevate him eventually to Katikiroship were greatly alarmed. They decided to act without further delay.

d. The Riots of 1945 and their aftermath

The disturbances or riots of 1945 culminated in the removal of Kulubya. The first real moves against him came when some Ssaza chiefs who were his opponents and Prince Ssuuna held a meeting "where they alleged (financial) misconduct on the part of Kulubya."¹⁴ An inquiry instituted by the Buganda Government to look into these allegations cleared the beleaguered minister. However, the Ssaza chiefs were not deterred by this setback. The support of *Bataka* and Traders' organizations was hastily enlisted. Among these was the publisher of *Buganda Nyaffe* and Ignatius Musaaizi of the Traders' Association. As a result, the movement increased in membership and organizational strength.

By January 1945, the hour of reckoning had come. Suddenly, there were riots in Kampala and the adjoining townships. In addition, strikers completely paralyzed hospitals and a number of European firms because the British were suspected to be the strongest supporters of Kulubya. The suddenness and organizational skill of the whole exercise took the administration by surprise. As a consequence, the scenario was that of a determined, organized opposition to Kulubya on the one hand, and a proscinating, confused administration on the other. The

colonial administration could do nothing but try to limit damage and watch hoping for the best as the crisis mounted. However, Kulubya brought about a quick resolution of the conflict by resigning as the leaders of the agitation demanded. Once again peace returned to Buganda.

The significance of the 1945 crisis was essentially twofold. In the first instance, for the first time in colonial Uganda, an incumbent had been removed from office by the sheer force of mobilization. In the case of Nsibirwa, the crisis never overflowed to the streets. Moreover the opposition was never as visibly and dramatically expressed as in the riots of 1945. In addition, the crisis was a training ground in organization and strategy of future nationalist leaders such as Ignatius Musaazi. Secondly, the period signalled some realignment of political forces. Kulubya began his political career when a man's advancement mainly depended on his birth, connections and patronage. By the time he left, political survival entailed popular support as well. In other words, the period saw that rising quest for popular democratic participation in decision making. Nsibirwa and Kulubya were the first political victims of these new forces.

The British eventually took a resolute rearguard action to salvage their credibility. They invited both Nsibirwa and Kulubya to return to their posts, Nsibirwa agreed, Kulubya refused. Nsibirwa's chief protagonist, Wamala, suffered deportation where he later died. Others who were deported but returned included Musaazi and several *Bataka* leaders. In addition, Nsibirwa this time took no chances he thoroughly purged the Wamala supporters from his administration. But his adversaries were also a determined lot. One Sunday morning, as he waited for the start of church service at Namirembe, he was out down by an assassin's bullet. The British alarmed by this provocative action of defiance now seized the initiative. The unpopular legislation passed under Nsibirwa, including the compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes by the Kabaka (which in reality meant

his government), was upheld. Then Kawalya Kaggwa, the son of Sir Apollo Kaggwa, was recalled from Ethiopia where he was on active service in the army and made Katikkiro. He proved tough and fearless as his father. He recruited and promoted new chiefs of loyalty. He also initiated a reform with far-ranging and crucial importance to the future of Buganda. This was the question of Buganda's representation in the legislative council which had been a constant source of irritation between the Baganda and the British. To the chagrin of many Baganda, and approval of the British, Kawalya Kaggwa also became the member of the Legislative Council for Buganda. The Kabaka himself adopting a modernist, collaborative and pro-British posture throughout these crises attracted considerable unpopularity. He was happy to be off for further studies at Cambridge.¹⁵

But all the agitation had not been in vain. On the economic front, there was some reappraisal of wages paid to African workers as well as the prices fetched by the produce, even if the measures were woefully inadequate to those affected. Politically, elected representatives were introduced in the Lukiiko for the first time. In practice, however, the chiefs held an even greater sway in the affairs of the kingdom. The introduction of large numbers of *Miruka* and *Gombolola* Chiefs as well in the Lukiiko mainly served to buttress hierarchical support at the grassroots.

What then was the *Bataka*'s fate in these currents? They could take some credit for some changes in the Lukiiko especially the bringing in of the *Miruka* and *Gombolola* constituencies which were closest to their aspirations. But the chiefs' dominated Lukiiko succeeded in manipulating these for political gains rather than serving the *Bataka* interests which remained unattended. Hence the *Bataka* grievanaces simmered on as continued ammunition for agitators but the Buganda model of administration was able to absorb these changes quite easily.

The Zenith of the *Bataka* power

(1946-49)

The *Bataka* in the wake of 1945 riots launched a political party, the *Bataka* Party in 1946. At its helm was James Miti of the old *Bataka* Association. He provided the link and a sense of continuity between the two organisations. Invoking Buganda nationalism the Party endeavoured to include every *Muganda* with a slogan, "Every *Muganda* is a *Mutaka*", intended as a consummation of citizenship with clanship. Its roots were essentially rural and hence conservative and unsophisticated in outlook. With a generalized but not large following and handicapped by lack of educated leadership and poor mobilisation and organizational tactics, the party supported almost anyone who seemed opposed to Buganda and colonial governments. This was a measure of their disillusionment. For example, they became increasingly bitter with the Kabaka whom they saw as a British quisling especially after the passage of the Kabaka's Land Acquisition Act. They played on the familiar Baganda fear of being swamped by launching bitter diatribes against the Katikkiro for having been lured into the Legco. There was a fear among the traditional Baganda that accepting a political office in the Protectorate administration such as the Legislative Council (Legco) would make recipient malleable to colonial manipulations vis-à-vis Buganda aspiration and therefore a sell out.

As Kawalya Kaggwa was the son of Appolo Kaggwa, the *Bataka* continued to look at him as the embodiment and perpetuation of their old antagonist.

But a key past grievance was inadequate to sustain a political party. Hence the *Bataka* converged with all sorts of political fellow travellers even as the objectives diverged. These included Musaazi, as already mentioned, with his farmers organisations and subsequently the Uganda National Congress, and later, in the full blossom of the political parties, the *Bataka* figured prominently in the *Kabaka Yekka*, King Only, party-cum-movement.

Musaazi used co-operative organisations, in which the *Bataka* were most active, as a launching board for his political party. When he formed the Uganda African Farmers' Union (UAFU) in 1948 and, later, the Federation of Uganda African Farmers (FUAF) in 1950, he "use (d) the *Bataka* units as the basis for the Farmers Union."¹⁶ He thought this would be advantageous for a number of reasons. First of all, the *Bataka* with their historic grievance were, as already mentioned, a ready, willing and important constituency which Musaazi had recognized early as useful for mobilization. More crucially, the *Bataka* membership tended to overlap in both co-operative movements and the *Bataka* party. This was due to their rural farming roots which served Musaazi well in recruitment. Lastly, their historical position lent credibility and legitimacy to his efforts.

The 1949 Riots and their aftermath

The 1949 riots were largely spearheaded by the *Bataka* Party members many of whom belonged to The Uganda African Farmers' Union UAFU as well with specific economic grievances. On the political front, the *Bataka* Party members were incensed by the revival of the proposal from the Colonial Office in 1947 to set up the High Commission, touching on such sensitive matters as land and legislation for the three East African territories. This seemed to the Baganda in particular, as closer union once again, and they vehemently opposed it. The *Bataka* Party had recruited a colourful figure in the person of Ssemakula Mulumba who agitated for Buganda's independence. At the same time, Musaazi was attacking the economic injustices particularly as regards cotton.

In the words of Apter:

The image of despoliation and deprivation, of lost opportunity as a kind of slavery, of rank without superiority, penetrated almost everywhere.¹⁷

The riots started with the agitators petitioning the Kabaka for support. As a crowd surged to the Kabaka's palace he wrote expressing his willingness to meet their representatives

but warned of possible breach of peace. But the crowd continued swelling and milling around the palace. When a delegation of eight representatives of the *Bataka* Party eventually gained audience with the Kabaka, their demands were emphatic and revolutionary. They demanded first of all, for democracy and power for the people to select their own chiefs; secondly, they wanted the incumbent Buganda government dissolved; thirdly, they asked for 60 representative members in the Lukiiko; fourthly, they asked for the right to gin cotton; and lastly, they argued for free trade and the direct sale of produce outside Uganda. Even the elected representatives to the Lukiiko were not spared because, according to the protest submission, some of them “acted as chiefs rather than popular representatives.”¹⁸

The administration’s strong-armed response to the challenge triggered off the unrest. The decision by the police to arrest some of the leaders sparked off resistance and violence. Some buildings in Kampala and the suburbs were set ablaze. In the rural areas, the lorry drivers were instrumental in carrying and directing the rioters to houses of suspect chiefs which were also torched and their cattle destroyed.¹⁹ For several days, there was mayhem and paralysis in government. Yet again, the colonial government’s credibility was at stake, a notion which the authorities felt duty bound to disabuse from the African mind by resolute action.

Quite draconian measures were taken to contain the unrest. For the first time in colonial Uganda’s history, thousands of rioters and their leaders were incarcerated. Europeans and Asians were enlisted in the police as special constables to beef up security. A state of emergency was declared and the king’s African Rifles were brought into Kampala. The *Bataka* Party and the Farmers’ Union were proscribed. Furthermore, Musaazi and Ssemakula Mulumba of the Farmer’s union and the *Bataka* Party respectively, even if they were abroad, were rightly seen as the prime movers of events and prevented from returning until 1951 when the ban was lifted. Other

leaders of the two organizations spent various spells in incarceration.²⁰

What then were the repercussions of all this? First of all, this was the climax of the *Bataka* Party’s effectiveness. As the key organiser of the agitation, it took credit for its mobilization ability but after that, failed to capitalize on its success. This was partly due to the government clampdown. But the other explanation must be sought in the Party’s failure to look beyond history into developing a modern outlook. On the other hand, one wonders whether, in light of its origins and environment, it could ever effect such a transformation! Secondly, the Musaazi wing eventually noted that the political clumsiness of the *Bataka* Party rendered it an awkward bedfellow in modern political arena.

But there were some solid achievements as well. There was now a new serious realization on part of the colonial government that reforms could not be held back for ever. It was decided to take the “bull by the horn”, by appointing a reformist Governor in place of the repressive Hall. All those subsequent 1950s’ reforms should be seen as an attempt by the British to retain credibility in a rapidly changing political environment. The 1950s also saw the launching of the first nationalist political party, the Uganda National Congress, by Musaazi. The *Bataka* Party deserve some credit for bringing about this change.

The *Bataka* Question in Twilight and decline (1950s and 1960s)

The 1950s, however, marked a watershed to the *Bataka* Party in particular and the *Bataka* in general. The period saw the shifting away from the *Bataka* grievance as a contentious issue into nationalist agitation which was sweeping the country. As a consequence, the *Bataka* cause lost some of its appeal when the focus shifted to larger issues. The declining fortunes of the *Bataka* agitation were exemplified in the *Bataka* Party itself breaking with Musaazi initially, and later with the *Bataka* allying with various causes and political parties which did not value their aspirations.

In the aftermath of the 1949 riots when the Uganda African Farmers Union (UAFU) was banned, Musaazi first launched the Federation of Partnerships of Uganda African Farmers (FPUAF) to replace the banned one, then the political party, the Uganda National Congress (UNC) in 1952, with both organisations keeping a weary distance from the *Bataka* movement. The disappointed *Bataka* wasted no time in launching political attacks on their erstwhile ally, Musaazi, what he stood for, and his associations. The two remained at loggerheads until when the Kabaka's deportation on 30th November 1953 brought them once again into an uneasy alliance.

By deporting the Kabaka, Sir Andrew Cohen, threw Uganda into a crisis whose magnitude has never been fully appreciated. First, the development of the political process and the agenda of nationalist parties especially the Uganda National Congress which had just been formed, were thrown in disarray. The other crucial repercussion was that the Baganda political focus on the whole narrowed to the defence of the kingdom. They were rudely shocked from the larger issues as they rallied to the Kabaka's cause. The subsequent ascendancy of neo-traditionalism to a large extent owed its origins to this episode. While the UNC's crusade in the return of the Kabaka reaped its dividends in Buganda, the party's national image suffered:

... because of its active role in the return of the Kabaka of Buganda (in 1955) outside Buganda, the party was increasingly looked upon as one formed to promote Buganda interests at the expense of the rest of the country. Buganda's anthem, *Ekitibwa kya Buganda*, Buganda's Glory, was always sang at the opening of every UNC political meeting. BU (*Bataka* Uganda) cries filled most of the air of the UNC rallies.²¹

After the return of the Kabaka in 1955, the issue which had temporarily bound together the UNC and the *Bataka* was removed and the two organisations resumed their rancour. When Musaazi recruited some sympathetic

whites to assist him in co-operative and party organization, the *Bataka* looked at this action as a sell-out to European interests. From then onwards, the two groups drifted further apart and never again took joint action against the colonial establishment.

The *Bataka* on the Eve of Independence

One of the consequences of the Kabaka crisis and his subsequent return as already mentioned was the rise of neo-traditionalism. Apter rendered this description:

Normally neo-traditionalist or revivalist, the ideology needs to embody the moral prescriptions of the past and apply them to modern conditions. Hence, the ideology is normally highly symbolic and in a manner of speaking, "epic", yet sufficiently adaptable to allow innovation to be traditionalized and thereby sanctified.²²

He continued:

The neo-traditionalists were political populists in the peculiar *Kiganda* fashion of monarchist populism. And they were anti-European and Anti-Asian... the economic groups identified with neo-traditionalism in newly established political organisations devoted themselves to the eradication of what were now regarded as evil men in the Buganda government. In this way they were joined with some chiefs and the *Bataka*.²³

Neo-traditionalism, among other reasons, was therefore a contributory factor in those earlier agitations in which the *Bataka* were involved. As the ancient guardians of traditions in Buganda, they were totally at ease with this ideology. After the Kabaka Crisis, it assumed a more menacing dimension in which the *Bataka* were willing accomplices.

This new guise included "a great concern with custom and its modifications (which) became an important factor in keeping younger educated people in tune with the rest of Buganda".²⁴ The subsequent attacks of all political parties before independence were partly motivated by this consideration as well as being an effort to affirm

the centrality of the Kabaka in the new political dispensation. Interestingly, when the anti-party campaign failed, neo-traditionalism turned itself into a political party, the *Kabaka Yekka* with the intention of occupying an exclusive position in Buganda!

The formation of this party shortly after the final Constitutional Conference of 1961 was according to Ibingira politically astute:

Kabaka Yekka K.Y. was never intended to be permanent- it was an emergency adhoc measure-but the result of their efforts was masterly and truly astonishing. The Mmengo regime did not need any "manifesto" outlining their programme of development if elected; it sufficed to rephrase Jesus' famous dictum:" He who is not for me is against me". Whoever was not a member of Kabaka Yekka was automatically anti-Kabaka and assumed to be living a treasonable existence.²⁵

This move, therefore, achieved a number of key objectives which were crucial to the Mmengo establishment. First of all, Kabaka Yekka was in appearance an all embracing movement intended to include all shades of Baganda political opinion. However, the aims in reality were more sinister. One of the key motivations of the party was to stop at any cost the DP from leading Uganda to independence. DP's "crimes" in Mmengo's eyes entailed: one, the party's leadership being essentially catholic; two, they had dared to organize successfully in Buganda and three, it had the audacity to question publicly Mmengo's stranglehold on the political development in Buganda. With the DP out of the field and the UNC on death-throes, KY remained the only Buganda-based party of significance with the Kabaka as the fulcrum. But its exclusive Buganda appeal precluded it from becoming a serious party in the rest of the country. It was therefore limited to the role of power-sharing. Apparently, it was contented with that. Even if the *Bataka* were some of its key members, the KY on the whole was a party of the establishment which still regarded the *Bataka* aspirations anathema to the status quo. Consequently, when the UPC-KY alliance

took the reins of power from the British on 9th October 1962, the *Bataka* grievances remained unaddressed.

Conclusion

The *Bataka* were, therefore, one of the victims of colonial distortion in Uganda. By touching their very essence, *ettaka*, land, colonialism succeeded in dividing and alienating this very vital segment of Buganda society from leadership. But the British thought it a worthwhile price to pay in order to appease her collaborators and uphold the new colonial order. The agitation, however, also added further passion to the vexing land question in Buganda. There was a nagging fear on the part of the elite, for example, of a future unraveling of the settlement in a bid to redress the land question. Later, in 1960s as independence approached, land became a critical issue particularly because the rest of Uganda never had an elaborate arrangement as that pertaining in Buganda.

Endnotes

- ¹ 1 Pratt R.C.(1982) Administration and Politics in Uganda 1919-1945", in Harlow V.and Chilver E.M (eds), History of East Africa, vol.2, OUP, Nairobi Kenya. P.499
- ² 2 Apter David E, The Political Kingdom in Uganda, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1967 (USA) p146-7
- ³ 3 Pratt, op.cit. p.500
- ⁴ 4 Apter, op. cit. p. 153 (footnote 21)
- ⁵ 5 The whole saga is best presented in, Apter, Ibid pp.149-158. See as well, J.R.P.Postlethwaite's autobiography, I look back, Boardman and Co. 1947, (London)
- ⁶ 6 Apter, Ibid p.253
- ⁷ 7 Ibid p.149
- ⁸ 8 Ibid p.204
- ⁹ 9 Musaazi through marriage was related to

the Apollo Kaggwa family. There were other supporters motivated.

¹⁰ Ibid p.207

¹¹ Ibid p.226

¹² Low, D.A, The Mind of Buganda, Heinemann, Nairobi, 1971 pp 122-3

¹³ Apter, op.cit p.227

¹⁴ Ibid p.228

¹⁵ ibid p. 231

¹⁶ Ibid p. 252

¹⁷ Ibid p. 259

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹ Ibid p.260

²⁰ See , Mulindwa F. (1993) "The Uganda National Congress Revisited", Dept. of History Seminar paper, p.7

²¹ Kayunga, Simba, Sallie, Uganda National Congress and the struggle for democracy 1952-62, CBR Publications p.74

²² Apter, op.cit. p.27

²³ Ibid p.195

²⁴ Ibid pp. 198-9

²⁵ Ibingira, G.S.K, The Forging of An African Nation Uganda Publishing House, 1973, Kampala (Uganda). P.238

The Baganda Invasion of Teso, Pallisa and Tororo

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Abstract

This paper examines Buganda's invasion of the far Eastern regions of Teso, Pallisa and Tororo. This is a zone which was occupied by the "Bakedi"- a term which meant "the naked ones, the backward ones". The British government had not yet brought these areas under their control. To do so, they used the services of a Muganda general called Semei Kakungulu who, step by step, advanced eastwards establishing forts as bases for his operations. In all, Kakungulu was successful in establishing a model of administration similar to that of Buganda for the easy operation of the British system of "Indirect rule".

The British saw in Kakungulu a sure collaborator whom they supplied guns and other logistics so long as he was useful to them and finally discarded him when he was no longer needed.

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White “Butterflies” would come to fill the world and they would come from *Too* (the west). The *Itanya* (bowl-like pots from which our great grandfathers ate) would become white. They would have *apopongo* (guns), and we, Iteso, would not match them.¹

Very soon, brown people, glittering like “butterflies” will invade us. Let us not offend them, for they are very powerful, carrying with them *apopongo* (guns), weapons which make thunderous noise²

The above prophecies tell of the story, well remembered up to this day among the Iteso, of a people who came to invade Eastern Uganda towards the end of the nineteenth century. These people were the Baganda. A lot remains to be seen about the prophecies particularly as the Oral traditions believe that it was the *Imurok* (foretellers) who predicted the coming of the Baganda to Teso, that no one else knew of it except particular *Imurok* like Amongin (a woman) of Bukedea and Okolimong (a man) of Northern Usuku.

A conflict of opinion arises when one notes that before the Baganda came, the Iteso had already had contacts with the Basoga and Banyoro particularly on military and trade aspects of life. To modern researchers³ and others, it was the earlier contacts which made the coming of the Baganda known to the Iteso. Moreover, the Iteso mercenaries who had fought against the Baganda in Busoga had known of the Baganda's intentions of conquest⁴. It was not therefore surprising that those at home came to know of it. Furthermore, the similarities in the prophecies may indicate some element of the *Imurok* having been told before hand. But, this is not intended to disregard their role but the coming of the Baganda must have been known to the Iteso soldiers and traders who had been to Pallisa, Busoga or even Bunyoro on their expeditions. Foretellers must have merely popularized the coming of the Baganda to make it more acceptable to the ordinary people who otherwise would not have believed the traders and the soldiers. Prominent *Imurok* were

very much feared and respected because their predictions always came true.⁵

The British imperialism in Uganda, particularly in the segmentary societies of Eastern Uganda, towards the close of the nineteenth century, would not have yielded much fruit without the contributions of persons like Semei Kakungulu. Macdonald's treaties in Eastern Uganda did not mean much since there was no effective military control.⁶ Yet something had to be done about Eastern Uganda. If the British themselves were too parsimonious to take control of the area themselves, they had to induce somebody else to do so. As is well known, it was Semei Kakungulu, the successful Protestant General, who took control of the greater part of Eastern Uganda during the first years of this 20th century on behalf of the British.⁷

It has been argued that the British Imperialism, in need to link up the already protected territory South and West of Victoria Nile with those lands of the Nilotic and Nilo-Hamitic ethnic groups to the north, sought the services of the Muganda General, Semei Kakungulu, the greatest of the Baganda adventurers.⁸ He had already won military honours and distinction in the campaign against Bunyoro in 1893-94 and had increased his reputation by the part he played in the capture of Kabarega, and Mwanga in 1899 at a place called Kangai in Lango.⁹ Sometimes attributable to the advent of firearms, Buganda's militarism throughout the nineteenth century was felt in the North, in the East, in the South and in the West, to an extent that she became the terror to her neighbours¹⁰. Out of this militarism emerged Kakungulu who, because of the rivalry between him and the great Katikiro, Apolo Kagwa, broke away to content himself with Bugerere, an area to the North-Eastern Buganda, given to him by the British as a reward for his efforts against Bunyoro.¹¹ However, Kakungulu, following the footsteps of some of Buganda's famous war leaders during Mutesa's reign¹², realized that Bugerere was too small to contain him and therefore sought to extend his influence

and authority beyond Lake Kyoga among the Kumam and Iteso ethnic groups.

Being encouraged by Colonel Ternan and the British government who supplied him with a few guns, Kakungulu in his venture made advances towards the land, north of Lake Kyoga which the British Government and its agents had not yet brought under their control. Kakungulu however, step by step, had to advance eastwards establishing forts as bases for his new operations. Kakungulu's first visit to Lango and Teso was in 1895¹³ and by 1896, he had generally got into touch with the people living north of Lake Kyoga¹⁴, and the 'naked' (Bakedi) people from the far side of the same lake, who were thought to be in league with Kabarega and who periodically raided the Southern side of Lake Kyoga.¹⁵ During this expedition, Kakungulu was instrumental in bringing a deputation of Kumam and Iteso elders to Mengo to ask for protection against the Langi in September 1896. The oral traditions of both the Iteso and Kumam point out that before the Baganda came to their respective areas; both parties had jointly fought against the Langi from time to time¹⁶. However, the fact was that after taking part in the capture of the ex-kings, Kakungulu was placed in charge of the territory, North of Lake Kyoga by Colonel Ternan, and he was given the authority and orders to subdue and bring the unruly men under control and keep the area free from fugitive mutineers.¹⁷ This thrusting of power into the hands of the veteran general had to play an important part not only in the history of the Eastern Uganda but also in the career of Kakungulu himself.

Invasion of Teso

The arrival of Baganda among the Iteso changed the trend of events dramatically. Kakungulu and his followers, as the oral traditions tell, committed some atrocities but Kakungulu never used violence as his weapon of conquest. He was a strategist and diplomatic in the art of imperialism,¹⁸ who "gave his Baganda soldiers the instructions never to disturb the inhabitants of the area until he returned".¹⁹ As a result, in

many areas he invaded, there was no effective resistance against him and his followers. At first indication that the Baganda were coming, most Iteso leaders were willing to challenge the strangers. However, everywhere in the pre-colonial Africa, it was the powers with superior arms that were able to get what they wanted. In Eastern Uganda, like everywhere on the continent, the noise, the mystery and the almost "supernatural" power of Baganda guns were enough to turn potential resisters into acquiescent collaborators.²⁰

In his conquests, Kakungulu's pattern of occupation was the same everywhere, for his armed expeditions operated to new areas from the already established posts. In 1896, however, Kakungulu established his first fort in Teso, on Kaweri Island in Lake Kyoga. This could have been his base for operation against the fugitive ex-kings. Nevertheless, leaving Lango in October, 1899, Kakungulu moved to Serere (Pigire) on the lake shore. The elders of Bugondo said:

The place was not originally called so but when the Baganda came, they brought with them some Kumam from Kaberamaido to dig the ditch (*Eigo*) in the area. It was the Kumam who called the place 'Pigire' meaning 'a dangerous and uncontrollable water area'. The place was initially called Omaswaje, derived from the then well-known elder called Omaswa.²¹

Apparently Kakungulu's appearance was not welcome. The elders of Pigire said that:

After fighting and defeating Kabarega and Mwanga in Lango, some Baganda, led by Kakungulu came to Bululu and from there; they came to Pigire in Serere. At Pigire, the Baganda found a big man called Omoding who tried to resist them. He was killed by the bullet and his brother Epola was made a chief to replace him. Omoding's body was tied on the tree and covered with a skin. Epola, unlike his brother collaborated with the Baganda.²¹

When the Baganda broke their way through, a lot of fighting ensued, involving bloodshed. However, it was Epola who stopped the people

from fighting and responded to what the Baganda were saying. In the meantime, the Baganda were camped at Omaswa's home, the overall elder and leader of the area.²² After some negotiations, Kakungulu appointed Maraki Magongo to take charge of the affairs in Pigire. He was also left with some garrisons and a new *Saza* was proclaimed, the first in the Teso-occupied areas. It was based on the Buganda model of administration. As soon as Kakungulu subdued Pigire people, he made a return journey to Kumamland.

By 1899, the Kumam people had already heard of the Baganda and their intention of getting Kumam land. They had learnt that the strangers were both black and white and brown, and that some of them were wearing turbans and carrying guns.²³ This was of course, part of the military expedition led by Lt. Colonel Evatt and assisted by Kakungulu, which was destined to capture the two ex-kings. The group consisted of Europeans, Indians, Swahili, Baganda and Banyoro. While the rumours of the strangers was circulating all over Kumamland, the Kumam people very soon saw Mwanga soldiers and followers passing through their country, running away after the capture of their masters. Like Seyyid Said's Arabs who entered Nyamwezi land peacefully,²⁴ this particular group of strangers to Kumamland was well-treated; they were given food in exchange for empty bullet-shells which the Kumam used for neck-ornaments.²⁵ During their flight, the fugitives were believed to have passed through Kaberamaido, Kalaki, Soroti and continued to places where their security could be guaranteed. Following from this, it would appear that the run-aways confirmed and alerted the Iteso expectations about the Baganda's arrival, a fact and an issue which was already known to the majority of the people.

During the early years of 1900, Kakungulu moved his headquarters to Bululu, the most remembered place up to this day because it acted as the first base for Kakungulu's conquest

of Teso. Yosia Engulu, an elder from Orungo, said that:

Kakungulu and his colleagues came to Bululu. They stayed at Okwero's home for he was a big man in the area. The Baganda used forced labour in the construction of their defensive base or fort at Bululu. Deep ditches were dug all around the site with only one removable bridge. Okwero then directed the Baganda to those areas where resistance seemed inevitable²⁶.

While there, the General invited the elders of the neighbouring village called Kanyidinyidi, whose *Ejakait* (Chief, Leader) was called Orisa. Kakungulu asked them to help in the building of a fort at Bululu and he also expected the people of the area to bring him some presents of ivory.²⁷ Most likely, the requests had the implications of showing the General's authority over the local people who, in return, had to pay for the services being rendered to them by their new masters. Kakungulu's demands or requests were perhaps not quite different from the ones the Germans wanted from their subjects in German East Africa²⁸ or what the Egyptian administrators, during the Mahdist movement in the Sudan, sought.²⁹ The demands, however, annoyed the people who felt that their existing political system, based on clan level, was being violated and undermined by the strangers.

Kakungulu might have sensed the negative attitude and feelings of the people around but with the determination to make his mission a success, he sent Erisa Mukasa, one of his agents, to collect the people and bring them to build the fort. Mukasa was accompanied and directed by Orisa who initially seemed to have been friendly to the Baganda. Orisa might not be termed as a collaborator in the true sense of the word, but circumstances and conditions of the day seemed to have influenced his decisions to follow the Baganda against his inner feelings. But if Mukasa and his followers thought that they had a friend in Orisa, they were mistaken for they were soon to be disappointed. The disappointment occurred at Orisa's home where Mukasa requested for some drinking water. One

of the children in the home brought the water in a calabash but no sooner had the distinguished guest held the calabash than the owner of the calabash and water (a woman, most likely one of Orisa's wives) snatched it away from Mukasa with distaste and abuse. Mukasa was obviously provoked to anger and being a representative and symbol of higher authority, he could not afford to tolerate and stomach such an ignominious insult from a woman.

He tied the woman with a rope together with the other women in the home, and this gravely hurt Orisa who tried to spear Mukasa from the back. Unfortunately for Orisa, his spear missed the target and Mukasa found chance to escape unhurt. Because of this incident, Kakungulu felt touched and so he sent a disciplinary expedition against the people in the area. Fighting ensued and many people were shot dead.³⁰

The above incident could be interpreted in several ways. One could argue that the snatching away of the calabash was caused by unexplained reason perhaps involving some taboo or merely that the woman did not like the strangers at all, a behaviour undeserving of a woman who came from a chief's home. Nevertheless, if it had involved taboo, Orisa as well as the child should have known of it long before Mukasa or any other visitor or stranger was to be offered water or anything else. Furthermore, in most African societies, visitors were received with open hands and on this occasion, one could observe that Orisa in most cases had agreed to work hand in hand with Mukasa according to instructions. The Kumam, however, were no exception to the African universal manner of open-handedness in the reception of visitors particularly strangers. This negative incident on Mukasa should not have involved a woman, for women were generally regarded as cowardly and full of fear.³² However, Orisa's contribution to the incident would seem to make the whole episode suspect. It would appear that he had already authorized or advised his household members to show a negative attitude towards Mukasa and his followers. Yet one should

not underrate Orisa's sympathy for his wives, let alone his duty and responsibility over the family matters. But before attempting to spear Mukasa, Orisa should have known better that he was going to do what would eventually determine and indeed rupture the future of his area and people. In the close examination of the above, one would perhaps note that Orisa's incident was merely an isolated one, which should not be generalized as an example of resistance everywhere in Teso.

By the application of their guns that made much noise, the Baganda and their followers frightened and, in fact, shot people dead. They were not always blessed with success for when the Kumam began to apply ambush and surprise attacks, like Chief Mkwawa of the Hehe country³³ they too succeeded in killing some Baganda³⁴. What weakened the Kumam to submission was a phenomenon which was universally prevailing all over the entire pre-colonial Africa, the role of collaboration. Some Kumam collaborated with the Baganda against their fellow relatives and neighbours because of clan and other disputes involving debts, adultery, theft and several others. For example, the elders of Kamuda (Soroti County) said that:

Emesu was one of the well-known elders in Anyara (Kaberameido). His clan members had complained to him that certain people at Otuboi village had refused to pay back their goats and bulls which they had borrowed for marriage. This complaint was raised at the time when the Baganda were already established at Bululu. Emesu and his people decided that Otuboi people should be punished for that. Emesu, therefore, welcomed the Baganda and assured them that Otuboi people were spreading nasty rumours against the Baganda and that they were also planning to resist the Baganda if they went there. But this was completely false. Believing what they had been told, the Baganda, together with the Anyara people, inflicted great damage to their opponents who were brought to submission, while their cattle and other property were taken away. Some people, such as Egadu, of the *Atek* clan, got killed³⁵

If the Baganda were to be blamed for the damage they caused to the Kumam people, more or less the same share of blame should be accorded to some of the Kumam people themselves for the role they played against their compatriots. Indeed some Kumam imitated the Baganda attire which in most cases they took away after killing some of them. As well as taking away the clothes, the Kumam also took away the Baganda guns. Dressed and armed like the Baganda therefore, the Kumam involved raided their fellow Kumam who, panic-stricken, ran away.³⁶

This could obviously be attributed to clan conflicts. The arrival of the Baganda therefore equipped the opportunists with the chance to revenge and loot. To some extent, the opportunists succeeded but their inexperience in the use of guns made them lose because in the end, they were eventually rounded up by the Baganda agents and punished severely.³⁷

After leaving Lango in 1900³¹

Kakungulu first got to Ogwengi (named after the first founder), later to be named Bugondo by the Baganda. They found Omukule, the elder of the area who did not resist the Baganda at all. It was only at Pigire-Sambwa, where Omoding tried to resist the Baganda, did fighting and the shedding of blood take place. As to how the Baganda got to Bugondo and Pigire, the elders of Bugondo said that:

When the Baganda came to Serere, they found some Banyoro who had been there before, trading with the Iteso particularly on red-hoes.. There was one outstanding leader called Namuyoyo with his company of Banyoro who were patrolling the waters of the lake. Namuyoyo was more or less a pirate and raider but when the Baganda came, he joined hands with them and became their boat -driver. He and his company had about four big wooden boats made of *Mvule* trees. These were the boats the Baganda used for coming to Serere³⁹

On his return visit to Serere, Kakungulu came to Ogwengi (Bugondo) around 1900³² and finding the place peaceful, he made Yakobo

Dungu the *Gombolola* Chief, while Omukule was made his assistant³³ From Bugondo, the Baganda made their way towards the interior of Serere, instituting administrative centres and appointing leaders. The digging of ditches for defensive purposes and the building of administrative centres was to be compulsory. On leaving Bugondo, Kakungulu made his way to Pigire to see what Magongo had done. To his surprise and amazement, he found that Magongo had already made headway towards the interior of Serere and in fact had already reached Olio, the present administrative centre of Serere. On their way towards Olio, the Baganda met with no resistance at all. The elders of Bugondo said that the Baganda were not all that bad people for they only killed or punished the few who tried to disobey them, otherwise they dealt with people peacefully³⁴ Right from the time of their arrival, the Baganda had warned people not to resist alien rule for they had not come to fight and kill them but to make friends and peace ³⁵ Nevertheless, as a measure and style to show their superiority, the Baganda fired at the big trees called *Ijinga* to frighten people and warned them that if they tried to resist, they would be shot on the spot.³⁶

The manner in which the Baganda made their advances into the interior of Serere would perhaps represent a general pattern they adopted in all the places they visited. For example, their centres of operation in Serere County were Pigire and Bugondo. Whenever they moved inland, they, in most cases, returned to those centres. It was the duty of inland elders, their collaborators, to arrange for the Baganda visits to the areas to be conquered. On certain occasions, some elders who feared to come into conflict with the Baganda sent their messengers with presents of he-goats and bulls to Magongo and his followers. Amolo of Ongoto (Kamod sub-county) sent two he-goats, to Bugondo with the aim of beseeching the Baganda not to come and fight his people³⁷ This present was more or less a measure of soliciting friendship from the Baganda, and as a matter of fact, Amolo died as a good and trusted servant of

the Baganda when he got killed at Soroti.³⁸ Generally however, the Baganda feasted in the homes of the most recognized leaders such as Adepo of Olio, Omaswa of Pigire, Omukule of Bugondo and Okitukuba of Kyere. The elders of Pigire remembered and still do remember the flamboyant feast which Omaswa held and organised by Epola at Pigire for welcoming the Baganda, particularly after making peace. The elders said that:

Omaswa ordered two of his very big bulls, one called Okorimo and the other named Ojeran (both named after his great ancestors), to be slaughtered for their new and honourable visitors who had come to bring them the things they had never seen before. Dressed in a long, white 'thing' (presumably a *Kanzu*), Omaswa spoke vehemently, appealing to his people to receive the visitors with open hands. The bulls were then slaughtered. He and the elders of the clan and those afar, sat with the Baganda, while Okitukuba of Kyere interpreted what was said, for he knew some *amo* (Bantu language). The Baganda ordered the intestines of the bulls to be thrown away while their heads were used as pot-supporters during the cooking. After eating the meat, the Baganda used fat from the meat for polishing their guns while everybody was watching.⁴⁶

However, the consensus of opinion among the elders in Serere was that the two wings of the Baganda from Pigire (led by Magongo) and from Bugondo (led by Dungu) converged at Olio, the central headquarters of present day Serere. Yosia Biatike was appointed by Kakungulu as the new Saza chief. Pigire headquarters came to be

abandoned.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the findings in Serere have confirmed that it was at Olio, the focal point, that the Baganda grouped themselves and later took to various directions. Some made their way to Soroti through Atiira, others headed towards Ngora because Ijala of Ngora needed Baganda support against his father, Papa Itaok. The third group passed via Alosi (Kateta) on their way to Gogonyo (Pallisa) across the lake.

In most cases, however, it has been assumed that the Baganda during their conquests, they moved in a straight direction but the Bugondo elders said that the Baganda moved 'forwards and backwards' at the same time grouping themselves so that they could spread to various directions well knowing among themselves where they were to meet or converge next.⁴⁸ The elders might be justified in what they said because the straight road legacy left behind by Kakungulu could easily misguide one to think that Kakungulu strictly followed such routes during his conquests. This could be related to the fact that both the Arabs and Europeans made use of the same routes which the Nyamwezi had used for a long time on their trade transactions except that the latter two might have made some improvements. Kakungulu, also followed the same paths that the Kumam and Iteso had used but decided, for the purposes of his new administration, to make the paths wider and straight. He could have been imitating the developments already taking place in Buganda, but was quite aware of the new introductions such as bicycles and cars that would shortly come to his 'empire', which might necessitate the presence of good and modern roads.

Invasion of Pallisa

From Serere, Kakungulu and his followers, plus some garrisons of about three hundred rifles landed at Gogonyo in Pallisa.⁴⁹ They passed across Awoja swamp which connects Serere with Pallisa. At their arrival at Gogonyo, they found Opade, the elder of the area, who welcomed them cordially. According to the elders of Gogonyo, Opade had already received the message about the arrival of the Baganda to his area and since he knew some *amo*, he was eager to meet them so that when he spoke to them, his people would know how great he was.⁵⁰ When the Baganda got to his home which was at the shores of Lake Kyoga, they found Opade, some elders and the people of Gogonyo ready to meet and receive them at his home. Opade was dressed in a *kanzu*, which,

according to some elders, had been presented to him by his Banyoro friends who were traders.⁵¹

Up to this day in Teso or Bukedi, elderly people normally wear *kanzus* whenever a big visitor goes to their homes or areas. As a token of welcome to the Baganda, the elders said that:

Opade slaughtered no less than five bulls which the Baganda ate. The Baganda also drank *mwenge* (beer from *matooke* which was made by Opade's Bagwere servants who knew the art of brewing it. While the feasting was going on, there were some Baganda soldiers guarding Opade's home lest some mischief was planned against the visitors. For most of the night, drinking went on while some Iteso musicians drummed and danced⁵²

For a week, the Baganda feasted at Opade's home and made sporadic expeditions in an endeavour to pacify the people of Pallisa. Afterwards they moved to Kachango (a modern parish in Gogonyo sub-county), near Opade's home where they dug a ditch for defensive purposes which is still seen today. This became the centre of operation. Throughout their stay at Gogonyo, there was no resistance of any nature against the Baganda.⁵³ The lack of resistance could be attributed to the bloodshed and suffering that had been witnessed at Serere and Kumamland. The Gogonyo people might have seen no chance in trying to resist. Also Opade, the well-known leader of the area, could have influenced his people not to resist the Baganda since he himself was known to have traveled as far as Bunyoro and Busoga not only on military expeditions but also on trade missions.¹ So he might have known or heard of the Baganda military prowess. Coupled with this view also is the fact that the coming of the Baganda would, as the elders said, enhance his reputation among his people.

However, it was from Kachango that the Baganda divided themselves into two major groups, each one operating towards a different direction but heading inland. One group, headed by Okiasi (Presumably a Muganda or Munyoro) made its

way towards Pallisa, while the other group led by Kamisi (also presumed to be a Muganda of Islamic religion) moved towards Kameke (now a new sub-county in Pallisa bordering Teso district). In Pallisa, where the shops are situated today, Outa, the big man of the area, and of the Atekok clan, resisted the Baganda advance towards his area. Outa was known to have been the greatest war-lord of Pallisa,⁵⁵ just as Omiat was for Komolo in Amuria (Teso).⁵⁶ He had on many occasions carried out successful military expeditions against the Bagisu and the Basoga⁵⁷ The elders of Pallisa said that:

Outa, a renowned soldier of the day, tried to resist the Baganda. Okiasi was the leader of the Baganda and when he took his people to Pallisa from Gogonyo, he found that Outa had blocked the way with big, thorny trees and had even dug ditches so that the Baganda would fall in and get trapped. Furthermore, he had raised a strong army awaiting the Baganda arrival. Outa's soldiers plus his people thought that the Baganda were deceiving people with noise out of their *apopongo*. But when the Baganda advanced, they shot dead many of Outa's soldiers while many others ran away. A few Baganda too, among whom was Kabanda were killed. Outa and one of his wives were caught and punished severely before being taken to unknown destination⁵⁸

The Baganda seized and killed Outa and up to now, no one knows where they put his body⁵⁹ A number of informants said that the Baganda first made "him carry a hot pot of meat. Proud as he was, Outa threw down the pot. The Baganda regarded this as an insult" and had him executed.⁶⁰ On the general reputation which preceded the Baganda before they reached West Mukongoro and North Pallisa, Yonosani Tukei of Kisirana said that:

The Baganda inflicted great damage on Iteso property, cattle, goats and chickens were captured, groundnuts and *sim-sim* were taken away. Homes were burnt and many slept on the rocks in caves. Having been shown this kind of bitterness, the big clan leaders surrendered and just accepted the Baganda as they came⁶¹

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No doubt, Outa aimed at the preservation of his people's independence, a duty and goal, of course, desired by even the collaborators all over the world. His decision and determination to resist the Baganda could be viewed as a test of his military valour and reputation and he might also have wanted to prove to Pallisa people and others that he could win where the others such as Orisa and Omoding had failed. Whatever motives Outa had for resisting the Baganda, the fact remains that upon hearing that a gallant and famous war leader in Pallisa had been tortured by the Baganda, other leaders elsewhere took heed and learned the intended lesson. Soon after Outa's defeat, Tukei of Pallisa was appointed to work hand in hand with the Baganda and a ditch was dug in Pallisa, near the present Pallisa shops. This became the Baganda centre of operation to other areas. Elders and leaders such as Otuba of Agule, Arikodi of Kibaale, Iseku of Kakoro, Ourum of Kabwangasi and many others welcomed the Baganda to their areas. There was only one exception to this long list of general acceptance, and this was Osako-Oloit of Kameke who, because of strong reasons affecting him and his people, resisted the Baganda. Osako-Oloit, the military leader of North Pallisa Confederacy, presumably like Orisa, first of all 'welcomed' the Baganda to his home and then later on turned against them. Osako's 'welcome' was not a gesture of collaboration but a strategy aimed at inflicting military defeat on them.

Osako-Oloit's resistance affected Kamisi's group of Baganda who had made their way towards Kameke. The elders of Kameke and Kisirana, both modern parishes of Kameke sub-county said that the Baganda were warmly welcomed at Malinga's home (leader of Kisirana) and at Osako-Oloit's home.⁶² Later, when some Baganda invaded Chelekura (a modern parish in Agule Sub-county), about three kilometers from Opade's home and an area within his military confederacy, Osako Oloit led an expedition against the invaders. After giving the Baganda much drink at his home, Osako-Oloit diplomatically lured them to an area which was

surrounded by his soldiers with the intention of killing them. This could be compared to what king Dingane of Zulus did when he enticed his Boer enemies unarmed into the midst of the assembled warriors only to be killed.⁶³ While Dingane was successful in his plan, Osako-Oloit did not manage to kill many Baganda who turned against his people furiously. As a result, Osako-Oloit became popularly known as *Isiaramo*, meaning "the Bantu scatterer".⁶⁴ Some argue that he was seeking the assistance of Chelekura because it had always been within his military sphere of influence, while others say he became annoyed with the Baganda because they had destroyed the home into which his daughter had married.⁶⁵ Considering the above, it would appear that Osako-Oloit planned to get the Baganda intoxicated and then on escorting them to Kachango ordered his followers and soldiers, already planted somewhere on the way, to attack. It further seems that his support for Chelekura was in retaliation. He might have misjudged the situation and felt that once the main Baganda force had passed on, he could strike a blow against the invaders. The Baganda now looked upon him as a double-dealer, a dangerous plotter and conspirator, just as the Arabs viewed Sera the same way and executed him.⁶⁶ Osako-Oloit was killed by a Muganda called Kisale with a gun, using a broken piece of pot as a bullet.⁶⁷ The elders of Chelekura said that:

Osako-Oloit's forces were able to surround the Baganda at a place called Adodoi (a sub-parish of Chelekura). They managed to kill several Baganda but others escaped to Kachango where they called for more support. Osako – Oloit hid himself, squatting by the big tree called epopongi nearby, but unfortunately for him, one of the Baganda called Kisale who had climbed on the roof of the house, saw him, and using the broken piece of a pot as a bullet, shot at Osako-Oloit who died instantly. Once this great leader was killed, all his other followers ran away and the Iteso strength was broken completely⁶⁸

Osako-Oloit's resistance clearly shows the half-hearted support that leaders like Orisa had for the Baganda. The initial acquaintance, welcome

and the acceptance of peace would appear as a diplomatic style applied by several African leaders such as Samori Toure of the Mandika Empire against the external invaders.⁶⁹ It acted as a breathing space which would prepare them for the final assault against the enemy. The style might have exalted the invaders who thought that they had indeed got the proper allies. However, at Osako-Oloit's death, punitive expeditions were sent to Kameke until finally the Baganda chose Tukei to replace him. By the time the Baganda overran Kameke, there was hardly any noise of resistance being heard everywhere in Pallisa.⁷⁰

Meanwhile, some of the Baganda that remained at Kachango were invited to Ngora. By about 1900, the Ngora people, through various sources of information, must have heard of the Baganda and their intentions to come to Teso. News of Serere's subjugation must have reached them and they too must have learnt of the branch of the Baganda that were heading towards Ngora through Kyere. Furthermore, Ijala, the man who was instrumental in inviting the Baganda to Ngora was said to have been in the service of the Baganda at Serere where he acted as the interpreter and translator for he knew some *amo*.⁷¹ He too could have made the Ngora people know of the Baganda. Most important of all, and perhaps a very reliable source, was Ngora's membership in the West Mukongoro Military Confederacy which used to go to Busoga to help Muloki against the stubborn Basoga subjects.⁷² The red-hoe trade, too, played an important part in making the people know of the Baganda and their intentions.⁷³ Ngora, therefore, was no exception to this. On the whole, it would be surprising that Baganda were not known of by 1900 in Ngora.

Ijala Omasuje, the son of Papa Itaok, is believed to have run away from his father's home to Busoga where he most likely learnt *amo* and since he entered the service of a chief called Ngetemwa in Busoga,⁷⁴ it is possible that he came to know the relationship between the Basoga and the Baganda and the latter's

intended mission to other lands beyond Busoga. Moreover, the Iteso mercenaries in Busoga, in a way, undermined the Baganda in Bulamogi.⁷⁵ However, Ijala ran away from his father's home after committing some atrocities against his father. The general view among the elders of Ngora was that Ijala had excessive adulterous greed on his father's wives.⁷⁶ In order to come back home and teach his father a lesson, Ijala sought the support of the Baganda whom he had known to be in possession of guns.⁷⁷ Giving the Baganda the promise that he would let them rule Teso as a whole, after they had helped him to kill his father, the Baganda accepted and categorically came by invitation.⁷⁸ Ijala, therefore, fetched the Baganda who were at Gogonyo and took them to Ngora through the Southern route, others passed by the north route via Serere.⁷⁹

The elders of Atiira said that:

Papa Itaok, Ijala's father, was a big man at Ngora. He had very many wives and was very rich indeed. Some Baganda, together with Ijala himself, killed Papa Itaok by sitting on his stomach until he died. It was Ijala who told the Baganda to kill his father, for he rejoiced at his death. The Baganda then made him a chief of Ngora.⁸⁰

Ijala's invitation of Baganda to kill his father was indeed a unique act in the social and political history of the Iteso. The elders held their positions according to certain qualities and features of acceptability among the people. Ijala's usurpation of power was not different from what the notorious Bashorun Gaha (1754-1774) did against the Alafin in the Old Oyo.⁸¹ The fact that the two arrogated themselves all the attributes of sovereignty is clear evidence that the unwritten constitutions in their respective areas had broken down. Furthermore, Ijala's usurpation of power would look like a succession war or struggle for power in an area where centralized institutions existed, for most of the succession disputes were normally backed up by external forces. Undoubtedly, Ijala's direct contacts with the external forces such as the Basoga and the

Baganda must have taught him of the “better” and possibly new form of government that he would have wished to introduce to Ngora. Even if Ijala had not invited the Baganda, it was almost certain that the Baganda would have, all the same, found their way to Ngora, with or without, resistance. It is even difficult to envisage Papa Itaok’s reaction if the Baganda went to Ngora without the company of his son, Ijala; most likely, he would have collaborated with them. However, seen in whatever form, Ijala, utilizing the facilities of his travels and the knowledge of the Kiganda vocabulary, in a way, succeeded over his father but the act of having his father executed, signalled the end and capitulation of Asonya rule and order in Ngora. As it turned out, Ijala became the indigenous embodiment and personification of Baganda overrule in Ngora.⁸²

The group of the Baganda that came from Serere found their way to Ngora without any significant resistance against them. This was so because at Kyere, the Baganda felt at home in the safe hands of their friend, Okitukuba, the man who had served them as an interpreter when they set foot at Serere. Okitukuba, like Ijala, had travelled widely and in the process picked up the Luganda language⁸³ while the invited group of the Baganda had already reached Ngora and had calmed the area (controlled formerly by Papa Itaok), the branch from Serere was making its way to join the former. The only sign of what could be called resistance without violence against the Baganda was witnessed at Agu, the water-way and the boundary between Serere and Ngora where some unknown individuals attempted to block the way so that the Baganda could not cross over to Ngora.⁸⁴ At Agu, Omadi II was the big man and some of his power was felt in some portions of Ngora. He, too, knew how to speak Luganda and like the others of his class, Omadi II collaborated with the Baganda. Some informants of Ngora said that the Baganda had heard of Omadi II and his father, and having showed the Baganda the territory that was under his control, he was initially accepted as a chief in his area.⁸⁵ Omadi I had been the military leader

of the Ngora army that formed part of the West Mukongoro Confederacy against the Basoga. It is not, therefore, surprising that the Baganda had heard of him and his son. However, the elders of Kyerere argued that Omadi II was as powerful as Ijala,⁸⁶ but because of Ijala’s invitation of the Baganda, leading to a greater share of influence with them, Ijala was able to cold-shoulder Omadi II and set him as his “Katikiro”.⁸⁷ With the two formidable figures on the Scene, the Asonya era at Ngora had to give way to a new order of administration.

But the conquest and occupation of Ngora was not without some measure of challenge and difficulty for the Baganda as the arguments seem to portray. Things were, however, bound to be different at Opege. The leader of the resistance was a man called Okalany who came from Kide (East), most probably Nyero (in Kumi County). According to the informants, “Okalany came with a splendidly (dressed) army adorned with feather-hats to challenge Baganda. All way along they blew their horns and trumpets.”⁸⁸ It is tempting to note that even in this very small society, there was a representation of both attitudes of colonial rule - collaboration and resistance. The evidence available points out that the Battle of Opege of 1900 was fought with frightening casualties on the side of the Iteso and this could be attributed partly to the disparity of weapons. The elders of Mukongoro said that:

Okalany and his army fought on and on without despairing. They made use of their spears and shields to protect themselves from the Kiganda bullets. There was no immediate capitulation. Many Iteso were shot dead, while a handful of Baganda, too, fell dead⁸⁹

While many Iteso died in the battlefield, Okalany, the leader of the resistance, was taken captive. In the course of punishing him, Okalany is said to have killed a Muganda who urinated on him in contempt.⁹⁰ According to the elders, this way of punishing a distinguished soldier and leader was unbecoming of a civilized people who advocated that they had come to educate the

primitive people of the East. On the contrary, the Muganda who did this could have done so out of anger at that particular time. Unlike Outa of Pallisa who accepted to die alone without taking revenge, Okalany on the other hand felt it better to share the final fate with one of his adversaries. Like those before him, Okalany was subsequently executed and his death marked the end of active resistance in Ngora and the start of the Baganda rule.

While at Kameke, some Baganda wanted to cross over to Teso via Oladot swamp, unfortunately for them, Okoboi, one of the leaders of the East Mukongoro Confederacy and the military leader of Oladot, made an attempt to resist the Baganda by blocking the route through Oladot swamp. For the time being, he succeeded in diverting the course of the Baganda advance towards his area. The Baganda, therefore, decided to pass via Kide (Bukedea), where they found Okoce a big man at Bukedea. The elders of Malera said that;

The Baganda found Okoce-Epiu a big man at Kide (Bukedea). Okoce tried to resist the Baganda but Amongin, an outstanding Amuron (a woman fortune-teller) warned him not to take to arms against the Baganda. But Okoce attacked them. Okoce's right hand man called Ecuru, the son of Angicob, of the Inyakoi clan was shot dead. Okoce's home was burnt and the old woman named Ajilong was shot at and died. The death of these people and several others reminded Okoce of Amongin's predictions and so he surrendered. The Baganda thereon made him a chief.⁹¹

Prior to the coming of the Baganda, Okoce had been a great military commander against the Bagisu. His expeditions to war were at all times, authorized and directed by Amongin, the great woman fortune teller. It surprises one to note that at the arrival of the Baganda, Okoce did not listen to the warning directed at him. It further becomes questionable whether, by this time, the fortune tellers had lost their significance and reputation. On realizing that there was truth in the prophecy, Okoce surrendered. On the other hand it was diplomatic of the Baganda to have

recognized Okoce as a big man in Bukedea and they possibly did so because Okoce realized that he was no match against their superiority. In this respect, the Baganda should not be entirely blamed for some administrative changes because in this particular incident, Okoce was a resister but because of his popularity, the Baganda reinstated him. Kakungulu and his agents were following the footsteps of the British philosophy of imperialism by creating, re-instituting and removing chiefs. Those who attempted to resist but were forgiven and re-installed to positions of authority among their own societies and this was what happened to Okoce. This, in a way, was a high mark of recognition for traditionalism, though bearing new features.

Okoce, widely reputed for his formidability against the Bagisu, was defeated by the Baganda and the news of his fall spread far and wide. Okoboi of Oladot, the leader who had attempted to resist the Baganda, on hearing that Okoce and been defeated, sank into a state of despair. Some informants argued that East Mukongoro did not help Okoce because the military leaders at Mukongoro remained to mobilize their forces in the military confederacy for the imminent danger.⁹² Other informants argued that East Mukongoro was in fact mobilizing and was ready to go to Bukedea when the word came that Okoce had surrendered.⁹³ So, Okoboi was compelled to change his mind and welcome the Baganda, apologizing for his earlier behaviour.⁹⁴ Although the Baganda managed to subdue places like Mukongoro, there were still some leaders who were quietly resisting the Baganda by refusing to obey their orders. The digging of the ditches, the building of bridges and roads were some of the activities that the Baganda insisted. These activities were only possible through the use of the Iteso manpower. Leaders, who had initially submitted, occasionally turned resisters over the issue of forced labour. Okiria, an elder from Onyakelo said that:

Agi (war leader for Onyakelo) was killed because he resisted the Baganda by refusing to lead his people to dig a ditch at

Mukongoro... the Baganda confirmed the authority of those who were obedient to them but removed or punished those who tried to resist.⁹⁵

On their way back to Pallisa from Ngora, some Baganda who had helped in the conquest of Ngora passed via Mukongoro. There, they found their fellow Baganda who had broken the military might of Mukongoro. The two groups then merged into one and began organizing the building of a fort at Acapa. Towards the close of 1901, however, they left Mukongoro for Pallisa and some continued to Budaka where, by this time, Kakungulu had established his grand headquarters. The evidence available says that a very big enclosure was put up at Budaka,⁹⁶ and one chronicler, according to one writer, states that labourers came from all over Eastern Uganda to build the enclosure.⁹⁷ The elders of Pallisa agreed with the above view:

The already established Baganda chiefs and their subordinates sent people to Budaka to build Kakungulu's enclosure. People came from Kumamland, Kumi, Ngora, Bukedea, Serere, Pallisa and several other places to Budaka. They were escorted by chiefs who were carrying guns.⁹⁸

The developments so far have shown that by 1901, Kumamland, Pallisa, Southern Teso and Budaka had come under Kakungulu's grasp and administrative discipline. It was not until 1902 that the Baganda took effective control of Mbale and Tororo. By 1902, Kakungulu had moved to Mbale where he met with some resistance from the inhabitants of the area. It is estimated the Bagisu killed forty Baganda soldiers at Bududa.⁹⁹ Despite this setback, Kakungulu settled at Mbale which he called *Mpumude*, meaning "I have rested". It was from Mbale that he patrolled places as far as Sebei and on his return from there, he is believed to have made his last expedition to Tororo.¹⁰⁰

Invasion of Tororo

On arrival at Tororo, Kakungulu's force had a hostile reception at the hands of the local chief, Oguti, and had to fight its way across the

Malaba River.¹⁰¹ The view above would seem to agree with that given by the elders of Tororo since Mella and Opetta (Petta) would point at the Malaba direction. The elders said that:

The Baganda came to Tororo from Mbale. They found Oguti an overall leader. There was some noticeable resistance against the Baganda. They fought near the present Tororo Rock. Oguti's forces pushed the Baganda as far as Mella and some ran to Opetta. Soon after this, the Baganda, who before had under-estimated Oguti's military strength determinedly pushed back against Oguti's army. Finally Oguti and his soldiers were defeated because the Baganda made greater use of their guns to kill Oguti's people who used only spears and clubs. Oguti's home was burnt and some cattle were driven away including Oguti's very big bull called Onyanga. Oguti himself was captured and taken to Mbale for imprisonment. Later on, he was taken to Jinja for further imprisonment.¹⁰² Despite this, the Ganda and the British accorded Oguti the status of a chief.¹⁰³

With the fall and the imprisonment of Oguti, Tororo had to accept the Baganda Sovereignty. As an important personality in the History of Eastern Uganda, the conquest of Tororo seemed to have been the last venture made by the Veteran General. The years between 1902 and 1904 witnessed a drastic decline and erosion of Kakungulu's powers and authority. Kakungulu was relieved of his royal office, and failing to realize, even if they did that, Kakungulu had paved the destiny for the colonial auspices in Eastern Uganda, the British were too quick and arrogant to justify their action against Kakungulu by asserting that he had terrorized the people, and hence his unpopularity. The British could not therefore allow him to continue as the master-mind in the final subjugation of Eastern Uganda. Kakungulu was forced to step down from being the 'Kabaka' of Bukedi, a position which, according to what he had done, he eloquently deserved; and his powers were reduced,¹⁰⁴ just as the Buganda Agreement of 1900 reduced instead of elevating, the Kabaka's powers in Buganda.¹ This treatment of Kakungulu revealed the strategy and the

diplomacy of the British Imperialism exercised almost everywhere on the continent. Kakungulu and his followers were, therefore, withdrawn from the outposts and concentrated at the new centre at Mbale. Nevertheless, this was not the end of Kakungulu for the British knew that he was still a necessity in the final conquest of Eastern Uganda. So, from 1904 onwards, he was sent to complete his work in Teso.¹⁰⁶

Conquest of Northern Teso

While all the areas mentioned above had been brought under Kakungulu's sphere of influence, Northern Teso had remained free from the Baganda conquest. This of course, does not indicate that the Baganda were not going to visit those areas, for it should be noted that they seemed to have adopted a piecemeal approach until the final engulfment of the intended areas in their programme. In this programme, they were assisted by some indigenous followers who would show them some areas of possible resistance. To explain why it was not until 1907 that the Baganda went to North Teso, the above cited reason could perhaps help to account for it. The Iteso of the North had undoubtedly heard of the Baganda exploits in Bululu and other areas. After all, by 1900, Omiat, one of the renowned military leaders of the Southern Alliance, had gone to Bululu to seek the Baganda support against his neighbours.¹⁰⁷ If the Iteso of the North had heard of the Baganda, there should be no doubt that the Baganda too had learnt of the civil war which was raging on in Usuku. Nevertheless, it was Omiat, more than anyone else, who was instrumental in bringing Northern Teso under the Baganda conquest.

The Baganda arrived in North Teso (Toroma-Amuria) at the climax of the civil war in 1907 and began their conquest by supporting Omiat and his Toroma-Ikomolo Alliance (Southern Alliance) against Ocopo and his Northern Usuku Alliance. In Komolo, however, there was virtually no resistance to the Baganda military columns.¹⁰⁸ Working hand in hand with Omiat's officers and the Baganda regiments, the conquest of the Northern Alliance began in

earnest. It is difficult to assert with certainty why Omiat welcomed the Baganda against Ocopo and other areas of resistance in Usuku and Amuria as well - whether it was his intention to unify the whole of Amuria, an ambition which would have altered the nineteenth century political set-up or whether he had the aim of stopping the civil war which had caused much suffering to both sides. If his ambition was to be crowned the overall chief of North Teso, he was mistaken, for the Baganda had their own style of awarding chieftaincy contrary perhaps to Omiat's expectations. Finally, Omiat had to be content with a parish chieftaincy in Amuria just as his opponent, Ocopo, in Usuku.¹⁰⁹

Okolimong, the most well-known *emuron* of the Northern Alliance had advised people through a prophecy not to resist the Baganda ('butterflies') and if they did so, disaster would befall them.¹¹⁰ Like many other leaders before him, Okolimong by this time must have known of the Baganda conquests and victories in Southern Teso and had therefore the opportunity of emphasizing the possibility and likelihood of defeat against his people. He could have also seen the coming of the Baganda as a necessary step in putting the civil war to an end. In line with the above, Okolimong seemed to have noted some weakness in the military performance of the Northern Alliance. In this way, resistance was bound to be weak. However, the elders of Asamuk (Amuria) said that:

Ocopo of the Northern Alliance tried to resist the Baganda who were in the company of Omiat. It was Okolimong who had told Ocopo and other generals not to resist the Baganda because their guns were powerful. This news obviously broke the nerves and the military zeal of the soldiers who later on gave in and sought peace terms with Omiat and his Baganda friends¹¹¹

Because of the above, it was not surprising to note that Ocopo, on confirming that Omiat was in the company of Imo, sent a delegation to seek possible negotiations for peace.¹¹² In this light, the coming of the Baganda altered the situation which had existed between the two formidable

enemies-the Southern Alliance and the Northern Alliance – for they had to come to terms. The reconciliation of the North and the South, the latter originally being supported by the Baganda, could be compared to the fate of the Fante and the Ashanti in the history of West Africa whereby the former were being supported by the British. The common feature among the two groups was the fact that they were eventually subjugated under the powers concerned. While both the north and the south came under the political umbrella of the Baganda, likewise the Fante and the Ashanti finally came under the political control of the British.¹¹³ While both groups found unity among the new masters, they too found themselves on the losing side for they were deprived of their independence, hence the loss of their autonomy.

It would appear unjustifiable to say that the Baganda conquered North Teso with ease. Contrary to this, there were some occasions whereby the Baganda clashed with the local peoples. For example, Otelu of Alyakameri resisted the combined forces of Omiat, Ocopo and the Baganda. This culminated in the Battle of Odiike where two Baganda-Timeteo Kaggwa and Kabanda were killed.¹¹⁴ Trusting on the collaboration of Omiat and Ocopo, both powerful military commanders, the Baganda succeeded in taking control of North Teso which, by 1910, had practically fallen under the Baganda rule.

On the whole, however, the Baganda invasion of Eastern Uganda gives an illuminating perspective in the history of Uganda. The Baganda approach could be compared to that which had been adopted by the British in their spheres of influence all over the continent. The developments which had taken place in Buganda helped to mould Kakungulu's personality, eventually leading to his success in shaping the way for the success of British Imperialism in Eastern Uganda. The ease with which the Baganda succeeded in establishing their hegemony could be attributed more to the

role of collaboration, an aspect which has been noted in most areas of the continent, than the other factors such as the power of the gun, to mention but one. For sure, the British supplied Kakungulu with guns and other logistics so long as he was useful to them and finally discarded him when he was no longer needed. This was done to all African collaborators. Finally, without the efforts of Kakungulu and his followers, the subjugation of Eastern Uganda would have given the British a weighty challenge.

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Performer, Community and the Divine: A case study of the contemporary Buganda oral poetry performance processes.

*Suzan Nalugwa Kiguli**

Abstract:

The paper examines the cyclic nature of the relationship between the oral poet, community and the spirit world in Buganda. It presents and privileges the oral poets' voices in order to locate and understand the suggested interrelationship between the spirit and physical world and its consequent impact on the whole society. The paper also interrogates the implied sense of cooperation between the secular and the spiritual as well as the suggestion that the divine fuses with daily activities. The paper then concludes that performance is a complex and composite process that invents and re-invents experiences and actions embedded in culture and the performer's world view.

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Introduction

Sample performance picture

This is a record of a performance aimed at the mobilization of women for village activities at Kigombe, Nsozibbirye, Bulemeezi, Luweero District on 12th July, 2001. This performance was at the community ground. This particular performance had been more formal because the local council was involved and had given permission for the event to take place. The form of presentation was similar to what happened at performance events elsewhere, the poet presented after the group had sung a few songs. A song was used to introduce the group. The poet, Byamagero, introduced herself within the body of her poem, the same way other oral poets had done at earlier events. The introductions were made as part of the items presented at the performances. The audience formed a semi-circle around the performers and although some benches were provided, most people preferred to stand and often moved closer to the performing group. Byamagero's poem was interrupted several times with shouts from a number of people in the audience supporting or contesting the views expressed in the poem. The poem was a religious one and when asked why she recited it at a secular forum, her response was that she was an evangelist and had made a vow to preach the gospel wherever she was. She believed that the village activities' week was a good opportunity to use her talent to promote the message of salvation together with other development messages.

This picture, although representative of a larger corpus of performance events introduces a number of themes: community, participation, mutual exchange of values, issues which form the core of the views expressed by the oral poets selected for the purposes of this study.

Oral Poetry in Buganda

Most poetry in Buganda was put to music both at the royal court and outside it. The kings' harpists in past generations are said to have sometimes chanted poems at court but the

harpists who now play before the king do not recite poems before him.

Recited poetry in Buganda is associated more closely with life outside the court. The folk poems in circulation are very popular in the countryside and in schools. In 2001 I visited Lugazi West Primary School in Mukono district in Eastern Buganda and the children recited folk poems without effort. One of Buganda's well known poets, Phoebe Nakibuule explained:

Recently in July, 2001, I adjudicated at the annual poetry competitions for Buganda schools. The poems had to be in Luganda. The children from rural areas did better than the urban children. Yet they were all composing on the same theme. Some very old folk poems still exist in rural areas. If you go to the village and hear children at play, you will realise that many old poems still exist (Nakibuule, 2001).

The oral poems are not all regarded as children's rhymes. Old poems that seem to have been composed by adults are being taught to children in primary schools. Nakibuule, who recorded and co-edited a book of oral poems pointed out:

I recorded oral poems and wrote them down to preserve them. I showed the collection to Professor Livingstone Walusimbi and later the poems were printed... The poems are indirect and have deep hidden meanings. Children even recite them without being aware of the hidden meaning. We realised this and this particular book was elevated to an A' Level text. Children all over Buganda recite these poems but serious study of them is at a higher level (Nakibuule, 2001)

The composers of folk poems are not known but most people know the names of the people who recorded and edited them. In the interview with Nakibuule, she observes:

I was invited sometime ago to talk about the challenges of culture at the dawn of a new millennium. As I was thinking about this topic, I remembered Psalm 137 of the Bible. When the children of Israel were in captivity in Babylon and they were asked

to sing a song of Zion, their reply was that they could not sing the Lord's song in a strange land. If you sing the Lord's song in a foreign land, people do not understand because the approach to God in one culture is different from another. When the Europeans came here, they thought that our people were heathen, yet there are many references to the gods in folk poetry (Nakibuule, 2001).

Nakibuule is interested in the rootedness of Buganda folk poetry and its relationship to place, value systems and beliefs.

Most poets in Buganda are also musicians, I found very few that did not recite as well as sing. The poets that recited also felt a strong sense of loyalty to the king, and even though their compositions were more to do with day-to-day experiences, they pointed out that they composed poems on the kings and the kingdom. One of the poets, Kaddu Mabbirizzi, who won the title Poet of Poets in Buganda (*Ssabatonтоми wa Buganda*), three times in the Buganda poetry competitions organised by the king's court, says that he has composed more about the dead kings than the present king. His aim is to recreate their lives for the children who have no immediate sense of what it was to live under the past kings. He says:

In my life, I avoid political themes, especially when I learnt the cause of Kawadwa's murder under Amin... But when it comes to the king, I compose with all my heart. I feel that my love for the kingdom comes from my very being therefore composing about kingship is part of me. I love the king very much and when I compose poems about him I feel everything coming together. My king is in my blood: he is my blood. In fact I have recited before the present king several times. I was chosen to recite when he was on tour. I was chosen from Kaggo Malokwezi County. I wrote a beautiful poem for him. It was even broadcast on Radio Uganda. Ooh! When it comes to *Ssabasajja*, *Bbenne*, *Cuccu*, *Mukono Nnantawetwa*, *Ssemanda* - I do my very best. (Mabbirizzi, 2001)

Recited poetry is still very important in Buganda. It is not strictly identified with the

court but it recognises the existence of the king and his relationship to the community

Overview of oral poetry performances in Buganda

Based on the interviews and performances of selected Baganda oral poets that I attended, it became increasingly clear to me, that performance, to echo Richard Schechner, is not simply an event enacted before a specific audience but it is a set of intimate correlations between what happens in a performance event and the reality of the world in which a performance takes place. The oral poets presented their performance as an intense interaction of knowledge, alternate perspectives and experiences in a way that compels both performer and audience to engage in a mental and physical conversation. I argue that what is extremely important to recognise in this discourse is that the performers' aesthetic is informed by their own beliefs and values. The performers are acutely aware of the power of the process in which they are involved. According to them their own voices, their own art that expressed their ideas was part and parcel of their culture located both in the past and present.

The poets emphasised that the context, the location, the social relationships between performers, between performers and audience and between performers and their sense of both the physical and spiritual intimately influence the product of the performance event. Paying attention to the location and the contextual dimensions that underlie the performances is meaningful to the understanding of the various strategies employed by the oral poets.

In my view, therefore, it is vital to regard the performers and composers as possessors of very intimate and critical knowledge about their work which they can ably use to promote both public and academic debate on oral performance. I would therefore argue that there is a need for the composer and performer to speak analytically about the pressures they experience and the understanding they generate through

their interaction with both their work and the audience. The poets' links with their specific historical, cultural and literary locations provide insights into the value of performances as well as the meaning of content and the general effect of performative events on both the performer and audience. The oral poets emphasised their ongoing negotiation of meaning and experiences within the performative as well as the cultural environment. The poets' perspectives of the process of performance are anchored strongly in both specific cultural-historical processes and in the audience's resources and responses in confirming their social and cultural knowledge.

Even more compelling and perhaps intriguing was the emphasis by the oral poets I interviewed of the cyclic nature of the relationship between performer community and spirit world in the African world view. The poets suggested an interrelationship between the spirit and physical world. The different aspects of their practice and experience overlapped and demarcation of boundaries was impossible, particularly as reflected in their understanding of performer-audience relationships.

Interconnections between Audience and Performer

An oral poem is an act that unites me and my audience. I feel that reciting a poem frees me and makes me part of my audience. When performing involves my very being, I fully engage in what I am doing and this makes my audience hear and feel what I say as if they were me, (Betty Mulindwa Byamagero, 2001).

Oral performance, in my interpretation of the events I attended, is a celebration as well as a reflection on the multi-layered responsive presentation of performer and audience. The performance of oral poetry is multi-vocal, where the performers seek to incorporate the voice of the audience with theirs. It is a process of extroversion where the performers can create their own refrain from the audience. In the performers' world view it is important to get the connections between them as performers

and their audience that lead to the collectivity of changing things that are not working and endorsing those that work. There was an ever present sense of the performer and the audience as active interpreters of the performance. The oral poem was understood as an act that changes all the time with the participants constantly rearranging it in a number of different ways, guiding the multiplicity of voices that inevitably inhabit an oral performance. What seemed important in the actual performances was the degree of audience participation or to put it in one oral poet, Florence Namaganda's words "the audience is doing this poem with me." Therefore the audience is a constant participant-witness of the action, in communion with the enactments of the experiences in the poems. This is supported by MacAloon's description of cultural performances as:

Occasions in which as a culture or society we reflect upon and define ourselves, dramatize our collective myths and history, present ourselves with alternatives, and eventually change in some ways while remaining the same in others (MacAloon, 1984:1).

Performance is, according to the poets a redeployment of ideals of daily living to ensure their continuity among the community. It is a reinforcement of the values people in the community hold dear. It is within this interaction with the audience that the poets and singers are able to create counter-discourses when needed, and to challenge or even establish new cultural and literary values. As Betty Mulindwa Byamagero comments:

We thought that poetry and song would appeal straight to people's inner selves. Many people learn better by listening to something enjoyable as song and poetry rather than when they are given a plain message. These forms appeal to people. There are people who attend these occasions because they hear that there will be song and dance. So when they come they also hear the educative messages. One has to find a way of getting messages to people (Byamagero, 2001).

Okot p'Bitek, one of East Africa's most renowned poets and performers, argued for the power of oral performance since according to him; literature is "the communication and sharing of deeply felt emotions" (Okot p'Bitek, 1973:22). In this argument is the implication that the audience is important because 'communication' and 'sharing' are key pointers in an interactive process.

While arguing that culture was part and parcel of a people's life, he said:

Now, whereas for the performers each song and dance and even the costume (I do not mean political party colours) have deep meaning, in that they celebrate their philosophy of life, the visiting dignitaries do not and cannot begin to grasp the slightest significance of the poems, the music and the dance. Thus, while a love song may be extolling polygamy and the joy of having many children, the visiting politician, accompanied by his one and only wife, who joins the dance at the airport, cuts a very strange and ridiculous figure. They remain and leave as total strangers, which they actually are (Okot p'Bitek, 1986:17).

The quotation delineates the strength of performers as people who celebrate and enact values of their communities and share their often exclusive knowledge of societal symbols and situations. According to p'Bitek, the stranger will not be in a position to participate as fully in the expression of life as the owners would. He points out that a tourist will not, for example, understand fully the significance of a drum, because in most cases he or she will see it in a museum. His main argument, therefore, is that performance within the 'right' context is what renders a song, poem or a drum meaningful and the audiences in these situations are not mere spectators. He further comments:

These 'items' do not operate in solo, alone, away from home, in the absence of the people who, steeped in the world-view of that society, create them to fulfil definite purposes, but each one is an essential piece of a complete, deeply felt, enjoyable festival. Each in its distinct and unique way, contributes to the meaningfulness

of the whole society and thereby also to the meaningfulness of the life of the individual person in society (Okot p'Bitek 1986:23).

The interrelation of the cultural context, performers and the actual performance event instantiates a set of meaningful relations set up by the solidarity that characterises the vision of performer and audience.

The poet-performer then is reassured when performing for his /her own community by the knowledge that the audience s/he performs for is capable of holding a dialogue with him/her in and on the presented work. An insistence on the importance of audience participation is one way of interpreting performance as participatory with both performer and audience having parts in it and being part of it, sharing in the pride, dangers or even difficulties that arise. The performance becomes a circle, a liberating circle that holds in as well as gives out the synergy of the performance. There is a sense in which a shared history and culture become alive, flexible as well as reflexive. The poet-performer and her or his audience become active interpreters of their own situations, ready through the act of interaction to develop events and re-energise the context. In my analysis, both the performer and the audience are witnesses and creators of the process of performance; they connect to the themes, rhythms and to the very presence of the poems.

Heritage and Community

Poetry is part of life, if you review our lives they are situated in poetry and music. If performers woke up one morning, went on a strike and decided not to sing or perform, I think the world would miss out and would be in an awkward position (Damascus Ssali, 2001).

For Damascus Ssali, radio presenter at Buganda FM, dramatist and poet, oral performance not only conveys a great deal about a community but also creates a relationship of interdependence between the performers and their communities. Performance acts as a space in which knowledge is debated, perceived and exchanged.

He insisted that in Uganda from the 1970s into the late 1990s, performances of drama, poetry and song tended to be very topical, particularly because of the severe economic conditions. These art forms became the main source of discussion and dramatisation of events in the nation. According to Ssali, drama, poetry and song developed rhetorical and poetic devices anchored deeply in the cultural milieu that made the issues discussed quite opaque to the official eyes and ears, so that performers could survive censure. He further pointed out that oral art, particularly in the 1980s, was regarded by the elite and the authorities as predominantly farcical because of the rapturous laughter the witty symbolic representations of events and characters evoked, and thus became a safe form for communities to comment on and present issues that could have otherwise been viewed as seditious.

In my discussions with individual poets and singers, they drew attention to their attempts to connect and engage with the existing body of folk memories. They painstakingly connected their narratives of self to customary practices and community values. This is significant given the political conflicts experienced in both Buganda and Uganda. The poets and singers in Buganda were keen to reinforce a positive image of their kingdom now that it was restored. They considered the 1967 ban on the kingdom as a “desecration of what makes us a people who share group values. It is a breaking of the bonds that make us ‘*egwanga*’, a nation” (Majwara, 2001).

The aesthetics of the poets’ performances are based on what they view as their connection to their communities and culture. As B. Jewsiewicki notes:

...understanding tradition is a process which opens the self to change, but the act of understanding is as much determined by its own historicity as by the historicity of our existence. (B. Jewsiewicki, 1991:14.4:963)

A number of poets and singers told stories that portrayed their connection to cultural values and communities as an important factor in shaping their compositions and performances. A deep sense of understanding their own place in their history determined their view of the success of a performance event. Teddy Sseruyange explained:

Yes, I compose poetry and song. My emphasis is on the woman because the women are the mothers of this nation and our behaviour sets the example, therefore my main interest is to talk about the role of women firstly in Buganda and then in Uganda. Even the poem I recited was about women (laughs)... You are from Luweero so you know what I am talking about. I know you have not come to talk about women so I will just tell you this: most people misunderstand us. They do not know why we tell certain things to our daughters. They think it is because we do not know better (laughs again). I think, we know, it is called survival. You know what I mean? Making sure you know the circumstances under which you live and you pass on the knowledge from your culture because you live within this structure. Your daughter had better know certain things and you must promote that knowledge that will serve her best. I use my poetry to do that. Some of my poems do not please those who do not understand how Baganda look at dignity... (Sseruyange, 2001)

I quote her at length, first because she was at pains to explain why her poems talk about women even before I raised the issue. Secondly she explained that her poems mainly explore the position of women from a Buganda cultural point of view. She was not willing to discuss the issue of women and cultural space even though most of her songs and poems concentrated on this. She told me that this issue needed a specific time of its own, but I also felt that she may have thought that I as a woman graduate would not understand her views, although I still do not know why she then was not prepared for a mutual exchange of ideas. She used her understanding of specific institutions like

marriage to connect herself to her community and interpret particular cultural values to reflect their importance as strategies of survival.

Female poets from Buganda were very keen on being recognised as speaking from a particular place, from a history that could be best explained by them. This could be viewed in two ways. First, most of the women poets and singers I interviewed originally came from Luwero district. Luwero was the base for the 1981-1986 guerrilla warfare staged by the National Resistance Movement. In the interviews, there was an unacknowledged feeling that the war had uprooted and robbed them as individuals of a sense of being fixed to a place. The counter reaction was an attempt to speak themselves back into a sense of belonging to a cultural space. One way they did this was not to speak as people from Luwero but as people from Buganda. Secondly, the women seemed to embrace the National Resistance Movement's effort to create space for development and the progress of women, but at the same time they were concerned with staying within a familiar cultural domain. The following poem composed and performed by Teddy Namutebi Seruyange, is a good example of a poet's struggle to show and maintain a cultural view point:

*Abakyala na baami abatudde wano
Mwenna mbalamusiza era mukulike olugendo
Kiba kya nsobi okutandika ebigambo byange
Nga temuntegedde awo mba nkoze kikyamu*

*Nze bampita Tereza Maria Namutebi
Eyo e Nakasozi e Buddo gyenina amaka
Ndi mukyala mufumbo na baana tuyina*

*Kati nsumulula entanda ntegera okutu kwo
Omukyala mu maka gwendeese y'entanda yange
Omukyala mu maka nze mukulaba kwange
Ye ssanyu lya waka ye ttaala eyakira wona
Lwaki muyita ettaala topaapa nkireeta
Kuba empisa emubaamu eyaka buli wona*

*Omukyala wa kitiibwa nange nkitegeera
Kyokka nga tokyewadde mpawo akikuwa ggwe
Ani alisangibwa ng'akyala buli kakedde
Jjo n'omusanga ewa Ssempa ate nkya wa
Lutwama
Nge enkono asimbye assetula ebifa mu makage
Ne bifudde wa Zirabwa yabimanya byonna
Tagera kaseera kuddayo alabe amakage
Agera ssaawa ya mwami waddirira awaka
Kati otegeka ddi omwami okulya obulungi?
Nze oyono mu bakyala mulaba si mutuufu.*

*Omukyala omutuufu mu maka wuliriza eno
Yalaga omukwano mu maka eri buli muntu
Okuva ku mwami abagenyi abakyala bonna
Okwo teekako abaana baabasanze mu nju
Omukyala omutuufu mu maka wuliriza era
Talulunkana mu nsimbi kwefaako yekka
Bwaluka ekitambala oba luse akakeeka
Era olufunamu ensimbi ziyamba amakage
Omukyala omutuufu mu maka wuliriza era
Tawuliriza ngambo yatayombera mu bantu
Yawa bba ekitiibwa ne birala bingi*

*Nandyogedde bingi naye nzirayo mu bwangu
Omwami namumanyiza atuuka nga wendi
Kanzireyo bannange ngende ntegeke eka
Kale tuliddamu netuwaya nga asiimye.*

Ladies and gentlemen who are seated here;

I greet you all and welcome.

It would be a great mistake to start,

Without introducing myself; I would have done wrong.

I am called Tereza Maria Namutebi

My home is at Nakasozi, Buddo.

I am a married woman and we have children.

Now, I am untying the package so tune your ear.

A woman in the home is the theme of my package.

In my own view point, the woman in a home
Is the joy of that home, the lamp that lights everywhere.

Why am I calling her the lamp, do not be in a hurry, I am unpacking;

Because her manner lights up everywhere

The woman is of value and I know that

But if you do not take yourself seriously no one will do.

Why should one visit every dawning day?

Yesterday you find her at Ssempe's and tomorrow at Lutwama's.

With her arms stretched out divulging her family's business

And she also knows what happens at Zirabwa's home!

She never knows when to leave and go to look after her own!

She goes to her home just before husband returns!

Now when do you prepare so your husband can eat well?

In my opinion, that woman is not right.

Listen to me, the suitable woman in the home

Will show love to everyone in the home

From the husband to all visitors

Plus the children she may have found in the house.

Listen to me, the suitable woman in a home

Will not be greedy for money and will not be selfish

When she sews a table cloth or weaves a mat

If she gets money from this she will use it for the home.

Listen to me, the suitable woman in a home

Will not listen to rumours and will not quarrel in public

She respects her husband among many other things.

I would have said much but I am in a hurry,

My husband is used to finding me at home after work.

I am going back to put my home in order

Therefore we will meet and enjoy each other's company another time, God willing.

On first hearing Teddy Seruyange perform this poem, I could not help feeling, and I suppose even showing, that while I was impressed by her techniques of presentation and delivery, I was not quite sure that I agreed with the content. But after revisiting the recording a few times and hearing the performer's discussion of the poem I began to think differently. I found that I had to consciously draw on my understanding of the setting from which the poet came.

This presentation, like Betty Mulindwa Byamagero's in Kigombe village, drew my attention to the fact that the women in the rural areas in Buganda understood the role of woman and culture quite differently from, for example, me coming from the urban and university settings. I had to connect with my experiences of growing up in a rural area to begin to see that the poem did not advocate conservative views as I had initially assumed. When Sseruyange talks about the woman in the home, she is not saying that the woman's place is only in the home. I had to listen carefully and not let myself hear my own prejudices. The poet argues that respect begins with the individual and if the individual does not respect herself first then she should not expect others to respect her. She focuses on women because as she pointed out, she is one of them and therefore has intimate knowledge on this subject, and she felt that she was in a good position to discuss the women's problems because they were hers too.

Sseruyange insistently explained to me that her poem was to discourage irresponsible behaviour such as idleness when one could do something useful. When I asked why she did not point to men's idleness, she quickly responded that her main preoccupation was women's issues. She also emphasised that the image of women she was seeking to promote was progressive. She argued that she promoted the image of a woman who worked and was in control of the economics of her home, and we had a long discussion about the idea of work. Sseruyange reasoned that in a setting where most women were not economically independent from their husbands or male relatives, it was more realistic to discourage any habits that further weakened a woman's control over her person and home. She contended that it was important to instil a spirit of negotiation in the women rather than that of confrontation. She based her argument on the view that culturally the marriage rites gave authority to men.

During the traditional *kwanjula*, betrothal/engagement ceremony, the prospective groom with a small entourage of his own relatives and friends went to meet a large gathering of the prospective bride's people. We both agreed that there were many ways in the ceremony, which inevitably tilted the power balance. It seemed as if the bride needed to prove more about her family than the groom did. The discussion and explanation of details that I had overlooked in the past helped me to see why Sseruyange wanted to be understood from within her cultural setting.

I contend that voices of poets and singers like Teddy Sseruyange are a challenge to the established patterns of knowledge and authority in the universities and in Western forms of viewing and interpretation. Debates on the position of African literature and the place of gender have highlighted how issues of subjectivity and identity impact on African women. Ama Ata Aidoo has maintained that the African female writer must work from the understanding of her cultural traditions

and community. She must also confront the predicaments she encounters as an African and as a woman. Chikwenye Okonjo Ogunyemi identified the complex position of black female writers as they inevitably have to be mindful of the racial, cultural, national, economic and political ramifications of their contexts and situations. Later debates have emphasised the need to stop treating black women as one homogenous group and pointed out that their circumstances are diverse. The question of location and how it shapes one's views has been widely debated. Obioma Nnaemeka has consistently pointed out the importance of position and place in the discourse on and by African women. She argues:

It is not a paradox to exercise freedom within limits as these independent women, who are reformers and catalysts for change, are doing within the limits of cultural boundaries. Their feminism is what I call feminism of negotiations - negofeminism... The crossroads therefore is the location for exchange, give and take, compromise, negotiation; the politics of negotiation begins at the crossroads; the feminism of negotiation (negofeminism) is first learned at the crossroads (Nnaemeka, 1995:26.2:107-109).

Nnaemeka clearly argues for open mindedness in considering the complexity of the African woman's life and realities as they appear in the arts in Africa. In *The Politics of (M)othering*, which she edited, she further states:

In its narration of woman, identity, and nation, this book navigates the contours of the category woman/ mother as the "other" in past and current debates in orature, literatures, and mother tongues of Africa... while not dismissing the relevance of theory to the analysis of the literary texts, the essays argue forcefully that the African texts, as cultural productions, must not be de-contextualized from the cultural contexts that gave them life and to which they refer (Nnaemeka, 1997:1, 22).

The issue of the positions and identities from which African women operate is vital to the understanding of gender relations across Africa. It is important to historicise the multiple positions

and identities of African women. The way, for instance, a woman performer ‘constructs’ herself and her audience is vital to the whole understanding of how patriarchal institutions have laid down structures that constrain the discursive space of women. It is also inevitable that one has to take into account that the construction of images of women in Africa is complex, and has been and is still managed through maintenance of ‘societal norms’ and the various levels of social categorisation. The performances discussed here are embedded within the history and memories of the places and people of which the performers form a representative voice.

The question of power relations as presented in Sseruyange’s poem provides a platform for discussion of gender questions in a local and ‘popular’ context. The general approach to social and political issues by the women performers in Uganda was to use their own cultural milieu as their base. The performers’ thinking was influenced by what they regarded as their knowledge and experience of the places where they lived. In my discussions with the poets and the group of singers from Kigombe Luwero, Nakasazi Wakiso, and Lugazi West in Mukono district, the women said that they had to examine and question their community sanctions from an understanding of how they work. I was reminded that the community had groomed the girls and women into a particular pattern of thinking and the women had to find acceptable ways of breaking and revising cultural values that did not suit them. The women performers in general suggested that any unwanted practices had to be discarded based on a careful analysis of local people’s attitudes. There was definitely a measured and cautious response to issues of gender in these contexts.

In a particularly notable way, the performers from Buganda highlighted their awareness of their bond to the community. They deliberately claimed space to voice their identities as a kingdom and a community. The performers were very passionate in their belief that the

performance of oral poetry permitted audiences to celebrate and reflect on community issues in an immediate and personal manner. They remarked that even when they performed topics of deep personal interest, they did not have to invite the audience to participate in the performance, rather they joined in the observance of familiar and shared themes.

Inspiration and the Divine

In their discussions, most oral poets clearly connected inspiration to their location within their cultures, communities and to supernatural powers. They acknowledged the interrelationship between the individual, community and the divine. The divine was very much part and parcel of the wholeness of the world they occupied. They invested their authenticity as poets partly in what they regarded as their sources of inspiration and affirmed themselves as beneficiaries of particular traditions. For them, attachment to the divine was not simply a revelation of themselves as important people in the areas where they lived; rather it bonded them with the community. They created particular visions and invited others to share in them. The strong correlation of inspiration to the divine by the poets and singers acted as a pointer to cultural continuity and power. The poets and singers suggest that the divine fuses with their daily activities. There is an implied sense of cooperation between the spiritual and the secular.

The performers from Buganda referred frequently to their respective myths of origin when explaining their understanding of inspiration and its link to the divine. They identified with the myths’ explanations of the polarities between sky and earth and the relationship between humanity and divinity. The myths offer reasons for their social and ritual structures. The poets found it significant to use the myths they were familiar with to illustrate their engagement with the divine order. The myths also provided insights into their relationship to life and divinity. They are dramatic accounts involving the relationship

between supernatural and human beings and they offer symbolic and open interpretations to both primordial and current events.

Samuel Kasule, in his discussion of ritual, indigenous folk forms and the formation of Ugandan theatre, talks about performance and its connection to possession and trance. He cites the development of the concept of possession and its underpinnings of impersonation and acting in the extended myth of Kintu and Nambi, the said first man and woman and therefore the ancestors of Buganda. In the myth, Lubaale, one of Nambi and Kintu's sons, was transformed into a medium when Kiwanuka, the god of lightning, landed on his head, enabling his parents to commune with the Supreme Being, Ggulu, and the whole of the metaphysical world. According to the myth as narrated by Kasule:

In a strange voice, Lubaale talked to them about their past, present and future. Through him, they communed with Ggulu (Supreme God) and the other spirits in Ggulu (metaphysical world). After sitting for a long time, Lubaale went into a fit, collapsed, and then knew nothing about what had happened during the time when he was not in control of himself (Kasule: 1993:4).

The events of the myth are not only spectacular but are underscored by a high sense of the dramatic, characteristics that are quite prominent in the narrative of divine revelations told to me during interviews with poets and singers. In the myth, powers beyond the ordinary inhabited Lubaale and transfigured him temporarily into another being. Kasule further explains:

Among Baganda mediums, a person in this state may be transformed into animal 'caricatures', barking, snarling and howling. This transformation of medium into 'a non-being' underlines his multi-faceted character as the counsellor, judge, comforter, seer, psychologist, poet, musician, linguist and philosopher in his community (Kasule, 1993:6).

Spirit possession is seen as a state that enables a person to attain supernatural powers and acquire a new identity, and in the cases of mediums this

identity raises their status above other members of the community and marks them as a vehicle for the gods' revelations. The poets' drawing on this background and power is a way of presenting themselves as people in possession of knowledge not available to everybody and therefore indispensable to their communities. Okpewho, in his introduction to *The Oral Performance in Africa*, briefly mentions and seems to make light of performers' claim to links with the spiritual forces. He makes it sound like a simple manipulative ploy for recognition, but I think it is a phenomenon that has played a significant role in the poet's and community's psychology. Okpewho's focus is on a different issue, he argues for the use of the aestheticist model in the study of oral performance and comments:

In my fieldwork among Aniocha story tellers in Bendel State, Nigeria, I encountered one who claimed that his box-harp (opanda) had spiritual origin.... Faced with these similar phenomena from three distinct cultural settings, the literary scholar of performance is inclined to explore, not so much the environment of belief or religion in the respective societies, as the basis of such a claim before an audience...that the performer is simply trying to impress or affect as to the authoritativeness of his art (Okpewho, 1990:7) (Emphasis mine).

But in interviewing poets, I felt that the poets' claims of divine inspiration played a major part in the perception of their roles in their community. They frequently linked their inspiration to dreams and powers beyond themselves. One could easily read this as the poets' way of representing their power of imagination, but it also suggests their deliberate effort to attach their experiences to their cultural realities and firmly claim power as spokespersons in the communities. They see themselves as vehicles of divine revelation rather than simply individual creators and thus further emphasise the importance of the interrelationship of individual, community and the divine in the context of performance.

Some of the narratives presented by the poets may sound extraordinary to an outsider but the most important issue in this analysis is that the poets believe these notions enough to present them in discussion. Such views must in my estimation be taken seriously because they are expressed by a number of poets from different areas. They become important signals in interpreting what the poems 'mean' and are manifested in performance as part of the power of beliefs and traditions. The poets are in effect interested in legitimising their process of inspiration and composition by situating it within an area of recognised and largely unquestioned power in their communities of origin. Their interpretation of the source of their poems compelled me to read the explanations as a focus on the spiritual, psychological and emotional forces that characterise the process of poem production. It was as if the poets were projecting psychological revelations of themselves. The issue of divine revelation is a concept of power, or at least the poets demonstrated that it conferred power and understanding upon them. This is one way the poets create a cultural image of themselves as accepted voices and therefore generate a way of 'owning' creative and performative authority. Further reflection makes me think of divine revelation as the poets' way of saying that they bear characteristics of the culture and communities that formed them.

The poets and singers insisted that their daily lives intertwined with their spiritual awareness. To most of the poets and performers their spirituality was linked to their cultural roots. The poet Phoebe Nakibuule, who is well known for her written poetry and her activism on cultural matters although she also performs oral poetry, kept emphasising throughout her interview that her compositions were strongly influenced by divine revelations. This kind of understanding was summarised by Damascus Ssali in the following response:

The strategies used by any poet are influenced by talent. God gives talent to people and composition involves talent. You compose the action as well

as the voice rendition. Some people have talent in using their voices as well as the gestures. In Luganda poetry (which I live with), the voice and gestures shape the content. As I said before pulse in our poetry is important. To master these methods, I believe you have to possess the power communicated by the voices of the ancestors; it is divine power (Ssali, 2001).

In discussing the complexity of the oral poets and popular singers' insistence that dreams and divine revelations were the vehicles of their inspiration, the above quotation offers an interesting view. Especially when examined alongside such comments as the one made by Paulo Kafeero. When asked about composition of poetry and song, his response was:

I am singer who loves both the words and the rhythm. In my experience, talent counts and cannot be taught, education acts like a brush for talent. Of course education is great because it helps improve one's insight. Composition is influenced mainly by talent and one's background. You cannot separate these two things. For example you may ask about my knowledge of Luganda, my answer will be that I grew up listening and speaking this language. It is my familiarity with the tongue that helps me with expression... I learnt Luganda from home, from my parents and I feel I can handle it with ease. I dream in this language. (Kafeero, 2001).

The above quotes raise two related but quite separate points. It is emphasised that poetry and song are talents that are divinely inspired and the performers are strongly aware of the power of the sacred. Secondly, the poets acknowledge that the divine gift can be improved by instruction and the process of critical thought. This in part explains why most poets treated inspiration and composition as two related but distinct procedures.

The late Moses Serwadda, a performer as well as music lecturer, told me that dreams were a common way for poets and singers to receive their inspiration. He recited a long narrative folk poem titled *Geya Geyanga* in which the person dreams about the dangers of laziness. In

the poem, dreams are used to teach the person to avoid being lazy and inept:

Geya geyanga

Bwenali nga nebisse

Geya geyanga

Otulo netukwata

Geya geyanga

Ng'o tulo nga tunsimbye

Geya geyanga

Nefuluta nekamala

Geya geyanga

Otulo ng'atunteze

Geya geyanga

Ebirooto n'ebyesomba

Geya geyanga

Translation:

After covering myself with the bedclothes

Geya geyanga

I fell asleep

Geya geyanga

After sleep had paralysed me

Geya geyanga

I snored uncontrollably

Geya geyanga

After sleep had trapped me

Geya geyanga

Dreams came in great numbers

Geya geyanga

According to Sserwadda, dreams were one way of seeing in images and therefore had a very close connection with poetry. But my interest in the point of poets explaining the importance of dreams and divine revelation lies in the fact that most of the performers I interviewed raised this issue and regarded it as a mandate and imperative to practice their art. Phoebe Nakibuule explained the power of dreams and divine revelations as it links with oral poetry:

Oral poets in my view are more powerful than the ones who write. The oral poets' selection of words is stronger than that of

poets who write. The oral poets feel that a poem should sound a certain way. Our people in Buganda have a fear of writing but when composing orally they feel freer. They hear and feel what they say. *Do you know that people still see visions? There are people who see visions. Someone may keep silent and hear voices. There was a famous poet in the 1950s called Bugembe. He had that gift, in fact he just disappeared, no one knows his whereabouts.* He sang the famous song *Bulange*. This man was a great musician and poet. In fact Ssekabaka Muteesa II wanted him to go to Britain to study music and he offered him a scholarship. Bugembe went to the King and begged him not to send him away from home... He told the king that sending him to England would not make him a better poet or singer. He revealed that whenever he wanted to produce a poem or song, he just had to climb up the top of Mutundwe hill and he would be able to come up with a composition... On the other hand some of our great composers will not be able to tell you where their inspiration comes from. I remember a lady with whom I used to work in the 1980s. She used to dream a whole poem; she would dream it again and again until she mastered it. She never knew the source of her dreams (Nakibuule, 2001) (Emphasis mine).

Nakibuule Mukasa suggests a connection between the composer, the place and the divine. A number of poets revealed that the gift of poetry and song led them to take the presence of the divine extremely seriously. They were open about the centrality of the divine in their lives and some named the shrines where they worshipped. Nakibuule's view is similar to another woman poet from Buganda, Betty Mulindwa Byamagero:

My name is Betty Mulindwa Byamagero. God gave me the last name when I got saved, became born-again. It means 'by miracles'. Eight years ago when I got saved, I got a vision and I left the body state. God showed many things... I wept with sorrow and repented. After repentance, I saw Christ in full form and he told me to go and tell people that God is one. He gave me the power in my right hand to heal the sick. He also gave me power to compose poetry and to use it to heal people. Since then I tell people

that God is one and there is no cause for divisions. So my right hand and my mouth perform miracles and heal the sick (Byamagero, 2001).

The poet and singer Teddy Sseruyange related a similar experience:

I do not know, may be God's hand is on me, when I go to sleep I sometimes feel a tune or words of a poem come clearly into my head and I wake up to register them. In fact I do most of my compositions be it song or poem at night (Sseruyange, 2001).

The poets and singers argued that poetry and song were directly divine and efficacious. The divine was the springboard for an effective and meaningful song or poem. In some cases, the poets linked the power of speech and the ability to praise not only to their places of birth but powerfully to the divine. They anchored their views in the domain that intersects the sacred and tradition.

The approach and attitude by the performers to the role of the divine in inspiration demonstrates that oral performance is not a form that can be completely rationalised. It has to be acknowledged that when talking about their experience of performance, most poets first referred to the influence of the divine and the process of inspiration. Ssenoga Majwara related an experience he regarded as central to his perception of composition and performance for both his music and poetry:

The story I am about to tell you is a bit difficult to tell and believe. I had gone to Mityana to supervise some of my students who were on school practice. I was alone in my room, awake reading and then around one or two o'clock (maybe I had dropped to sleep), I saw myself playing an instrument and I could not recognise it as one I had seen before. I wondered about it and I eventually realised it was a type of xylophone. I was playing it and the song I was playing sounded complete. I woke up and realised that it was a dream. I then went back to sleep and just about ten minutes later I had exactly the same dream. I saw this instrument again and I was playing it alone. I produced a whole

song. I looked intently at this instrument and saw it very clearly. It looked real. I woke up again as if from another world. I got a piece of paper and drew a sketch of it just as I had seen it in the dream. I went to our xylophone maker Mr Ssebuwufu and I explained in detail what I wanted him to make and he made it...This instrument came to me in a dream and so have some poems that I recite. (Ssenoga Majwara, 2001).

These conspicuous references to the divine clearly broaden our view of performance. They compel us to re-evaluate the context and its relationship to the text and personal beliefs of performers. The oral poets and popular singers through the interviews I conducted and in their performances sought actively to focus on the essence of being individuals who also belonged to their communities and experienced a divine presence. They sought to emphasise their interpretation of their performance as part of 'a ritualised existence'. They pointed out that to understand what they were 'doing' as performers one had to understand and be able to interpret their connection to place, people, and to their ritual and divine experiences. They demanded that the scholar be cognisant of their perspectives on the performance process. Their commitment to explaining their inspiration and composition process as strongly and intimately connected to their cultural knowledge made me as a researcher feel it was imperative to assess the historical as well as the social events of the places where the performers joined in a communal understanding of how cultural, social and political processes regulated or even controlled performances. The challenge then is to combine both the performer and the researcher's perspectives and understand oral performance as a dynamic and to a degree subjective experience.

Conclusion

My examination of the oral poets' specific practices and contexts reveals their view of the process of composition, meaning and their interaction with the whole performance environment. Performance as understood from

my analysis is not just about language and action but also deals with expressing layers of meaning located both in the present and the past. The poets present their performances as an intense interaction of knowledge, alternative perspectives and experiences in a way that compels both performer and audience to engage in a mental, spiritual and physical conversation. Contemporary oral poetry performance in Buganda, therefore, can be seen as demanding its own kind of space based on time, locality, and context.

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The Phenomenon of Conflicts in Uganda: A Case Study of Kibaale District, 1996 – 2009

*Baligira John**

Abstract

Conflicts in Uganda have become so regular that they have so far pre-occupied the minds of several scholars and politicians. This paper focuses on the conflicts in Kibaale district of Mid-western Uganda where the Banyoro (believed to be the indigenous ethnic group of Bunyoro region) have been in conflict with the ‘immigrants’ since the 1990s. It tries to address the main question of why the Banyoro and the largely Bakiga ‘immigrants’ who lived together peacefully for many years since the 1970s eventually conflicted. The main argument is that these conflicts can be better explained by first analyzing the question of ethnic identities since the British colonial period. By tracing the problem from the colonial period, the paper highlights that the ethnically-defined administrative units since the colonial period form a major basis of contemporary conflicts between the Banyoro and other ethnic groups. It actually helps to explain why the Banyoro in the colonially-defined Bunyoro regard other groups as foreigners. The paper further demonstrates that in the context of rapid population growth and the struggle for other issues such as land and political power, people in Kibaale district have used ethnicity as a rallying or mobilizing factor. Then on the role of governments, the paper recognizes the fact that different post-colonial governments are responsible for the unresolved land tenure issues and the negative use of ethnicity in Uganda in general and Kibaale district in particular.

As a way forward, the paper recommends for efforts to address the ambiguities in the land tenure system and to streamline issues of migration and settlement. It also proposes that steps be taken by relevant authorities to educate people on social and political issues likely to bring about sustainable peace among the different ethnic groups in Kibaale district and other parts of Uganda.

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Introduction

The high incidence of conflicts in contemporary Uganda is of major concern because these conflicts have greatly contributed to lack of meaningful socio-economic and political development. It is sad to note that post-colonial Uganda has experienced time and resource wasting conflicts such as those related to the 'lost counties' controversy, the Kabaka crisis, the war against the Amin regime, the National Resistance Army (NRA) guerilla war, the northern Uganda rebellions (Alice Lakwena's and the Lord's Resistance Army) and the conflicts in Kibaale district. Explanations of the occurrence of all these conflicts are still inconclusive but it is quite certain that the ethnic factor has played a pivotal role particularly in the conflicts which have taken place in Kibaale district since the 1990s.

The main aim of this paper is to contribute to an understanding of the conflicts between the Banyoro and the immigrants (Bafuruki)¹ in Kibaale district. The paper does not only highlight the ethnic element in the Banyoro-Bakiga conflicts but also demonstrates the connectivity between ethnicity, land disputes and political conflicts in Kibaale district. At the same time, the paper attempts to evaluate the methods so far used to resolve the Kibaale conflicts in order to establish a basis for a way forward.

My argument is guided by the view that ethnicity², which may in some cases not necessarily result in conflicts, has been one of the main factors which have led to constant conflicts in Kibaale district. In an effort to understand the history of negative ethnic relations in Uganda in general and Kibaale district in particular, this paper points back to as early as 1900 when the Buganda Agreement was signed and used by the British

colonial masters to reward the Baganda with Bunyoro territory of Buyaga and Bugangaizi thus laying a basis of ethnic rivalries between the indigenous Banyoro³ and the Baganda. It further contends that the impact of British colonial rule particularly on ethnic identities later contributed to the way how different ethnic groups regarded each other and in some cases led to conflicts such as those between the Banyoro and the largely Bakiga immigrants in Kibaale district starting from the 1990s.

In consideration of the fact that British colonialism contributed much to the institutionalization of ethnic identities, the paper deals with a brief study of British colonial policies in Uganda at the beginning of colonial rule. It examines the impact of British colonialism on ethnic identities and highlights the colonial injustices with regard to land ownership and how this contributed to the perpetuation of conflicts in the region? By focusing on the National Resistance Movement period, it becomes possible for one to analyze the main features of the conflicts which have destabilized Kibaale district since the inception of the NRM government. Among other things, the study explores the factors which have undermined the ability by government to put in place an appropriate land tenure system in to minimize land related conflicts such as those in Kibaale district. Above all, the paper tries to address the question of why the Bakiga in Kibaale district are considered by the indigenous Banyoro as immigrants or Bafuruki when they are actually within the boundaries of their country Uganda.

In an attempt to explain the persistence of conflicts in Kibaale district, the paper is premised on the constructivist theory deemed applicable to the Ugandan context in which ethnic identities have largely been constructed through a series of processes. It mainly assesses the colonial and post-colonial governments'

1 The term *Bafuruki* refers to people who shifted from other areas to Kibaale district. The majority of the immigrants are Bakiga who happen to be the major rivals of the Banyoro in the district.

2 The concept of ethnicity is in this study considered as a social construction, which indicates identification with a particular group of people believed to have descended from common ancestors and share common cultural characteristics such as language.

3 Ba- and Mu- are prefixes used in most Bantu languages in Uganda in plural and singular respectively. For instance, 'Banyoro' is used to mean more than one person from the Nyoro ethnic group while 'Munyoro' refers to one member of the Nyoro ethnic group.

performance with regard to ethnicity, land policy, resettlement and migration of people from other areas into Kibaale district.

As a background to the explanation of the conflicts in Kibaale district, I review some literature on theoretical and empirical issues of conflicts. From a primordial perspective, Talcott (1975:56) considers an ethnic group as a trans-generational type of group in which members have respect for their own sentiments and those of non-members, a distinctive identity which is rooted in some kind of history and a common culture. Similarly, Markakis (1996:4) also agrees with the primordial conception of ethnicity and regards an ethnic group as a historically formed aggregate of people having a real or imaginary association, a specific territory, shared cluster of beliefs and values connoting its distinctiveness in relation to similar groups and recognized as such by others. In the case of Uganda, different factors such as European influence and intermarriage have greatly transformed the original ethnic groups, though there is evidence of indigenous cultures and many, including the Banyoro and the Bakiga, continue to disagree or conflict over resources such as land, using ethnicity as a mobilizing factor.

Instrumentalists generally claim that there is a strong flexibility in the course of history about the formation of ethnic identities. They dismiss the idea of assigning roles for race, origin and language in constituting an ethnic group. They instead say that people, depending on their personal/social feelings and perceptions compose an ethnic group. In line with this view, Stephen Cornell and Douglas Hartmann (1998: 59) assert that, “ethnicity and race are viewed as instrumental identities, organized as means to particular ends”. In other words, the instrumentalists focus on the manipulation of ethnic identities and loyalties for political and economic ends.

Dan Mudoola observes that ‘the ethnic factor has been so pervasive in Uganda’s politics that it has put institutional structures under strain’

(1996: 92). He considers the role of ethnicity in post-colonial Uganda’s conflicts such as those about Bunyoro’s ‘Lost Counties’ in 1964 and the Kabaka crisis of 1966 which were mainly fuelled by ethnic sentiments between the Baganda and non-Baganda. With regard to national politics, he demonstrates that even the friction between President Milton Obote of Uganda and his senior army officer Idi Amin was largely due to conflicting ethnic interests.

Then, Kumar Rupesinghe (1989) argues that the concept of ethnicity became increasingly useful for political legitimating and domination in the post-colonial era. He further contends that it became common for those in power to rely on members of their ethnic groups for political support and to carry out recruitment into government positions on the basis of ethnic loyalties. This, according to Rupesinghe, caused a dangerous situation in which the favored ethnic groups were made to think of the state as their own special protective agency. It is quite clear that what Rupesinghe says about post-colonial Uganda is also reflected in Kibaale district where members of the Bakiga and Banyoro ethnic groups have consistently appealed for political support from their tribesmen, thus aggravating the problem of ethnic conflicts.

In the six case studies of ethnic political participation in Uganda, Kasfir (1976) argues in the context of the instrumentalist theory and demonstrates the strength of ethnicity in the Rwenzururu movement of Western Uganda between the Bakonzo and Batooro. In this case, the Bakonzo who accused the Batooro of enjoying a wide range of privileges were struggling for the establishment of an independent kingdom and had come to believe that they were suffering because of their identity as Bakonzo. He further highlights the ethnic factor in the “Lost Counties controversy” between the Banyoro and Baganda, which led to crop damage, arson and some losses of human lives. He argues that the issue of “Lost Counties” reached such an alarming stage because “it was successful in evoking traditional affiliation

as a moral obligation". He concludes that the ethnic factor was used to mobilize people in the mentioned areas for political ends.

However, the proponents of the constructivist theory dismiss the views of the primordialists and the instrumentalists as unfounded and not consistent with reality. They do not agree with the primordialist model, which insists on the archaic cultural basis of ethnic identities and the instrumentalist model, which only focuses on the manipulation of ethnic identities and loyalties for political and economic ends. The scholars of constructivist theory point to the 'overwhelming' evidence that ethnic conflict is normally caused by calculated economic and political actions of people. As Berman (1998:305) put it, ethnicity is socially constructed and is a product of a continuing historical process, always simultaneously old and new, grounded in the past and perpetually in creation. He rightly asserts that, pre-colonial political and socio-economic boundaries in Africa were flexible and the people of different cultural backgrounds could easily overlap and intermingle. To the proponents of the constructivist approach, therefore, ethnicity is not a fixed condition, but a historical process determined by prevailing conditions. This theory is quite applicable to Uganda whose pre-colonial history was characterised by a diversity of ethnic groups but were constantly changing due to migrations and conquests. For instance, at the time of British entry in 1900, the kingdoms of Bunyoro and Buganda consisted of other communities, which had either been incorporated by force or had voluntarily moved in. The British colonialists ended up constructing more sharply defined and differentiated ethnic groups of the Baganda and the Banyoro in a number of ways. They drew new boundaries along ethnic lines and in most cases employed the policy of 'divide and rule', which intensified conflicts between different groups. For instance, the British used the Baganda to conquer the Banyoro, and by the 1900 Buganda Agreement, the British rewarded the Baganda with the Bunyoro counties of

Buyaga and Bugangaizi which later became Kibaale district. This became a basis of long-term conflicts between the Baganda and the Banyoro. At the same time, the general colonial policy of indirect rule exacerbated ethnicity in different parts of Uganda and limited the chances of national unity and stability.

Another constructivist, Welsh (1996:485), argues that ethnicity is often manipulated as a political resource from which, those who wield power obtain legitimacy or consolidate themselves in power. Indeed, many politicians in Kibaale district have always appealed to their respective ethnic groups during campaigns for local and national political posts. It was not a surprise that in the elections of 2001 and 2006, some Banyoro and Bakiga politicians were driven by ethnic sentiments while mobilizing votes from their respective ethnic groups.

From the constructivist theory, Okuku (2002) also argues that "the intricate ethnic configuration and militarism in Uganda's politics lie in their historical construction and continued reproduction since independence in 1962". He correctly asserts that, the different regimes in post-colonial Uganda have mostly rested on ethnic political foundations and reproduced themselves on the basis of ethnic alliances.

The other literature, which also falls in the context of constructivism, is that of G.S.K. Ibingira (1973) who offers much about the challenges of building a nation. He notes that the British colonialists assembled Uganda into a coherent, political whole from a collection of tribes with different social systems, languages, and ethnic characteristics. Unfortunately, the British colonial policies perpetuated the feeling of separate existence along lines of particular ethnic groups, which eventually contributed to suspicions and conflicts in Uganda for much of the time after 1962. As a way forward, Ibingira rightly recommends that 'these problems can be resolved by positively fostering national consciousness as a concept superior to tribal loyalty' (1973: 273).

Musheshe (2003), whose arguments fit in the constructivist theory, recognizes the role of the British colonial masters in sharpening the ethnic identities, such as those between the Baganda and the Banyoro as well as between the Banyoro and other groups including the Bakiga. He attributes the conflict in Kibaale to the struggle for power along ethnic line. He further notes that the immigrants in Ruteete (Kagadi) Resettlement Scheme were allocated 10 acres per family, yet on average each family of the indigenous people owned only 2-5 acres of land, which in reality belonged to the Baganda. According to Musheshe, this kind of land allocation became a basis of subsequent conflicts because the Bakiga spread from the resettlement schemes to other parts of Kibaale district and conflicted with the Banyoro.

According to Miirima (1998), the issue of land should be given much consideration in explaining the recurrence of conflicts in Kibaale district. He also falls within the constructivist theory when he argues that the problem of land in the 'Lost Counties' and the deepened ethnic conflicts between the Banyoro and other peoples partly resulted from the British colonial policies. Many people argue that the unresolved question of land ownership in Kibaale has caused despair among the Banyoro. They thought victory at the referendum of 1964 meant that they had got what they had been fighting for, the land of their ancestors. Unknown to the Banyoro, the Baganda had kept the land titles they acquired after the Buganda Agreement of 1900. In effect, the Banyoro had won the referendum, got political and administrative independence, but they remained squatters on their own land. Miirima argues that this lack of land titles has prevented the Banyoro from obtaining bank loans for economic prosperity. As a result, a number of Banyoro believe that the immigrants (particularly the Bakiga) may take strategic political posts and curtail the Banyoro struggle for legal land ownership.

Another important study of conflicts in Kibaale District is that of Espeland (2007). His study

particularly emphasizes the role of communal violence in contributing to conflicts of Kibaale district. He also points to the fact that the colonially categorized ethnic Banyoro in Kibaale district are considered to be the 'sons of the soil' and the other ethnic groups are foreigners. His focus on what he regards as the 'Black Sunday' of May 25, 2003 in Kabamba⁴ village demonstrates a wider "ethnic" problem between the Banyoro and the Bafuruki. He notes that, although the number of victims in the conflict at Kabamba was small, the incident attracted massive media attention, which signified the conflicting ethnic interests of people in the region. Espeland's view is that Black Sunday linked local social relations and everyday life to wider political struggles over land rights and political representation between indigenous and migrant groups (2007:13).

Perhaps, what I would consider as part of the most interesting literature on conflict studies is that of Mahmood Mamdani. He has extensively written about the Great Lakes region and Uganda in particular, emphasizing issues of identity and conflicts among others. Mamdani (2002:15) discusses the background to genocide in Rwanda and particularly the impact of colonial and post-colonial regimes on Hutu and Tutsi identities. He correctly argues that the Hutu and Tutsi as political identities changed from one historical period to another, each period indicating a different phase in the institutional development of the Rwandan state. He points to the role of indirect colonial rule, which divided natives into separate groups and governed each through a different set of "customary" laws and established a basis of a society composed of rivaling Hutu and Tutsi "ethnic" groups. He proceeds with the idea that the post-colonial government continued to reproduce the native identity as ethnic, while enforcing an ethnic version of "customary" law, which sharpened the Hutu-Tutsi distinctions and

4 Espeland used a fictitious name *Businge* instead of the actual village name *Kabamba*. Although I am not sure of the grounds for Espeland's use of the word *Businge* which means peace in Runyoro language, I can say that he probably applied it wrongly.

prepared Rwanda for bloody conflicts including the genocide of 1994.

Then, in another piece of work, Mamdani, M (2009) emphasizes the construction of ethnic identities in Uganda since the colonial era. He notes that before colonialism, the tribal identity was open and one could become a Muganda or a Munyoro over time. But, under British colonialism, the law defined tribal identity as biological rather than cultural, which also meant that tribal identity had become permanent and could be passed over from father to son and to grandson. He rightly argues that as a result of colonial law, tribal discrimination centered on land and political representation distinguishing between “indigenous” and “non-indigenous” tribes in each administrative unit.

The above provides a foundation for onward analysis of the nature and causes of conflicts in post-colonial Uganda in general and Kibaale district in particular. It demonstrates the need to consider the fact that ethnicity was perpetuated by the colonial masters and has been continuously reinforced by the post-colonial governments.

The conflicts in Kibaale district

With the signing of the Buganda Agreement of 1900, the British colonialists created a basis for future conflict when they rewarded the Baganda with Bunyoro land, which included Buyaga and Bugangaizi counties. In 1907, the Banyoro organized what came to be known as the ‘*nyangire Abaganda*’⁵ rebellion against the unfair territorial re-allocation and the imposition of Baganda chiefs on some parts of Bunyoro (Ingham, 1974). This was the beginning of serious conflicts between the Banyoro and what the Banyoro regarded as outsiders, particularly the Baganda and later, the Bakiga. By 1921, a campaign for the return of the counties to Bunyoro and to stop the ‘persecution’ of the Banyoro by the Baganda on an ethnic basis had been started by some Banyoro who formed the Mubende-Banyoro Committee (MBC) (Kasfir,

N, 1976: 137). The Banyoro demands for the return of the “Lost Counties” only materialized after the referendum of 4 November 1964 by which the Banyoro in Buyaga and Bugangaizi counties voted in favor of belonging to Bunyoro Kingdom. However, even after the referendum, no steps were taken to return legally the land, which the Banyoro in the two counties considered to be theirs. In actual fact, the Banyoro remained tenants⁶ of the Baganda absentee landlords. It is unfortunate to note that the post-colonial governments have not done enough to solve these problems.

Although the Land Act of 1998 gave special treatment to Kibaale district and cleared the way for a scheme under which the Baganda absentee landlords were to be compensated for their land in Kibaale district, the problem of who had the right to benefit from the redistribution of land remained. Whereas the non-Banyoro, particularly the Bakiga, wanted the land to be re-allocated to the Kibaale inhabitants irrespective of their ethnic group, the members of the MBC and several other Banyoro insist that the land should be allocated to the original owners, the Banyoro. In July 2001, a group of selected Banyoro led by Joseph Kazairwe (one of the founder members of the MBC) reconstituted the Mubende Banyoro Committee and launched a campaign against the non-Banyoro. The MBC called for the abolition of the resettlement schemes in Kibaale district and the eviction of all illegal immigrants. The most targeted ethnic group was that of the Bakiga whose candidate, Fred Ruremeera, had defeated a Munyoro candidate, Sebastian Sekitoleko, in the district Local Council elections. There followed serious conflicts between the indigenous Banyoro and the Bakiga who formed the largest percentage of the immigrants in Kibaale district.

6 Although no rent was being paid to the Baganda absentee landlords, the Banyoro had no land titles which could either guarantee their land ownership or enable them to access loans from financial institutions.

5 Literally meaning, I have refused the Baganda.

President Museveni intervened⁷ in the conflicts of Kibaale district in April 2002, but no permanent peace followed. The district continued to experience conflicts between the Banyoro and the immigrants, particularly the Bakiga. Following the Presidential and Parliamentary elections of 23 February 2006, there were fresh conflicts in many parts of Kibaale district. Tension increased after the Banyoro had realized that no indigenous Munyoro in Kibaale district could win a seat in Uganda's Parliament due to the Bakiga numerical superiority⁸. This made a number of Banyoro politicians to push for the resignation of the Bakiga MPs, which in turn contributed to more violence. A good number of Banyoro were accusing the Bakiga as being naturally rude and arrogant. Even with heavy deployment of security personnel in the district, it proved difficult for the authorities to ensure peace. In order to forge a way forward, further analysis of the causes of the conflicts in Kibaale district is essential.

Ethnic stereotypes as sources of conflict in Kibaale district

The common stereotypes with a direct bearing on conflicts in Uganda include: natives and aliens, indigenous and non-indigenous, patriots and traitors, etc. The problem with stereotypes is that they create wrong impression of certain groups of people or situations. So far, stereotypes have not only contributed to the distortion of Uganda's history but have led to grounds of hatred and ethnic conflicts. The conflicts in Kibaale district can be said to have been partly the result of ethnic stereotypes. For

instance, when I was a child in the late 1970s, I used to hear my fellow Banyoro describing the Bakiga as arrogant and rude people. This was partly because of their language which was characterized by such phrases as "*ori omushema*" and "*ori nk'ekifire*" literally meaning "you are a fool" and "you are like something dead".

My view is that rudeness and arrogance should not be attributed to specific ethnic groups such as the Bakiga. A member of any ethnic group can be rude and arrogant depending on the circumstances. It is important to note that whereas such phrases in the 1970s did not cause any conflict, in the recent times they have combined with other factors to develop into conflicts. During my 2003 research work in some of the conflict-affected sub-counties including Kiryanga, Mabaale, Kagadi and Kyanaisoke in Kibaale district, most Banyoro interviewees complained about the Bakiga arrogance. One Munyoro gentleman in Kagadi town, also my former student at Makerere University informed me that the Banyoro were furious because the Bakiga had gone to the extent of regarding the Banyoro as dogs (Interview, Kagadi, April 28, 2006).

By 2006, the Bakiga were being singled out of the other immigrant communities as rude, abusive, arrogant and ill-mannered people (Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Bunyoro issues, 2006: 126). Although such conduct of some Bakiga elements could have provoked the Banyoro to engage in conflicts with the Bakiga, more convincing explanations for the intensification of conflicts in Kibaale particularly from 2002 such as those revolving around land ownership, ethnicity and politics are necessary. As demonstrated in the next part of this paper, the contemporary land-related conflicts in Kibaale district can be understood by analyzing the ambiguous land policies in Bunyoro since the period of British colonial rule.

7 The President's intervention, partly guided by the report of the commission of inquiry of 2002, involved forcing the newly elected Kibaale district Chairman, Mr. Fred Rurempera (a Mukiga) to stand down in favour of a "compromise" Chairman, Mr. George Nyamyaka (a Munyoro). Unfortunately, like other commissions of inquiry in Uganda's history, this commission operated within clearly laid down government guidelines and the report does not reflect the actual opinions of the majority members of Kibaale district communities.

8 As a result of different forms of immigrations, the immigrants who were mainly Bakiga in Kibaale district made up 60% of the total population in 2006 and this enabled them to vote their fellow Bakiga, Ms Mable Bakaine and Mr. Barnabas Tinkasiimire as Members of Parliament for Bugangaizi and Buyaga counties respectively, counties which form Kibaale district. There was no Munyoro elected to Parliament!

Land ownership controversy

As already noted, the controversy over land ownership in Kibaale district has its roots from the colonial period. This was after the signing of the 1900 Buganda Agreement which enabled several Baganda to acquire land particularly in the Bunyoro's two counties of Buyaga and Bugangaizi. It is estimated that a total of 9,834 square miles of land, representing 68% of present day Kibaale district land was given out as mailo land to the Baganda chiefs. The rest of the land was regarded as Crown land which became public land after the attainment of Uganda's independence.

It is important to note that the British colonial masters did not only help the Baganda to acquire land in Bunyoro but also failed to introduce a more acceptable land tenure system. Even the committees of inquiry of 1906 and 1911 under Justice Morris Carter, did not address the main demands by Banyoro. With the entry of other ethnic groups from areas such as Kigezi into Buyaga and Bugangaizi, land ownership controversies became inevitable. The first major group of Bakiga to enter Kibaale consisted of about 300 families of Bakiga who voluntarily moved from the overpopulated Kigezi district and were resettled by Amin's Government in 1973 in Ruteete Resettlement Scheme in Buyaga County where each immigrant family was allocated 10 acres of land. By that time, no one expected any kind of conflict between the Banyoro and the Bakiga who were after all thought to be temporary settlers. Moreover, the Bakiga were actually left to settle in areas which the Banyoro did not want at that time because of reasons such as remoteness and tsetse fly infestation. In other cases, the Bakiga settlements served as Banyoro shields against vermin and wild animals (Interview, Paachwa, December 25, 2005).

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Bakiga participated in productive commerce and agriculture. At the same time, a good number of Bakiga entered friendships and intermarriages

with the Banyoro.⁹ By 1992, the population of immigrants in Kibaale district had tremendously increased. Then in 1993, about 3,600 families of largely Bakiga were moved from Mpokya Forest Reserve in Kabarole district and put in Kisiita Resettlement Scheme in Bugangaizi County.¹⁰ Each of the immigrant families in Kisiita was given an average of 12.5 acres of land. Contrary to regulations regarding the conduct of people in the mentioned resettlement schemes and the utilization of land therein, the Bakiga soon engaged in activities which, in the long-run, contributed to conflicts with the indigenous Banyoro. The settlers are reported to have embarked on an exercise of either selling or distributing parts of the land in the resettlement scheme to fresh immigrants. This was followed by illegal movements of immigrants from the resettlement scheme to other parts of Bugangaizi County, which in turn contributed to increased conflicts between the Banyoro and the Bakiga.

Irrespective of the nature or method of land acquisition in Kibaale district by the immigrants, ethnic conflicts could not be avoided. With regard to resettlement schemes, there developed complaints among the Banyoro that the Bafuruki had been given much land (10 acres per family) in Ruteete yet an average indigenous Banyoro family had only 2-5 acres of land much of which actually belonged to Baganda absentee landlords. Matters worsened rumors that some government officials who hailed from Kigezi region were extending preferential treatment to the immigrants in Kisiita resettlement scheme. For instance, the Banyoro were not happy with the package to each family of immigrants which included 12.5 acres of mailo¹¹ land, free food for a year, provision of boreholes, household goods, farm implements and the grading of 130 kilometers of road to the resettlement scheme.

9 Even my father Joseph Kihika (RIP), a Munyoro, married two Bakiga women who in the absence of my mother helped to raise me and my two sisters. My family is now composed of half Banyoro and half Bakiga.

10 Report of the Government Committee of Inquiry into the Political Developments in Kibaale district, April 2002, p.5.

11 Most of my interviewees considered the resettlement scheme on mailo land which was still owned by Baganda absentee landlords as an obstacle to the return of land formerly given to the Baganda to the rightful owners, the Banyoro.

It is possible that the resettlement schemes would not have caused conflicts if relevant authorities had done careful planning and implementation. For instance, no proper administration was put in place to govern the conduct of members of Kisiita Resettlement Scheme. Another shortcoming was that the authorities did not have an appropriate program for social integration and ethnic co-existence. Due to the loopholes, the Kisiita settlers either brought in many more illegal settlers or moved to areas outside the resettlement scheme and acquired land.

Meanwhile, land related conflicts between the Bakiga and the Banyoro were on the increase in different sub-counties of Kibaale district, especially in Kagadi, Kyanaisoke, Kiryanga, Kyebando and Kakindo during the period 2002 – 2006. This was due to increased illegal acquisition of land including that in the forest reserves by the immigrants. According to the report of one of the Commissions of Inquiry, immigrants from Kabale, Rukungiri, Kanungu and Kisoro districts encroached on gazetted forest reserves such as Gurama and Kangombe in Nkooko and Kyebando sub-counties respectively (Report of the Commission of inquiry into Bunyoro issues, 2006, p.136). One case of encroachment by the immigrants was reported in Kyanaisoke Sub-county of Buyaga County. Here, a large piece of land, owned by the Banyoro youth of the National Union of Youth Organizations (NUYO) since 1974 was grabbed by mainly Bakiga immigrants and it caused serious ethnic conflicts. In the county of Buyaga, ethnic conflicts were sparked off by another case of land grabbing at Mangoma in Mabaale sub-county, where some Bakiga grabbed part of the 181 hectare farmland belonging to Kiiza Yovan (Interview, Mangoma, January 12, 2006). Then in Bwikara sub-county, Mr. Barwogeza Matayo Akiiki Kasumba Kabugahya Isenkurubantu complained that a large part of his 7 square mile land on Block 23 was grabbed by Bakiga who refused to acknowledge him as the landlord and went to the extent of harassing him and destroying his property (Interview,

Nyakarongo, January 20, 2006). Several cases of this kind have been recorded in many other parts of Kibaale district and have contributed to serious conflicts between the Banyoro and the largely Bakiga immigrants. The question is: why have such cases taken place in Kibaale district more than in other parts of Uganda? One answer could be that the immigrants found large tracts of land seemingly redundant and without evidence of ownership. It may also be argued that the predominantly customary land ownership in Kibaale district contains loopholes for the immigrants to exploit. This is worsened by a situation of overlapping and conflicting land ownership rights in Kibaale district partly due to the weaknesses in the land ownership policies of post-colonial Uganda governments. Obviously the Bakiga and other immigrants would have found it difficult to engage in 'illegal' acquisition of land in Kibaale district if the land tenure system had been clear.

The population factor

The factor of population growth also contributed to conflicts in Kibaale district in various ways. It is important to note that there was rapid population growth in Kigezi especially in the counties of Ndorwa and Rukiga from as early as the 1920s and 1930s which led to massive migration of people to other areas such as Ankole, Tooro and later Bunyoro.¹² From the 1940s to the 1960s, more Bakiga families continued to settle in various parts of Buyaga and Bugangaizi counties. The precedence of successful colonial government resettlement schemes in Ankole and Tooro encouraged the establishment of Ruteete Resettlement Scheme in Buyaga in 1973. The decision to establish this resettlement scheme in Buyaga County and the subsequent massive migration of Bakiga into what came to be Kibaale district was mainly due to the availability of large expanses of land and the sparse population in Bunyoro. Many parts of Bunyoro had remained sparsely populated for many years particularly after a

¹² See details of Kigezi population growth and the subsequent migrations in Paul Ngolongoza (1998), *Kigezi and its People*, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, pp. 83-99.

substantial number of Banyoro had died as a result of the British-led war of conquest in the late 1890s, famine and diseases.¹³ This decrease in population in Bunyoro provided room for the entry of large numbers of people from Kigezi which became a basis of the contemporary conflicts over land between the Banyoro and Bakiga ethnic groups.

It is evident that as a result of the high fertility rate and massive migration of the Bakiga and other ethnic groups of people into Buyaga and Bugangaizi Counties, the population of Kibaale district almost doubled from 220,300 to 413,000 between the 1991 and 2002.¹⁴ At an annual population growth of 5.9%, the Kibaale population was estimated to rise to about 500,000 by 2009. One may argue that such population growth has contributed to ethnic conflicts in Kibaale due to the fact that the Bakiga population has been increasing at a higher rate than that of the Banyoro. In these circumstances, the Bakiga have been accused by the Banyoro as people who have over time deliberately increased their numbers in Kibaale district so as to emerge as a dominant ethnic group (Interview, Mabaale, December 23, 2006). There is no doubt that rapid population increase between 2001 and 2009 in Kibaale district has contributed to different socio-economic and political problems which have reinforced ethnic conflicts between the Banyoro and the Bakiga.

The role of the post-colonial state and the politicians

From the time Uganda became independent in 1962, different leaders presented themselves as nationalists and some have indeed tried to devise methods of destroying the ethnic identities earlier created or promoted by the colonial masters. President Apolo Milton Obote (1962-71 and 1980-85) tried to pursue policies that were aimed at discouraging “tribalism” in Uganda in vain. When the National Resistance

Movement (NRM) government of Yoweri Museveni emerged in 1986, it also appeared to be committed to the struggle to reduce citizens’ identification of their interests with ‘tribal’ groupings. One of the strategies designed to discourage ethnic nationalism and conflicts involved the establishment of a broad-based government which practically postponed the politics of multi-party democracy. Although these leaders may have had genuine commitments to national unity and development, their governments have either consciously or unconsciously perpetuated the ethnic divisions and conflicts in Uganda in general and Kibaale district in particular. Just as the British colonialists made distinctions between ‘indigenous’ and ‘non-indigenous’ tribes in each administrative unit such as a district, the post-colonial governments have also applied policies which practically promote peoples’ thinking and association in terms of ethnic groups.¹⁵ For the case of Kibaale district, the Banyoro consider themselves as the ‘indigenous tribe’ or the natives of Bunyoro region and regard the Bakiga as ‘non-indigenous’ or ‘foreigners’ due to existing laws and conduct of politicians. It appeared sensible in the late 1980s when the NRM government dismantled the old ‘tribal’ administrative regions and replaced them with a larger number of smaller, town-based districts. However, this has not yet helped to reduce the ethnic suspicions and conflicts in Kibaale district due to conflicting interests of members of the Banyoro and Bakiga ethnic groups.

In 1992, the decentralization program was introduced with the aim of not only to reduce national conflicts in Uganda but also to extend services closer to the people. Unfortunately, the decentralization program has instead exacerbated local level conflicts between ethnic groups as it has been the case in Kibaale district. This has been partly due to the concentration of resources and power at the district which has made the positions such as that of district Chairman (Local Council 5) very attractive.

13 The demographic collapse in Bunyoro from the 1890s to the 1920s has been properly documented in Shane Doyle (2006), *Crisis and Decline in Bunyoro*, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, pp.134-157.

14 See the 2002 Uganda Population and Housing Census.

15 As analyzed by Mahmood Mamdani in the Abu Mayanja Annual Lecture, *Uganda: Buganda and Nation at a Crossroads*, August 7, 2009, Kampala International Conference Centre.

Competition over these political positions has intensified due to the Bakiga belief that their stay and property in Kibaale district can only be safeguarded by occupying strategic positions. On the part of the Banyoro, they have not only been driven by the need to be masters of their “native” region but also believe that it can only be through the control of top district positions that land and political reforms can be carried out in their interests. With regard to the creation of more districts (112 by May 2010) the move has instead politicized ethnicity in Uganda due to its tendency to encourage people in most districts to consider themselves or to be considered as either natives or migrants. Under these circumstances, many politicians have manipulated ethnicity for political gains in Uganda thus promoting ethnic conflicts such as what is happening in Kibaale district.

Analyzing the conduct of politicians with regard to Kibaale district since the 1990s, one is able to detect their role in directly or indirectly contributing to ethnic conflicts. It is true that both the Banyoro and the Bakiga candidates in the parliamentary as well as local council elections in Kibaale district in 2001 and 2002 respectively appealed to members of their ethnic groups for votes. Most probably, the largely Bakiga ‘immigrants’ decided to vote as a block for a Mukiga, Fred Ruremeera for the Local Council 5 (LC5) Chairmanship in 2002 after being told that the Banyoro were planning to expel them from the district.¹⁶ On the part of the Banyoro, there were also reports that the members of the Mubende Banyoro Committee (MBC) led by Kazairwe and several other Banyoro politicians were engaged in ethnic-oriented campaigns to block the Mukiga from becoming LC5 Chairman. Such politics which continuously define Ugandans in terms of ethnic groups have only helped to deepen the problem of ethnic conflicts in Kibaale district. It is unfortunate to note that even the President’s involvement has instead perpetuated the conflict between the ‘indigenous’ and ‘non-indigenous’ or ‘native’ and ‘foreigner’ relationship between

the Banyoro and the Bakiga. In spite of the constructive ideas concerning national unity and stability, some of the messages in President Museveni’s letter of April 15, 2002 and from the recent one of July 15, 2008 regarding the ring-fencing of certain political positions in favor of Banyoro could instead perpetuate what the President did not intend, people’s continued thinking and practice in terms of ethnic groups, in this case, in terms of Banyoro and Bakiga.¹⁷

Conclusion

The main point of this paper is that the conflicts in Uganda in general and Kibaale district in particular cannot be fully explained without considering the impact of British colonial rule, ethnicity, land ownership controversy, the role of the post-colonial governments and of the politicians. These factors have played an important role in the recurrence of conflicts in Kibaale district where the Bakiga and the Banyoro continue to regard each other as different. Such distinction in terms of ethnic groups resulted from the British colonial system which applied a particular set of customary laws over a particular ‘tribe’ or ethnic group. The post-colonial governments have continued with the colonially defined system which has in the process perpetuated ethnic conflicts in places like Kibaale district. The issue of land as a cause of conflicts in Kibaale district has become prominent due to lack of a clear land tenure system and the failure by governments to sort out the problems of absentee landlords. The problem of ethnic conflicts has been aggravated by politicians who appeal to their ‘tribesmen’ for votes.

In order to solve the problem of persistent conflicts in Kibaale district, there is need for serious steps to be taken to refine the resettlement policies, to develop an appropriate land tenure system and to resolve the issue of absentee landlordism. The National Resistance Movement government (NRM) has so far demonstrated its interests in resolving the land problems through the Land Act of 1998 and

16 See *The Monitor*, March 28, 2002.

17 See analysis in *The Sunday Monitor*, August 2, 2009, p.3.

recently through the Land Amendment Bill of 2010. However, much more needs to be done to compensate the Baganda absentee landlords and to discourage the negative relations between the Banyoro and the immigrants. As a way of establishing harmonious relations between the Banyoro and the largely Bakiga immigrants, transparent committees for the co-ordination of land issues should be established.

Lastly, relevant authorities should embark on civic education programs to promote social and political harmony in Kibaale district. At the same time, government policies need to be applied in such a way as to avoid the perpetuation of ethnically defined systems and practices.

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Historical and Contemporary basis for Sectarian Residential Settlement Patterns in Kaduna Metropolis of Northern Nigeria*

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Abstract

Kaduna became the capital of the British administered protectorate of Northern Nigeria in 1912. Prior to this time, the colonial capital of Northern Nigeria had been moved three times and within a thirteen year period from Lokoja to Jebba, later to Zungeru. This paper discusses the history and contemporary manifestations of sectarian urban settlement pattern in Kaduna metropolis. The paper is driven by three broad objectives. First, it explores the historical processes and social metamorphosis that Kaduna metropolis has undergone since its creation by the British. Second, the paper outlines the social and economic spectrum that provides the enabling environment for persistent struggle and in some cases violent contestations by identity entrepreneurs for the control of the metropolis. Third, the paper uncovers the extent to which contested identities provides the road map to the sectarian urban settlement patterns that has become the trade mark of Kaduna metropolis.

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Introduction:

This paper interrogates a century of urbanization and attendant sectarian challenges in residential settlement patterns in Kaduna metropolis from 1912 to 2010. Kaduna metropolis is located at Latitudes (DMS) 100 31' 23N, Longitudes (DMS) 070 26' 25E (latitude (DD) 10.5231N and longitude (DD) 7.4403E) at an elevation of 612m MSL (2011 feet) and time zone(est) of UTC +1 (Abdullahi, et. al.: 2009: 2). Kaduna metropolis has been an administrative capital of the Northern Protectorate since the colonial era and of the Northern Region after independence in 1960 (Abdullahi, et. al.: 2009: 2). The metropolis later became the administrative capital of North Central State, the old and new Kaduna State (see Nigeria's 36 federated states in figure: 1). Kaduna metropolis is a pivotal

nerve centre of Northern Nigerian politics, an important regional trade, industrial and commercial centre in West Africa. It is also a major transportation junction.

With its centralised location (see figure 1), Kaduna metropolis connects the far north, south west, south east and south-south of Nigeria through road networks, railway system and air transportation. Major industries in the metropolis include textile and garment, paint, chemical plants, a petroleum refinery, petrochemical plants (see figure: 2), vehicle assembly, fertilizer processing, breweries, and a military defence industry. Kaduna is also a regional headquarters of all military formations in the country. The metropolis attracts migrants from all over Nigeria and other regions of the world (Abdullahi, et. al.: 2009: 2-3)

Figure 1: Map of Nigeria showing 36 States and Abuja.



At the threshold of the 21st century, Kaduna would ordinarily mean two things in Nigeria. Kaduna is a state with its capital city located in Kaduna metropolis. At the risk of repetition, a simplified historical chronology of Kaduna metropolis shows that it has been a capital city since its colonial creation in 1912. Kaduna was the capital of the Northern region under colonial rule from 1912 to September 1960. Kaduna remains the capital of the Northern region in the immediate independent Nigeria from 1st October 1960 to 1966 when Nigeria was made up initially three regional governments (see figure: 4). The fourth region, known as the Midwest region was created on August 9th, 1963¹. This was about three years after Nigeria's political independence from Britain.

When the regions were abolished and twelve states created by the Military government on May 27, 1967² North Central state was among the 12 new states. Kaduna was again made the capital of North Central state. The 12 states were further divided into 19 states and Abuja created as a federal capital territory on 3rd February 1976. North Central state became Kaduna State with the capital again in Kaduna metropolis. Another state creation exercise took place again on 23rd September 1987 taking the number of states to 21 states. This time around, Kaduna state was divided into two states (Kaduna state and Katsina state). Still again the capital of new Kaduna state remains in Kaduna metropolis. On 27th August 1991, nine additional states were created bringing the number to 30 states. Kaduna state was not affected as she remains Kaduna state with capital still in Kaduna metropolis. The last state creation exercise took place on 1st October 1996 and 6 new states were created bringing the total number to 36 states³ (Alapiki; 2005: 54-62). Again, Kaduna

state was not affected and her capital remains Kaduna metropolis till today.

Alapiki (2005: 49) states that primordial factors have been the driving force for state creation in Nigeria, and that "the fissiparous tendencies bearing on the Nigerian national polity make the policy of using state creation to achieve national integration a failed strategy". He attends to "how the outcomes of state creation exercises in Nigeria have failed to assuage the very forces that instigate new state demands". He contends that solution to ethno-religious conflict and "the prospects for national integration and local autonomy depend on the emergence of a purposeful national leadership and proper political restructuring of the federation designed to generate a national image" that can be more appealing to all sections and groups. Threats to peace by sectarian pattern of state creation is an admission that equitable resource distribution has never been the cardinal principle behind the exercise.


Prior to British colonial incursions, all settlements in Kaduna and environs were inhabited by the Gbagyi people. British colonial policy of land confiscation, suppressed Gbagyi community's claim to it (Gandu: 2003: 54). British colonial system of "indirect rule" (Yahaya: 1980) subjugated the Gbagyi and other egalitarian polities in the Middle-Belt area of Nigeria to the northern emirate system. Urbanisation process in Kaduna was therefore characterised by South African-apartheid style forced evictions, seizure of Gbagyi settlements and peasants' land without compensation (Abdullahi, et. al.: 2009: 3). Contesting this colonial legacy, the Gbagyi community (Gbagyi: 2000), call for a redress through boundary adjustment that would give them control over Kaduna metropolis and other adjacent towns including Jaji. Jaji is about 30 kilometres towards Zaria (Zazzau) Emirate from Kaduna city centre (See figure: 2).

1 For details, see: "Essay in honour of Midwest History Month 1999", by O. Igbo Natufe; accessed on: Wednesday, September 1st, 2010, at: <http://www.dawodu.net/igbo.htm>

2 See Gowon's broadcast to the nation - May 27, 1967: Gowon's Broadcast to the Nation, dividing Nigeria into Twelve States, accessed at: <http://www.dawodu.com/gowon.htm>, on: 17/02/2010

3 See Nigeria States, accessed at: http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Nigeria_federal_states.htm, on: 17/02/2010

Figure 2: Map of Nigeria showing the location of Kaduna Metropolis and Zaria (Zazzau).



Claim and counter claims over Kaduna metropolis became fierce after the end of military rule in May 1999. Four factors explain the resurgence to political violence and sectarian contestations over Kaduna in post-1999. Since 1983, Nigerian military junta have been led by Northerners who exhibited penchant for authoritarian rule. Secondly, Military rule suppressed human rights, stifled open-civil debate, banned all forms of civil protests and agitations. Thirdly, it is the general feelings of the Gbagyi and other egalitarian minority polities in the middle-belt of Nigeria that like their British colonial predecessors, Nigerian military administrations served, projected and protected the interests of northern aristocracy. Fourthly, the militarised policies and process through which Kaduna metropolis was ceded to Zaria Emirate (Zazzau) in 1987, has continued to ignite agitations (Gbagyi: 2000: 1-9). The culpability of the Nigerian military and conspiracy of Northern aristocracy in the ceding of the metropolis to Zaria Emirate is also a contested issue (Filaba: 2000: 5).

Kaduna: Origins, Myths, Legends and Political Manipulations:

The origins of Kaduna metropolis have been shrouded in myths, legends and political manipulations by contesting ethno-religious or identity groups. History has it that Gbagyi settlements in Kaduna and environs date back to the early 14th century (Oyedele: 1987: 166). Kaduna is generally believed to have gotten her name from River Kaduna which cuts the metropolis into two. There has however been a great debate and intense animosity over the authenticity of River Kaduna as the source of its origin. Paden (1986) submit that in 1912 when Kaduna was selected by Lord Lugard to be the new location of the political capital of Northern Nigeria:

“Kaduna was Savannah bush and a resting place for crocodiles (*Kada* in Hausa). Hence, the name “Kaduna”... from traditional African perspective, Kaduna had never been uninhabited but had been major Gbagyi (Gwari) area, reflecting their segmental village structure. The name “Kaduna” means “the river of snails.” Kaduna is a “Gwari” town, but

these original people were pushed to the outskirts and the land taken from them. The Gbagyi do not believe in “rebellions” against constituted authority, or violence, and hence have not been “problem” to the larger communities in which they live... Kaduna was never given a “Chief” by the colonialists means that the Gbagyi are still recognised as the “owners” of Kaduna” (Paden: 1986: 318).

Oyedele (1987: 162) attributed the name to the Hausa word “*Kogin Kadduna*,” or “river of crocodiles”. And that *Kaduddna* is the plural Hausa word for Kada or “crocodile”. He also added that the Gbagyi word *Kadundna*, which means “crossing the river of snails,” connote an entirely contrasting and contesting meaning. He concluded by stating that, “while one cannot dismiss either of the two as likely origin of the name, it would seem that the Hausa are the probable group that gave it its current usage” (Oyedele: 1987: 162).

In contrast to Oyedele’s pro-Hausa views, the Gbagyi provides what they consider to be the ‘authentic’ explanation of the origins of the name Kaduna.

The Chairman⁴ of the Gbagyi Development Association, attempt to situate the origins of the name within what he regards as “concrete historical reality”. He states that the name *Kaduna* originates from two Gbagyi words. The first is *eka* which means “snails” and the second is *edna* or “river”. When the two words are combined as one word, it reads *eka-edna* or *kadna* meaning “snail-river.” His explanation holds that the Hausa people of northern Nigeria have always corrupted words and names of other minority polities or non Muslim groups from the middle-belt of Nigeria. He cited examples such as *Aegworok* corrupted to mean *Kagoro*, *Atyap* corrupted to mean *Katab*, *Bajju* corrupted to mean *Kaje* and *Aninka* corrupted to mean *Ninzam*. He states thus: “the Gbagyi word *kadna* or “snail-river” was corrupted by the Hausa to mean Kaduna”.

4 In-depth (face-to-face) interview Conducted in Kaduna Metropolis by the author with the Chairman of the Gbagyi Development Association (Kaduna chapter) on October 1st – 4th 2002.

This third explanation attested to the fact that there had been a good presence of both snail and crocodile population on the swampy banks of river Kaduna before its conquest and acquisition by British colonial forces. While the third explanation of the origins of the name Kaduna cannot be said to have settled the debate, it has however brought to the fore not only the continuation of the search for answers, but the contest for its historical and contemporary meaning.

Yet there is a fourth explanation on the origins of the name Kaduna offered by the **Sa Gbagyi I** (the Traditional Chief of Gbagyi Chieftdom). He presides over the Gbagyi people living in the in the periphery of Kaduna metropolis. The **Sa Gbagyi I**, cautioned that to understand the origin of the name Kaduna, it is important to locate the analysis within the material context of Gbagyi history.⁵ In the first place, he argue that varying interpretations of the origin of the name Kaduna has to do with the fact that there was a good population of reptiles like crocodiles found in the area which was swampy and water lock. He adds that the natural habitat and environment of these reptiles were compromised due to construction of modern infrastructure by the British colonial administration. The **Sa Gbagyi I** averred that the name Kaduna has little or nothing to do with crocodiles but more to do with snails. According to him, snail in Gbagyi simply means *eka*. Its plural form is *aka*. The word *du* in Gbagyi means “many”. Therefore, *duna* and *edu* means “more than”. *Edna* in Gbagyi means “river”. When the five words are combined (*eka, du, edu, edna*) as one single word, it will read *eka-dudna* meaning: “there are more snails found in this river than in others”⁶.

Besides the foregoing elaborate trajectory on the origin of the name Kaduna, the Sa Gbagyi 1 added another dimension. He opines that when the main bridge was being constructed across river Kaduna, Gbagyi men and women

5 In-depth (face-to-face) interview Conducted in Kaduna Metropolis by the author with The Sa Gbagyi I, October 10th - 11th 2002.

6 Ibid.

who went to town to sell their agricultural produce to construction workers were awe with the way the construction work disrupted their natural footpath. They soliloquised amongst themselves by asking *ya-kadduna*? Meaning; “the construction of this bridge is done on our walk-path across the river, where do they want us to pass”. The Sa Gbagyi 1 notes that persistent soliloquy, discussions, complaints and mentioning of the words: *eka dudna* and *ya-kadduna* by local Gbagyi women and men attracted the attention of construction workers, who in turn, popularised the two words in its modified form to Kaduna as it is in use today.

The Sa Gbagyi 1 also states that the two Gbagyi words: *ekadduna* and *ya-kadduna* may ordinarily coincide and come close to Hausa words *kada* or “crocodile” and *Kaddudna*; or crocodiles. He however insists that it is only the Gbagyi version that has a direct historical and logical ethnographic contextual relationship and claims to the origin of the word Kaduna. His argument is enunciated on the fact that the legal imposition of the Hausa version of the origins of Kaduna could only be rationalise and legitimises through state power. He however interjected that legalising the Hausa version cannot erase the ethnographic origins of Kaduna as a Gbagyi word and name. He sum-up the Hausa version to be a mere calculated attempt to deny that the Gbagyi people existed in Kaduna from the early 14th century, long before it was created as a regional capital of Northern Nigeria in 1912.

After relocating the capital of the Northern region of Nigeria from Zungeru to Kaduna, the colonial state provided the administrative needs of the area through the ‘indirect rule’ (Yahaya: 1980) system under the supervision of Zaria (Zazzau) Emirate. Zaria (Zazzau) continued to appoint district heads for Kaduna metropolis. Those so appointed did not have independent status but report to the District Officer (D-O) or *Kantoma*. The *Kantoma* or Administrator had the legal authority over Kaduna. Kaduna was therefore legally and administratively not an integral part of Zaria (Zazzau) Emirate.

Lord Lugard’s decision to relocate the regional capital of the North from Zungeru to Kaduna was informed by the desire to have a capital that was not under the absolute influence and control of an indigenous traditional ruler.

From the colonial era up to the late 1980s, no Emir or Chief had judicial, executive or legislative powers over Kaduna metropolis except otherwise delegated to handle trivial issues. This was responsible for the liberal, peaceful and secular tranquillity that Kaduna metropolis enjoyed from the colonial period, until it was ceded to Zaria (Zazzau) Emirate under the military government of Kaduna state led by Abdullahi Sarki Muktar in 1987 (Gandu: 2003: 55). The act of ceding Kaduna to Zaria (Zazzau) by Abdullahi Sarki Muktar put asunder on the peace and tranquillity that the metropolis had hitherto enjoyed. Communities and groups in the city who had live in peace became sharply divided. By ceding the metropolis (Abdu and Umar: 2002: 86), the military reconfigured intergroup relations, destroyed harmony that hitherto existed, militarised and made the city insecure and set the machinery for a sectarian pattern of residential settlements that was to emerge in the 1990s and 2000s. Given his legendary sectarian antics, Major-General Abdullahi Sarki Muktar (rtd.) was recently disengaged as National Security Adviser to the Nigerian Presidency “for various offences deemed to have undermined the security and the stability”⁷ of the country.

The denial of the right to the traditional stool of Kaduna metropolis to the indigenous Gbagyi is rooted on a colonial segregation policy and official discrimination against indigenous people (Gbagyi: 2000: 1-9). Colonial segregation set the foundation for the insecurity and violence that currently pervades the metropolis. Filaba (2000: 5) argue that morally, legally and historically, Zaria Emirate could not justify her

⁷ See: “Muktar Out, Gusau In: Why Jonathan Removed Him”, in The Will, March 08, 2010, accessed at: <http://thewillnigeria.com/politics/3875-Muktar-Out-Gusau-Why-Jonathan-Removed-Him.html>

claim to Kaduna because none of her princes ruled the town since its inception. He submits that Zaria (Zazzau) Emirate would have not left her most:


“...prosperous town without a traditional ruler...nobody lay claims to Kaduna until when the Gbagyi are demanding for their right... Unlike the Emir of Zaria who did not put up any resistance, the Gbagyi put up stiff resistance and refused to co-operate with British colonial administration. Hence, the colonial administration made it a matter of policy to carry out punitive measures against the Gbagyi and denied them a place on the Kaduna Council. Lord Lugard imported Yoruba, Kanuri, Hausa from Katsina and Zaria, and gave them membership of the Council, and as well auctioned land to them. It was in 1917 that Lugard brought a judge from Zaria to Kaduna, the first time any Zaria person with influence on Kaduna workers was brought” (Filaba: 2000: 5).

British Colonialism and the Search for a Northern Regional Capital

As noted elsewhere, Kaduna became the capital of colonial administration of Northern Nigeria in 1912. Before this time, the colonial capital of Northern Nigeria moved from Lokoja a town located at the confluence of the rivers Niger and Benue in central Nigeria. From there, the capital was moved to Jebba by the river Niger. The capital was again moved to Zungeru (see figure: 3) in the present Niger state, before finally settling for Kaduna.

Figure 3, shows that the Northern protectorate is twice the size of Lagos and the Southern protectorate put together. An extensive study of “Colonial Urbanisation in Northern Nigeria” by Oyedele (1987: 116-131), traced the historical metamorphosis and social transformation process that informed changes

Figure 3: Nigeria in 1900 showing the three regional protectorates (Southern, Northern and Lagos) and the location of Zungeru in Northern Nigeria.




Adapted from: <http://www.zum.de/whkmla/region/westafrica/northernnigeria.html>

in the choice of a capital city in this most expansive region of Nigeria. Lokoja became a temporary colonial administrative capital of the Northern region from 1900 to 1902. The confluence of the Niger and Benue rivers made Lokoja naturally attractive for colonial

military reconnaissance operations. Lokoja also provided communication and navigable routes into the interior of the Northern Protectorate, as well as a centre for commercial activities (Kirk-Greene and Cambell: 1957, Kirk-Green: 1965, Adeleye: 1971, Audu: 2009: 329-331).

Figure 4: Three Regions of Nigeria at Political Independence in 1960




As earlier as 1899, the British colonial administration had constructed a telegraph line linking Lagos and Lokoja. This made Lokoja suited as both an administratively and militarily capital for the Northern protectorate. The strategic location of Lokoja informed initial speculation by the British to make her the capital of not only the Northern Protectorate, but for Nigeria as a whole. Within two years however, Lugard moved the capital from Lokoja to Jebba (see figure: 4). Official rational offered for transferring the capital to Jebba has been summarized by Oyedele (1987: 124) thus: "That

all Lokoja was in poor communication with the big political centres of Sokoto and Borno. Indeed, with the building of the Nigerian railway between 1900 and 1930, this avoided Lokoja, its importance as the commercial centre of Nigeria diminished".

Other reasons were advanced to explain why the British abandoned Lokoja for Jebba. Jebba played a strategic role as a military command and control centre in the campaigns by the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) against stiff resistance to British incursion into central and far-Northern portions of the Northern Protectorate from 1897-1903 (Adeleye: 1971, Mason: 1970).

the rocks near Lokoja often-wrecked steamers, the water supply were poor and sewage facilities inadequate. And above

Figure 5: Nigeria showing the location of Lokoja.

Tukur (1979) provides details on both the pattern of resistance to British colonial rule and counter military manoeuvre employed by the British to crush opposition to its rule. For instance, Tukur observes that British colonialism met stiff resistance in Bida, Muri and Ilorin in 1897. The British encountered similar response in Agaie, Lapai, Kontagora and Yola in 1900. Keffi and Abuja gave a similar response to the British in 1902. Kano and Sokoto responded in like manner in 1903. Jebba served as a capital for less than a year in 1902. After successfully performed the strategic military role assigned to her, she was suddenly abandoned and the capital was relocated again. In September 1902⁸, Zungeru became the new capital. Zungeru existed as a capital for ten years.

Despite the fact that Zungeru had no solid economic and commercial potentials, and very little political insignificance in the North compared to Lokoja and Jebba, Zungeru still attracted the attention of the British colonial

administration and was made capital. One of the strongest factors that Zungeru had which other towns did not, was that she was less infested with mosquitoes and other flying insects. The soil in Zungeru was said to be fertile for agricultural activities, and an easy gateway in the advancement of British colonial conquest further north (Orr: 1965, Perham: 1960). Lugard quoted in Oyedele (1987) spelt out the utility value of Zungeru to the British thus: "It was in 1901-1902 the farthest point North, towards the Hausa states, which it was possible to occupy without a railway. It has proved healthy with adequate water supply and it was at that time free from flies. It is however now possible to make the headquarters anywhere on the line to Kano" (Oyedele: 1987: 131).

On taking over the mantle of leadership as the Governor General of Nigeria, Lord Lugard was confronted with the logistical desire to expand colonial domination to the entire northern region (Orr: 1965). For such a project to succeed, it required a new and more centralised political capital strategic for military manoeuvres (Kirk-Greene and Cambell: 1956). Lugard rejected Zungeru for what he regarded as the "unhealthy

⁸ See Northern Nigeria, 1900-1914, accessed at: <http://www.zum.de/whkmla/region/westafrica/northernigeria.html>, on: 10/02/2010

valleys of the Niger and Benue” (Oyedele: 1987: 116). Railway construction begun in 1896 and extended further north up to Kano (see figure: 1) in 1907. This was done with the relocation of the capital from Zungeru to Kaduna in mind⁹.

Driven by the foregoing dual objective, survey parties were set up in May 1900 by the colonial administration to ascertain the feasibility for a suitable site. The first team was made up of about 300 men of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) under Colonel Morland. This team undertook several reconnaissance research surveys of the Kaduna River and environs. Two other survey parties led by Lt. Moric-Mason and Lt. Col. Coles surveyed the Gurara and Okwa Rivers respectively. The two parties were to link up with the main patrol team on the upper River Kaduna.

Lugard review the report of the three topographic surveys in August 1900 (Oyedele: 1987: 117). Armed with this report, he immediately set up a committee under the Chairmanship of H. R. Palmer to find a suitable site for a new regional political capital for the North protectorate. Other terms of reference for the Palmer Committee includes the quest to find a central location for a Northern Nigerian capital with ease of access to railway and other means of communications. The new potential site or sites were not be too far from Zungeru and Kaduna at which the railway intersects River Kaduna. Other inclusive terms of reference insists that the new site or sites must and should provide “ample room for future expansion, a sufficient generous sort for sanitation, planting, gardening and absence of undue radiation, and an area either remote from or to win-ward of marshy land” (Oyedele: 1987: 138). The committee was also employed to “secure an area comparatively free from insects, particularly from mosquitoes, sand flies, tsetse flies and other actively biting insects” (Oyedele: 1987: 138).

As would be expected from the terms of reference, both the topographic survey reports and the Palmer committees’ report were more favourable to Kaduna for three fundamental reasons. In the first instance, while the Jos Plateau area had a favourable weather, its rocky topography would have required enormous resources to develop. The rocky topography of the Jos area also meant that water supply would not be easily abundant. Both Gurara and Okwa Rivers were surveyed but their navigational difficulties rendered these two sites unsuitable. The relative ease with which the survey team navigated the Kaduna River and its central strategic geo-location, which could be reached from any part of the North within a relative short space of time (see figures: 1&2), influenced Lugard’s instant choice of Kaduna.

Oyedele (1987: 141-142) argue that the British colonial state wanted among other things to avoid “local political complications” and did not want to “encourage the establishment of a large native population within the confines of the administrative capital.” Other reasons advanced by Oyedele include the fact that “without actually establishing a capital in the Hausa country proper, the region of Kaduna affords a site which has Hausa environment and which will be in close touch with the East of the protectorate when that portion of the country is linked up by railway”. After all Kaduna provided the British colonial army a strategic military striking distance against resistance to its rule from any part of the North. With the absence of a dominant influence of the Emirate system, the neutrality of Kaduna possesses the potential to attract and accommodate what Oyedele (1987: 144) describes as “a fairly large alien population without serious risk of denationalising a major groups such as Hausa and the Yoruba.”

Kaduna Metropolis: ‘A Melting Pot’ with ‘Un-melting Identities’

British urban development policy in Kaduna metropolis was anything but segregated and sectarian. As noted elsewhere, urbanisation process in the metropolis was characterised by

9 Ibid.

seizure of Gbagyi settlements and farmlands without compensation. This policy was subsequently adopted by post-colonial regimes (Bawa: 1999). As a matter of colonial policy, the Gbagyi and surrounding small polities were subordinated to the Emirate system under the 'indirect rule system' (Turaki: 1993, Tukur: 1979, Bonat: 1985, Toure: 1995, Adeleye: 1971, Mason: 1970). The case of Kaduna was unique in the sense that it was accorded a special status as an 'independent regional capital' from the Emirate system. There was no Chief or Emir that had legal or traditional control or influence over the affairs of the metropolis. This is the philosophical thrust on which Kaduna metropolis was founded by Lord Lugard. Kaduna was projected to be not just a neutral city, but a 'melting pot' of diversities. The objective was to attract mass immigrant population from within and outside of Nigeria. The metropolis was meant to accommodate, cultivate, nurture and cherish human differences. This philosophy may have been responsible for liberal, peaceful and secular tranquillity that Kaduna metropolis enjoyed from its colonial inception in 1912 until it was ceded to Zaria emirate in 1987. The ceding of the metropolis in 1987 began the journey of the on-going ethno-religious and other forms of sectarian contestations.

The heterogeneous composition of Kaduna metropolis from 1912 to 1987, earned her the tag; "*Kaduna: The Liberal State*" (Gandu: 2003: 65). However, in the aftermath of series of ethno-religious identity contests and violent battles that span the period from 1987-2002 (Gandu: 2004), Kaduna metropolis lost her credentials as a liberal, secular, and peaceful city. In the aftermath of the Islamic Sharia debate violence that engulfed the metropolis in 2000, the Kaduna State government officially abolished the liberal slogan; "*Kaduna: The Liberal State*". A new slogan was designated by the state government. It reads: "*Kaduna: Centre of learning*" (Gandu: 2003: 65). From 1987, both Kaduna as a state and Kaduna the metropolis degenerate from being 'liberal' into anarchy and violent. Residential pattern

of settlements became sectarianised. This is the way Abdullahi (et. al.: 2009: 3) describes Kaduna metropolis in the 1980s: "in the middle 1980's there were religious crises which re-occurred several times... and made the state in general and the city in particular notorious". This led to mass exodus of non-indigenes and those that felt vulnerable to the religious or sectarian crises. Some of them fled and left the city to other parts of the country. Others took resident at the outskirts of the city.

Part of the problem can be traced to the insensitive timing of Kaduna state government's official re-designation of the metropolis. The metropolis was already embroiled in the after effects of the bloody Sharia riots that devastated the city in 2000 and 2002. These ethno-religious riots were the most violent the city had witnessed in recent time. The independent variables that influence the decision to change residency were no longer income level, class, status symbol and or decent environment, but 'safety'. Safety was defined in terms of taking residency where a person's ethno-religious group are in the majority. This means that people affiliated to a particular ethno-religious orientation took residency in one clustered colony. All these measures were security precautions. Inter-religious and ethnic harmony which the city worked so hard to cultivate and propagate in the past suddenly became the source of battle.

Official confirmation that Kaduna was no longer a "*Liberal State*" set a chain of sectarian reactions that has not let off in the metropolis. This single act by the Government of Kaduna State threw open, four broad issues on the front burner of political debate. In the first place, it raises a fundamental question which centred on whether Kaduna metropolis would continue to be secular, heterogeneous and cosmopolitan city that it has been since its colonial creation. Secondly, it rejuvenated an old debate between the Gbagyi community and Zaria (Zazzau) Emirate as to who owns Kaduna? Thirdly, it threatens relative intergroup harmony and social equilibrium that the metropolis had

enjoyed since its colonial creation. The fourth issue concerns the fundamental mandate on the part of government of Kaduna state to ensure peaceful co-existence amongst the different groups in the metropolis. By throwing away the conception of Kaduna as a '*Liberal State*', the government opened the door for the emergence of sectarian entrepreneurs who reconfigures and heightens ethno-religious contests.

The 2000 Sharia violence and others that came after it did not only claimed hundreds of lives, but destroyed property worth millions of naira and divided the population of the metropolis into Muslims-Christian antagonistic camps (Gandu: 2003: 69). Residential segregation which the British had encouraged became the strategy which individuals and groups adopt to ward off fear and insecurity. Till today, people keep relocating residency to those areas in which their ethno-religious group is in dominance. Stream of Christians continues to relocate en-mass from Muslim dominated areas like Tudun Wada, Kawo, Angwa Dosa, Angwan Sarki, Rigasa and Angwan Muazu. Their Muslim counterparts gave up their residency in areas generally considered as Christian suburbs like Sabon-Tasha, Television, Nasarawa, Goningora, Narayi, parts of Makera and Kakuri. Sharp ethno-religious identity residential divide did not affect areas such as Angwan Rimi, Barnawa, and Malali. Population composition in these areas seems to be evenly spread amongst the two major religious groups.

Kaduna metropolis remains divided into two blocks; north and south. Misguided sectarian entrepreneurs seems to enjoy this tragic situation because they keep reminding people visiting the city that river Kaduna which cuts the metropolis into two is the 'natural boundary'. The Muslim northern portion of the metropolis is tagged: '*Mecca*' or '*Medina*', while the Christian southern half became '*Jerusalem*' or '*Tel Aviv*'. Recurrent ethno-religious crises that afflicts Kaduna metropolis and the usual residential cleansing that followed every crisis, do not always affect the Government Reserve

Areas (GRAs). The GRAs are home to Nigerian elite group. After inciting the under-privileged classes, all factions of the elite group usually retire back to the comfort and security of the GRAs. Since the 2000 bloody Sharia riots, people residing in areas in which their religious affiliates are in the minority, have continue to live in fear and insecurity. Absence of concrete democratic structures of governance in Nigerian mega-cities combined with poverty, unemployment and the manipulation of identity difference to make life extremely difficult for the poor majority. Regardless of ethnic or religious orientation, poor residents live in poverty, insecurity and antagonism.

The struggling for control of the soul and heart of Kaduna metropolis is at the root of the raging sectarian war. First of all, the British used the metropolis as a strategic political and military base to coordinate its dominance of the Northern region. In its contemporary setting, Kaduna has been described by Takaya and Tyonden (1987: 40) as a city and state that has great strategic, economic and political importance to Nigerian elite. Kaduna is therefore a city that is home to top brass of serving/retired military officers and bureaucrats as well as elements of the Northern aristocracy. Kaduna metropolis also has a strong presence of the two major religions (Christianity and Islam). All groups in Nigeria, from other regions of Africa and the rest of the world are adequately represented Kaduna metropolis. This partly explains why Kaduna metropolis is often regarded as a 'melting pot' after the commercial city of Lagos. Kaduna is often referred to as "the thermometer of the social and economic temperature of the country, and so whenever Kaduna sneezes, the rest of the country catches cold" (Olayiwola: 2001: 39). The website of the current government in Kaduna State also describes Kaduna as "the political barometer of the country and is been looked at as a pace setter in the northern states."¹⁰ The history of ethno-religious configuration and violence

¹⁰ From the official website of Kaduna State government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, accessed at: <http://www.kadunastate.gov.ng/policy%20thrust.htm>, on: 25/02/2010.

that afflicts Kaduna metropolis in the recent past has often been compared to the history of disruptions witnessed by the city of Jerusalem. Similarly, the debacle of Kaduna metropolis has also been compared to the height of sectarian wars fought between 1970s and 1980s in Beirut the Lebanese capital (Gandu: 2003: 66).

There has also been strong scholarly debate over the existence of a standing *Kaduna Mafia* in the metropolis (Takaya and Tyonden: 1987). While membership of the *Kaduna Mafia* is a guided secret, membership is drawn from both retired and serving military officers, bureaucratic elements, top University professors, business men and women, religious and community leaders from the North. Takaya and Tyonden (1987: 26) argue that members of *Kaduna Mafia* dictate what happens in the metropolis. The membership of *Kaduna Mafia* is constantly routinised. As old members pass away, new and young members are recruited to pursue the agenda of the group. Besides having their base in Kaduna metropolis, the *Kaduna Mafia* is said to be economically and politically powerful to the extent that it dictates not only the social, economic and political running of the metropolis, but has overwhelming influence on national policies in Nigeria. In essence, the activities of the *Kaduna Mafia* dictate and influence the political road map of Nigeria.

The pre-occupation of this paper is not contesting whether *Kaduna Mafia* exist or not. What can be said though with certainty is that over the years some power elite have played and are still playing a central political role in controlling and directing identity energies exacerbated by ethno-religious entrepreneurs in the metropolis. Over the years, the state of security and insecurity in Kaduna metropolis has always spilled over to other urban centres in the Northern region of Nigeria. Like the Israeli and Palestinian struggle over the divided city of Jerusalem in the Middle East, Kaduna metropolis is the most contested and divided city in Nigeria. While contemporary contests over the control and ownership of Kaduna metropolis could simply

be said to be between the indigenous Gbagyi community and their northern neighbours from Zaria (Zazzau) Emirate, a critical assessment of the contest shows that there are several other complex intervening variables that need to be taken on board if we are to understand the anatomy of sectarianism in the metropolis.

One of the trademarks of conflict over Kaduna metropolis is the tendency for any slight inter-group misunderstanding in the city to metamorphose into a Muslim/Christian contest. The conflagration of primordial hostilities in Kaduna metropolis was demonstrated in the violent protest against Nigeria hosting of Miss World Pageant in 2002 (Oyewale: 2002). The genesis of the protest was an article published in *Thisday* a Nigerian Newspapers (Oshunkeye and Mumuni: 2002). This publication triggered violence. The publication in *Thisday* newspapers was considered blasphemous against Prophet Muhammad, SAW, and offensive to all adherents of Islam in the country and the entire world. The careless author of the offensive, provocative, blaspheming article and the publishers of *Thisday* were neither indigenes nor residents in Kaduna metropolis. But the violent protest began from the metropolis. Prior to the 'anti- Miss World', the metropolis was just recuperating from the 2000 Sharia violence that left many people dead and an unspecified number injured with property worth millions of naira destroyed (Adebanjo and Nmodu: 2000, Awowede: 2000).

While the 2000 Sharia riots did caused loss of lives and property in the metropolis, its 2002 anti 'Miss World Pageant' version was anything but a bloodbath. This has been described as sheer mayhem.¹¹ Nigerian Muslims were opposed to the intent to hold the yearly beauty pageant in the country. The beauty pageant earlier fixed for November 2002, had to be shifted by organisers to 7th December of the same year.

11 See "The Damages Religious Crises Have Done to the North", Newswatch, Wednesday, 28 October, 2009, by Abimboye, D. accessed on: 07/02/2010, at: http://www.newswatchngr.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1460&Itemid=26

Organisers opted out of November because it was Muslims Holy month of Ramadan. This is a special sacred period in the Muslim calendar. It should be added here that in Nigeria, adherents of both Islam and Christianity consider the whole exercise of beauty pageant; an immoral venture. By Wednesday, November 20th 2002, hundreds of angry Muslim youths had taken to major streets in Kaduna metropolis to protest. Building housing the office of the newspaper was torched. Private property was also set ablaze in the ensuing violence. Anarchy was unleashed on the metropolis for several days. It later spread to the national capital territory in Abuja. 'Guesstimates' by Human Rights Watch put the death toll at over 5,000.¹² The strategic location of Kaduna and its diverse composition explains why there is persistent battle between groups for its control.

Autocratic Rule and Sectarian Partition of Kaduna Metropolis

It is pertinent to observe that perennial conflict and general insecurity that pervades Kaduna metropolis, correlates with the past and present repressive and autocratic colonial and post-colonial regimes that ruled over the metropolis (Turaki: 1993). From British colonial repression, military mis-rule, to the present so-called democratic government in Kaduna metropolis, none could be said to have enjoyed genuine representative legitimacy. Manipulation of ethno-religious and other forms of identity sentiments have always been the strategy employed by past and present regimes to divide the mass population in the city into fiercely opposing sectarian camps. Like their colonial counterparts, oppressive military and even so-called 'democratic' civilian regimes in Nigeria have never placed the interest of Nigerians above their personal interests.

It is therefore important to ask; why did the Gbagyi community claims over Kaduna metropolis waited until the 1990s before coming to the fore of public discourse? Why was their

agitations stifled and could not come to the open either before or immediately after 1987 when Kaduna was officially ceded to Zaria? Answers to these two questions would help us understand the correlations of repressive and autocratic rule and the predisposition of Kaduna metropolis to sectarian conflicts. The foregoing questions are also significant if placed within the context of the politics of the time. From 1979-1983, both Kaduna State and its capital Kaduna metropolis had a genuinely elected democratic civilian government. This civilian administration was led by a pro-people political party; the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP). The PRP government was headed by a veteran leftwing politician Alhaji Abdulkadir Balarebe Musa. For the first time in post-colonial Nigeria, his government implemented social programs and policies that uplifted the material living condition of ordinary citizens in both Kaduna state and in the metropolis. Influence of aristocratic institutions and identity entrepreneurs in governance was curtailed in the metropolis by the PRP government.

Questions over the ownership of Kaduna metropolis did not form part of the PRP's ideological mandate. The government created an enabling environment that guaranteed peaceful co-existence, development and empowerment of all citizens regardless of ethnic, religious or regional orientation. It is on record that the period from 1979-1983 was the most peaceful in post-colonial Kaduna. This is because the PRP ran a populist government based on consultation of people at the grassroots. The government also invested heavy resources in providing basic needs and qualitative free education and scholarships to all citizens regardless of class, ethnic and religious orientation. The poor peasantry in the rural areas were provided subsidised agricultural inputs. The highest form of inter-ethnic and religious harmony and security in Kaduna metropolis; and indeed the entire Kaduna state, was recorded during this period. The time-lag in the agitation by the Gbagyi community for the control of Kaduna

¹² Ibid

metropolis can be seen in the foregoing context.

A coup d'état in Nigeria by pro-nationalist military officers led by a nationalist; General Mohammedu Buhari took over the reign of power on December 31st 1983. This military regime dismantled all civilian structure of democratic governance. Buhari's government was overthrown in yet another counter military coup d'état led by corrupt and sectarian right-wing forces in August 1985. This government laid the foundation for the tendency by corrupt government officers to engineer sectarian crises to cover their misdeeds. This is what we are witnessing today in Nigeria. The emergence of identity entrepreneurs in Kaduna metropolis and the whole of Nigeria is a function of military misrule and corruption. Another variable was the socio-economic dislocations that characterised the implementation of Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in the late 1980s under the same corrupt military regime (World Bank: 1994, Olukoshi: 1993). By the 1990s, the impact of SAP on the Nigerian masses had become more obvious (Gandu: 1992). As sources of economic survival began to be eroded by SAP (Gandu: 2003: 69), primordial identity became an easy source of sentiment and impetus deployed by the ruling elite from opposing identity camps to mobilise the masses to achieve selfish political goals (Onwuzuruigbo: 2007, Abubakar: 2003).

Bottle-up social and economic stress under the military metamorphosed into the ethno-religious violence that perennially afflicts Kaduna metropolis. Under the foregoing circumstances, claims and counter claims over Kaduna metropolis between the Gbagyi community and Zaria Emirate throw open and reifies the general sectarian divide in the metropolis. Amidst such claims and counter claims, elite from the two opposing camps create ethno-religious associations, assemble die-hard militant followers, whip primordial sentiments; and creates an atmosphere of social insecurity in the metropolis.

From the foregoing, we can infer that the

struggle for Kaduna metropolis goes beyond Zaria Emirate and the Gbagyi community and has expanded to engulf the entire Kaduna state, the northern region and Nigeria as a whole. For instance, retired Generals from the Federated Ethno-Christian Southern Kaduna Peoples Union (SOKAPU) held a press conference on June 7th 2000. At the press conference, the retired military officers expressed their opposition to the introduction of Sharia Islamic Law. They claim that "there can be no Sharia in a state with 55 percent to 45 percent Christian/Muslim ratio" (Nmodu: 2000: 17). Muslims countered by estimating the population of Christians to be just about 40% in Kaduna metropolis.¹³ In another development, the former civilian governor of Kaduna state, Alhaji Abulkadir Balarabe Musa, was alleged to have said that "Sharia is superior to the Nigerian Constitution" (Nmodu: 2000: 17). Sharpening of sectarian positions by the elite inflamed already fragile inter-group relations.

An already charged atmosphere of insecurity in the metropolis was further compounded by the abortive attempt by the Kaduna state government to relocate all residents of the Goningora suburb away from Kaduna metropolis. Goningora is a Christian settlement on the outskirts of Kaduna-Abuja dual-carriage express road. This is where the 'temporary' office of the *Sa Gbagyi I* is located. The attempted relocation of the Goningora suburb was to make way for a Police barrack that would guarantee security and safety for people who ply the Kaduna-Abuja express road. For the fact that Goningora is a predominantly Gbagyi and Christian, government's decision even if well intended, was interpreted by the Gbagyi community/Christians as punitive and sectarian in favour of Muslims. Christian leaders successfully mobilised residents against it (Gandu: 2003: 71-72).

Failure on the part of the Kaduna State government to successfully relocate Goningora suburb brought out four negative outcomes with

13 Maier, K. "Northern Exposure: Northern Nigerian states adopt Sharia". The New Republic 223 no. 7 (Aug. 14 2000).

severe security implications for the metropolis. First, it openly compromised the neutrality of the state government in the sectarian divide of Kaduna metropolis. Second, the legitimacy and mandate of the state government to govern a heterogeneous state like Kaduna state and its divided capital city was brought into disrepute. Third, the government could no longer be trusted to be fair to all citizens regardless of ethnic or religious orientation. Fourth, government lost the initiative and ability to control the security equation in the metropolis. Personal initiatives to ward-off fear and insecurity became the only option open to most people (Gandu: 2003: 72).

The foregoing discourse has shown that the struggle between Muslims and Christians over the imposition of strict Islamic sharia has slowly been built into the contest for Kaduna metropolis. The contest is no longer between the Gbagyi Community and Zaria Emirate. It has gained a wider dimension in terms of both the contestants and the trigger issues in contest. Some of the contestants especially the retired Generals from SOKAPU could be regarded as opportunists. Most of these Generals were top government officers for several years when most sensitive decisions on Kaduna metropolis were taken, but they did nothing to ensure that decisions and policies were equitable, democratic and non sectarian. Now that they found themselves outside power, they began to mobilise 'their people' on sectarian grounds there by triggering primordial issues on their tracts (Gandu: 2004: 6-12).

Since the 1970s, Sharia and Secularism has continued to be the most contentious and trigger issues in the Muslim/Christian standoff in Kaduna metropolis. While Muslims advocate for the complete implementation of the Sharia Islamic Law, Christians insist on maintaining the city as a secular entity. Parallel views on these two issues by Muslims and Christians have continued to generate ethno-religious violence, loss of human lives, and the destruction of property worth millions of Naira. Inter-group conflicts and violence in Kaduna

have persistently spilled over to other regions of the country¹⁴.

Inadequately understanding of the complexity of trigger issues has equally been a major problem. For instance, Abdu and Umar (2002: 95) understood the 2000 Sharia violence to have been caused by "uneducated" youths. We beg to differ with Abdu and Umar's interpretation that "the crisis was more in high-density areas" because it had "high population of uneducated and unemployed youths". It is important to point out that these areas had highly educated youths too. From both sides of ethno-religious divide, a good number of these educated youth actively participated in the perpetration of violence by providing both the logistics and ideological support that pushed the metropolis to bring. We are though in agreement with Abdu and Umar that unemployment has always been a catalyst in Nigeria's sectarian wars.

Concluding Remarks:

As a solution to the foregoing problems, the Kaduna State government created Chiefdoms for all indigenous communities in the state including one for the Gbagyi Community. But apprehension immediately followed government announcement. The map of the new Gbagyi chiefdom shows that the geographical boundary demanded by the Gbagyi was completely altered and ignored in favour of Zaria (Zazzau) Emirate. The political map of the newly created Gbagyi Chiefdom composed of only outskirts and suburbs of Kaduna metropolis. The official boundary demarcation means that the indigenous Gbagyi community have finally been dislodge from any future claim to Kaduna metropolis. This also suggests that the government lends its legal approval and tacit support for the recent spontaneous sectarian residential settlement patterns that emerged in the city in the aftermath of the 2000 riots.

Even if one were to hold brief for the government, how can we explain that most of the suburbs and

¹⁴ See Abimboye, D. (2009): "The Damages Religious Crises Have Done to the North", Newswatch, Wednesday, 28 October.

outskirts which had spontaneously been declared ‘*Jerusalem*’ and ‘*Tel Aviv*’ or the Christian axis of the Metropolis, were the ones that met the criteria to be included in the new Gbagyi Chiefdom? This decision by the government continues to generate paralysis and violence in Kaduna metropolis. It is therefore not surprise that widespread discontent and protests greeted the arbitrary demarcations of Chiefdoms in Kaduna state. The intensity of protests forced the government to set up a committee to take a second look at the problem (Kaduna State Government: 2001). The committee was inaugurated on Tuesday March 13th 2001. The committee was charged to among other things: “Ascertain and demarcate boundaries between the Chiefdoms in Kaduna through investigation so as to properly identify the boundaries of the various Chiefdoms... to reconcile between affected Chiefdoms on any contending matter(s) and where such contending matter(s) remain unresolved, appropriate recommendations should be submitted to the Government” (Kaduna State Government: 2001: 3-5). Despite setting up the committee, the Kaduna State Government still claimed that it created Chiefdoms to: “Eliminate mutual suspicion and discontent often express by the way of recurring ethnic or communal violence... the need for peace, stability and development, the right to self-determination as enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria” (Kaduna State Government: 2001: 2).

The Gbagyi Traditional council interpreted the intension of Government to be well meaning. This spurred council members to submit memorandum requesting that areas such as Barnawa, Kurmin Gwari and Kakuri/Makera, be merged to the newly created Gbagyi Chiefdom.¹⁵ The committee appreciated the peaceful way through which the Gbagyi community presented its demand thus: “The Committee noted the humble and mature manner the Gbagyi request was presented and encouraged the Zazau

Emirate Council and Kaduna State Government to consider it on its own merit” (Kaduna State Government: 2001: 11). The state government did not however come out clean. It merely found excuses in its long awaited white paper’ thus: Government notes the recommendation. As a policy, Government will not transfer any District from one Chiefdom/Emirate to another except there is a consensus between the Traditional Councils involved (Kaduna State Government: 2001: 11). The foregoing position of the Kaduna State Government is more or less a policy of fence sitting and it represents betrayal of the trust, mandate and legitimacy entrusted on government.

Since the first bloody conflict between Hausa-Ibo in Jos in 1945 (Plotnicov: 1971), the Northern part of Nigeria has continued to be embroiled in ethno-religious violence leaving losses and pains in their trail¹⁶. A new dimension is that figures of death victims of ethno-religious violence are often manipulated by sectarian entrepreneurs to trigger more conflicts. Sectarian entrepreneurs often display death bodies of victims and or chunk out fake figures to the media with intend to cultivate sympathy and engineer revenge and more violence. Children from both sides of the sectarian divide grow to know anything but ethno-religious violence and hate values. Political compromise is treated with disdain. Hate, pride, mistrust, fear and anger, continue to inhibit the realisation of benefits that are derivable from cross-fertilisation of cultures.

At the heart of any long-term strategy of conflict prevention and de-escalating existing ones; is the need to develop strategies that can prevent recurrence of violence. One way to set the agenda for conflict prevention is the need to cleanse our democratic engineering. Elections should go beyond the dotting of Nigerian cities and rural areas with campaign posters and party sloganeering. Elections characterised by vote

15 Focus group discussion held with selected members of Gbagyi Development Association in Kaduna State by the author, October 15th 2002.

16 See Abimboye, D. (2009): “The Damages Religious Crises Have Done to the North”, Newswatch, Wednesday, 28 October, accessed on: 07/02/2010, at: http://www.newswatchngr.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1460&Itemid=26

buying, illegal and criminal; stuffing of electoral papers in ballot boxes, massive use of money, violence and manipulation of ethno-religious differences to influence voting patterns; does not demonstrate the presence of democracy in a polity. Government policies should re-construct appropriate value systems that build one single inclusive Nigerian national identity. Such a proud national identity should guarantee access to resources and power to the majority of the population in Kaduna metropolis and the whole of Nigeria. In doing this, there is the need for government to monitor the activities of Children Religious Schools (Islamic *Madrasas* and Christian *Sunday Schools*) in the metropolis. These are institutions through which children are indoctrinated with sectarian and in some cases hate values. These sectarian institutions are configurations with potential to over-heat the ethno-religious tempo in the metropolis in the very near future. How the foregoing issues are aggregated for the peace in Kaduna metropolis will still have the Gbagyi Community playing a major stabilising role.

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Method for Intercultural Knowing: A Foundational Philosophy for the Right to Knowledge of and by a Human Person

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Abstract

The discussion, on the right to knowledge, is situated into philosophy. It examines the knower, “Subject-in-act” and how they know. The discussion looks at the contexts into which knowing can be actualised. Three contexts are presented. These are: the pre-scientific, the scientific and interiority. It examines the possibility of intercultural learning from different races/tribes which may be engaged in different occupations. It argues that knowing can be achieved through the cognitional set of operations. Since the entire human race possesses these sets, inter-cultural knowing is possible. It is one effective way that can minimize or even remove intercultural prejudice.

Key Words

Right to Knowledge, Subject-in-act, inter-intercultural learning, Common sense, Theory and Interiority.

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Introduction

This essay discusses the right to knowledge with a philosophic inclination. It goes beyond the considerations of knowledge per se to the agent of knowledge or the knower. The knower is placed in two contexts: the traditional pre-scientific context and the modern scientific context. The word “primitive” is sometimes used in the discussion not in the derogatory sense but it refers to the pre-scientific context. We use Europe as an example of a developed area to largely represent the modern period because it is more scientifically developed compared to large sections of Africa where on average close to sixty percent of the population is illiterate. As an example we use the people of *Ankore*, a group of people with which we are familiar, to largely represent the pre-scientific context. The people of *Ankore* are largely found in South Western Uganda. We are responding to the fact that since the world is becoming a global village, people deserve the right to know about one another inter-culturally

Our argument is that we cannot meaningfully talk of the right to knowledge without talking about knowledge of the knower or the human person. It is common knowledge that all human persons are cultural beings each with a tradition. It is this tradition that gives them identity wherever they are located on the globe. We argue that the implementation of the right to knowledge can only be meaningful if it leads us to the understanding of the human person in her cultural set-up. We also argue that before we attempt to understand the theories of social and natural sciences, let us try to understand what is common to the human person no matter her geographical or cultural location. Consequently our argument is rooted in two strands that is knowing the knower and the knowers knowing one another inter culturally. Our method of intercultural knowing offers three frameworks common sense, theory and interiority.

Our arguments are based on the assumptions that values/rights are an exclusive monopoly of the human race/human persons. This is

commensurate with article 1 (All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which forms a cornerstone to all Rights. All human persons are endowed with a conscience, that is, by nature they are moral beings. African societies and indeed other societies ensure this reality by setting principles and standards of behaviour to guide society in moral matters; all human beings are endowed with a capacity to reason and reasoning functions in its context. The locus of this context is the mind. The mind is a monopoly of all human races. In the function of reasoning the mind uses a basic set of cognitional operations. That is, it wonders, asks questions, judges and makes justifications. This again cuts across all races.

From these assumptions it is evidently clear that a human being is not only ethical and rational but an epistemological one. He needs the set of cognitional operations in order to understand reality in all its departments. It is knowledge that leads her to correct comprehension and interpretation of the set standards of behaviour. Correct understanding and interpreting of values/rights will lead to knowledge of their appreciation, observance promotion and protection.

In our argument we try to show that traditional Africa put knowledge (informal education) before everything else. This was done through, among others, folklore. We take as an example, the genre of proverbs. This genre, if properly synchronized, can or does categorize all belief systems, standards and practices. Its teaching capacity cuts across all traditional walks of life. The teachings in this genre, if properly comprehended correctly interpreted, using the cognitional set of operations, which is a monopoly to all human race, can lead to correct appreciation of all values/rights. It is Important to note that there is no difference between the cognitional set of operations of the European and that of an African when it comes to the correct comprehending and appreciation of the African values/rights. We all judge them before

understanding them, hence, judging them incorrectly. We reiterate that before judging one let us try to know one another. Let us try to explore the frameworks by which we can know one another. In this exploration we are guided by three basic authors namely Cronin, Lonergan and Cisternino.

Cronin following Lonergan is the first thinker to talk about “The cognitional set of operations as a monopoly of the knower which does not only help the knower to know but also to know other knowers and their cultural contexts”. African folklore being largely oral, Cisternino documents the proverbs of the people of *Ankore* which serve as an example of a carrier for the “African traditional values”.

2. Framework of Common Sense and African Traditional Wisdom

We now proceed with the exposition of the frameworks for inter-cultural knowing beginning with the framework of common sense. In this exposition, we are mainly guided by Cronin.

2.1 General Exposition: Cronin

Cronin informs us that every person and every culture starts with the mentality of common sense. Sometimes this person or this culture remains at that level. In common sense there are inadequacies and it is these inadequacies that call forth theory. Theory attempts to solve problems of common sense. However, sooner or later, theory itself reveals its own inadequacies. This necessitates the intervention of interiority or the subject-in-act. In the usual context, “common sense” refers to a down-to-earth, practical, sensible attitude, or as Cronin defines it, “an undifferentiated, practical, short-term mentality” (Cronin, 1999: 25).

He gives us the characteristics of common sense in traditional cultures. These cultures are simple and undifferentiated or compact. Political, social, religious,

moral, economic and practical affairs tend to intermingle and overlap. Specialised institutions are not yet needed. Education and socialisation are informally passed on in songs, ceremonies and prescribed rituals. Economic institutions comprise cultivation and survival skills. Oral cultures develop languages that are rich in proverbs, nuance, personal relations and attention to practical details of food and work. However, the problem is that they lack in precision, definition, distinction and mathematical terms of reference or abstraction. We must say that this is the case for all pre scientific societies whether European or African. Africa is only being used as a case in point.

In these cultures the predominant reality is personal relations, that is, the primacy of the community, belonging to the group and identifying with the clan. Another characteristic is that the wider cosmos tends to be identified along the lines of the family, that is, the sun as the father, the moon as the mother and the stars as the children. Symbols and myths appeal to feelings, as they are easy to remember and pass on. It is these symbols and myths that provide the answer to global questions about God, life, death, sickness, origins and destiny.

This compactness in all areas of life does not allow clear differentiation. Dangerous confusions result, for example between the symbol and the symbolised, the image and the real, dreams and the waking consciousness and desire. and fulfillment. It is not easy to talk about implementing the right to knowledge in a scenario that is compact and undifferentiated.

In these cultures the rhythms of nature are mostly cyclical. The day, the month, the year, the seasons, birth and death are cyclical and one generation succeeds the previous generation. In these communities, life is lived harmoniously,

with these recurrent cycles. A linear historical idea of progress is alien. The gods, the divine, the spirits of the ancestors, spirits of places, earth and river, all inhabit a spiritual universe which is very close to the physical one. Cronin informs us that religion; superstition and empirical thinking overlap and intermingle. He points out that a failure of a crop might be attributed to bad farming methods, anger of an ancestor, witchcraft of a jealous neighbour, punishment from God or any combination of these. Here as we can see knowledge is crowded and confused. It would not be simple to try to know about such a situation by simply using research questionnaires and percentage the responses.

Cronin also points out, a position that needs further study and investigation, that the languages of these cultures are poor in expressions concerning conscience, consciousness, intention, feeling, psychic tension, soul, intellect and will, freedom and responsibility. The internal states are usually alluded to by using symbols of inference such as head, heart, breath and bowels. He explains that the internal tends to be projected into theophanies, conversations with gods, divine signs and commandments on stone. Freedom is usually understood as submission to fate. Their beliefs are expressed in myth and ritual and handed on from generation to generation. He states that these cultures were practical in a sense that the struggle for survival was the first priority. The environment in which they live is often quite hostile. Their technologies are underdeveloped/basic and challenges are many (Cronin, 1999: 26). So in order for one to understand a situation like this one needs more than the conventional methods.

However, Cronin, a leading scholar in this area, cautions us that common sense does not exclude the distinction between true and false, right and wrong, good

and bad. These criteria are operating, but only implicitly, and are difficult to be made explicit. The criteria are operating, but not in all areas and not at all times.

Cronin is of the opinion that this inadequate distinction between image and idea, dream and reality, the symbol and the real, results in near permanent confusion. For example, disasters were sometimes attributed to natural causes, and at other times to sorcery or divine punishment. It is these inadequacies that eventually call forth for scientific theory. Theory being largely objective, helps in unpacking this compactness.

At this juncture, in contrast to the framework of common sense, we must note that science is multi-definitional. In our discussion we shall be talking about the scientific method which is characterised by clear definition of compact and undifferentiated cases, theory that is based on laboratory provable results and formulae that leads to the proving of tentative hypotheses. We are not saying that the scientific method is a monopoly of the West (Europe). The scientific approach manifests itself all over the globe as long as its criteria are fulfilled. We are not saying that the subject-in-act is a Western creation. The subject-in-act is an idea which manifests in its precepts. It is an approach that is inter-cultural as will be discussed in the subsequent sections. But before we delve into the paraphernalia of the scientific method as an effective method that would help in implementing the right to knowledge, let us look at one of the commonly used genres that is often used to dispense knowledge and that is the proverbs.

2.1.1 Bantu Proverbs: Cisternino

Among the *Bantu*, represented by *Banyankore*, who use proverbs, and we believe even in other social groups all over the world, the main function

of proverbs and other genres found in folklore is teaching and learning. Folklore, in general, and proverbs, in particular, preserve the wealth of wisdom of a particular social group in a particular region or adjacent or related regions. This wisdom is standardised and memorised through the literary forms of proverbs. In the majority of cases, proverbs teach about the behavioural values and standards of a people in a particular region. The potency of proverbs cuts across all ages and social classes. Proverbs are structured aesthetically in order to assist the memory, but their chief function is to provide wisdom. For pedagogical reasons, proverbs are structured in propositions. These propositions are, however, not atomic as in Wittgenstein's case, because one proverb may be employed for many objectives or purposes.

We are introducing proverbs into our discussion because they constitute a rich pedagogical reservoir in the common sense framework of learning and knowing. We feel that their pedagogical richness is not exploited to the full, due to lack of a comprehensive learning method. In that respect the wisdom in them remains largely unexploited. Due to unavailability of a comprehensive method of extracting the rich wisdom in them, they remain undefined, undifferentiated and lacking in logic and mathematical control. So this not only limits the learning of indigenous people, but may also affect foreigners who may not be familiar with the social experiences of the community. Here we are talking about inter-cultural learning and knowing. Proverbs are one genre that can teach a cross-section of people from many unrelated social strata. Proverbs might be based on the experiences of a particular social group.

While that may be true, however, today it is difficult to keep social groups in strict confinement. Every day we experience

cross-border and cross-continent movements. These movements entail the notion of inter-cultural learning. In order to fit into a particular social group, we must respect the social behaviour and values of that group. Proverbs are a rich reservoir of norms of behaviour and values. Let us discuss the potency of the proverbs in their teaching mission. In this endeavour we are assisted by ideas from Cisternino. In his book, *The Proverbs of Kigezi and Ankoe* (1980).

Cisternino groups the proverbs of this region into thematic categories. Following his index, these categories are ranked. The first category focuses exclusively on human behaviour. He does this probably because, behaviour among the *Bantu* as in any other cultural group that is still functioning largely on the common sense framework of knowing, is of paramount importance.

The second category of proverbs focuses mainly on human life and nature. The first category teaches about the self, work, foresight, courage, selfishness, laziness, incompetence, despair, prudence, patience, anti-social feelings and behaviour, humility, truth, friendship, co-operation, kinship, pride, faults of the tongue, disobedience, justice, negligence, theft, debts, drunkenness and stubbornness.

In this category he includes proverbs that teach about the pleasant side of life such, as marriage, children, well-being, riches and so on. Along these, he also introduces proverbs that teach about the bad side of life such as fate, poverty, illness, illusions and death. He also introduces a sub-category on the human being and nature.

We are mentioning these categories in order to show the extent and diversity of knowledge available in the genre of

1 Kigezi and Ankoe are regions in South Western Uganda. People found in these regions are Bakiga and Banyankore. The languages which they speak are Runyankore-Rukiga. The two groups belong to the Bantu Sub-group.

proverbs. At the level of common sense framework of knowing, they seem to touch on all areas. Proverbs are thus a huge reservoir for knowledge worth benefiting from, by those interested in inter-cultural learning. Proverbs contain substantial wisdom to benefit anyone, indigenous or alien.

Cisternino, interpreting the proverbs of *Banyankole* and *Bakiga* says a proverb may be understood as “a soothing sentence” or a “medicine phrase.” In fact, among the *Banyankore* and *Bakiga*, and related Bantu tribes, the word “proverb” means “*orufumu*”, this is derived from “*omufumu*” or “medicine man.” So a proverb, apart from its teaching role, is in fact a healing proposition. He goes ahead to define the proverb as follows:

Proverbs are standardised, short, witty, humorous statements meant to comment on a situation or to give light to summarise it;... a proverb aims at shedding light onto today's fact by relating it to a broader, deeper and traditionally accepted experience. This light is rather dim and 'uncertain and therefore embodies a halo of mystery around it... (Cisternino, 1980: 8).

In this respect, the problem with proverbs that needs to be tackled is the dimness, the uncertainty and the halo of mystery that surround them. This problem is there because proverbs are lacking in definition, differentiation and logical and mathematical control. The effect of this shortcoming is largely the blocking of the impact of the rich wisdom that they contain. They lack in logical and mathematical control because they are not a codified set of laws or rules or counsels. Examples of such proverbs as given by Cisternino are: *Ekyazibiire embwa okumera amahembe nikyo kyagizibiire kugamba*. (What stopped a dog from growing horns is what prevented it from talking). This proverb has a literal meaning as the one given above and a literary meaning. It is the literary meaning that carries the value

of the proverb. According to Cisternino, the literary meaning of this proverb is that “No body is perfect”. Cisternino is a foreigner to the languages of the *Bakiga* and the *Banyankore*. A native speaker is likely to contest the literary meaning given by Cisternino. Cisternino may fail to see the link between the growing of horns and speaking, why the metaphor of the dog is used, the logic between speaking and the growing of horns, the relationship between the creator of the dog and the dog, his intentions in creating the dog and a host of many other reasons.

These shortcomings are evident, even in many other aspects within the framework of common sense knowing. We can cite Mbiti's example of the concept of time in the traditional set-up, in his book, *African Religions and Philosophy* (1969). Before we come to that in the spirit of inter-cultural knowing, however, let us see whether there is anything which Europeans can learn from the genre of proverbs.

It is very likely that proverbs are used more within rural set-ups, where people are operating mainly within the common sense framework of knowing, than with those operating mainly within the framework of the scientific theory of knowing, such as adopted by the Europeans. Because of this imbalance it is likely that there are more proverbs for each topic, with a greater variety of meaning and social and psychological analysis in them within the framework of common sense, compared to the framework of scientific theory.

This does not mean, however, that it is only those within the framework of common sense who should continue to learn from the rich wisdom of the proverbs. Cisternino observes that proverbs in the rural set-up have a much more developed social dimension, as compared to those of the Europeans.

Take the case of proverbs on “greed.” These will teach the individual that the vice might harm you personally. On the contrary, Bantu proverbs do not only target the individuals but the whole community or society through the individual. In this case, the teaching from the same proverbs on “greed,” might teach the individual that, her, “greed” might be harmful to the community. In other words, they focus on the general welfare of the whole community. Maybe this is because of the compactness of these communities. This scenario provides a very good lesson for Europeans, that is while teaching about behaviour or morality it is better to target the community rather than the individuals within the community. This may be explained by the fact that most African societies are founded on the communalist mode of operation. Societal institutions are placed above the individual while European societies are largely founded on capitalist tendencies where the individual is largely placed above institutions. Probably this is because Europe underwent the industrial revolution. This may have greatly transformed their value base as compared to the communities in other parts of the world who are still operating in the commonsense framework. A proverb such as “a stitch in time saves nine” may have come during or after the industrial revolution. Probably its deeper meaning may be - respect for maintenance. It comes at a time when capitalism takes root, this is when community values of communalism run parallel to industrial values of profit maximization.

Another lesson that might be learnt is that Bantu proverbs never tell you directly what to do or what to avoid. They almost never use the imperative form. They simply tell you that “this is what happens” and leave you to draw your own conclusion. For example a proverb such as: “*Muture ni yo murongore*” (The host should load the visitor’s basket only when

the visitor came loaded). The reverse is also true. For instance a proverb such as *Akaibo kaza owanyamugarura* means that (One should not expect to get free things from the community if one is the type who does not reciprocate one should expect nothing from the community). Its equivalent in English would be (a good turn deserves another. This is a very important trait that probably should be learnt by everybody. Bantu proverbs give the premises and leave you to apply your operation of reason. We can see that there is a lot to learn from the proverb genre, but the problem remains and that is how to go about it. As we mentioned a moment ago, this problem remains, even in many other aspects within the common sense framework. We note that in our discussion it was not our intension to project the nature of proverbs but to give their pedagogical capacity. We mentioned the problem of the concept of time. We now turn to this aspect.

2.1.2 African Concepts of Religion and Time in the Common Sense Framework: Mbiti

Regarding the problem of compactness, lack of definition and differentiation, we look briefly at two examples presented by Mbiti (1969). The first example concerns the religious consciousness of common sense culture. On the relationship between the human person and religion, Mbiti says that the individual is always immersed in religious participation. It is an experience which starts from birth and continues until death. Therefore, for the human being to live is to be caught up in the religious drama. The human person lives in a religious universe. As Mbiti explains:

Both that world and practically all his activities in it are seen and experienced through religious understanding and meaning. Names of people have religious meanings in them. Rocks and boulders are not just empty objects but religious objects; the eclipse of the sun or moon

is not simply a silent phenomenon of nature, but one which speaks to the community that observes it, often warning of an impending catastrophe. There are countless examples of this kind (Mbiti, 1969: 15).

This quotation is a good summary of the lack of definition and differentiation characteristic of the common sense framework of knowing. As we can see, the world of religion is one, all-embracing phenomenon, into which everything else is compacted. There is no clear definition of what this world is. A physical rock is not just a rock but also a religious one. The religious component in the rock is not properly defined and its nature is not given. An eclipse is a warning sign of danger. The proper identity of material things and abstract things is not given. A name does not only identify a person, but it carries a religious connotation. As Mbiti says, examples are countless. This world is a world with no clear boundaries, if it is undefined and undifferentiated to people who live in it, and definitely there is no way inter-cultural learning and knowing can be possible.

We consider briefly another example from Mbiti regarding time. Mbiti tell us that time is of little or no academic significance to African peoples in their traditional life. Time for them is simply, a composition of events which have occurred that is events which have taken place in the past are occurring now or are to occur in the very near future. Events which have not taken place now, and those which are not likely to occur immediately, fall in the category of “no-time”. The consequence of this as Mbiti explains:

...according to traditional concepts, time is a two dimensional phenomena, with a long past, a present and virtually no future. The linear concept of time in Western thought, with an infinite past, present and future, is practically foreign to African thinking (1969: 16-17).

In this submission Mbiti is to a large extent right when you consider the fact that the majority of rural Africa is largely illiterate. As the saying goes, we are now living in a global village, where control of events would be impossible without a clear concept of time. Inter-cultural communication about happenings, harmonising of activities and proper planning would be impossible without the mathematical divisions of the clock. No one can afford to live only in the past, the immediate present or the near future. There is need to have a clear concept of the distant future, for the purposes of long-term planning. For proper inter-cultural learning the concept of time has to be clearly defined, and activities and events differentiated according to standardised modes of time. These two brief examples from Mbiti serve to confirm Cronin’s description of the typical scenario of the compact nature of the common sense framework of knowing. We extend these observations to Masolo’s expositions of the same framework. This is because Masolo, like Mbiti further clarifies the problem of compactness and lack of differentiation.

2.1.3 Traditional Africa in the Common Sense Framework: Masolo

Masolo, 1994, gives two sides of Africa that is Africa before colonialism and Africa after colonialism. He projects the views of scholars such as Hountondji, Wiredu and Odera Oruka, among others, as they discuss this dichotomy. Masolo points out that, in the twentieth century, a revolution in many Africans’ conception of the universe has been produced. This new view of the universe in some case has led to complete repudiation of traditional beliefs, systems and, in some other case, to their sharp modification. He points out that now some African thinkers claim:

That traditional reasoning was often inexact; that its physics was moral rather than scientific, that is, that it was divided

into good motions and bad motions, good causes and bad causes; that its classifications were static and were based on supposedly unchanging forms and essences; and finally, that its formulations were useless, for they gave to people no control over natural forces (Masolo, 1994: 194).

The thinking in this quotation projects the exact picture of events in the common sense framework of knowing. Masolo points out that the thinking in this extract can be traced in the ideas of Hountondji, Wiredu, and Odera Oruka. He quotes Hountondji in his essay argues that:

Africa is rich in its products of language (proverbs, stories, dynamic poems and the whole of oral literature); but this language... is not philosophical. "Scientific rigor" requires that no philosophical meaning be read into such linguistic forms beyond what they express or are meant to serve. Although they are important, many such proverbs, stories, epics, and dynamic poems do not necessarily have a philosophical agenda (Hountondji, in Masolo 1994: 197).

Hountondji introduces a very interesting idea and that is that traditional folklore only projects what is meant in the genre. He says that, in its theoretical implications, a philosophical practice supposes, above all, and by all evidence, a responsible thought, a theoretical effort of an individual subject and excludes by this fact any reduction to philosophy of a collective thought. This is a debatable position held by Hountondji. Our own view on this is that philosophical expositions are generalities that address questions for all times, while collective thought is communal for purposes of addressing problems as they present themselves. For our purposes, however, it still reflects the compactness of ideas within the common sense framework of knowing.

Another philosopher who falls within the framework of our discussion is Wiredu. Masolo presents Wiredu as a

more moderate thinker, compared to Hountondji. In Wiredu's thinking, the European or Western scientific forms of knowledge, and the knowledge that is prevalent in the traditional societies, can be modified and reconciled. Masolo presents Wiredu's thinking as follows:

For him, ethno-philosophy is essentially a system of pre-scientific or pre-industrial folk philosophies that have no direct relevance for the modern African who has adopted modern patterns of living.... Living by integrating not only the use of modern machinery into one's life, but also the methods and techniques of acquiring knowledge so characteristic of modern disciplines of study, including philosophy. Both are important ways of living in a modern world (Wiredu in Masolo, 1994: 204-205).

Ethnophilosophy is an expression adopted by Hountondji that looks at African belief systems and thoughts.

What we read in Wiredu is that he does not completely reject the idea of ethnophilosophy, but for him it is a philosophy of the past. Though that is the case, it can be modified in order for it to fit into the modern patterns of living. Here we can say that even in Wiredu we still see the problem of compactness in the common sense framework of knowing. This time it is expressed through ethno philosophy. Our problem with Wiredu is that he also does not tell us how the modification in ethno philosophy can be effectively carried out in order for it to fit into the modern patterns of living.

Odera Oruka is one of the philosophers whose views, for instance on the African philosophic sagacity, falls within the scope of the common sense framework of knowing. Masolo presents Odera Oruka, in his essay, "Sagacity in African Philosophy," as belonging to a group of those who think that:

...in Africa, contemporary or traditional, there were, and must still be, wise men and women who, despite their lack of modern

and formal education, convey critical thinking that is essentially philosophical and distinct from the type of general narrative description of cultural traditions, customs and laws, as portrayed by the old sage... (Oruka in Masolo, 1994: 234).

Odera Oruka presents something new on the debate concerning Africa philosophy. He sees something else which is above the wisdom in the propositions and the narrative in the folklore, that is the men or women who may be illiterate but are capable of conveying critical thinking that is essentially philosophical. He is of the view that philosophic sagacity should go beyond the ability to recite the lore. He suggests a method of how this could be achieved and that is being rationally critical. However, in our opinion, good as this method might be, it is not comprehensive enough, as we shall demonstrate in the next subsection.

Odera Oruka defines philosophic sagacity as the reflection of a person who is a sage and a thinker. A sage is a person who is well versed in the wisdom and traditions of his people. A thinker is a person who is rationally critical and who opts for, or recommends, only those aspects of the beliefs and wisdom that satisfy her rational scrutiny.

As we have said, we find Odera Oruka's approach not sufficiently comprehensive. For instance, he does not tell us how one goes about the task of being rationally critical as one navigates through the traditional folk lore. He says that a philosophic sage recommends only those beliefs and wisdoms which satisfy her rational scrutiny. Do traditions comprise only beliefs and wisdom? What about practices? How does he go about scrutinising these beliefs and wisdoms? His approach falls short of the set of operations.

Our main aim in this subsection on the framework of knowing is not to critique the ideas of the authors who are

helping us in our arguments, but to use their ideas in order to show the general trend running through the common sense framework of knowing. Cronin presents this framework as compact and lacking in definition, differentiation and control. Cisternino, in his presentation of the *Bantu* proverbs, summarises this scenario as follows:

Why do people suffer so much at times, if they have such wealth of human wisdom codified in proverbs? But then I look at the Bible and at the people who have had it for thousands of years! ... Both people of the Bible and *Bantu* of the proverbs share at least one thing in common: that of disregarding in practice the wisdom they possess in theory... (Cisternino, 1987: 5).

Cisternino is not using the term suffering in the generic sense. He actually means moral suffering. Cisternino is calling our attention to failure to apply the subject-based set of operations as effectively as we should. In this case all the wisdom that we have remains a sealed possession.

From Mbiti's ideas we again see the problem of lack of definition, differentiation and control. The world of religion, spirits or superstition in general are not properly defined and differentiated from the physical world. Time is compacted into the past, the present and the immediate future. This situation calls for a comprehensive method that would help to unveil this compacted knowledge and wisdom so that they benefit not only those in the common sense framework, but through inter-cultural dialogue, and other cultures as well. Before we look at how our method of the subject-in-act can lead to inter-cultural knowing, let us give a brief summary of those frameworks which seek to solve the problems of the inadequacies of the common sense approach, namely the framework of theory and the framework of interiority.

3. The Framework of Theory:

3.1 Need for Theory in the Clarification of Meaning

As we have just seen in the section above, the compactness and the undifferentiatedness that characterise common sense cultures, which are pre-scientific cultures, tend to breed confusion and ambiguity. Theory comes in here in order to attend to the problems of common sense. These problems include lack of clarity, distinction and control. Cronin proceeds with showing us how different traditional cultures, individuals and groups experienced a breakthrough to theory. Taking as an example, let us look at how the Greeks experienced a breakthrough to logical and metaphysical thinking, then we shall explore what Cronin calls the threefold philosophical breakthrough to modern epistemological theory and thereafter we shall explore theory in the scientific revolution.

3.1.1 Greek Breakthrough to Metaphysical Theory

Cronin (1999: 27) reminds us that the early Greeks had a rich mythology. At first critical questions were therefore directed to these myths, for instance to the gods and their intervention in human affairs. It did not seem reasonable and fitting for gods to get drunk, marry and have children. A crop of thinkers emerged who tried to find alternative explanations to why in the universe things happen the way they do, for instance, the movement of heavenly bodies, why things change to other things, how an element can change into another, what everything is made of. These questions demanded different

answers which were discussed and refined and resulted in philosophy becoming fully theoretical at the time of Aristotle. A new culture of defining words and meanings in grammar, the logic of propositions and arguments emerged. In

these endeavours, principles, definitions and distinctions were clearly drawn and laid down, which later were expanded into a system of interrelated terms and relations.

Cronin cites the development of geometry as a good example of shifting from common sense to systematic theory. This development theoretically enabled Euclid to apply definitions, axioms and principles to straight lines, triangles, circles and other plane figures and later to three-dimensional figures. Euclid proceeded by applying his principles, developing, expanding, exploring, deducing, testing, proving, until he arrived at the required conclusion.

A question emerges here: how do all these solve the problem of common sense? Cronin points out that at this stage a new control of meaning emerges and becomes explicit, words acquire precise meanings, arguments get formulated, systems are set up, deductions are made, politics is differentiated from ethics, logic from grammar, and the practical from the theoretical. It is at this stage at which many of the confusions of the common sense stage are cleared up. It is now possible for one to say what one means and mean what one says.

3.1.2 Threefold Breakthrough to Epistemological Theory

Cronin tells us that during the period of modern philosophy, philosophers began by rejecting the confused Scholasticism that emerged from the Middle Ages. It set up a system of philosophy that was independent of theology or the authority of the church. The three thinkers who spearheaded this move were Descartes, Hume and Kant. The systems of philosophy that they founded were self-sufficient, theoretical and critical and needed no religious beliefs but reason and sensation. The focus of their systems was the limits and power of human

knowing. The whole of philosophy became confined in epistemology.

The first thinker in the picture was Descartes, who is regarded as the father of modern philosophy. He believed in the power of human reason alone. He believed that, using reason, one could arrive at clear and certain conclusions about man, God and everything else. Through his methodic doubt, he eliminated all presuppositions and established his philosophy on indubitable foundations. He established the fact that the one thing which one cannot doubt is one's existence, hence his dictum "I think therefore I am." From there he moved to the existence of God and the rest of the universe.

Cronin writes:

Descartes aimed at a single integrated system incorporating philosophy, the empirical sciences, mathematics and medicine. He produced the theory of rationalism (1999: 30).

The second in line was David Hume. He typified the theory of empiricism. He comes in opposition to Descartes. His stand is that all knowledge is sense knowledge. He is of the view that there will be more certainty and less disagreement if we stick to the obvious observable evidence of the senses. This stand led him to the abandoning of metaphysics, theology and ethics. According to him, the human mind is limited in its capacity to acquire truth. He believed that whatever ideas we have are derived from sensation and are put together by laws of imagination rather than intelligence.

The third in line was Immanuel Kant. He was of the view that both Descartes' and Hume's theories were extreme. He instead set to establish a synthesis of the two. He accepted Hume's view that our contact with the world is through sensation. It is through sensation that we know phenomena. But this was not

the whole of knowing. He thought that the mind had a contribution to make. The mind constructs or imposes forms on reality. He showed how sensation and the mind combine in the knowing of sensibility, understanding and reason. He established the theory of "subjective idealism." This theory incorporates elements of rationalism and empiricism.

For our purposes, the problem here, as Cronin puts it, is that each theory claims to be true, to be the one and only truth and is incompatible with the others. Though each theory manifests the advantages of the theoretical mode in having the coherent, systematic, precise principles and methods, according to Cronin,

each shows the disadvantage of the theoretical in that it cannot account for itself, cannot deal with contrary theories, and is subject to constant revisions and changes (1999: 31).

The root of our argument is that theory, because of its weaknesses, cannot provide a foundation for the knowing of all reality and all cultures, much as common sense cannot provide a foundation because of its ambiguities and confusions. So far we have looked at the establishment of theory in terms of philosophy we shall now look at the establishment of theory in terms of science.

3.1.3 Theory in the Scientific Revolution

According to Cronin, it is during the period of the scientific revolution that theories rather than common sense ideas concerning the physical world emerged. Generally, these theories manifested five particular characteristics, namely induction, mathematics, measurement, technology and method (Cronin, 1999: 31).

Induction: In order to produce significant data, the first scientists appealed to sensation and experimentation. They stopped appealing to authority figures such as the Church or Aristotle. These

endeavours involved inductive methods of moving from particular observable cases to generalisations about all cases. A case in point is that of astronomy, where precise and long-term observations helped to establish the heliocentric, as opposed to geocentric, systems.

Mathematics: There was a remarkable development and application of mathematics. Geometry expanded to trigonometry, algebra and calculus. Pythagoras' dream of reading the world in terms of mathematics seemed possible. Now mathematical correlation seemed to unlock the mysteries of how matter behaves, as opposed to Aristotle's schema of four causes.

Measurement: Although the Greeks had made tremendous breakthroughs in producing profound geometrical systems that were coherent, systematic, rigorous, deductive and brilliant, they had shown little interest in the actual measurements. It would not strike them to solve a problem by actually measuring or counting. So measuring became important for accurate observations and precise experiments and for useful application of inventions. A case in point is that of Galileo, in his attempt to measure the distance and the time traversed by falling bodies.

In terms of technology, it was at this time, when many scientific discoveries had many practical applications in the making of instruments, in aiding navigation, in building pumps, weapons, houses and roads, to mention a few. A technology that changed the way people lived evolved together with the principle of verification and progress; in a sense that every time a new machine worked it proved the theory on which it was designed. At the same time it produced new situations and new data for further improvement. The history of the motorcar is a case in point.

Method: According to Cronin, the early scientists attempted to solve problems by trial and error. They rejected philosophy and Aristotle and had no one to tell them what to do. Science evolved its own form of theories and methods, verified by observation and experiment.

We have seen a movement from common sense to theory. We have also seen that common sense has its own problems that seem to be solved by theory. But theory also has its own problems, in the sense that it cannot account for itself, it cannot deal with contrary theories and it is subject to constant revision and change. This situation calls for the third framework and that is interiority. Before we look at interiority, let us revisit the notion of the relationship between the framework of common sense and that of theory, by asking: "Does theory really solve the problems of common sense?" Here we again draw on Cronin. He summarises the answer as follows:

The mentality of common sense continues with its emphasis on the practical, the short-term and the lack of clear definitions and distinctions. The undifferentiated nature of common sense remains with its confusions where images may be more important than verified facts, where the way a politician presents herself on television may be more important than what she is in actuality, where no difference may be seen between a psychiatrist and a witchdoctor or the astrologer and the diviner, where belief in alien abductions is on a par with belief in witches changing to animals, where the traditional medicine man is compared to a conventional medical doctor (Cronin, 1999: 32).

This exposition shows that theory has not adequately tackled problems of the common sense framework. Now we turn to our method of interiority and ask the same question, does interiority — subject-in-act — solve the problems of the common sense and theory frameworks? Our contention is that it does. We strongly believe that interiority is a foundational method that can effectively lead to the

knowing of all traditions and all cultures. It effectively answers the question of the right to knowledge interculturally. But before we look at how it does it, let us present its summary account.

4. The Framework of Interiority

Cronin, following Lonergan, defines interiority as follows:

Interiority is not just another theory, but a theory about theories; it is not more of the same, but is rather a shift to a new perspective, a different approach, a total appraisal. It is a going beyond common sense and theory, not in the sense of negating their value and leaving them behind, but in the sense of appreciating their specific but limited contributions (Cronin, 1999: 36).

Interiority has four characteristics. First, it is characterised by awareness of the actual process of human intellectual knowing. It is also characterised by reflection on the multitude of mental activities that together constitute human knowing. Interiority calls for a self-knowledge, not just of our feelings and dreams, our motivations and character, but of the very process by which we see, hear, think, imagine, remember, criticise, evaluate, conclude, and judge. The main characteristic of interiority is to grasp the activity of human understanding; not as it happens in others but as it happens in oneself. Interiority is not another theory about human knowing; rather, it is judging of all theories about human knowing in the light of the data of consciousness.

The second characteristic of interiority is that if we grasp the activity of human intelligence then we understand the source of all languages, cultures, common sense conclusions, philosophical systems, empirical science, historical knowledge, mathematics and the multitude of products of human intelligence. In other words, it is the human mind that is foundational to all knowing. Understanding its

nature and function will lead to the understanding of everything else. Therefore if we can grasp the source of this infinite variety of products it means that we can see that they have something in common, they conform to a common structure, that even though they seem to be contradictory they can also contribute to a single goal of comprehensive understanding of all things in the unity of a single perspective. Nothing is beyond the intention of understanding; nothing can be excluded in principle. Though we cannot fully understand everything we can intend, desire, name, point at, move towards an understanding; we can grasp our desires to know and compare it with the limits of achievement.

The third characteristic of interiority is awareness of how understanding unfolds. It reveals that there are norms that are immanent in intelligence. This is how the mind is designed and works. When we have reached the right conclusion we can know. We do not need somebody to tell us. Ultimately we do not need to depend on an authority, a teacher or a tradition. This is because we can attend to the data; think the matter through; assess the relationship between the conclusion and the evidence of the conclusion; ask all relevant questions; exclude all alternatives; and posit the conclusion as certain, highly probable or just probable. Conclusions are reasonable, defensible and demonstrable; they are not the result of an arbitrary choice, or of blindly following a tradition. We have the criteria for being authentic in our common sense, our theory and our interiority.

The fourth characteristic of interiority is in the recognition that we do make mistakes, but we can reflect further and discover our own mistakes. Systematically we can investigate the typical source of misunderstandings and false judgments. We can notice that we did not attend to all the data. For instance, we did not read all the reports or we

jumped to conclusions on insufficient evidence. We can recognise that we did not think the matter through, or realise the implications of a statement, clarify precisely what we meant, or delimit clearly the limits of our competence. We can also recognise when temperament interfered either rashly, in pushing us into premature conclusions, or timidly, in unreasonable hesitation in positing a conclusion. We can also recognise many biases, prejudices, ulterior motives, much twisted affectivity, which interferes with the proper unfolding of the process of knowing. Going to the basic root of all misunderstanding in philosophy and science, we can recognise the dialectic operating in our knowing between elementary animal knowing, with its criteria of the real in sense, and proper human knowing, with its criteria of the real in correct understanding and affirmation.

We now have the three frameworks of understanding and knowing. We have seen that the common sense framework has problems and so does the theory framework. Cronin reminds us that the advantage of theory over common sense is to be found in the clarity, the precision, the control that it confers through mathematics or logic over the field covered by its principles and method. However, the problem with theory is that it cannot account for itself. It also cannot account for a succession of theories. Again, it cannot identify the criteria for choosing between conflicting theories. It cannot account for its own origins or compare itself with common sense. This scenario calls for something more and that is interiority.

On the urgent need for interiority Cronin summarises as follows:

In the mentality of common sense there is a process of discernment between what is true and false, what is moral and immoral, what works and what does not work. But the process is implicit. It is difficult to put

it into words, to check on how it operates, to objectify the procedures to be followed; hence the application of this common sense discernment is haphazard and uneven, in the mentality of theory the procedures of discernment are stated explicitly either in logic or in mathematics. Enormous clarity and rigor can be attained within the scope of its principles, procedures and conclusions. But... theory is nevertheless incapable of giving an account of its own limitations, its relation to common sense, and the criteria by which we discriminate between conflicting theories. The crisis in classicism, contemporary philosophy and contemporary science seems to be rooted in the intrinsic limitations of the theoretical mentality. The crisis of contemporary times seems to cry out for a further perspective, a third stage of meaning, the realm of interiority (1999: 36).

In this quotation Cronin has not minced words in giving the summary of the solution to our problem of inter-cultural understanding. It is clear that we can learn and know within the framework of common sense. We can also learn and know within the framework of theory. We can learn and know within a combination of the two frameworks, but the confusion in our knowing remains enormous. It is not until we have moved into the framework of interiority or subject-in-act, that we have genuinely learnt or known. We now turn to how interiority can lead to inter-cultural knowing.

4.1 Subject-in-Act and Inter-cultural Knowing

We now have the three frameworks of knowing. The pre-modern period framework of knowing whose centre of meaning is in the common sense framework. We also have the modern period framework of knowing whose centre of meaning is in scientific theory and, finally, we have what we would like to call the present-day framework, whose centre of meaning is in interiority or the subject-in-act. Our task now is to show how a debate or a dialogue

can be conducted effectively in these frameworks leading to inter-cultural knowing. We would like to propose the subject-in-act as a way forward in this development.

4.1.1 Aspect of Truth in the Three Frameworks

The question that we are addressing is how do we get to the truth in any of these frameworks and how can someone who has been predominantly influenced by what takes place in one framework get to the truth in an alien framework? While searching for truth in a tradition or a context or a horizon, among other things, we mainly look at peoples' principles, beliefs, practices and wisdoms. The approach that we propose, which we think cuts across all frameworks and which we think is a way forward in this endeavour, is to be found in the idea of Lonergan's slogan, which presumably is acceptable to all, of "Be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable and be responsible."

We feel that this method can work effectively in any framework one may care to investigate. It is comprehensive because it touches all aspects in any framework. This is because it invites us to be attentive or alert to data of the senses and of our imaginations. If we are not satisfied with the truth in them then we move to the level of intelligence. Here we raise and attend to the questions that have led to our dissatisfaction. We also look at the alternative and competing data. At this level we isolate all those elements which have led to our dissatisfaction and make corrections where we can, or call upon assistance from experts. Then we move to the level of reasonableness, where we establish the truth in our data, that is whether this data meets our expectations before we finally move to the level of responsibility, where we make a personal decision to take a stand, in case we make mistakes

along the way questions will arise which will direct us to where the problem is and then we make further investigations.

As we can see, this approach creates room for open-mindedness and keeps prejudice and bias in the background. This is a trait that is needed in intercultural debates or dialogues. This approach is thorough and comprehensive because it can be applied to all frameworks. This means, for instance, one can be attentive at a common sense framework, intelligent at a common sense framework, reasonable at a common sense framework and responsible at a common sense framework. It is also the case that one can be alert or attentive at the theory framework, intelligent at the theory framework, reasonable at the theory framework and responsible at the theory framework. Of course one can be attentive at the interiority framework, intelligent at the interiority framework, reasonable at the interiority framework and responsible at the interiority framework. That said, we are now faced with the problem of how our method actually works.

When we settle forth the task of understanding and knowing in any tradition, context, system, or horizon, as Cronin puts it, we need to understand something. That is, understanding presupposes something that is to be understood, no matter what it is. This could be a principle, a belief, a practice or wisdom. And this could be at any framework of knowing. The task of knowing presumes a level of presentations, of data, or of the given. It presupposes the level of experience, where data are given but are not yet understood. There must be content to the act of understanding. We cannot talk of understanding unless there is something to understand. The matter to understand comes to us either through the medium of the senses or through our memory or through our imagination. Cronin calls this the first level and it is the level of

direct understanding. For our purposes, this is the level of being alert or attentive to the data, no matter at which framework we may happen to be operating. This level is characterised by activities or a set of cognitional operations, as Cronin puts it,

the activities of defining, distinguishing, considering, forming hypotheses, classifying, identifying, explaining, relating, correlating, counting, measuring, calculating, supposing, conceiving... (1999: 206).

Needless to say, all of us possess these operations, no matter the framework at which we are operating. These operations can bring members from all traditions and cultures to a round table and get them engaged in a dialogue or a debate. Understandably, there may be differences emanating from our frameworks but we can go around them through, for example, the operation of definition, differentiating, distinguishing, classifying, explaining, relating and so on. Surely any normal human being should be able to participate in such a dialogue. This is because all those operations are common to all of us. Of course, some people may not agree with others, but this will be the case not because they have failed to see the truth but because they have chosen not to see it.

Again, no matter at what framework we may be operating, all of us can move to the second level of cognitional process. The first level gives us a possible relevant hypothesis or a bright idea, or a set of concepts or definitions which may or may not be correct. At the second level of cognitional processes we are at the level of being intelligent. We are weighing the evidence, checking the results, studying the link between the conclusion and the premises, examining reasoning and so on.

Of course here we are likely to face a challenge concerning how people from

the common sense framework can sit at a round table with people from the theory framework and learn from one another. The solution here lies in the definition and differentiation and not necessarily in content. For example, theory understood in the scientific context connotes coherence, systematicity, precise principles and methods. This mode is not a monopoly for the Europeans. It can be learnt by anyone from any framework. Similarly, people from the common sense framework do formulate theories and hypotheses in the form of ideas.

Although we can add that these theories are still in their rudimentary form and are not yet well developed as a system in these cultures, they still work for them. For instance, the *Banyankore*, in their practice of witchcraft, do reflect tendencies of theory and hypothesis. They accept that witches are capable of causing harm to others. That is their theory, which is in the form of a belief. They also ask the question who is responsible? This leads to hypotheses. Finally, they ask the question is it true? They then proceed to establish the aspect of truth through consulting with the oracles. Whether the outcome of this process is acceptable or not is a matter which can lead the two opposed members to a debate. Since the two groups have the criterion of intelligence, this debate should lead to some form of understanding from both sides. This example illustrates the fact that the three frameworks are not mutually exclusive. That is why common understanding is possible

It is this process of looking at all aspects, examining them, comparing them, differentiating them, associating them and harmonising them that ensures a reasonable conclusion. This is the level that culminates in judgment, whether the aspect is true or not, and finally leads to a personal stand being taken.

As we saw in the previous sub-sections, Cisternino gives the genre of proverbs as the source of wisdom and knowing, but he does not tell us how this knowing can be achieved. Here we say that we can extend our method of the subject-in-act into the genre of proverbs. We can proceed from the level of being attentive right through being intelligent, to being reasonable and responsible. Cronin talks of the compactness at the framework of common sense knowing. Again we say our method can open up this compactness through definition and differentiation, and through all the other operations which we have mentioned.

Odera Oruka talks of the rational sage, but he does not tell us how this sage operates. We see lack of definition and differentiation in African religions and in their concept of time. Our method through the set of operations can clarify this scenario. Cisternino's approach of the proverbs can lead to knowing, but this approach is not comprehensive enough to cover all areas of knowing, as we have demonstrated in this sub-section. The same can be said about many other thinkers. All-in-all we believe and remain convinced that it is the idea of the subject-in-act or self-appropriation that can lead to inter-cultural dialogue and debate that can finally lead to inter-cultural learning and knowing. We will now discuss how the self-appropriated subject comes about.

4.2 Self-Appropriated Subject

4.2.1 Moving in There

Contrary to the empiricist view of reality and intercultural knowledge being out there and being perceived by the detached sense organs, Lonergan invites us to begin the journey towards self-appropriation by "moving in there." Before we see what that means, let us explore the problem which motivates Lonergan to invite us to undertake this journey. In order to

appreciate the envisaged problem fully, he begins by inviting us to appreciate the fact that when we pursue knowledge we pursue the unknown. This quest is not only conscious but it is a pursuit that is intelligent, rational, deliberate and methodical. From this statement, anyone would wonder how this pursuit, which is intelligent and methodical, would be possible when one is attempting to attain something which one does not know.

This aspect alerts us to the fact that in the human being, there exists something which Lonergan calls a natural ideal of knowledge that moves her towards knowledge. This ideal is a tendency that is innate. That is, it belongs to the human being by nature. It is not a facility that is acquired externally. We cannot easily understand its nature or what it is. Equally, we cannot understand its goals naturally or naively. We have to exert conscious efforts in order to work out our conception of it and its goals. That makes it a formidable problem to face. Why is that so? Lonergan points out that several ideas of knowledge have been put in place, but found to be inept as ideas that would lead to knowing all reality. For instance, the idea of pure reason has been criticised by Kant and contemporary scholastics. Lonergan wonders, if this idea is wrong, then which one is right? By being wrong, it means that philosophy can no longer claim its status as a movement from self-evident, universal, necessary principles to equally certain conclusions. If we want to claim our position in the universe as human beings who are different from other creations, self-appropriation is a process which all of us have no choice but to undergo. We have to join hands with Lonergan, respond to his call and undertake this journey, but before we do that we have to understand what this journey is all about or what it involves. It is to that explanation that we now turn. Self-appropriation involves the

perfection of the ideal of knowledge. Once this ideal is perfected, it will lead us to the correct search of the unknown.

The question of our concern now is, how do we begin the journey to self-appropriation? We begin this journey by “moving in there” — not in the Cartesian sense though — that is,

...to move into the subject as intelligent — asking questions; as having insights — being able to form concepts; as weighing the evidence — being able to judge. . . in there the ideal is functionally operative prior to its being made explicit in judgments, concepts and words. Moving in there is self-appropriation. . . reaching what is prepredictive, preconceptual, prejudicial. . . it is moving from ontology, which is the logos, the world about being, to the ontic, which is what one is (1990: 14-15).

Here we can say that moving in there is tantamount to looking in there, though not in the ocular sense, which Wittgenstein (1974) and the empirical school try to propose. Below Lonergan uses the term “presence” to illustrate what is understood by looking in there. He points out that there are three ways in which the term presence could be understood. For instance, it is possible to say that the chairs are present in the room, but it would not be possible to say that the chairs are present to the room, or the room is present to the chairs. Being present to, which is the second sense of presence, cannot be used in order to relate to the objects that are not conscious of one another.

Presence in the second sense can be used to relate to animals, for instance a dog seeing another dog across the road and crossing over. In this example the term “present” can be used in the second sense. The dog is present to the other dog, or the dogs are present to each other. This second sense of present is different from the first, because the second sense of present presupposes consciousness. However, there is a third sense of

presence, which is our direct concern. This is the sense which concerns the subject, which explains what is meant by self-appropriation, begins by looking in there. My being present to someone and someone being present to me is not the same thing as the chairs being present in the room.

The third sense of present is that someone cannot be present to me without me being present to myself. For example, if I were unconscious someone would not be present to me and if someone was unconscious I would not be present to her, so the third sense of presence is the presence to oneself. In a nutshell, the presence of the chairs in the room is a physical, material presence. This sense of presence is different from the presence of two objects being present to each other, for example a dog being present to another dog. In the third sense, the person has to be present to herself first, in order for others to be present to her. This is the presence which is of importance in the process of self-appropriation. Someone is there but she is also present to herself. Self-appropriation involves this third presence.

Our task now is to see how it is achieved. As Lonergan expresses it, is not achieved by craning one's neck to see what is inside oneself, neither is it achieved by turning oneself inside out in order to look at oneself. Even if this was possible, it would still be being present to oneself in the second sense. In other words, in order to have yourself to yourself, you will have to be out there first, looking at yourself. This type of looking is the empirical type. It is only a step in the process of self-appropriation. As Lonergan states,

What is important, in other words, is the looker, not the looked at, even when the self is what is looked at. So it is not a matter of introspection in any special sense, in any sense of “looking back into,” because what counts is not the presence

of what is looked at but the presence of the subject that looks, even when he is looking at himself (1990: 16).

To explain the main idea in the above quotation, Lonergan uses the example of a teacher in class. In a lecture room students are empirically conscious. However, depending on what is going on in the class, the teacher can tell by the mere looks on the students' faces whether what she is teaching them is being or whether they are finding it dull. If what the teacher is saying is getting through, then the consciousness goes beyond the mere physical to the intellectual or intelligent consciousness. What is happening is that the students are probably catching on or understanding; or they are trying to, but are still puzzled. That is what is regarded as intellectual consciousness or presence. Then there is the third level, which is the level of reflection. This is when the student is judging whether what she is trying to understand or what she has understood is true or false. Once the student is satisfied that she has got the idea properly and it is a true idea, then she moves to the fourth level, which is rational self-consciousness. That is the final level along the journey of self-appropriation. At this level the student's rational reflection is about herself. It is the stage when she asks herself whether what she is doing is right or wrong. This is where rational reflection is concerned with her own action. Lonergan summarises this journey of moving in on oneself, as follows:

It is not a matter of looking back into yourself, because it is not what you look at but the looking that counts. But it is not just the looking; it is not being entirely absorbed in the other object; rather, it is adverting to the fact that, when you are absorbed in the object, you are also present to yourself. If you were not, it would not count. If there were no one there to see, that to whom other things are present, that which must be present to itself for other

beings to be present to it, is not necessarily there. He or she is intelligent, rational, and rationally self-conscious (1990: 16-17).

Self-appropriation is thus a series of operations ranging from empirical experiences, or being empirically conscious, through to intellectual experiences or being intellectually conscious, that is trying to understand what one is confronted with, to being rationally conscious or the level at which one is trying to establish whether what one has understood is true or false and finally to the level where one takes personal responsibility for the rightness or wrongness of one's actions and that is the level of rational self-consciousness. What we are learning from this exposition is that understanding all reality begins with self-understanding. Understanding all reality involves engaging the operations of the subject-in-act. The subject-in-act, through the precepts of transcendental method, can dialogue in all cultures, hence learning from them.

Conclusion

We conclude this argument by recapturing the three frameworks of inter-cultural knowing, beginning with the common sense framework. We say that this framework is characterised by compactness where activities intermingle and overlap. We looked at specific cases which included proverbs with their pedagogical potential, religious experiences and the concept of time in the common sense framework and how philosophy has been interpreted before and after the colonial experiences. We established the fact that answers to questions raised in the common sense framework could be found in the theory framework. This is because the theory framework is characterised by rules, precision, systematicity, coherence, logic and control. It became evident; however, that theory also had its own weaknesses, such as failure to account for itself, failure to deal with contrary theories and the problem of being constantly subjected to revisions and changes. We came to

the stage where it was evident that, though the framework of theory could explain some of the issues in the common sense framework, because of its weaknesses it could not be established as a foundation for inter-cultural learning. That necessitated a call for another framework, which is interiority or the cognitional set of operations or subject-in-act. We saw that, through its precepts of being attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible, it qualified as being comprehensive enough to facilitate the pedagogical call for inter-cultural learning. We looked at how the Greeks went about questioning their rich mythology. This was the beginning of a journey towards clarity and differentiation. We saw how philosophers during the modern period came up more succinctly with the theories of rationalism and empiricism..

However, that would not be possible until all those who are still operating largely at the common sense framework, all those who are still operating largely at the theory framework and all of us who have heeded Lonergan's call in the "Insight" to undergo the process of self-appropriation did not heed. We must, first of all, be present to ourselves before anybody else can be present to us. We must know ourselves in the Lonergan sense, before we can know anything else in any tradition or system. We established that it is a prerequisite that we must first undertake the journey to self-knowledge as conscious, intelligent, reasonable and responsible knowers. This is the move that would make us ultimately basic or foundational for all knowing. It is after accomplishing this move that we could proceed to inter-cultural knowing. We established that through the cognitional set of operations, or the subject-in-act, we could move towards knowing reality in its final analysis in all traditions and systems. European and African social anthropologists, and philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Lonergan, Winch, Macintyre, Evans-Pritchard, Horton, Shutte, Giddy, Mbiti, Wiredu, Masolo and Odera Oruka, would come to a round table to solve the problem of inter-cultural knowing,

once and for all. If that could be achieved, then we say that we have completed the mission that this discussion set out to accomplish..

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Culture, sexual values and AIDS risk among the Batooro, Western Uganda

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Abstract

Adherence to cultural values especially with regard to sexual fidelity is very important in the spread of HIV infection. Moreover, to the extent that there is no known cure or vaccine for AIDS, behaviour change constitutes the most effective way to stop the spread of the epidemic. Therefore, anthropologists and other social scientists need to be conversant with the social and cultural context in which sex is undertaken and the attendant risk thereof. Hence, it is important to undertake detailed ethnographic analyses in different cultural settings that can inform policy and programs aimed at HIV/AIDS prevention.

This paper presents data on cultural attitudes, values and norms regarding sexual behaviour in general and fidelity in particular among the Batooro who inhabit the Kingdom of Tooro, Western Uganda.

Data presented in this paper shows that when infidelity takes place among married Batooro, it is unusual for a woman to leave her husband because of the man's infidelity. The woman may quarrel, but she will not leave her husband. On the other hand, data presented show that infidelity can lead a man to leave his wife. All this reflects a cultural value in many Ugandan Communities that put a premium on a wife's docility and fidelity, while accepting, or even expecting a man to have more than one sexual partner. This needs to be taken into account by HIV/AIDS control programmes.

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Background

In Uganda, the first cases of AIDS were identified in 1982 at the fish landing sites of Lukunya and Kasensero in Rakai district. The disease spread rapidly throughout the country, resulting into a severe generalized epidemic. The Uganda AIDS Commission basing on data provided by the Ministry of Health Sentinel Surveillance Program has identified three distinct phases in the trends of HIV prevalence from 1989 to 2005. First, a period of rapid increase between 1989-92 with the prevalence rate peaking at an average of 18 percent, second, the phase of rapid decline, between 1992 – 2002, and the third, the current phase of a rate between 6.1 to 6.5 percent and increasing (UAC, 2006).

Overall, as noted by the Uganda AIDS Commission, HIV prevalence rates are lower in rural areas than urban areas. This trend was also captured by the 2004 – 2005 Uganda HIV/AIDS Sero-Behavioural Survey (UHSBS). This survey revealed that among men aged 15 – 49 years, HIV prevalence rate was 6.4 percent, while regionally, Central Region had 8.5 percent, Kampala 8.5 percent, North Central 8.2 percent, North East 3.5 percent, and North West 2.3 percent (UAC 2006; UNAIDS, 2006; MoH Uganda and ORC Macro, 2006; Kirungi et al. 2006).

Age and sex seem to play a big role in rates of HIV infection among Ugandans. For example, disaggregated data by age show an increase in HIV prevalence for both men and women until peaking for women at ages 30 – 34 (12%) and for men at ages 35 – 44 (9%). Apparently, women are far more likely to be infected at younger ages compared to men, so that prevalence rates for women are higher than for men at ages 15 – 49, however, at 40-44 years, the male rate is marginally higher than the female rate whereas at ages 50 – 59 years, the pattern is reversed, with prevalence higher among men than women (UAC, 2006).

While most Ugandans have high levels of knowledge on HIV/AIDS, this knowledge has not been translated into effective behaviour

change for HIV prevention. Nyblade et al (2001) for example, note that many Ugandans engage in higher risk sex including sex with multiple partners, especially non-marital sex for survival. In addition, the consumption of alcohol and drugs before sex and unprotected sex with someone whose sero status one does not know, is fueling the epidemic. In essence, there is lack of internalization and personalization of HIV risk (Kirungi et al 2006).

A second major conduit for the transmission of HIV in Uganda is Mother-to-Child Transmission (MTCT). Published data show that MTCT accounts for about 15 – 25 percent of new infections (UAC, 2006). Other important drivers of the HIV/AIDS epidemic include discordant couples, with data showing that overall, 5 percent of cohabiting couples, are HIV discordant, that is, one partner is infected and the other is not (UAC, 2006). More worrying, is that most discordant cohabiting couples are not aware of their sero status and therefore, unlikely to take precautionary measures such as using condoms. Moreover, studies show that couples who test individually are more likely to disclose to persons other than their spouses and even when they disclose to their partners, they may wait as long as two years to disclose (Oundo and Siu, 2005).

Economic factors are also important drivers of the epidemic, influencing poor and vulnerable people, especially girls, to engage in risky sexual activities for survival (UNAIDS, 2006). Conversely, HIV/AIDS is a driver of poverty, as it affects the most productive segment of the population. Leading to loss of wages and income, in fact, recent findings show that there is an increase in HIV prevalence rate among those in the lowest income quintile (MoH Uganda and ORC Macro, 2006).

Lastly, in Uganda, cultural values, such as wife inheritance and traditional gender roles and values that insist on women being obedient and subservient to men, are also fueling the epidemic. Such cultural values imply that a woman cannot question infidelity of the

husband, nor can they deny them sex even if they know their philandering ways (UNAIDS, 2006). Moreover, as some scholars have pointed out, gender relations and power dynamics in marriage favour the man over the women as regards decisions affecting economic needs, health seeking and how many children to produce (Rwabukwali, 2008).

This paper presents data from a study in Kabarole district, Western Uganda, employing a form of political economic approach, the “Cultural Critique,” (Justice, 1986) to understand and unravel the complex interaction between cultural norms and women’s social and economic dependency, and how these limit Batooro women’s ability to reduce their risk of HIV infection through safer sex practices. Specifically, the study aimed at identifying the socio-cultural and sexual behavioural patterns that influence the vulnerability of Batooro women to increased risk of HIV interaction of local gender relations, poverty and government health policies for making Batooro women more vulnerable to the risk of HIV infection than men. Lastly, the study aimed at identifying Batooro women’s choice of prevention strategies against HIV/AIDS. This paper will focus on the following objective: explication of factors linking cultural norms and sexual values and women’s vulnerability to risk of HIV/AIDS among Batooro women.

Gender and AIDS Risk

Social scientists distinguish **sex** and **gender**. Sex refers to biology: male and female, whereas gender refers to variation in roles learned through socialization, played by men and women as members of society (Whitehead and Conaway, 1988). The relationship between gender and health is complex, requiring consideration of not only social roles, but also sex based biological factors (Broom, 1991). Nevertheless, from a purely biological point of view, sexually, women seem to be at greater risk of acquiring HIV/AIDS and other STDs than men. First, the volume of male ejaculate, which is deposited

directly onto the vulnerable cervical tissues, is often much larger than cervical and vaginal secretions (Alexander 1990). Second, once an infection has been established, the anatomy of the female precludes ready visualization of the damaged tissue. Lastly, in most cases when women are infected with sexually transmitted pathogens, such infections cause no symptoms or such mild ones that many women fail to seek treatment. In effect, even if diagnostic procedures and treatment were available, some women would not seek them (Alexander, 1990).

But biological and physiological factors only partially explain gender differences regarding vulnerability to risk of HIV infection. In reality, as Mann et al (1992:78) observe, “It is people and their behaviour that constitute the key dimension in the HIV equation.” Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of gender differences in HIV risk must go beyond biological factors to analyse male and female behaviour and the ways in which behaviour is influenced by gender roles and relationships (Gupta and Weiss 1993).

The heart of the problem with regard to female vulnerability to HIV infection, it has been argued, is the unequal role and status of women worldwide (Gupta and Weiss). Often, this is subsumed under the rubric of gender relations. It is argued further that embedded gender relations lead to greater economic and social dependence of women on men, hence increasing their vulnerability to HIV (Kisekka, 1990; Rwabukwali, 2008). However, I should point out that the notion that unequal role and status of women compared to men increases women’s vulnerability to AIDS, and is often based on much generalization. There is dearth of carefully conducted studies that show empirically – the link between embedded gender relations and vulnerability to HIV/AIDS. The data presented in this paper is a move to remedy this anomaly.

The Batooro

This study focuses on the Batooro, of Kabarole district, Western Uganda. It is important to understand their history and cultural values regarding sexual relationships and sexual behaviour in order to understand the variables that influence AIDS risk among this population.

The Batooro live in Kabarole district (formerly Tooro Kingdom) of Western Uganda, at the foot of Rwenzori Mountains. The district is bordered on the North by Lake Albert and Hoima district, on the West by Bundibugyo and Kasese districts, on the South by Mbarara, and on the East by Mubende district.

Kabarole district is one of the Bantu populated interlacustrine societies of Western Uganda. The Kabarole plateau is densely covered by bush, and some of the valleys have fairly extensive forests.

Tooro Social Structure

The Batooro are a patrilineal society, and in the past, clans and lineages tended to be powerful corporate groups that occupied hills, ridges, or villages. Today, however, clans are not as powerful as they used to be although they still wield considerable economic, cultural, and religious power. For example, in some instances, clans have been involved in arrangements for succession of heads of households, in the event of a death of a clan member. Clans also help in solving local disputes, especially those involving land ownership. However, it is fair to say that currently, clans do not play a crucial and integrative role as in the past.

Tooro is a male-dominated society, and in the past, the superiority of a man over a woman was regarded as a basic foundation for a Mutooro man's whole way of life (Taylor, 1962; Perlman, 1966). Today, Batooro women continue to do most of the housework in addition to working in the gardens. However, through modern education, new ideas about relationships between men and women are beginning to

emerge. For example, while women are still expected to be differential, respectful, obedient, and faithful to their husbands, their status has improved. These days, women enjoy a number of freedoms and privileges; they can now take up employment outside their homes, and if a father dies without leaving a son, a daughter can inherit her father's property. It is also becoming increasingly acceptable for a woman to quit an abusive marriage.

Marriage in Tooro was, and is, relatively early for girls. In most cases, the primary purpose of marriage is procreation. In the past strong value was attached to female virginity, and at the same time, there were strong sanctions against an unmarried girl bearing a child out of wedlock (Perlman, 1970, 1975). Some of these values still exist, but they are not held as strongly as before. In the past, most of the marriages were arranged by parents for their children. These days, only a small fraction of marriages are arranged. However, as in the past, payment of bride-wealth is required to express transfer of rights in marriage to the husband by the girl's father. Polygamy was, and still is, an important conjugal institution although only a few wealthy and powerful men can afford it. In Tooro society, both in the past and today, there is great value attached to children, and a man with many children is regarded as "wealthy". For purposes of the present discussion, it is noted that culture, sexual values and behaviour influence risk of HIV/AIDS infection among the study population.

Methodology

The study on which this paper is based was carried out in Kabarole district, Western Uganda, about 300 kilometres west of Kampala, Uganda's capital city. In Kabarole, interviews were held with 120 village women aged 15 years and above, residing in Mugoma village. The bulk of the interviews were conducted between August 1995 and January 1996, and periodically updated between 2001 and 2008. The aim of the interviews was to identify socio-cultural and sexual behaviour patterns

that influence the vulnerability of risk of HIV among Batooro women, and to identify socio-cultural factors influencing Batooro women's choices of preventive strategies against HIV/AIDS. The 120 women were selected using purposive sampling in that any woman who was 15 years and above, and who was willing to be interviewed was recruited until the quota of 120 women was reached. Two interviews were conducted with each of the selected women. The first interview collected socio-demographic data (religion, years of schooling, and income). This demographic and background information was essential to describe and profile the study population. The second interview collected information concerning such issues as the role of sexuality in life; awareness and knowledge of AIDS; prevention strategies against HIV/AIDS; exposure to information about AIDS, and cultural values and practices that predispose Batooro women to the risk of HIV/AIDS. The interviews were conducted using a semi-structured interview guide.

In order to gain a deeper understanding of the intersection of cultural factors, gender relations, and poverty that expose Batooro women to greater vulnerability to the risk of HIV infection than men, in-depth focused interviews were done with a sub-sample of 30 women key informants. These women were located using snowball/networking procedures (Bernard, 2006). That is, once a woman was identified as being particularly knowledgeable about cultural issues, she was recruited and then asked to name two or three other women whom she thought would be a useful resource to interview.

Results

After transcription, data from the semi-structured interviews were entered on a lap top computer using the ethnographic software, Ethnography V4.0. This assisted in coding the data. The coded qualitative data was then transformed into quantitative information using the EPINFO 5.0 program. This resulted in data in form of frequencies which was subjected to

bi-variate analysis. The data set from the in-depth interviews was analysed using content analysis. Each of the 30 cases was reviewed in total as a case study, to obtain an understanding of the "whole picture" as it affects HIV risk among the Batooro.

Risk of HIV/AIDS among the Batooro

To gain insight into factors that may be associated with increased risk of infection with HIV among Batooro women, subjects were asked to name any cultural practices or sexual behaviours that may lead to the spread of HIV/AIDS among the Batooro. Most women (60%) were of the view that the Batooro, both men and women, are a fun loving people, who love sex too much. It was further reported that not only are the Batooro sexy, but they are also lazy, and Batooro women use sex, *kukwana*, to achieve material needs. The following excerpts make this clear:

The Batooro have manners of "wanting", literally meaning that the Batooro love sex too much (30 year old married woman).

Tooro people are very lazy. They prefer to be given things for free. So, you find many women sleeping around to get what they want. The Bamba (aneighboring tribe) are equally lazy, and they are also suffering, but the Bakonjo (also a neighbouring tribe) are hard working and industrious. So, you don't hear Bakonjo women with AIDS (58 year old, separated, "saved" woman).

Tooro people enjoy living town life too much. They go to Kampala or Kasese and come back with the disease (19 year old married woman)

A perception that Tooro people are sexy and promiscuous is difficult to validate since it is essentially a matter of opinion. In part, this opinion is based on old Anthropological studies of the Bantu of Western region in Uganda in general, and the Tooro people in particular, ascribing to them lax sexual values (Southall, 1960; Southall and Gutkind, 1957, and Taylor, 1962). The love of easy money is another cultural

trait among the Batooro that was mentioned as possible factor in the spread of HIV/AIDS in Tooro society. One respondent said:

Well, it is promiscuity and love for money that exposes people at risk of AIDS. Money brings problems. Even married women are going out with other people because of money. Young people, including school girls, go out with older men because of money (60 year old divorced woman).

Forty-one (34.2%) of the women report that excessive consumption of alcohol among the Batooro is another behaviour exposing Tooro people, especially women, at risk of HIV infection. As one informant told us:

People in Tooro and in the village drink too much. Too much drinking of alcohol can bring danger. When a person is drunk, he or she can be lured into sex. Moreover, a drunken woman may even be raped (43 year old single woman).

The importance of alcohol consumption as a risk factor for HIV spread was not lost on the village leadership in Mugoma. In a move specifically aimed at AIDS control, the village Local Council passed a by-law in 2002, banning dancing places in the village, as well as the sale of alcohol. All bars were closed. However, during this study, I found that consumption of alcohol is still very high. Most bars may have been closed, but this has led to a rise in private drinking places, often run by single women from their own homes. These women sell local brew, *tonto*, and a potent locally distilled gin called *waragi*, which also goes by the nick name of “*kill me quick*”, because of its ability to make consumers intoxicated very quickly. Informants stated that the danger of alcohol consumption with respect to the spread of HIV/AIDS, is that people who are drunk tend to lose their normal rational judgment and may end up sleeping around, hence helping spread the infection. It should be noted that this observation is often assumed with no hard data.

While many sexual behaviour practices among the people of Tooro seem to favour the spread

of HIV/AIDS, a number of emerging practices were mentioned as being potentially beneficial in protecting oneself against infection with HIV/AIDS. The first important trend that may provide the Tooro people with protection against HIV/AIDS is the reported tendency of married couples being more sexually faithful to each other. This was mentioned by 27(22.5%) of the women interviewed.

A second trend is the observation that people are now more “careful” about whom to have sex with. This was mentioned by 25(20.8%) of the women interviewed.

The last trend is the reported increase in the number of young people getting “saved”, and vowing to abstain from sex until marriage. This was mentioned by 14(11.7%) of the women in the sample.

Cultural Values about Sex and HIV/AIDS Risk

Many sexual values, behaviors and attitudes of sub-Saharan African Cultures have implications for AIDS infection and transmission (Ankrah, 1989; Caldwell, et al. 1989; Larson, 1989). Among the Batooro, traditionally, premarital virginity and post marital fidelity in females was highly prized, while males were given more sexual leeway (Perlman, 1975; Taylor, 1962). With this background in mind, a number of questions were asked regarding sexual values of the women in this study. Each of the 76 married women in the sample was asked if she had ever had sex with anyone other than her husband. The majority of the women, 71 (93.4%), responded in the affirmative to this question. However, for most them, this was before they had married. Seventy-four (97%), of the married women in the sample denied currently having a boyfriend. When asked why they did not have a boyfriend, most of the women reported that they feared that their husbands would beat them up or leave them if they found out that they have a boyfriend. We asked this question to married women because research by Caldwell et al, (1989) found that in many African cultures, married women

do have boyfriends. However, in theory, this should not happen. Indeed, during the in-depth ethnographic interviews, I was informed by several respondents that one of the women in my study had been caught by her husband having sex with another man. The husband beat her up very badly and threatened to chase her away. However, the LC court intervened and pleaded with the man to forgive his wife, especially as she had a number of children with him. The man forgave the wife and the two seem to be living happily together.

Women in the study were asked how many different men they would estimate that they had sex with in the last twelve months and in the last five years. Overall, the majority of the women, 64 (53.3%), reported having sex with only one man in the last twelve months. Forty-six (38.3%), reported that they did not engage in any sex at all in the previous twelve months. Similar results were obtained with regard to the women's sex history during the previous five years. Sixty-five women (54.2%) of the sample reported only one sexual partner whereas 32 (26.7%), reported no sexual activity in the past five years.

It should be pointed out that it is extremely difficult to know whether this information is completely reliable. Women may fear to reveal complete details of the number of their sexual partners for fear of being labeled prostitutes, *malayas*, which is stigmatizing. If, on the other hand, they are telling the truth, this might reflect behaviour change in the face of the HIV epidemic. At the same time, it is important to not that there were age differences among the women in the sample with respect to behaviour change in the face of HIV/AIDS. For example, the greatest proportion of women reporting no sex in the last 12 months was among the older women than the younger ones. Of the 15 women aged less than 20, three (20%), reported no sex in the last 12 months, while among the 15 women aged between 31-35 years, 9(60%), reported having no sex in the same period. Therefore, most women who abstain are older

women. It seems younger women have not modified their sexual behaviours as much as the older women, suggesting that younger women are more likely to take sexual risks than older women.

Published data demonstrate that a sexual double standard exists in most East African societies, Tooro inclusive, that permits men to engage in extramarital liaisons and to practice polygamy, while expecting women to refrain from extramarital relations, display patience, respect, and obedience to their husbands despite their husbands' infidelity (Kilbride and Kilbride, 1990; Kisekka, 1976; Southold, 1973). However, when asked if they thought their husbands might be having sex with other women, only 22 (18.3%), of the married women replied in the affirmative, which seems rather low. Often, these women learned of their husband's extramarital affairs from reports from friends and relatives. But in a few cases, the women caught their husbands in the act of having sex with other women. A few of these women separated from their husbands, but most decided to stay.

Men were reported to have more sex partners than their wives over the past 12 months and in the last five years. While most women reported having sex with only one partner, both in the past 12 months and in the last five years, 11 (9%), of the women thought that their husbands had sex with at least two women over the last 12 months and 15 (12.5%) of the women thought that their husbands had sex with at least two women in the last 5 years.

When asked how old they were when they first had sex, 52 (43.3) stated that they had their first sexual experience before age 15. Since marriage in Tooro society is relatively early, this first sexual contact is not likely to be within marriage. In most cases women have their first sexual encounters with a man who is older, with 32 (26.78%), of the sample reporting that their man was between sixteen and twenty years.

At times there is discrepancy between cultural ideals and reality. For example, when asked how old should a girl be before she has sex, most women (68.3%), said the girl should be between sixteen and twenty years before sex. When asked why this should be the case, when many of the women had begun sex at earlier ages, it was pointed out that times have changed. Both older and younger women in the study agreed that these days a girl needs to complete school before she can begin thinking of sex and marriage. Moreover, with the advent of deadly diseases such as AIDS, a girl has to be careful who she has sex with. Most respondents, 81 (67.5%), thought that a boy should be between sixteen and twenty years before he has sex. Most women pointed out that by this age, a boy has completed school, and is old enough to have children, and manage a family.

Further insight into the sexual values and practice of the women in this sample was obtained by asking the women to describe occasions when they might have sex with another man other than her husband. Some of the occasions/reasons why a woman may have sex with someone other than her husband include: influence of alcohol, husband's absence for long period, to avenge a cheating husband, and if the husband is impotent. However, the most commonly mentioned reason was failure by a husband or boyfriend to meet all the necessary material and economic needs of his wife and family. In Tooro society, men are expected to provide proper housing for their families, buy sufficient food, buy clothing for the wife and family, and meet medical expenses. If a husband fails to meet these obligations, then a wife may be justified in getting an outside lover who is willing and able to meet her economic needs. Women in this sample also mention that some women take on extra lovers because they are promiscuous, *basihani*, and cannot be satisfied by one man alone. It was also reported that if a marriage is "shaky", in that the man shows no intention of regularizing the union by paying bride wealth, the woman may seek additional sexual partners as a hedge should the current union collapse.

Respondents were asked to name any occasion when a woman is expected to have sex with someone, not her husband. Most women stated that currently in Tooro there are no occasions when a woman is expected to sleep with someone other than her husband. However, the women pointed out that in the past there were such occasions. For example, the paternal aunt of a girl was expected to have sex with her niece's new husband to "check" if the man was able to "perform" his sexual duties properly. It was also pointed out that in the past, certain types of persons, for example, the brother's of one's husband, were permitted to have sex with the wife of their brother. However, the majority of the women agreed that currently this is not widely practised.

When asked if there are times when it is wrong for a woman to have sex with anyone, even her own husband, occasions mentioned entailed: when the woman is in her menstrual period, when a close relative or friend dies, when either the woman or the man is sick or tired, when the woman is nursing a baby, and during pregnancy. Violations of these prohibitions are thought to cause illness, but not death, as in the case of the Baganda of Central Uganda (McGrath et al 1993). Most of the customs prohibitions, and injunctions described so far, were regarded by the women in the study as no longer practised in current Tooro society. They were perceived as old traditional customs that are widely ignored by women, especially those in urban areas. However, this does not mean that these traditional customs and practices are completely irrelevant to Tooro society. To the extent that these cultural rules provide a range of conditions regarding what is appropriate and inappropriate sexual behaviour; they serve as a guide to sexual conduct.

When asked if infidelity is a common reason for a woman to leave her husband, and for a man to leave his wife, women reported that infidelity is not a common reason for a woman to leave her husband. The women may quarrel, but she will not leave her husband. On the other

hand, women reported that infidelity can lead a man to leave his wife. Below are some quotes regarding women's view on infidelity:

A woman can leave her husband because of infidelity. However, I have never seen a woman leave her husband because of infidelity. The woman fears to leave because she would have to leave her children behind. For a man, if he catches his wife with another man, he has to chase her away. Yet, men bring children from outside. But if a woman produces an illegitimate child, she would be dismissed (33 years old married woman)

It depends, a man can catch his wife with another man and he ignores it, *nanuga*, yet, another man can beat up the woman or even kill her if he is the jealous type, *enfuhi*. If a woman catches the husband with another woman, she can fight the woman, or she may ignore the whole affair. Recently, my neighbour caught her husband with another woman, and she stoned the other woman (39 year old married woman).

Infidelity is not a common reason for a woman to leave her husband. She may quarrel and fight both the husband and the other woman, but in the end, she gives up. He can beat her, but not leave her. However, some men can kill the woman (30 year old woman).

Summary and Conclusions

This paper had the main objective of elucidating cultural values held by the Batooro regarding sexual matters and how these might translate into HIV/AIDS risk. The thesis here was that embedded gender roles and relationships in several African societies at times work to keep women in a dependent position to men, hence serving to increase their vulnerability to all sorts of social problems including diseases such as HIV/AIDS (Bledsoe, 1990; Ulin, 1992).

It is clear from the data presented in this paper that in Tooro society, infidelity by a woman is less tolerated than that of a man. Reflecting a cultural value in many Uganda communities that

put a premium on a wife's docility and fidelity, while accepting or even expecting a man to have more than one sexual partner (Obbo, 1993; Parkin, 1966; Rwabukwali, 2001). Several reasons were given why a woman is likely to tolerate a cheating husband. Women pointed out that, if a woman chooses to leave her husband because of his infidelity, she would have to leave her children behind, since by custom, children in Tooro Society belong to the husband and his lineage. Second, many women are poor and depend entirely on their husband's income. If they left, they would be denied this support and their welfare would suffer. In any case, if a woman leaves a cheating husband, then she will be paving the way for the man to bring in his lover as the new wife. For these reasons, most women decide to remain with their husbands despite their husband's infidelity, hence putting themselves at increased risk of infection with HIV/AIDS.

Data presented in this paper also shows that the cultural sanctions against a woman's infidelity are more serious than against a man's. These sanctions can include severe beatings, separation, and other forms of mistreatment. Nevertheless, despite these sanctions, women do have affairs, and respondents in this study gave instances where husbands caught wives having extramarital sex. Some of the reasons why a woman may have sex with someone other than her husband include the failure of a husband to meet economic needs of his family and/or sexual impotence.

In the final analysis, this paper has provided insight into social, cultural and sexual factors that may be associated with increased risk of HIV among Batooro women. Those charged with developing AIDS prevention programmes ought to take these factors into account, if they are to design programmes that will be culturally sensitive and acceptable to the Batooro; and hence stand a chance of being successful.

Notes

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Impact of African Traditional Ethics on Behaviour in Uganda

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Abstract

Western normative ethical principles derived from, namely, utilitarianism, rule-based ethics, and virtue ethics, are insufficient to guide human behaviour in Africa. The paper attempts to find out if African traditional ethical values systems also do have an impact on the behaviour of public servants in Uganda. This means, the paper will evaluate the relationship between African traditional ethical system and behaviour of public servants in Uganda. Examples from the Acholi's ethical system together with other studied cases from Africa will be used to make analysis, derive conclusions and later make recommendations to improve the behaviour of public administrators in Uganda.

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Introduction

Analyzing human behaviour falls within the scope of normative ethics, since normative ethics deals with moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct.¹ To discuss behaviour of individuals, social groupings and public officials in Uganda require that we understand and adopt particular ethical principles we think are most appropriate to help us understand such behaviour. Unfortunately, there is no commonly acceptable standard that can be used to carry out this analysis. If we are to adopt the western ethical principles from virtue theories, duty theories, and consequentialist theories,² which fall within normative ethics, a lot will be left unsaid. This is because little attention has been paid to the impact of African traditional ethics on human behaviour in Uganda. In the opinion of this article this area needs to be investigated to find out the motivating factors behind the major actions that impact on other human beings in Africa. The question is whether such actions, done by individuals, by social groupings within Africa, or by African public officers, are motivated by western ethical principles alone or not?

Apparently, major social evils that haunt different societies, especially in Africa, like corruption, inter-tribal conflicts, nepotism etc., are believed to be the absence of good governance. Good governance on the other hand is the deliberate adherence to ethical principles in the private and public domains. Corruption in the public domain, for instance, has been described by Kwame Gyekye as political corruption. He argues that “political corruption is the illegal, unethical, and unauthorized exploitation of one’s political or official position for personal gains or advantage.”³

Broadly speaking, behaviour is a way of acting, functioning and treating others by an individual,

a social group, or a public official. The interest of this paper is to try and identify the ethics behind the behaviour of individuals, public officials, and social groupings in Africa, with specific reference to Uganda. Ethics and morals are traditionally treated as separate. While ethics is different intellectual framework, morality is patterns of practice of given societies. So ethics is the way of seeing and morality is the way of doing. Fieser defines ethics as systematic defence and recommendation of the concepts of right and wrong behaviour.⁴ Human behaviour affects not only the individual but also others, either negatively or positively. The behaviour of social groups or public servants is even more important since this affects a wider group of people. Good behaviour of public servants, for instance, is the just and fair administration of public institutions, affairs, and resources in a manner that guarantees the realization of human rights free of abuse and corruption and with due regard for the rule of law.⁵ Wikipedia encyclopaedia enumerates all the qualities or characteristics of good public governance: participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus oriented, equity and inclusiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, and accountability.⁶ Social groups within any society behave in accordance with the basic principles of morality they hold dear to them. Some of these moral principles may have great limitations if subjected to rigorous intellectual framework, which is the proper field of ethics.

When we talk of the behaviour of individuals, social groupings and public administrators, in a particular society like Uganda, we are already in the field of morality, and if we are to subject the moral principles behind the human behaviour in such society, then we need more rigorous intellectual framework provided by ethics. To do this we need proper ethical principles guiding such framework and judgment. Here in Africa, we can’t say there is one set of ethical

1 James Fieser, ed. ‘Ethics’ in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (<http://www.iep.utm.edu/ethics>). Accessed 2 October, 2009.

2 Ibid.

3 Kwame Gyekye, *Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical reflections on the African Experience*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997, p.193.

4 James Fieser, ed. ‘Ethics’ in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (<http://www.iep.utm.edu/ethics>). Accessed 2 October, 2009.

5 From Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Good_governance; accessed 5 September 2009.

6 Ibid.

principles well defined to guide our individual, social or public behaviour. There is the western set of ethical principles, and at the same time our traditional set of ethical principles continues to guide and motivate human behaviour.

The western ethical principles derived from, namely, utilitarianism,⁷ rule-based ethics, and virtue ethics,⁸ are insufficient to guide human behaviour in Africa. We need as well to look at African traditional ethics, and see their impact on the behaviour of individuals, social groupings, or public officials. My conviction is that, the conducts many people in present day African societies are impacted very strongly by their traditional ethical value systems. For practical purposes, I am going to use the Acholi traditional ethics and other African societies studied by others to try to find out if the hypothesis that *the behaviour of many people in Africa are impacted by African traditional ethical values systems other than by western ethics* is true or not.

The Acholi traditions have been studied by many, including Okot p'Bitek, Chrazolara, Ociti etc. However, none of these authors was directly interested in Acholi traditional ethics in as far as human behaviour is concerned. The examples of African traditional ethics that will be cited are far from being exhaustive studies or detailed studies of those societies. However, the concrete examples will serve as pointers to the right directions of where such ethics lead us. They are exemplary to African traditional ethical settings. Such examples are useful because, to talk about Africa in general without substantiating with concrete examples would be too presumptuous. Same few traditional ethnic groups we shall quote may have many things in common with the other Africans, and we are interested in those commonalities other than the variations in them.

If this hypothesis can be proven, then there is reason to understand why most of such beautifully stipulated western ethical principles find difficulties in being applied in regulating human behaviour in Africa. What is clearly wrong, according to western value system and for that matter unethical, is sometimes not the case for an African traditional ethical value system that still influences human behaviour in Africa.

This paper will try to identify the African traditional ethical value system by analysing and discussing its foundations, principles and values on which it is based. In other words, the objective of this paper is to identify the African traditional ethical value system typified in some of the African traditions like that of the Acholi's of northern Uganda. Secondly, the paper will discuss the impact of that value system on the behaviour of public servants in Uganda. This means, the paper will evaluate the relationship between African traditional ethical system and behaviour of public servants in Uganda. Lastly, the paper intends to propose ways in which such ethical value system could be adopted, if necessary, to promote good public administration in Uganda.

The methodology I will use includes asking, discussing and proposing. By asking, I will dig into the traditional ethical value system of some African people like the Acholis of northern Uganda. By discussing, I will find out the impact of African traditional ethics, typified by that ethical value system on public administration and what type of impact this ethics has on good behaviour in public administration. By proposing, I will be able to recommend that which I think will be relevant to adopt from the African traditional ethical value system for the purpose of good behaviour in public administration in Uganda today. Let us now look at the African traditional ethical values.

7 John Stuart Mill, (1863), "Utilitarianism", [<http://www.utilitarianism.com/mill1.htm>], accessed 2 October 2009.

8 Aristotle, A. The Nicomachean Ethics. Penguin; Hursthouse, R. (2003). "Virtue Ethics", in The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (Fall 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), [<http://www.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries/ethics-virtue/>]

African Traditional Ethical Value System

In as far as African traditional ethics is concerned; I will try to survey it from three points of view. The first is to look at ethical values from the point of view of its *foundation*; then *principles* embedded in this ethics; and the *values* that can be derived from it for the purpose of guiding behaviour in public administration.

The Foundation of African Ethical system

The foundation of African traditional ethics basically lies in their social philosophy. To understand this social philosophy, we must first put it within a wider context. In general, three main views exist about social philosophy. The first considers man to be perfect in himself, so that he associates with others only on the basis of usefulness. The individual person is everything, so society is simply a means for the self realization of the individual. The second view maintains that man is basically incomplete in himself and as one who has meaning and purpose only as a member of a community. The community is everything, the individual as such lacks all proper worth, he lives and dies only for the sake of the community. The third view holds that, the individual person possesses the inalienable worth of his own moral personality which prevents his ever being used as a mere means to an end or as a mere part of a larger whole. Nevertheless, he is not simply closed off from all others, for he is essentially related to the community. Community is the individual members in their unity.⁹

For the Africans, the third interpretation of social philosophy applies. It would be wrong to say an individual is perfect and he needs society only as a means for self-realization. It is equally wrong to say an individual is incomplete, that he needs the society and he lives and dies for the sake of the community. But rather an individual has inalienable worth without which there is

no society, and society is so important that an individual cannot survive without. The two need each other. There are several sayings in Acholi, used in this case as an example, which confirms these dual and complementary understandings of social philosophy. For instance, sayings like *cing acel pe time gin mo*; meaning “with one hand one cannot do much”. So, when two people work together there is greater success, than if one acts single handed. *Ribbe aye teko*, which means “unity is strength”.

On the other hand sayings that confirm the importance of the individual are: *dano wayi lonyo*, meaning “an individual is wealth”. *Kwo pe wille*, meaning “life cannot be bought”. Among the Africans, life, whether of a child born or unborn, crippled or normal, blind or not, old or young, male or female, is considered very important. The future, the strength, and prosperity of the society depend on the availability of the individual members of that society. So, if you touch an individual, you have tampered with the entire society and the entire society will get down on you. If you ignore the society then the individual is in for great problems. Society is not a means for the realization of the self, but an essential institution that gives support to its individual members. Individual members are not mere accidents in the organization of the society, but necessary parts and parcels of the society.

So, any ethical evaluation must be taken and understood from this background. Whatever is done to enhance the good of the individual members of that community or of that entire community is morally good, otherwise morally evil. From this ethical foundation springs naturally certain ethical principles that guide their ethical behaviour in the day to day living.

African Ethical Principles

Some of the principles that can be derived from this social philosophy are the following: principle of life, principle of communal responsibility, and principle of individual responsibility.

⁹ Oswald von Nell-Breuning, “Social Philosophy”, in *Philosophical Dictionary*, Gonzaga University Press, Washington 1972, pp. 375-376

The principle of life

The first ethical principle that springs from the above social philosophy is the principle of life. Life in Africa is symbolized by blood, and around blood there are several expressions that would help us to understand the African philosophy of life. For example, among the Acholis, when one is talking about ones child, you say this is *remona*, meaning this is 'my blood'. Any person that behaves and treats you as if you were of one blood then is described as *larem*, meaning 'of the blood'. So the word for a friend becomes *larema*. This is a very deep term which expresses bonds that exist between two people similar to that created by blood ties. Friendship then is not simply social phenomena, but a moral reality. Friends for that matter are treated as those to whom one is tied by blood relation.

Occasionally, when two people feel that close as friends, a friendship pact ceremony called *nango remo* was performed. In this ceremony *nyig kwir* (some special seed of a plant called *kwir*) was mixed in the real blood of the friend and was swallowed by each of the partners. In such pact, the friendship was believed to be much stronger and only death could separate such two people. This was common among male friends, and even among wives and husbands who think and feel that their friendship was much deeper than normal, and they do not desire or intend to get separated from each other. In case of male partners, their siblings became like blood brothers and sisters who could no longer get married to each other. If by chance such friendship was broken, a lamb was required to be sacrificed to unbind such a pact. If any of the partners violated the terms of such friendship, it was strongly believed death was the punishment.

When something goes wrong among two individuals that may cause loss of life, the elders immediately perform a ceremony called *tumo kir*, meaning atonement sacrifice in which an animal blood has to be shed to substitute for

the blood of humans that would be shed. So, *tumo kir*, is a moral remedy for an offence that would cause loss of life. It is a very grievous ethical offence to cause the loss of life of another among the Acholis. They have a saying supporting the vitality of life among them like; *kwo cule ki kwo*, meaning 'life can only be paid for with life'. In their traditional setting then, if one of their member's life is intentionally taken by another, the remedy is to go and pay for that life by taking away the life of the offender which for them is ethically right. They call it *culo kwoo*, which means revenge. This can help us to understand the so many cases of revenge in Africa; the worst of its manifestation in the modern times has been the Rwanda genocide. It is only *mato oput* that can stop such a revenged.

This example of *culo kwoo* is typical to most African societies. So, the moral principle here is that life can only be paid for by life. Anything done to pay for a lost life would be morally acceptable. The only substitute for a human loss of life can only be the sacrificial blood of an animal that would stand for the human blood that should have continued to flow. This animal bloodshed in the ceremony of *mato oput* can only be done when that life lost is compensated for. Such compensation takes the form of a young girl or an equivalent in terms of animals sufficient to pay for the bride price of another girl. This young woman is to produce life in substitute to the one lost.

This principle has very serious consequences on the ethical behaviour of an African when it comes to the question of life. This same principle is followed even when a parent carelessly allows one's own child to die, for instance, in fire or in water. That very parent will have to get cows from which a bride price will be paid and another woman who will produce life will get married. Again an animal is sacrificed and the blood is sprinkled on the people as a sign of reparation for the life lost.

The principle of communal responsibility

The second African ethical principle is the principle of communal responsibility. Among the Africans, the principle of communal responsibility is taken very seriously in judging moral conduct of a person. Whatever a member of the community does, the consequences on the entire community is great, and whatever the community does collectively equally affects the individual members of that community. For instance, when a member of a given community commits a crime against a member of another community, it is the entire community that will pay the price. While communal responsibility was morally acceptable in traditional communities, today it is a moral evil to condemn an entire ethnic group for the wrongs of a few of its members.

In Africa, this sense of communal responsibility was expressed recently during the Rwandan genocide; the Tutsi's as group were massacred because of the invasion on Rwandan government by the Tutsi lead Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Inter-tribal conflicts were common in traditional African societies on the basis of communal responsibility. For instance, if a single member of a particular tribe was killed by another, then the entire tribe was attached in revenge by the tribal members of the killed person. In Uganda, for instance, the northerners (particularly the Langis and the Acholis) were persecuted as a group during the Regime of Idi Amin because they supported or belonged to the tribe of Milton Obote. The people from Madi and Kakwa were persecuted as a group from 1979 to 1985 during Obote II regime because they were sympathetic or belonged to the tribe of Idi Amin. Gersony, emphasizes that the main cause of the northern conflict (1986-2009) was the *Ghost of Luwero Triangle* that haunt the Acholi people who lost economic and political influence following Museveni's rise to power.¹⁰ Gersony talks of Acholi as a people, other than blaming the Acholi political leaders

as individuals. This reflects such account of collective responsibility.

In the traditional society, when the community decides to do what is wrong without a proper justification, *lapir*, then all the members of that community are responsible to see that such a community thinks otherwise and reverses the decision, since this will affect all members of that community, including the innocent ones. For instance, a community cannot take a decision to go to war with another community if there was no sufficient justification for that war. Otherwise, such a decision would affect all the members of that society regardless of the innocence of the individual members.

This type of ethical principle of communal responsibility has grave impact on the understanding and behaviour of the Africans in the areas of right and wrong. It was taken to be perfectly right to avenge the deliberate murdering of any of the members of a particular society, so long as that member killed was innocent. In similar way, it was commonly believed that the community had great moral responsibility to avert any danger that could be incurred on the people by the fault of any member of that community. This was done by seeking reconciliation with the offended party or community before things get out of hand. Failure to do this was a moral evil on the part of that community. My observation is that, people in Africa today very easily invoke communal responsibility at the time of revenge, and forget to carry their communal responsibility to avert such a catastrophe by seeking remedial measures.

Principle of individual responsibility

The third ethical principle is the principle of individual responsibility. Given the above scenario, one may think that there is no individual responsibility among the Africans. In as far as wrong done by any member of the community affects an outsider, the responsibility for such an offence rests with the entire community. This is not the case if that

10 Gersony, Luwero Triangle Wars, <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Monographs/No99/Chap2.pdf>, accessed 5 September 2009.

offence affects another member of the same community. In this case, the individual bears the responsibility for such an offence. For instance, if one fights with another member of the same community, then the responsibility rests with the individual. Beyond the individual, however, are the immediate members of one's own family, but not the entire community. All offences committed in secret cannot be left unaccounted for, among some Africans like the Acholis of northern Uganda. Here the Acholi's would invoke the invisible powers including the gods to punish such an offender. There is a saying which holds that, *kadi ibut ki maru i te pii, olo twal bingene*, meaning, even if you have sex with your mother-in-law (the most abominable act one can commit) under water (a place one may think is most secretive) it will one day be known. There is no ethically wrong act that will remain unpunished. The responsibility of such offences, however, rests with the individual offender.

On the other hand, when someone commits an offence against one of the members of the same community openly and it is known, the community's legal system takes its course. This means, the legal system of the community will emit justice, or will make sure the rightful offender answers for such offence. Here the offence is settled in local courts called *kacoke* or *laro lok* and when the offender is convicted proper punishment is remitted on that individual. The greatest punishment that can be remitted on an individual by the community is the expulsion of that member from the society. To be expelled from a particular community is the worst punishment because, such a person is at the mercy of anything, ranging from hostile enemies to wild animals' attack.

Connected with this is an offence one commits on oneself, like committing suicide. This again is very serious offence that is paid for by an individual. In such cases, even the corpse of the dead person is given some lashes as punishment before burial. The tree on which a person commits suicide is even up-rooted. An

animal is to be sacrificed on the spot where such an offence takes place, so that no further blood is shed again in such a manner. It is again an expiation sacrifice, where the blood of the animal shed should now substitute the more precious blood of humans from spilling. From such ethical foundation and principles, the following ethical values can be derived.

African Ethical Values

Some of the ethical values that underpin the discussed ethical principles and African social philosophy are the following: ethical value of goodness, value of solidarity, and the value of respect.

Ethical value of goodness

The first ethical value one can identify among the Africans is the value of *goodness*. Goodness is the characteristic inner quality of a person or group of persons, which is cultivated and in-built, regardless of that person's ability to make mistakes. Among the Acholis for instance, goodness is not just an isolated act performed by an individual or groups of individuals, it is characteristic of a person or group of persons. In two of the Acholi proverbs, given as examples, one elder had the following to say. *Gwok pe dongo i ot labongo yibe* which literally translates as, "a dog cannot enter a house leaving its tail behind". Goodness or badness of a person is an in-built character, without which a person can continue to live. A dog, sometimes in un-familiar environments, folds the tail in-between the legs. But it will not take long, it forgets and the tail is left to hang the way it really is. Likewise, human character, whether bad or good, cannot be hidden for long. In unfamiliar circumstances people try or pretend to be good and to behave well, but their true characters cannot be hidden for long, sooner or later the true colours of their character will be manifested. If it is good, the goodness will shine, if it is bad, the bad character will equally show.

The second proverb is that; *ber ber pa lalar* which literally means, "goodness of *lalar* plant".

There is an edible vegetable among the Acholis of northern Uganda called *lalar*. Usually it is a very beautiful plant with oily shining leaves, but when cooked, it will always taste bitter. The bitterness, which is in-built, cannot be seen from outside, but only in coming in contact with it, can this bitterness be noticed. Likewise, human goodness cannot be easily seen from outside by admiring the physical beauty of the person, the true goodness or badness of a person, can only be seen after making close contact with the person concerned.

Goodness then, is not just an isolated act performed by an individual or group of persons, according to African traditional ethics. On the contrary, goodness is the characteristic inner quality of a person or group of persons, which is cultivated and in-built, regardless of that person's ability to make mistakes. Ethical training then subsists in cultivating this inner goodness in an individual.

This is similar to what Kirk-Greene found among the Hausa in Nigeria. The term used for a good man is *mutumin kirki*, which refers to man's intrinsic goodness, and which rests in the *hali* or his character. Kirki is then an inner quality, or an accumulation of qualities.¹¹ It is not a physical attribute. According to Kirk-Greene, the warrior-hero of Hausaland may be seven feet tall, with the heart of a lion and the strength of a bull-elephant, of heroic stature at every turn, and yet never qualify for recognition as *mutumin kirki*. It is in the character that *kirki* reposes, so that *halin mutum*, a man's character, is at once the wellspring of his virtue and the mirror of his moral make-up.¹² He goes on to compare character to a rock by saying "Character is like a line drawn on a rock, nobody can erase it".¹³

In western Philosophy goodness can be intrinsic or moral. An intrinsic good is a perfection or

a *bonum per se* (a good in itself),¹⁴ which philosophy of religion attributes to God alone. While moral goodness is a quality of acquiring some of the attributes of the intrinsic good, it can refer to behaviour or action being done. The African concept of goodness is different from this western understanding of goodness, in that it is humanly acquired and imbedded in the character of the person. It is not just isolated acts of goodness, nor accumulation of different good acts done by a person, it instead radiates from an inbuilt personality or character of the person considered to be good. Goodness does not exclude making mistakes, but it essentially supersedes particular isolated mistakes, because despite such mistakes, the goodness of such individual shines.

In Acholi, there are several expressions reflecting this deep inner goodness of a person: *kite tir* (an upright person), *cwinye leng* (good hearted person), *kite ber* (good character), *cwinye yom* (generous person). So the two terms which are quite expressive are *kit* and *cwinye*. *Kit* expresses an inner quality of a person, much deeper than mere acts of a person, it is the centre of one's activity which has some similarity to the English words "heart" or "guts" or even better "bosom". From such an innermost part of a person, performance of goodness or badness by a person springs. Similarly, *cwinye* is the innermost part of a person from which true goodness or badness also springs.

Ethical Value of Solidarity

The second ethical value we can consider is the value of solidarity. Communal solidarity is an interactive relationship between individuals and the community for the welfare of both the individuals and the community. This was an ethical value on which the African traditional communities hinged and functioned. Without communal solidarity, both the individual and the community are impoverished. An individual works so hard to support the community, and the community in turn carries the greatest

11 Anthony H. M. Kirk-Greene, "Mutumin Kirki": the Concept of the Good Man in Hausa", in *African Philosophy: An Anthology*, Oxford (UK), Blackwell Publishers, 1998, p.121

12 Ibid. p.121

13 Ibid. p.121

14 Josef de Vries, "Good", in *Philosophical Dictionary*, Washington, Gonzaga University Press, 1974, p.162

responsibility to support every other member of that community. This brings out the quality of solidarity as an ethical value. Those who contribute positively for the welfare of the community are relatively fewer than the members who benefit from such communal support. Among the beneficiaries of this communal support are the children (born or unborn), the disabled, the sick and the elderly. According to this value of solidarity, every individual member of the society receives the support they need to live as human beings and this is always a moral good. Any damage or negligence attributed to any member of that community is a moral evil and cannot be accepted.

This helps us to understand John Mbiti's famous phrase; *I am because we are, and since we are therefore, I am*.¹⁵ Many authors have misinterpreted this solid moral principle, by saying that in traditional African societies, the individual is crushed by the almighty presence of the community. Segun Gbadegesin criticizes this interpretation; by saying this is not the whole truth. He argues,

Of course, individuals are valued in themselves and as potential contributors to communal survival. For why should the new baby be so immersed in love and affection? Further, it is known that many individuals have the wisdom to guide the community and such people are well respected.¹⁶

The limit of individualism, according to Segun, is in the *interdependent existence* of their lives with others.¹⁷ Not that the community forces itself on unyielding individuals; rather the individual, through socialization and the love and concern which the household and community have extended to them cannot now see themselves as anything apart from their community. The process of socialization that begins in the family finally gets into the larger community where the child is exposed to the

virtues of communal life. The children see, in the larger community, the display of selfless efforts by others to uplift the community. They have the first-hand experience of how adults are contributing to the welfare of the children, how women and men work on the farms and how the warriors risk their lives to save the community. Building on the initial exposure, they now see themselves as one of those who should carry the banner of selflessness, having been prepared for the task; they severely and collectively put their will at the service of the community.¹⁸ From this value of communal solidarity, orphans are looked after, widows are taken care of, disabled members of society are provided for, the elderly and the sick are looked after. This, according to Segun, is the meaning of the common reference to the famous Mbitian phrase; *I am because we are, and since we are therefore I am*.

The Ethical value of respect

The third ethical value for the Africans would be the value of *respect*. Most African traditions, consider respect to be an earned acknowledgement of a person for the services they have rendered to the community, but not a mere privilege of a given office bearer. For the case of the Acholis, respect (*woro*) has three dimensions, namely, respect for the ordinance of *God* or the gods, respect for *others*, and respect for *self*. In as far as the respect for the ordinance of God is concerned, one is suppose to offer sacrifices to the Him when it is necessary. In as far as the respect for others is concerned; this includes respect of persons and their properties. It includes respect for the authority of the elders, respect for parents, uncles, respect for the life of others, respect of other people's wives or husbands, respect of other people's properties, and respect for other people's bodily integrity. As far as respect for self is concerned, one was expected to have respect and integrity for what one says like telling the truth, respect for one's own life and actions.

For the Acholis, respect is not just a ceremonial acknowledgement of an individual or someone

15 John S Mbiti, *African Religions and Philosophy*, Heinemann, London 1971, p.214

16 Segun Gbadegesin, *Yoruba Philosophy: Individuality, Community, and the Moral Order*, in *African Philosophy: An Anthology*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1998, p.131

17 *Ibid.*, p.131

18 *Ibid.*, p.131

superior, but a deep-seated acknowledgement of the integrity, position, and value of the one to whom respect is due. In this way, an authority is respected not just because it occupies that position, but because that person deserves the respect accorded to persons in that office. This implies that, even God to whom one is to pay respect, must be worthy of his name, as a provider who attends to that highest office for which he is respected. Here, I would like to quote the prayer of a desperate believer from northern Uganda in the midst of the northern war and the frustration the war brought.

In all due respect God, I would like to know if you have a brother? And if you have one, in all due respect, I pray that you allow him take over the authority in ruling the world, since you have failed to provide that authority which we badly need. Allow him to rule for a while to enable him intervene to stop the wars going on in Acholiland. For Lord, we need peace, which you have failed to give us.¹⁹

This applies to other forms of respect too. For example, one is a parent, not simply because one has biologically produced an individual. Parenthood is a responsibility fulfilled towards a given child. That is why, among the traditional Acholis, when a married woman cheats on her husband and begets a child from that relationship, the child born would belong to the man to whom the woman is legally married. The biological father is referred to as a “*nyok tigo*” which means a “he goat that begets and who does not own what it has begotten”. This is both to punish infidelity in marriage, and also to teach society that parenthood is a responsibility from which respect arises, but not an act one performs to get a child. From such concepts one can derive the understanding of respect as a moral value.

19 The context of the prayer is the over twenty years of insurgencies in northern Uganda caused, among others, by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), in which people lost their lives, properties, and above all cramped together in the inhygienically congested Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps for over twenty years. The prayer tells us why, perhaps, today people run from one religion to another, trying to look for a God that delivers, in terms of providing health, rain, food, jobs etc. when they need them.

Impact of African Traditional Ethical Values on Behaviour

The first impact of African traditional ethical values on behaviour is surrounding the moral value of *goodness*. Goodness is that characteristic inner quality of a person or group of persons, which is cultivated and in-built, regardless of that person's ability to make mistakes. This quality is required for good public administration. In the administration of our public institutions, we should rely on such good people. They may make mistakes, but their consistency in upholding the welfare of the community at heart combined with their personal moral integrity, gives greater hope that public institutions would be justly administered. On the one hand, the implication is that, a mere correct following of the laws without a more concrete right moral attitude or integrity of character, may be deceptive for good public administration.

Most Africans think that mere following of the rule does not make one's behaviour in administration necessarily good, while western ethics maintains that rightful following of the rule guarantees good public administration. The Africans contend that good character of the public administrators, springing from their well-spring of cultivated goodness make them good and ethical.²⁰ Speaking about this, Kwame Gyekye emphasizes the importance of personal integrity in human ethics. He concludes by saying; ‘the moral is the ultimate, and therefore we must pay serious attention to matters of personal integrity and character’.²¹ Personal integrity and character does not come simply because one is able to make two or three good moral choices, but that such choices spring from a well of goodness in-built in one's personal character. It is this character that is

20 This is similar to the distinction made between Plato (who insists on good man theory) and Aristotle who insists on the good law theory). The difference lies in that; while Plato and Aristotle were discussing these in the context of political philosophy, here we are looking at these distinctions in the context of moral philosophy. For both Plato and Aristotle, goodness is a moral act, but not an acquired in-built human character.

21 Kwame Gyekye, Preface of his book Tradition and Modernity, op. cit., p.xi

the origin of goodness and ethical behaviour according to the African traditional ethics. Unfortunately the behaviour of modern African public administrators is no-longer guided by such ethics, and in my view that is one of the origins of great ethical problems in public administration in Africa. People know what is right and wrong, but have no moral strength to live by them, this is because our ethical principles and training are altogether wrong. Our moral education emphasizes knowledge of the laws regarding right and wrong, but does not care whether such a person who knows what is right and wrong, has also build a quality of integrity and good character to support that knowledge. Today, the question of ethics is no longer the alternatives between the western concept and the African one, but must be a concerted effort to inculcate both values into our daily lives and moral choices.

Another impact of African traditional ethics on behaviour is seen in the area of human **solidarity**. Communal solidarity, which is the interactive supportive relationship between individuals and the community for the welfare of both the individuals and the community, had strong impact on the behaviour of public administrators.

The public administrator has a serious responsibility to see to it that the benefit of communal solidarity reaches to all the members of their society. The problem with modern public administration is that such acts of solidarity, which sometimes comes from modern central governments and donor organizations, are selectively distributed and at times the most wanting members of our societies do not receive them. This selective distribution of the benefits of human solidarity is called corruption, favouritism, nepotism or tribalism, depending on the motives on which such selection is made. Such practice has become the cancer in the administrative system of modern Africa. In the traditional setting, such fruit of human solidarity actually reached the needy members of the societies and it was everybody's business to see that it was done.

In every society, those who contribute to the welfare of the community are fewer than the members who benefit from such acts of solidarity. Without communal solidarity enforced by public administration, most vulnerable members of the community would suffer grievously. From the fruits of communal solidarity, orphans, widows and widowers, disabled persons, the sick, and the elderly receive support. Indeed John Mbiti was right when he said, *'I am because we are, since we are, therefore I am'*.

From this value of human solidarity, there is the often abused or exaggerated sense of communal responsibility. In modern Africa, many senseless revenge or ethnic cleansing take place on the basis that all the members of such a community share the responsibility of the same community caused by the behaviour of some of their members. As mentioned above, these up to today continue to impact negatively on African public administrators. Most military takeovers in Africa often turn into moments of revenge in which the entire ethnic group members belonging to the deposed administrators are persecuted for belonging to such an ethnic group. Behind such revenge is the negative application of the collective principle of communal responsibility.

The third impact African traditional ethical values have on behaviour is in the area of *respect*. Respect being an earned acknowledgement of a person for the services they have rendered to the community, is very important in guiding behaviour in public administration. Authority is respected, for some African communities like the Acholis, in as far as such authority lives up to its expectation. A selfish king, for instance, that thinks only of himself and not the good of the members of the community he is leading, soon falls out of popularity and will lose grief of the entire community. Such leaders were normally deposed or their chiefdoms would split. The respect which can be given to the public administrator will depend on how one lives and behaves in accordance with the values upon which such a public office is established.

Whatever is done by such administrators will make them receive the respect they deserve.

Modern administrators want to be respected, but do not want to accept the responsibilities attached to such respect. Thus administrative appointments are sometimes made according to wrong administration policies, making such administrators lose respect in the face of the public they administer. Political and civic appointments are based on tribal, ethnic or nepotistic tendencies other than competence and knowledge about the office one holds.

African traditional ethical value of respect, determines the way an individual or the entire community will show their respect and gratitude for the wonders God and others have done in their lives. Other people and their properties are respected in as far as such individuals deserve to be respected and their properties deserve to be called their own. An administrator is then respected or not depending on the way they behave in public administration. Respect for self is the consistency between what one says or is and what one does for the good of that individual and others. On the same basis, parenthood, which is a fulfilment of responsibility towards a given child other than an act one performs to get a child, is understood and honoured in some traditional African societies, like the Acholis of northern Uganda.

Conclusions and recommendations

At this point we intend to present some of the conclusions that can be derived from this paper, and also propose some recommendations on the basis of these conclusions.

Conclusions

The first conclusion that can be drawn from this paper is to note the availability of double ethical standards in the practical life of modern public administrators in Africa. A modern public administrator is often confused as to what ethical principle to apply in dealing with issues pertaining to their office because of these double ethical standards. For example, modern

ethical standards require that every individual bears the responsibility for the wrongs they have done, but this very administrator belongs to some traditional community that still demands that he or she remembers, cares and shares in solving the problems met by members of their traditional communities. An offence committed by a tribesmate of a particular police officer, for instance, confuses the officer in charge of that case, as to whether to treat the case objectively according to the prescriptions of the law or compromise on this objectivity by helping that particular tribesmate out of trouble. Should that officer be faithful to the traditional community spirit of communal responsibility and tribal solidarity or be faithful to the demands of individual responsibility over the offence one has committed?

Secondly, we can conclude that, in Uganda, communal solidarity overwhelms individual responsibilities in guiding human conduct of public administrators. As in the above example, when this police officer comes across the offences committed by the members of his/her tribal community, he or she feels obliged to follow the spirit of communal solidarity, other than individual responsibility demanded by public law. In that way they feel it is only right to do something in favour of a member of their traditional community at the expense of the members of other traditional communities. This does great damage to the practice of justice, and in modern terms called nepotism, tribalism, favouritism etc. But in the moral aptitude of that African public officer, there is no intention of practicing nepotism other than being faithful to the spirit of traditional communal responsibility. So, nepotism and tribalism is being influenced by such traditional ethical values of solidarity.

Thirdly, the concept of community must be extended to include all within national boundaries and even to include all humanity. This would help to minimize the practice of selective distribution of justice. This means, where it applies, a public administrator should practice justice in a transparent and all inclusive

way. This can only happen if the concept of community has been broadened to include all regardless of one's traditional tribal origin. The concept of human community today, should include all and must not exclude any member of the human family.

The concept of tribal solidarity is still stronger than the concept of human solidarity in Africa today. Tribal solidarity embraces only the members of the same tribe or ethnic group. Today this limited understanding of solidarity should be broadened to include all within a national boundary or must include all humanity. So, the concept of human solidarity should replace that of tribal solidarity, since the former is broader than the latter. Today, it should be acknowledged that any wrong done to a member of a tribal or ethnic community is equally grave as those done against a member of a national or international community.

Prejudice, lack of information and knowledge governed human relationships within the limited territories of African tribal societies. So, while it was okay by then to revenge the murder of a community member, today such revenge is never acceptable, since human beings belong to one body of human community found all over the world.

Another conclusion we can make is that, the African concept of respect as a duty to be fulfilled other a good to be enjoyed, seems to be important for public administrators. As seen earlier, some African communities like the Acholis of northern Uganda, considered respect as a duty to be fulfilled and not just a privilege to be enjoyed. Having such an understanding of respect would make a public administrator more concerned with the execution of his/her duties rather than the enjoyment of the privileges their official positions gave them.

We can also conclude that, pure western ethical codes of conducts may not be sufficient to guide human behaviour in Africa today. Certain good elements of African traditional ethics should be

encouraged and incorporated in codes of ethics that would guide public administrators in the execution of their duties.

Lastly, from the paper, we can also conclude that, ethical education should aim at instilling ethical values other mere knowledge of what is right and wrong. This can be derived from the discussions done above, where it was discovered that traditional African societies insisted on sound ethical education rooted in the inculcation of values according to which individuals live and work. On the other hand, it was discovered that modern ethical trainings tend to insist on mere acquisition of the knowledge of rights and wrongs. This is found to be insufficient to help a public administrator to live in an upright way. In my opinion, such oversight create a problem in providing should moral education. The African approach to ethical education was more comprehensive and should be emulated.

Recommendations

The first recommendation is that in Africa today, the concept of community should be broadened to include all within a national boundary or should embrace the whole of humanity. This is because; the national boundaries of modern African societies are multi-tribal and brought together several tribal communities. The concept of community should now include all the different tribal, ethnic and linguistic groups present within those African national boundaries. In other words, that concept of a nation and national unity should be more emphasized and harmonized in all African countries. Besides, the concept of human community should also be emphasized; since the world is becoming more and more a global village, where all races, tribes and people of different colours meet. Public administrators should feel they belong, first and foremost, to the national community other than tribal communities from which they originate. If this change in attitude is not achieved, then the behaviour of such administrators will continue to be compromised by the narrow and particularistic ethnic or tribal group feelings.

Thus the track records of such administrators would continue to be marred by tribalism, nepotism and favouritism.

Secondly, the fruit of human solidarity should be equally distributed to all the members and regions of an African nation. If this is not done, then national resources will continue to be selectively distributed among the narrow constituencies of a traditional tribal or ethnic community. The horizon of human solidarity must encompass the broader context of the modern African state and all humankind. It is very unlikely that, we shall ever fall back to our traditional social boundaries. The world is becoming more and more globalized, so our concept of the value of human solidarity must include all humanity. For instance, the wrong done to a member of a tribal or ethnic community today is as grave as those done to a member of a national or an international community. In the past such concept of solidarity was narrow because of lack of communication and knowledge of the existence of other human communities. Today, no one has an excuse to exclude any part of humanity as being outside one's own. In this way the fruit of human solidarity shall not be selectively distributed, since all members of the national community belong to this one national family.

We can still recommend that in building national constitutions and professional ethics of public and private corporate organizations, care must be taken so that genuine and useful ethical values of different African societies are incorporated. Pure western codes of ethics and ethical values may not be sufficient to guide genuine African constitutional and professional ethical making. These constitutions and professional ethics are the basis on which modern African public managers operate.

Fourthly, we can still recommend that individual responsibility should be balanced with some amount of communal responsibility if sanity is to return to public administration. Levels of individual responsibilities in public

administration which is emphasized in modern African societies should be taken with caution. Several times, execution of the commands of the superiors are taken for granted at the expense of the individual. Corporate responsibilities should be taken seriously when individuals work in the name of corporations, institutions or companies. For example, individual responsibility must be cautiously taken if a medical doctor, who because of the poor working tools provided by a hospital may have caused the death of a patient who was completely out of danger, since the hospital administration shares in the blame. This means, certain levels of shared responsibilities (which we learn from African concept of communal responsibility) should be established in the process of judging the ethical responsibilities of public administrators suspected of wrong doing.

Lastly, in the area of ethical education, emphasis should be put on the inculcation of professionally sound character. It would not be sufficient for a public administrator to be taught about what is right and wrong, it is equally important that they are trained on how to live consistently in doing the right things and avoiding the wrong things. Sound ethical training empowers an individual to *know* and *do* the right things all the time, even though rooms are given for mistakes.

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The 'Cold War' Between the Charismatic Movements on the Institutional Churches.

*Medard Rugyendo**

Abstract

The paper exposes how the Charismatic movement has greatly influenced the traditional churches. It is misunderstood as a new 'religion'. The paper points out that some of the leaders of the traditional churches have been influenced by charismatic movement in worship-which is the central part of any church. The youth have greatly embraced the movement. It is also pointed out that there is a 'cold' war between the charismatic and non-charismatic: those that have not conformed. It is recommended that there is a need of blended worship and adequate Biblical exposition on gifts and gifting ;which is the source of the said cold war.

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Introduction

*'The charismatic movement has been a source of rejoicing to many but a source of disturbance and frustration to others'*¹. This paper discusses this assertion because there is a 'cold war' between the charismatic and the traditional group but within the same church such as in the Anglican Church in Uganda. It exposes the nature of some beliefs and practices especially how some of the gifts of Holy Spirit are handled and how they, at the same time become a source of both rejoicing and frustration. The paper also gives some recommendations arising out of the discussion.

More about the term, charismatic

Christians in the institutional churches are now becoming charismatic. Being charismatic has posed some challenges in the institutional churches. This can be evidenced both the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican Churches. But what does this term mean? The term charismatic is an umbrella term to describe those Christians who believe that the manifestations of the Holy Spirit seen in the first century church such as miracles, prophecy and speaking in other tongues are available to contemporary Christians and may be experienced today. For more details, see the following² Here, it does mean that the traditional Christians are not aware that they exist, but to a big extent, they are silent about such gifts while others neglected them. Others see them as 'reserved' only for the Pentecostals. Jeffery Peter (2001) says that: 'And these gifts are not talents merely, but gifts imparted by the Holy Spirit to fit the believer for his place in the body of Christ. They are like pipes on a great organ, permitting the musician wide scope and range to produce music of the finest quality. But they are, I repeat, more than talents. They are spiritual gifts.'³ The influence of this movement is can be witnessed in various ways:

Charismatic movement is attractive to the youth

For some time now, it has been a major complaint in the traditional churches that the youth are moving to other churches; running away from the churches that nurtured them. This is supported by this quotation: Anglicans often lament their inability to 'hold young people' in the church as they grow up....the bishops resolved to spend more time with the youth of their dioceses... reaching young people requires the church to be willing to adapt in worship, to treat the young with respect and care, and to enroll them in the church's mission. They are the church of today, not the church of tomorrow⁴. Indeed most of the youth are more interested to join charismatic services than traditional services. However, we also need to find out why charismatic services- some of the answers to this question are already spelt out in this work.

Charismatic movement and worship in the church

The charismatic movement has ushered in the breathing of new life into worship and patterns of liturgy in many churches today especially those in the urban centres. Since time immemorial, there have been the traditional ways of worship using the common written liturgy i.e. a fixed form of worship in church. Most people had been used to it to the extent of 'cramming worship' in a church service, for instance. They knew which songs or hymns, when to stand and when to sit. However, in a service, the 'praise and worship' time may take 30 minutes to a full hour while standing. Eventually, those who are still very traditional opt to sit down, but others especially the youth, keep standing and singing. Some grumble at heart of the 'new' way of worship that keeps people standing for a long time. More attention is given to 'praise and worship' than to preaching the word but traditional Christians, instead have "an appetite for the sermon". Many of the 'ancient and modern' hymns are not as common as it used to be. People are becoming used to the 'screen' songs through the use of

1 Chatfield, A, (1998). An Introduction to the Principles and practices of worldwide Anglicanism.p.102

2 1 Corinthians 12, Romans 12:3-8& Ephesians 4:7-11

3 Jeffery ,(2001) P.Christian Handbook. p 137.

4 Ibid.p.108

science and technology. Some people do not see the significance of carrying the song books since they will be found on the screen. These new songs are not necessarily the traditional ones that have been in the system since time immemorial. It needs to be noted here that how some people sing and praise is obviously Godly and scriptural. What may appear different is *how they do it*.-especially the youth.

In addition, they make the church warm and lively compared with the traditional way of praising and worshipping in the area of singing. Unfortunately, some churches have already catered for both groups to address the crucial matter⁵. Furthermore, Tiplady Richard notes that 'new ways of worship are being introduced. Modern instruments and more of them are being used in some places...a rock band style replacing a piano and hymns, along with new rhythms...the mode of worship has been adopted from television and is more American in its style'⁶. This is about the impact of globalization on mission, which in fact fits in our argument here. The influence of charismatic movement is trickling in day by day in the life of the church. What is significant whether traditional or modern is that: whatever tradition we belong to, and whatever convictions we have, the crucial issue is that our worship, in all its parts, should be acceptable to God rather than to us, and therefore in spirit and in truth'⁷

Charismatic movement promotes cell groups or house groups.

Many churches have developed cell or house groups⁸ for fellowship and more intimacy with God. This is indeed a new development for the church in the area of fellowship and reading

together the word of God. Unfortunately, there is a likelihood of turning such groups as new churches! The formation of other churches out such an arrangement is however, a sign of spiritual growth. Who knows? Can't God use such a way to plant churches and His purposes are worked out? Through the cell groups Christians know each other deeply than ever before. Some problems or challenges of individual members can be attended to both in prayer and action; which the entire parish would not have done. Most people have come to prefer cell groups to main churches because of their efficiency and effectiveness as far as a sense of personal faith is concerned.

Charismatic movement stresses the recovery of a number of neglected gifts

In the promotion of spiritual advancement of other Christians, God has always given 'a gift of grace' (charismata) to his people. In (1 Cor.12:8-11) they are enumerated as comprising the word of wisdom, the word of knowledge, faith, gift of healings, workings of miracles, prophecy, tongues, and interpretation of tongues. Most of the traditional Christians and leaders have for a long time neglected or kept silent about such gifts⁹. They are aware of such since they are Biblical but there has always been a cold war between the charismatic and the traditional leaders and Christians as well. The manifestation of such gifts is evidenced by the development of healing services in most of the churches especially in the urban areas. This is both in the Roman Catholic¹⁰ and Anglican churches respectively. This is a good spiritual and religious development because what other Christians claim that the Pentecostals have is already being done by some of the religious leaders. But, this is done by a few clergy

⁵ Some churches have both a charismatic and traditional/conservative services because they had foreseen danger. The former is full of the youth who are energetic, who can dance, stand up for a long time in praise and worship with modern instruments using 'screen' songs, while the latter is attended by the elderly, singing 'ancient and modern songs among others.

⁶ Tiplady R. (2003).The impact of globalization on mission, p.177

⁷ John 4:23,24

⁸ These are small Christian groups out of a bigger church-it is like decentralization. They keep in the big or mother church but group themselves in their respective areas for Christian intimacy.

⁹ Most of the traditional leaders especially the 'revival' people, are committed Christians but few practice or practically promote the said gifts such as the healing ministry or the speaking of tongues. They stress repentance, walking in light, giving of testimony, fellowshiping and preaching. They are elderly people-most of them.

¹⁰ The Roman Catholic Church has for sometime now got involved in healing ministry and other gifts which had never been experienced before. However, there are conservatives and traditional Catholics that do not join the charismatic group!

since others are very reserved about the whole affair. Those that practice such are branded Pentecostals¹¹ by the traditional and conservative Christians and some leaders as well.

One other example is the gift of speaking in tongues. Some lay Christians and leaders claim they speak in tongues because of the power of the Holy Spirit. This is not new except that in traditional churches it is not fully embraced by all Christians. However, all this is Biblical and what is important is to follow exactly the same teaching about tongues¹². Speaking in tongues takes place quite often in praise and worship time by the worship leaders and other Christians that are 'touched' by the Holy Spirit. Once again, the traditional and conservative Christians have doubts, suspicion and reservations as far as the speaking of tongues¹³. The conservative and traditional Christians in their groups¹⁴ do not speak in tongues neither do they encourage the speaking of the same. But, we are not saying that that the speaking in tongue is the only way to tell that the Holy Spirit of God is in that person. No! He (Holy Spirit) can be manifested among Christians in various ways, speaking tongues being one of them. Those who attempt to speak in tongues and who are charismatic have endeavored to portray a clearer understanding of the ministry and gifting of the people of God. But it should be noted that those who are claim that they are charismatic are very few in the institutional churches¹⁵.

Generally there is need to stress that regarding the use of gifts in the church, it is very edifying and building the body of Christ. It is a sign of Christian growth in various communities. The 'cold war' will stay if the same Holy Spirit does

not unite or reveal himself to those that have not yet discovered their gifts for the betterment of the church of Christ. However it should be underlined that 'not all Christians will possess the gifts of the Spirit; God gives them to whom He wills'¹⁶.

It is imperative to discuss the influence of this movement by pointing out some of the identifiable weaknesses. We need to stress that those who claim they are charismatic reject the formal liturgy as '*cold and unspiritual*'. That is why some churches may not necessarily follow the formal liturgy to the letter. They follow it to some extent but supplement it with other 'new' items not common to the traditional and conservative Christians. This does not go well with those that believe in the 'as it was in the beginning, is now and for ever, world without end Amen'.

There is the *impatience with the traditions of institutional churches* yet to others traditions are very vital in relation to one's faith. For instance, within Anglicanism there are traditions such the following of the formal liturgy as seen above, belief in infant baptism, catechism, confirmation and ecclesiastical orders among others. In other words, some charismatics are silently protesting from within and wooing people to know what should be truly followed in Christianity especially issues related with the Holy Spirit.¹⁷

*Spiritual arrogance*¹⁸ has been noted in that there are first and second class Christians in the church. Those that claim to be Holy Spirit inspired 'see' themselves to be higher than the traditional and conservative Christians. This one can be very well evidenced among church leaders. An example of this can be the way some charismatic people handle prayer and fasting and exorcism. Through exorcism, they 'demonize' almost everything. A normal

11 The traditional and conservative Christians claim that the charismatics 'copy' the Pentecostals and Anglicans' way of doing things such as worship. They see them as not genuine in their worship.

12 See 1 Cor.14. It is about the speaking in tongues: who, when, where and how.

13 Many Christians doubt their ability to speak in tongues; also some claim that some concoct the gift of speaking the tongues.

14 I mean prayer meetings such as fellowships

15 Most charismatics are centred in town and urban centres, e.g. in Kampala city, Uganda. There are others, however, who are in rural areas but also come to minister to the urban people such as Fr Bashoboora from Mbarara

16 Jeffery, P. (2001). Hand book of Christianity, P.138

17 There is overemphasis of the holy spirit-blown out of proportion- eventually going out of the way raising doubts and confusion.

18 By this I mean, some of the charismatics 'see' themselves as the only ones on the real Christian track in matters of the Holy Spirit

illness will be associated with demons. This is supported by Walter (1972): 'there are demons of sickness, of lies, divorce demons, there are people who are possessed. Here in the midst of what is Christianity'¹⁹. He furthermore writes that demons may easily be known; for instance, 'as having a peculiar appearance, irritation, bad temper, pains all over the body, bad dreams, irregular periods in women and miscarriage'²⁰. Well, this may be to the extreme, but various situations and experiences have been witnessed.²¹ Tozer in Jeffery (2001) calls this: 'shameless exhibition, a tendency to depend upon experiences instead of upon Christ, and often a lack of ability to distinguish the works of the flesh from the operations of the Spirit'²²

It is known that most of the leaders that promote such a change *have the unwillingness to allow change to take place in a measured way*. It is as if they want a total break from the traditional way of doing things in Church. This spiritual current is good but it needs those that promote it take their time and sieve through the traditional one as well.

Conclusion

We need to accept that changes are inevitable at any time, any where even in church and in the work of God generally. The holy spirit of God uses any individuals irrespective of their spiritual affiliation to revive His church. The coming of charismatic movement has caused a 'cold war' thus a source of rejoicing to many, but a source of disturbance and frustration to others especially among the traditional and conservative Christians. However all roads lead to God but what is significant is to follow the 'constitution' namely the Bible as their guidance (the when, who, how, which in relation charismatic issues) and at the same time see how they can forge unity, reconciliation and harmony led by the same Holy Spirit.

¹⁹ Walter, J.H, 1972, P.165

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ This is often when there are prayers for healing and some over nights led by some charismatic people

²² Jeffery ,P. (2001) Hand book of Christianity, P.137

Recommendations

- The church needs to rethink and reconsider the recruitment system of its workers such as the clergy²³
- There is need to have a *blended worship*, (having both modern and traditional, to cater for both groups) come together and spiritually harmonize the unclear relationship between the two groups.
- The church needs both groups because they *complement* each other. They learn from each other.
- Important *traditions and roots* should not be lost! The youth especially need to be acquainted with them. Such tradition should be Bible based.
- There is need for ' *selective borrowing*'. Not everything that is seen or watched on the television or from outside Africa is edifying for the church. We need to have ways and means of extending the kingdom of God in our context (contextualization)
- Need for more Biblical exposition on gifts and gifting of the whole people of God.

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²³ There are some clergy who may seem not to know the Lord and the Holy Institution they are serving: taking it like any other job, but not a special vocation.

Is Uganda An Economic Star Performer?

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Abstract

Uganda is an east African country of just over 30 million people but among the least developed countries. In this paper we test whether it is an economic star performer. The paper is both location (Uganda) and time (1980-2010) specific. Economic indicators (foreign aid, domestic resource mobilization and current revenue performance, structural and public sector reforms, and the performance of major economic sectors) are qualitatively used for testing. Results suggest that while the hypothesis is held on macroeconomic stability and reforms, it is rejected in view of the budget and recovery fragility.

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Foreign Aid in Uganda

Between 1961 and 1970, Uganda had one of the fastest growing economies in Africa, with an average growth rate of 5.1 percent (World Bank, 1978: 78-79), subsistence production accounted for no more than 30 percent of total output and a fairly low and stable cost of living. The economy recorded a high rate of savings averaging 15 percent per annum which helped to finance internal investment. All the sectors of the economy had positive growth rates and there were no balance of payments problems, inflationary pressures, shortages of any kind and parallel market activities (Mutibwa, 1992).

Several events in the 1970s led to the destruction of the macroeconomic environment and subsequent collapse of the Ugandan economy (Kirunda-Kivejinja, 1995: 161-164; Mutibwa, 1992). The results of these events were a tremendous fall in production, depletion of social and physical infrastructure, a fall in exports and imports, shortages, inflation (World Bank, 1991: 204-205), widespread parallel market activities and smuggling; and increased government deficits and balance of payments problems.

The government instituted a program of recovery during 1981-1984 which was intended to reverse the deteriorating economic conditions. These series of financial programs were supported by the IMF and the World Bank and, for a time, reduced the macroeconomic imbalances in the economy. The IMF supported program ended in June, 1984 and Uganda had to start heavy repayments to the IMF which substantially reduced the supply of foreign exchange available for normal imports. The fragile gains of stabilization programs were lost (Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, 1991: 172).

After 1986 attitudes towards Uganda changed dramatically, from being an outcast earlier to a favorite among donors (Kirunda-Kivejinja, 1995; Mutibwa, 1992). Substantial import support, along with increased private transfers, ensured

that the economy was adequately supplied with foreign exchange for general imports, despite continuing weakness in the export sector (table 1). Without the large inflow of foreign aid, the rapid recovery of the Uganda economy would have been impossible (Tumusiime-Mutebile, 1994: 3). However, direct foreign investment was very small in spite of increasing confidence in the Ugandan economy.

Table 1: External Debt

External debt as % of exports of goods and services	1980	208.1
	1995	555.1
External debt as % of Gross National Product (GNP)	1980	54.6
	1995	63.7
Debt service as % of exports of goods and services	1980	17.3
	1995	21.3
Multilateral debt as % of total external debt	1980	11.5
	1995	61.8

Source: World Bank, 1997 : 246.

The position of the donors in Uganda, as stipulated above, has, like the support of the government for structural adjustment, changed over time. During 1986 international donors waited for the new government to formulate its economic policies before pledging any new funds, and the International Development Association (IDA) suspended disbursement of part of its committed funds. After the fears were sorted out, the donors were over-optimistic about the speed at which reform could be implemented and the capacity of the government to manage the process. However, in the first two years of the Economic Recovery program (ERP) the donors did not reduce their support in spite of the failure to stabilize the economy and the lack of progress on more fundamental structural reforms (World Bank, 1993: 126-7).

The government and the donors agreed at an early stage that government spending would have to be increased rather than decreased if reform was to succeed, because it had fallen to such low levels and because government salaries were so low. The budget deficit therefore increased, despite the increase in tax revenue. The increased deficit was financed by aid (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MFEP), 1994; Harvey and Robinson, 1994), to the point where eventually the government was not borrowing domestically at all from the banking system. The increasing dependence on aid inflows was also shown by the very high percentage of imports financed by donors. The development budget was financed almost entirely by donors from 1987, which gave the donors very high levels of leverage over the composition of government development spending.

Given the shattered state of the economy in 1986, Uganda had to rely heavily on donor support. The Economic Recovery Program launched in 1987 was assisted by a Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) from the IMF and World Bank Economic Recovery Credits, plus assistance from other multilateral and bilateral donors. Substantial IMF and IDA support has continued over the years through such facilities as the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Credit from the IMF and Structural Adjustment Credits from IDA.

Domestic resource mobilization

For the past 50 years, governments throughout the developing world have tried, with the support of donor agencies, to encourage growth by channeling large sums of money to state-owned credit institutions for on-lending at below

market interest rates. This was done in Uganda through both the then Uganda Commercial Bank and the Cooperative Development Bank before they collapsed. The objective was to increase incomes and reduce poverty particularly in rural areas by addressing acute credit shortages.

In many developing countries, financial markets - especially in rural areas - cannot operate efficiently because of an unstable macroeconomic environment, biased sectoral policies, excessive government intervention, and legal and regulatory barriers. Macroeconomic instability affects Rural Financial Institutions (RFIs) directly, through such monetary variables as real interest rates, and indirectly, through effects on clients. Persistent distortions, such as misaligned exchange rates, may lead to a misallocation of resources that is damaging to financial markets.

To describe the development and structure of financial intermediaries that promote resource mobilization, we use measures of the overall size of the financial intermediaries sector, the allocation of credit, the spread between borrowing and lending interest rates, and the size of particular types of financial intermediaries such as banks, insurance companies, and pension funds. No single measure is the correct measure of financial intermediaries' development. Indeed, each indicator may be the appropriate measure for a particular question. For an empirical presentation of domestic resource mobilization in Uganda such variables can be studied systematically but this has not been done in this paper. Instead, broad sources like income and international trade taxes are highlighted in table 2 to drive home the fact that Uganda is so dependent on foreign resources.

Table 2: Domestic Revenue Mobilization

Collections (Shs bns)	2005/06 Outturn	2008/09 Outturn	2009/10 Budgeted
Net URA Collections (excluding Government Taxes and Refunds)	2,230.85	3,662.32	4,474.23
Income Taxes	604.62	1,028.92	1,249.60
International Trade taxes	1,125.28	1,894.73	2,270.41
Tax Refunds	-65.89	-101.91	-92.45
URA Revenue (NET) GDP Ratio (%)	12.3	12.2	12.7
Nominal GDP at Market Prices	18,172	30,101	35,214

Key: URA = Uganda Revenue Authority. GDP = Gross Domestic Product

Source: Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED), 2010: 60.

Table 2 also clearly indicates that taxes as a proportion of the GDP, 12.2 percent in 2008/09, are insufficient for all Uganda's budget operations hence the dependency on foreign resources and the leverage that goes with it.

Recent economic growth objectives and structural reforms

In spite of the resource mobilization issues raised above, Uganda's recent primary objectives are to lower the rate of inflation, to reduce the balance of payments deficit and to increase annual economic growth. Structural reforms have been focused on strengthening the tax effort, improving public sector management, promoting exports, developing the financial sector, increasing domestic savings and investments, and generally promoting income earning activities throughout the country.

The resulting macroeconomic impacts include:

1. The rapid fall in inflation which has not been accompanied by any major adverse impact on economic activity.
2. Exchange rate stability has been generally maintained.
3. With the fall in inflation, interest rates have also come down though lending rates of commercial banks remain high largely as a reflection of the high cost of inter-mediation in the financial system.

On the external sector front, non-coffee exports have grown as an indication of export diversification from US\$395.63 in 2002/03 to US\$1,232.335 in 2008/09 (table 3). The liberal trade and exchange system has improved incentives to export. Recent policy and institutional reforms affecting coffee producers include the abolition of the Coffee Marketing Board's monopoly on exports, freeing farm-gate prices and free conversion of coffee proceeds into Shillings at the market exchange rate.

Performance of Major Economic Sectors

Agriculture: This is important for the Ugandan economy with a share of over 30 percent of GDP and is also the main source of income in rural areas where 89 percent of the

Table 3. The Value of Uganda's Exports of Merchandise (Millions of US\$)

	2002/03	2003/04	2007/08	2008/09	% ¹
Total Exports	507.91	647.18	2,597.743	2,811.562	8.2
Coffee	105.47	114.13	348.629	337.152	-3.3
Non-Coffee exports	395.63	525.90	1,180.693	1,232.335	4.4
Electricity	15.47	12.64	11.190	10.626	-5.0
Gold	48.18	58.49	44.852	40.857	-8.9
Cotton	16.88	42.84	19.904	27.643	38.9
Tea	29.46	39.25	46.757	52.052	11.3
Tobacco	39.89	36.16	64.488	63.353	-1.8
Fish and its prod. (excl. regional)	83.78	88.82	126.589	119.814	-5.4
Fish and its prod. (regional exports)	27.65	29.31	68.134	60.826	-10.7
Hides and Skins	4.18	5.86	13.829	9.398	-32.0
Simsim	1.55	3.38	13.869	12.378	-10.8
Maize	8.16	18.76	17.961	24.513	36.5
Beans	5.49	4.87	5.709	15.139	165.1
Flowers	17.04	27.16	38.983	47.414	21.6
Oil re-exports	11.69	34.32	23.697	5.254	-21.4
Cobalt	1.92	2.69	18.944	14.892	-21.4
Others	84.28	121.38	665.787	728.183	9.4
Informal Cross Border Trade (excl. fish)			1,068.421	1,242.421	16.3

Sources: 1. MFPED, 2007: 18-19 for 2002/03 and 2003/04.

2. MFPED, 2009: 46 for 2007/08, 2008/09 and Percentage.

population live and work. Despite the shrinking relative share in national GDP, the vast majority of working Ugandans (70%) still derive their livelihoods from this sector (MFPED, 2009: 65).

Industry: Due to the civil war in the early 1980s, the overall industrial production fell further until the mid-1980s but increased slightly in the late 1980s. In the 1990s, further efforts were made to revitalize the manufacturing sector. Setting up of the Uganda Investment Authority (UIA), enactment of an investment code, liberalization of foreign exchange markets, divestiture programs, etc., aimed at preparing the sector for competitive regional and international market helped.

Tourism: Tourism is one of the fastest growing sub-sectors within the service sector in the economy assisted by the launching of the tourism master plan in mid-1993. The Uganda Tourism Board was created to facilitate the marketing of tourist attractions locally and internationally, and to participate in international tourism fairs in order to popularize Uganda as a tourist destination (Okurut, 1998).

Energy: The country continues to experience power shortages, resulting in load shedding. This affects negatively the service and especially the industrial sectors. Low energy generation capacity is coupled with the use of costly energy sources. But Uganda does have numerous potential sites for the development of future hydroelectric power stations like Bujagali and Karuma hydropower projects, and commercially exploitable oil reserves have been discovered in the western part of the country.

Reforms in the Public Service Sector

When Uganda gained its political independence in 1962, its public service system ranked among the best in Africa. By the late 1980s, however, after years of civil strife and economic mismanagement, the public service sector had become weak and bloated. The government that came into power in 1986 inherited an ineffective

public service sector characterized by excessive centralization of power, inadequate pay and employee benefits, an obscure and compressed salary structure, and slow promotions. With the new government came a strategy shift toward macroeconomic stabilization. Its reform agenda called for private sector development and a smaller but more effective government achieved through public service reform.

The government set up the Public Service Review and Reorganization Commission in 1989 and, in 1992, launched the Civil Service Reform Program, based on the Commission's recommendations. In the first stage of the reform program – implemented in fiscal years 1993-1997 – the main objectives were to reduce the size of the public sector to manageable levels and rationalize salaries and non-cash benefits.

Reforming Salary Structures: The main objective of the salary reform, initiated in fiscal year 1995, was to increase transparency and to provide public service workers with performance-enhancing incentives by monetizing non-cash benefits, raising basic salaries, and rationalizing the salary structure.

Another objective of the salary reform was to pay civil servants a minimum acceptable salary for the most junior public service grade. The government recognized, however, that the concept of the minimum wage did not motivate staff and did not attract qualified foreign workers. It also did not in itself solve the problem of a compressed salary structure. The concept of a “living wage” therefore replaced the concept of the minimum wage. In addition to providing for basic needs, the living wage takes account of social costs – such as health, education, transportation, and clothing.

The second phase of the Reform Program covering the period from 1997 to 2002 – popularly known as Public Service 2002 – was launched in November 1997 with the following major objectives (MFPED, 1998: 21):

1. The implementation of the rationalized structures and functions to improve efficiency and effectiveness, and to reflect decentralization. Emphasis was to be on service delivery and the rationalization included the divestiture of non-core functions.
2. Increased devolution of responsibility to local government in the area of financial and economic management.
3. Increased accountability, transparency and improved service delivery through the introduction of result oriented management and the establishment of clear mandates and mission statement, service standards and greater citizen and private sector participation.
4. Improvement in resource management and expenditure control through improved procedures; the greater use of information technology (e.g. personnel, payroll, budgetary and financial systems); and improvements in asset management and audit/inspection.
5. The development of the necessary legal and regulatory framework to support the reform program.

Much of the above have been achieved but with varying degrees.

Foreign Debt

Uganda's total debt exposure is approximately US\$4.0 billion (MFPED, 2009: 48). The 2005 concluded Multi-lateral Debt-Relief Initiative (MDRI) significantly reduced the debt-stock and debt-service obligations, the former from US\$4.46 billion (51.7% of GDP) to US\$1.1 billion. The World Bank accounts for over 80 percent of the total loan portfolio of the country (MFPED, 2009: 49).

Conclusion

Is Uganda really an economic star performer"? Yes and no! There has been some headway on relative macroeconomic stability and structural reforms. On the other hand, however, Uganda's domestic tax revenue is only around 13 percent of GDP. According to World Bank (2007), world development indicators for 2005 show that for Uganda it was 12.4 while for Kenya and South Africa were 18.9 and 27.4 respectively. In addition, the fragility of the Ugandan recovery is obvious. Investments are financed by foreign savings and export growth and diversification is slow. Private investments in production activities are still small, and much of the recovery depends on the aid flow.

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Gender, Social Capital and Rural Development in Uganda

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Abstract

This paper examines the link between gender, social capital and rural development in Uganda. It brings in the complex interrelationships of power, resources, social networks and collaborations in the analysis of social capital. The paper further explores how these relationships that operates in everyday life impact on rural development programmes through the ongoing processes of resistance, negotiation, social networks, collaborations and interdependency.

Key Words: Gender, Social Capital, Rural Development and Uganda.

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Introduction

The concept, 'social capital', has been increasingly central in development literature (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 2000 & Woolcock & Narayan, 2002). The strength of social capital as a construct for understanding development lies in its interpersonal and inter-group character. Social network is connectedness among individuals and social groups that facilitates collaboration and equitable resource distribution at the household, community and state level. Social network is essential for societal stability and for easing the material and psychological stress of Poverty (Narayan et al., 2000). It also affirms individual and group identities and includes the less powerful. Social networks have value and this is expressed with the term social capital (Putnam, 2000). The concept social capital is relatively new within development studies and its relevance is recognised by researchers and policy makers only since the past twenty years. It can be roughly defined as 'institutions, relationships, attitudes, and values that govern interactions among people and contribute to economic and social development' (Grootaert & van Bastelaer, 2002). Social capital is important since it is at the core of the development studies, bridging economics and sociology, and because it has strong policy implications.

Social capital can be related to the broader concept of rural resilience, which is defined as 'the capacity of a rural region to adapt to changing external circumstances in such a way that a satisfactory standard of living is maintained' (Heijman et al., 2007). High levels of social capital not only lead to more sustainable development, but also to more rural resilience. The traditional composition of natural, physical or produced capital and human capital needs to be broadened to include social capital. The internal social and cultural coherence of society, the norms and values that govern interactions among people and the institutions in which they are embedded are vital synergy for rural development.

The paper discusses the leading thoughts on the definition of the concept of social capital and the role social capital plays in rural development from a gendered perspective. It highlights the relationship between social capital and development and then links social capital to rural development with illustration from farmers' associations and women's grassroots organisations.

2. Theorising Social Capital and Rural Development

2.1 Defining Social Capital

Social capital refers to aspects of social organisation, including social networks and norms of reciprocity and trust that facilitate cooperation and the accomplishment of goals. It is a resource created and accumulated through repeated everyday interactions among and between individuals. It includes not only the social networks and connections among individuals, but also the physical and political context that supports network development and the resources produced. Incorporated in this definition are two related, but disparate notions of social capital. One notion relates to social capital as a structural resource and examines resources that individuals access as a result of their membership in a particular social structure. The other notion refers to the nature and extent of one's involvement in relationships, regardless of context. Both conceptualisations share a focus on the productive potential of social capital i.e. social capital makes possible the achievement of ends that might be impossible in its absence.

The first view of social capital takes a social structural approach, viewing social capital as something realised through interactions embedded in a particular social and political context. In this view, social capital is neither owned nor embodied by particular individuals or groups, but is a structural resource available to individuals for personal gain. Whereas economic and human capital are the property of individuals, social capital is an emergent

property of relationships. Unlike other forms of capital, individuals both contribute to social capital and use it, but they cannot own it (Bourdieu, 1985).

Bourdieu's definition implies the deliberate investment of individuals in a network for later personal use or access with an unspecified obligation of reciprocity. According to Coleman (1988), social capital is the aspect of social structure that facilitates actions of individuals and institutions within social structure. Coleman believed that social capital had the potential to strengthen community social fabric because it builds bonds based on information, trust, and solidarity among people, most often as by-products of their activities.

The second view of social capital theory, popularised by Putnam (1993), focuses on the norms of trust and reciprocity that emerge from interactions among individuals, regardless of social structural context. Social capital is redefined in this school of thought as an attribute that individuals or groups either possess or do not possess. Here, social capital refers to the collective value of social connections and the inclinations that arise from these relationships to accomplish mutual goals. Individual gain might result, but social capital is more importantly related to the achievement of collective ends. Within this view, three dimensions of social capital are defined as bonding, bridging, and linking.

The dimensions are not either or categories, but differences in the ratio of the three may yield different outcomes. 'Bonding social capital' refers to ties among individuals who generally share similar socio-demographic characteristics. 'Bridging social capital' refers to ties among dissimilar individuals, while linking social capital refers to one's ties to authority, such as public or private institutions. Bridging and linking social capital are thought to contribute to a productive and well-functioning civil society because both types increase opportunities for civic participation, broaden networks of exchange, and increase access to resources.

Bonding social capital, on the other hand, has the potential to create strong group identities, boundaries, and intolerance of outsiders. Bonding social capital may also foster group norms that are so powerful that they restrict individual choice and freedom by disallowing exit from the group and creating strong demands for conformity.

Putnam (1993) introduced the idea that social capital carries with it social rewards, such as the better functioning of society. His view holds that when people share a sense of identity, possess similar views, trust each other, and act reciprocally for mutual benefit, social capital exists. The presence of social capital impacts on the social, political, and economic nature of society in which it exists. Thus, Putnam's conceptualisation of social capital has gained prominence with those interested in society and governance.

Social capital is defined by social interactions and their by-products such as trust relations, reciprocity and exchanges, common rules and norms, and networks and groups. These collective by-products are usually beneficial for society as a whole. In communities where people share trust and reciprocity, interaction is way more easy and efficient than in communities where people do not even know their neighbours (Dekker & Uslaner 2001). In many rural communities in Uganda, social networks serve as unofficial insurance systems. Social capital is about the value of social networks, bonding similar people and bridging between diverse people, with norms of reciprocity.

Grootaert & van Bastelaer (2002) built a useful framework that defines the concept along two different axes (Figure 1). Along the first axis, social capital is identified at different levels, where quality of institution has been positioned at the macro level. This includes functioning of laws, incidence of conflicts, and corruption. The lower end of this axis is the social capital at the micro level, which is about relationships among individuals and households. For example, the extended family, friends and the relationships

among neighbours. The meso level includes networks between individuals and larger structures like farmers' cooperatives. Along the second axis, Grootaert & van Bastelaer (2002), distinguish structural and cognitive social capital. Structural social capital is characterised by structures that are *objective and externally visible*, like laws, courts, bingo clubs and cooperatives. Cognitive social capital is subjective and intangible, i.e. common rules and norms, trust and reciprocity. It is also possible to indicate the structural and cognitive forms of social capital with respectively official and unofficial institutions.

According to Grootaert & van Bastelaer (2002), these two forms of social capital are exchangeable. When official institutions do not function properly, people will invent alternative coordination mechanisms. But when official institutions are functioning well, unofficial structures are losing importance, and official insurances will replace tight family ties, as we see in most western countries and urban areas in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, these two forms of social capital cannot exist without each other because for laws to work, people need to trust the system.

Figure 1: Forms and scope of social capital

		Macro	
		Institutions of the state, rule of law	Governance
Structural	Official institutions	Meso	Unofficial institutions
	Local institutions, Networks		Trust, local norms, values
Micro		Cognitive	

Source: Grootaert & van Bastelaer (2002).

This whole set of trust and reciprocity, common rules and norms, at the macro and the micro level and both structural and cognitive, is called social *capital* because it functions just like other forms of capital like money in a few aspects. It accumulates as a stock that in turn produces benefit, it needs initial investment and regular maintenance, and it is more easily broken down than rebuilt. Social capital distinguishes itself from financial capital, as people need to build it up together, and because it does not devalue because of use, but rather because of *lack* of use (Grootaert & van Bastelaer, 2002). Social capital is self-reinforcing when reciprocity

increases connectedness between people, leading to greater trust, confidence and capacity to innovate.

2.2 Social Capital and Rural Development

The existence of social capital is very important for economic growth and development. A growing body of evidence indicates that the size and density of social networks and institutions, and the nature of interpersonal interactions, significantly affect the efficiency and sustainability of development programmes. Yet the exact channels through which social

capital impacts developmental outcomes have only begun to be explored, and the lessons to be drawn from these observations for programme design and implementation remain to be formulated (World Bank, 2009).

Social capital is significant because it affects rural people's capacity to organise for development. Social capital helps groups plan, mobilise and manage resources, coordinate activities and resolve conflicts (Uphoff, 1986). In rural communities, social ties are often strong and longstanding. Informal ties and social norms provide essential safety nets. Social capital is a mediator for collective action and can help people build common property resources, such as fresh water wells (Ostrom, 1990). Not only can social capital improve access to natural resources, it can also improve access to physical capital.

Perhaps one of the most telling contributions of social capital is conceptual because it adds a social dimension to the development equation of capital that has been mostly ignored in economic explorations of determinants of poverty and household welfare (Narayan, 1997). The positive impact of social capital is now well recognised by governments and development agencies that increasingly use decentralisation and participatory strategies in their rural development activities.

Enforceable group norms are not necessarily good for community members. Traditions can stifle individual growth and creativity. Individuals, members and their families who do not comply with norms can be ridiculed or ousted from the community. For example, some rural communities pressure elites who have moved to urban areas to donate money and services to the community. Elites depend on the ethnic community in the village where they grew up and at the same time the community also depends on the elites to take care of them in illness and old age, especially in countries which have no formal safety nets. Elites therefore maintain a social presence in the rural community by service (Bates, 1989).

Despite the clear relationships that were described above, putting theory into practice is not that straightforward at all. Social capital clearly has to come from within society, and cannot be implemented 'top down' by governments or development organisations. If there is no intrinsic social capital in the form of trust and willingness, investments in the community will inevitably fail. In this paper I use two illustrations to demonstrate the application of social capital and rural development in Uganda. In the first case, I look at farmers association as a functional form of social capital and rural development. In the second case, I examine women's group as a synergy for networks, collaboration and development. Collaboration in this context is the level of solidarity among household or group members in time of need, specific incentives or purposes including access to credit, agricultural inputs, land, access to decision making, mutual help and opportunities to socialise (Westermann, et al., 2005).

i) Farmers Association in Rural Uganda

The majority of the rural communities are dependent on agriculture for employment and household income. Rural farmers require internal as well as external capacity to be successful (Sorensen, 2000). External capacity describes the farmers' ability to negotiate with other actors and the internal capacity refers to efficient management of resources (Bebbington, 1998 & Sorensen, 2000). If these two factors are combined, they can increase the income and productivity of the farmers.

Social capital in the form of local level farmers associations, networks or cooperatives can provide the environment necessary for rural development. For example, in the vast areas of the West Nile region of Uganda, farmers practice open field system of agriculture. In this kind of arrangement, households cultivate a number of scattered and unfenced strips of gardens. When the

harvest is over, the gardens become an open field for grazing their animals. This kind of arrangement ensures effective network and collaboration between women and men. The process also ensures that women and men harvest their seasonal crops and at the same time feed their animals minimising wastage of resources.

ii) **Women's Grassroots Organisations**

The different positions that women and men occupy in social structures have far reaching implications for women's and men's access to formal and informal institutions (Nayaran, 2000). The most important institutions in poor people's lives are often gender segregated and when development interventions do not factor in these differences, women may emerge as losers from such development interventions.

Women in rural Uganda have used their small organisations to exchange information, training and sharing experiences to empower themselves. They have also been able to access financial resources from different organisations to fill up the gap of resource needs. The institutional structure and relationships within and outside the women's organisations greatly affect the process of women's participation, access and control of resources. This also leads to empowerment since it eliminates wasteful deployment of energy and resources.

Owa-Mataze (2004), conducted a study of a women's community based group "*Abakyara Busesiire*", which generally translates as 'Women the sun has risen,' in Rukoni sub county, Ruhaama County in Ntugamo district, which provides a good example of functionality of social capital and rural development. The study revealed that the main objective of the women's group was to raise the socio-

economic condition of the poor and the marginalised and empowerment through micro-credit small savings and credit as their main strategy. Community-based groups command confidence and create sense of ownership and the feeling that the organisations are responsive to their priorities. As Nayaran (2000) observed, indigenous identity based on ethnicity, clan, gender and age lays the foundation for the evolvement of women's groups.

The study also revealed that the activities of the organisation greatly improved the relationships between the group members and their husbands. The group members were resourceful and their work earned them recognition and respect within their families, group and society. The study demonstrated that although this community-based group was initiated by women, it incorporated all members of society and served as the arena for negotiation, social networks, collaborations, resource sharing and interdependency between women and men.

3.0 **Gender and Social Capital**

Women and men commonly depend on different kinds of social relations or networks (Neuhouser, 1995 & Agrawal, 2000). Women are often more dependent on informal networks based on everyday forms of collaboration such as collecting water, fetching fuel wood and child rearing. Such informal networks provide solidarity and access to household resources like water and firewood. Men are often engaged in more formal networks, such as project groups and community councils that improve access to economic resources and decision-making (Agrawal, 2000).

Women and men may value collaboration differently. Women often have more everyday experiences of informal collaboration based on reciprocal relationships and higher dependence on social relations for access to household resources (Agrawal, 2000 & Cleaver, 1998).

At the same time, it is often assumed that women reveal more relational and altruistic behaviour due to their role and responsibility for reproduction (Folbre, 1994 & White, 1992), and are less motivated by selfish individualism while men are more individualistic and more engaged in formal collaboration, decision-making and organised power structures. Women are better able to overcome social division and conflicts (Agrawal, 2000 & Cleaver, 1998) because of their greater interdependency and their everyday experiences of collaboration.

However, the gender division in social networks carries significant costs for both women and men. While women tend to be isolated from production networks, men are isolated from those informal institutions that may provide for emotional wellbeing (Nayaran, 2000). More often poor men are left struggling to maintain their positions in local society. According to Mbilinyi (1989), honour requires the men to earn enough financial and material resources to support their wives and children and to maintain the family's position in the community by public demonstrations of prosperity.

3.1 Gender and the Household

Within the household, gender relations involve ongoing struggles over control of strategic resources and relationships. It is therefore important to bring the complex interrelations of power, knowledge, and agency in the analysis of social capital. By doing so, it is possible to explore how these interrelations that operates in everyday life, impact on rural development programmes through the ongoing processes of negotiation and resistance within gender relations.

A focus on the gendered division of roles, responsibilities, rights, and interests contextualises changes in rural development (Leach, 1991). The ideas of "relations of production" and "relations in production" the former understood as property relations and the latter as labour processes (Carney & Watts, 1990) provide important conceptual tools for

understanding local rural development issues. For example, gender analysis has illustrated that people with secure tenure rights invest in land with a long-term view, but their ability to do so can be compromised by lack of access to economic or other resources vital to the maintenance of their livelihoods (Leach, 1991 & Mackenzie, 1995). Within relations of production, gender analysis of availability of labour shows us how tasks are divided and how work is sequenced or segregated between women's and men's crops and space. Gender analysis also shows us the links between division of labour and right to access resources, and how they change in value over time.

Studies conducted by Esuruku (2003) in the West Nile, Uganda, revealed that among the Madi, women and men had their allotted places in the immediate and extended family organisation. Men wielded unlimited authority and occupied the highest echelons of influence as opposed to women who were seen as nurturers and caregivers. Valuable properties such as livestock, household implements, wealth acquired through agriculture or trade although communally owned were controlled by men. Although things such as house, courtyard, and granaries were considered as belonging to women, in the actual fact they belonged to men.

While aspects of decision-making reveal a lot about how gender relations impinge on rural development, Leach (1991) argues that they also hide a lot. Many people are not making decisions that they necessarily like, but are dealing with dilemmas and constraints in a context of socio political issues. In this way coping with changes in the political economy and new social contexts in response to broader changes means coping with emerging dilemmas and problems. This has implications for gender relations in rural development. As much as coping mechanisms and decision-making processes are affected by household production, they are bound up in context-specific notions about relations between husband and wife; among members

of an extended family; and among neighbours (Crowley, 1994 & Leach, 1991).

3.2 Access to Household Resources

Gendered access to resources, distribution, and control is commonly, although not exclusively, negotiated at the level of the household. The household is a site that represents to both women and men a channel of access to productive resources such as land, labour and income. It is also a space where other important social relationships intersect. To understand the gendered options and opportunities available for rural development, it is important to explore the processes by which household members gain access to and control over resources that are available to the household as a whole, and the forms of negotiation, bargaining, and conflict that occur between household members.

Evans (1991) points out that household are often shifting flexible structures in which boundaries are difficult to discern. Indeed, the sheer cross-cultural diversity of household forms almost defies definition. This diversity extends to various aspects of the household. For instance, family and household composition, and the ways by which social relations are mediated through kinship, marriage, and other social institutions, all create a variety of conjugal and residential arrangements (Evans, 1991). Heterogeneous household forms can include polygamous households, female-headed households, or clusters of households that are part of larger compounds and extended family units. Furthermore, patterns and channels of access to resources cannot always be located or confined to the household.

The household which is an important socially constructed concept offers a point of departure for gender analysis. Its activities may not have a single locus, and any one locus does not necessarily represent a single unit of labour or resources (Esuruku, 2003). Nonetheless, the household remains a valuable concept for exploring the effects of different gendered

interests, options, and social relationships on rural development.

The conjugal contract, defined as the terms by which spouses exchange goods, incomes, and services including labour, is a useful concept for drawing out these issues. It focuses attention on the changing nature of these terms according to broader changes in the political economy (Whitehead, 1981). The conjugal contract varies depending on factors such as cultural patterns of inheritance and residence (Evans, 1991) and on the extent to which resources are joined or pooled, or dealt with as separate holdings. Because of these types of factors, women's and men's access to resources, labour, and income may be determined by their positions in relation to complex webs of responsibilities, obligations, and rights within conjugal contracts, kinship groups, and the wider social and political-economic environments (Evans, 1991).

Recognising the fluidity of conjugal contracts makes it possible to focus on the complex interplay of power, knowledge, labour, and resource relations, and to incorporate gendered politics. The strategic and symbolic deference to patriarchal discourses, the marital and non-marital metaphors, the rhetorical struggles, the wars of words and the negotiation of symbolic representations are all used to configure and reconfigure gender relations, and to shift responsibilities, obligations, and rights within a changing political economy (Schroeder et al., 1996). Understanding the complex, overlapping rights and obligations, and the competing interests, tensions and conflicts, relations of domination, and cultural representations that produce and reproduce power relations, is crucial for understanding the politics and points of resistance associated with the control of resources (Carney & Watts, 1990).

3.3 The Household and Social Institutions

The household is also a locus for a number of relationships that take place outside the conjugal contract, such as social institutions including

kinship relations, social organisations, social networks, non-sanctioned social relationships etc. Women and men increasingly invest in social institutions such as kinship relations as diversification strategies in the face of increasingly unstable economic conditions. They offer a critical opportunity to explore struggles over resources and the way they are controlled, managed, accessed, and made available to different people (Evans, 1991 & Whitehead, 1981). For instance, social organisations, such as women's groups and informal networks, are important socially sanctioned channels for accessing resources. They provide women with autonomy and freedom to pursue their own interests and projects.

Moreover, there are important links between social relationships, social institutions and patriarchy that shape the gender division of labour, property relations, roles and responsibilities (Carney & Watts, 1990). For example, patriarchy is pervasive in influencing gender relations and the outcomes of women's struggles over resources that are vital to sustainable rural development. However, patriarchy is not fixed, monolithic, timeless, and unchanging. It is rather both a dominant ideology that underpins 'cultural' norms, idioms, and practices, and an inequitable social structure that shapes and permeates gender relations (Ruth, 1998). Women are not 'powerless' within the structures and ideology of patriarchy. They are actors who resist and manipulate patriarchy to access resources vital to the sustenance of their livelihoods.

Studies done by Owa-Mataze (2004), illustrated that in Uganda, Grassroot Women's Organisations (GWOs) play a very significant role. The institutional structure and relationships within and outside the GWOs greatly affect gender relations in the households. Owa-Mataze observed that although customary law still subordinates women within the traditional family and places them under the guardianship of a male relative, women through GWOs make contribution to the welfare of their households.

Men have come to appreciate the contribution of women in the welfare of the households. The GWOs response provided an avenue for dialogue between men and women.

Conclusion

The complex interrelationships of power, resources, social networks and collaborations in the context of gender, social capital and rural development formed the basis of our discussion. This paper has illustrated how social networks, collaborations and interdependency can lead to improvement of the livelihoods of rural communities. The main argument of the paper is that women and men depend on each other in different ways although they may value collaboration differently. In the rural context, the household has been considered as the site that represents to both women and men a channel of access to productive resources such as land, labour, income. It is also a space where other important social relationships intersect which form the basis to understand the gendered options and opportunities available for social capital and rural development.

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Inside the Coffee Smuggling Arena: The Amin Regime *versus* “others” in Uganda, 1973-1979.

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Abstract

The failures of the Idi Amin state led to the rapture of the established state monopoly systems, for instance, in coffee marketing, by the “illegal” parallel system (*magendo*). The coffee *magendo* revolved around contestation between the state and the differently positioned actors for a major resource during Uganda’s international embargoes and economic war. Inside the *magendo* arena were positioned the state; Amin and his inner circle state functionaries for the reproduction of his regime, versus the “unknown”, hence illegal operators. The arena presented a hierarchy of actors contesting for the coffee resource, whereby the success of the “unknown” operators depended on sophisticated socio-political networks to the “authorised” centres of power. Meanwhile the state “authorised” its power base functionaries as a means of its reproduction.

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Introduction

During the Amin regime, the economy was characterised by an ‘economic war’ and a resource base that had shrunk coffee earnings. Worse still, the state-controlled coffee marketing channel was crippled by an interplay of internal contradictions coupled with international embargoes. This enabled an illegal parallel marketing channel (*magendo*)¹ to thrive and become the arena of contestations that climaxed during the 1973 and 1975/76 coffee booms. In the contest, Amin’s repressive state in pursuit of the major coffee revenue was pitted against differently positioned actors who equally sought after coffee income (Asiimwe, 2002:112-187). Apart from the state, actors included those who were “authorised” versus the category of the “un-authorised” who the state considered the culprits in the *magendo* system. The major “authorised” actors included Amin relatives and inner circle of top commanders and the large-scale *mafutamingi*² smugglers. These were followed by junior army officers; top security personnel and provincial governors. These top categories were followed by smaller “un-authorised” *magendoists* who operated alongside the less known errant junior army officers and security agents *cummagendoists*. This paper seeks to present the *modus operandi* of the *magendo* coffee marketing system and particularly the contest between the state and the different “authorised” and “un-authorised” actors in the *magendo* arena. We will show the contest over the coffee resource between Amin’s state, which was constrained by embargos alongside the smugglers from the power base of the state versus a hierarchy of “unknown” smugglers who were the unwanted in the arena. This paper is derived from broader Doctoral research on coffee marketing in Mukono, Uganda (see Asiimwe, 2002).

Amin’s regime and the top strata *magendoists*

Actors in the *magendo* arena reflected the different socio-political configurations of the Amin regime and Ugandan society. These had a bearing on individual actor’s position, mode of operation and power in the *magendo* arena. At the top of the *magendo* chain were the revenue interests of Amin and his closest friends and relatives, and his internationally isolated regime. Owing to the international and regional embargoes and constraints, Amin and his government were compelled to sell coffee through intermediary actors and front countries using expensively chartered airlines and the newly formed Uganda Airlines Co-operation (see Asiimwe, 2002: 112-187; *Sunday Vision*, 8 October 2000, 9(42): 25). After this top level *magendo*, there were lower strata *magendoists* who will be differentiated by consecutively numbering them, starting with trader 5 (T5) at the top to trader 1 (T1) category at the base of the *magendo* arena.

Below the smuggling ring of Amin and his repressive regime, were some elements in the inner circle of top commanders, ministers and large-scale *mafutamingi* smugglers who will be categorised as Traders Number. 5 (T5). The *mafutamingi* rose from the Amin state-led re-distribution of resources and facilitation of the groups that formed his ethnic/religious socio-political base who replaced Asians as dominant actors in top commercial activities³. As Southall observed, the Asian minority traders were replaced by a minority ethnic group of Nubians (Southall, 1975). Mamdani also noted

3 By 1970, Milton Obote’s Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) government had softened on expelling Asians in order to stave off the potential growth of politically ‘hostile’ indigenous entrepreneurs, particularly from the Baganda classes (Asiimwe, 2002: Chaps 2 & 3). As a result, the indigenous entrepreneurial classes welcomed Amin who reciprocated by adopting the original UPC populist discourse of “Africanisation”/“Ugandanisation”. This climaxed into group re-alignments that included the expulsion of Asians in August 1972, thus opening opportunities for “the advancement of indigenous entrepreneurial classes”. Prominent of these were elements from Amin’s north-western ethnic groups and his fellow Muslims (Southall, 1975; Hansen, 1977: 102-104, 107ff; Nayenga, 1979: 128; Green, 1981: 15; Jørgensen, 1981; Mamdani, 1983: Chap 3; Rueschemeyer & Evans, 1985; Omara-Otunnu, 1987:123; Mudoola, 1993: 47-57).

1 *Magendo*, Swahili for illicit/unauthorised trade; *magendoistan* illicit trader. *Magendo* grew into a powerful system; and its own terminologies and sub-culture as will be noted in this paper.

2 *Mafuta mingi*, Swahili for much oil, hence oily with wealth

that the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council emerged the major beneficiary of the expelled Asian's properties to become one of the largest landlords in the country (Mamdani, 1983: 56). Amin's regime's contribution to the process of *magendo* class formation was through resource redistribution and its functional weaknesses. These enabled some *magendoists* who were part of, or associated with the social bases of the regime to operate as if 'authorised', while the errant actors exploited the functional weaknesses of the regime.

"Authorisation" of the *mafutamingi* was epitomised by Amin's address to members of the Defence Council at State House Entebbe in 1977, in which he stated that he was overjoyed at seeing Ugandans operating businesses successfully. He strongly warned what he called "envious saboteurs who heaped unfounded lies on the businessmen and reported them to security personnel". He cautioned the security personnel to avoid such "jealous people who stifled Uganda's advancement" (Direct translation, Munno, 68(149), 1977: 1). This policy gave support, patronage and a 'blank cheque authorisation' of the new 'entrepreneurs', which later circumscribed the nature of their operations. As various respondents pointed out, the benefiting dominant actors boasted of "falling into things", a euphemism that depicted their wealth, Asian's assets and economic opportunities despite having never gone to school (*naasoma wa?* i.e. where did I study from?) (informal conversations with respondents). With the decline of the economy and on-set of the 'economic war', the *mafutamingi* became major large-scale actors in the subsequent illegal *magendo* commercial activities (Asiimwe, 2002: Chap. 3, Green, 1981; Kasfir: 1983-84; Mamdani, 1983 and Jamal, 1991: 324).

Alongside the *mafutamingi* was Amin's inner circle of top commanders and ministers *cum magendoists*. On their operations, one respondent told of the involvement of Brig. Ali Fadhul, the then Minister of Provincial Administration. The respondent narrated thus:

We rarely bought from producers but got their (producer's) coffee from factories like Muniko, Namataba, and of Ali Fadhul, the soldier. His was near Mbiko. That one (Fadhul) was even a Minister in the government. We would, however, not deal with him, but his workers, (as) he would not be there, he was a soldier. It was his factory, we would deal with the Director, but he (the Director) would pass on to him (Fadhul) the money (interview, *magendo* participant, Mukono, 1998).

Some of the *mafutamingi* and inner top commanders and ministers were linked to international intermediary actors. It was, for example, reported that the 'Dubai Group' under 'The Sultan', which used to hire Uganda Airlines to ferry the coffee, in return brought goods under the names of Amin's close relatives. Furthermore, it was alleged that the 'Dubai Group' was: "helped by the notorious State Research Bureau to evade customs duty" (*Weekly Topic*, 11(9), 1980: 1). It was also alleged that Amin's Chief of Staff and Defence Minister, General Mustafa Adrisi was involved in such operations with an international Asian businessman (*ibid.*).

The T5 stratum was followed by medium *magendoists* who were mainly from regional level socio-political bases of the Amin regime. For differentiation, this category will be classified as trader 4 (T4). Some of the *magendoists* in this category also benefited from the properties of the departed Asian. It was pointed out that after distributing the major assets to the top inner circle, the remaining properties which included 5,655 firms, factories, ranches and agricultural estates as well as homes, cars and household goods were mostly distributed to relatives and friends of soldiers (Jørgensen, 1981: 288-289).

Alongside the T4 group of *magendoists*, were elements among the middle ranking army officers in regional barracks, security agents and provincial governors. The Amin government tended to turn 'a blind eye' to the operations of some of these officers owing to its inability to sufficiently remunerate them in the 'economic war' setting. Government salaries had been

eroded by inflation and a narrow tax base as the industrial and formal commercial sectors contracted after the expulsion of Asians in 1972. Gross investment, savings and capital inflows had, for instance, declined, and only coffee had remained as the major foreign exchange earner (Banugire, 1986; World Bank, 1993: 5). In addition, the official coffee marketing chain was constrained by, *inter alia*, the international embargoes (Asiimwe, 2002: Chap 3). In order to ensure the loyalty of the lower army officers and regional Governors, the government ‘authorised’ the *magendo* operations of some of them, especially those from Amin’s north-western ethnic groups like the Kakwa, Nubians, and Muslims notably from Badru Kakungulu’s Uganda Muslim Community faction.

The T4 and the ‘authorised’ security and military *magendoists* operated under the framework of loose central control and weakened traditional organs of the state like the judiciary and police. Decree No. 8 of 1972 had specifically granted extra-judicial powers to the military and security agents at lower centres of power rather than the judiciary and police, which enabled them to operate freely and with impunity. In this regard, Doornbos drew attention to the contracted sphere of central political action that left increased room to local and regional centres of power (Doornbos, 1987: 13). Mamdani reiterated that military provincial governors were under nominal control from the central government (Mamdani, 1983: 50).

During field interviews with former *magendo* operatives, it was pointed out that “big shot” *magendoists*, like those in top army positions, had coffee-buying agents in villages who mainly transacted with storeowners, some co-operative buying agents and private processors. Respondents maintained that the high ranking soldiers would only come at the loading stage (interviews with *magendo* operators, Mukono, 1998). Another respondent said: “Even some of the big boats that ferried coffee from Kiyindi landing site were owned by the “big shots” and they would provide armed

escort up to Bujwanga, in Kenya. They even knew Bob’s Astles schedule” (Respondent, Mukono, 1998). Another interviewee said that while at the lakeshore waiting for dusk to prepare for loading, you would hear murmurs that; “*ezo z’abakulu*,... (those (coffee) are for the big shots); ...that (boat) is for the (Army) Commander which would operate freely day or night, it would even have armed escorts” (Respondent, Mukono, 1998). In this regard, Mamdani reiterates that Amin’s provincial military governors: “...organized collection of export produce from ‘their’ provinces, smuggling the bulk under armed convoys to neighbouring countries” (Mamdani, 1983: 50).

The smaller and medium *magendoists*

Below the T4 category were smaller *magendoists* categorised as trader 3 (T3); trader 2 (T2) to trader 1 (T1) at the base of the *magendo* social structure. This paper argues that the regime’s repression was mainly directed against these lower categories, thus their operations depended on their different positions, social networks and bribery. Whereas the well connected could manage to operate, many smaller *magendoists* were harassed into highly risky, unpredictable and costly operations.

The T3 were smaller medium *magendo* operators who mainly evolved from various categories like rich and medium producers, medium entrepreneurs and businessmen, private medium coffee storeowners and processors, and former agents of Indian coffee buyers and processors. The Amin regime was officially against the *magendo* operations of these medium *magendoists*. However, most medium *magendoists* relied on “*chai*” (tea, the euphemism for bribery) and social networks like kinship and marriage relations to get facilitation from lower centres of power and accomplices in institutions and departments like Coffee Marketing Board (CMB), Co-operatives, Customs and the Uganda Railways. Most junior and a few senior institutional employees were susceptible to bribery given their meagre pay *vis à vis* the high cost of living during the ‘economic

war'. There was also group re-alignment in politically motivated staffing that tended to mirror the *magendo* social structure thus weakening the institutions and enabling many *magendoists* to get accomplices. Respondents pointed out that much of the profits the medium *magendoists* would have made were consumed by “*chai*” (bribery) paid out in the process of establishing multiple linkages in the *magendo* chain (interviews, *magendo* respondents, Mukono, 1998).

The various institutional accomplices rendered services that ranged from unskilled labour for loading coffee to sophisticated and specialised workers who falsified documents for the different *magendoists* (Green, 1981: 26-28). The Minister of Trade, Capt. Noah Muhammed stated that:

It was extremely surprising and alarming that even top government officials were involved in activities related to “*magendo*”. It was extremely dangerous, as the officers were a bad example to the ordinary people (Direct translation) (Munno, 67(61), 1976:1).

Although this medium category had operators from many groups, operations were easier for those who were part of the lower socio-political bases of the Amin regime. Some of our former *magendoist* respondents, for instance, maintained that Muslim *magendoists* had better connections to the different centres of power in the regime and institutions than non-Muslims. Most importantly, the Muslim *magendoists* could be easily released in case of arrest, owing to their connections to the different centres of power (interviews, with former *magendo* operators, Mukono, 1998). One of the respondents, said that during Amin’s regime: “Muslims and Nubians had a voice” (Respondent, Mukono, 1998).⁴

⁴ The mass conversions into Islam at grand mauledis (an Islamic ceremony) during Amin’s regime can, therefore, be understood in the context of the privileged connections and opportunities that Muslims had at the time (for conversions, see Mamdani, 1983: 56).

The upper *magendoists* and the official channel

Most *mafutamingi*, the T4 and some T3 medium *magendoists* got the bulk of coffee for smuggling from some state-controlled channel, private and co-operative stores and hulleries (interviews, traders and producers, Mukono, 1998). This pointed to a contradictory intersection of the state-controlled channel and *magendo* at various levels. At the grassroots, it was said that some co-operative officials and store agents assisted some *magendoists* with, for example, documents like coffee buying licenses to enable them buy coffee under the aegis of the non-private channel (interviews traders, Mukono, 1998). One former *magendo* operative said:

We took cover under East Mengo (Co-operative Union)” (Respondent, Mukono, 1998). Another interviewee said: “I had a card from the Society (Co-operative), hence, they could not disturb me. I would only supply 10 bags to the Society and take the rest elsewhere (Respondent, Mukono, 1998).

Alternatively, some store agents bought coffee within the framework of the legal state channel at government administered producer prices and secretly sold it to *magendoists* at higher prices (interviews, traders & producers, Mukono, 1998). Some of the then store owners admitted to having got unhulled coffee (*kiboko*) from producers at government set prices and then sold it to smugglers at better prices on *quid pro quo* terms (Respondent, Mukono, 1998). A former operative enlightened that it was easier to transact with the storeowners rather than risk roaming villages to collect coffee from scattered peasant’s households (Respondent, Mukono, 1998).

At processing level, some co-operative unions and private processors smuggled or sold the bulk of hulled coffee (*clean or kasse*) to *magendoists* instead of taking it to CMB as was required by law. A former operative narrated: “I bought *kasse* from Busaala Coffee Factory. I bribed the manager who then sold me three tons”(Respondent, Mukono, 1998). Mustafa

Ramathan, Amin’s Minister of Co-operatives and Marketing once pointed out that a lot of coffee was smuggled across Lake Victoria and most of it was from the processors’ factories (*Voice of Uganda*, 17 September 1977: 1). One such a case was in relation to Rugarama Coffee Factory in Kabale which, despite full operation throughout the 1976 season, no coffee was delivered to CMB, yet nothing was stored at the factory (*Voice of Uganda*, 1(1206), 1976: 1). Consequently, Mr. Ramathan directed that all coffee processors should buy, process and deliver at least 1,700 tons of ‘clean’ coffee to CMB during the 1977/78 season (*Voice of Uganda*, 17 September 1977: 1).

Despite the strong security at CMB, some *magendoists* and accomplices managed to siphon some of the coffee through methods like false documentation and under-weighting. On 16 January 1979 at Entebbe Airport, a Tally Clerk was reported to have “deliberately” created a

shortage of 5 bags from trailer Reg. No. UWL 191 after the departure of the Security Guard (CMB, 5 March 1979). It was reported that:

Faulty counting during loading meant numerous reports of excesses or shortages during offloading at Mombasa.... There were more instances of delayed and/or faulty documentation of contract coffee and long delays in preparing coffee for some contracts.... The Board received and accepted many claims concerning the underweighted bags for ex-warehouse contracts. This problem could also have cost the Board a lot of money on airlifting coffee, which was charged per bag (of 60 kg) basis (CMB, 1977/78: 5).

The CMB Chief Statistician reported that: “Drivers of trucks were known to have bribed our Tally Clerks and railway wagons were diverted” (CMB, (7 May 1986). Table 1 shows the shortages reported during the 1976/77 season which was the apogee of *magendo*.

Table 1: Coffee shortages en-route to Mombasa reported by the Mombasa Office in 1976/77 season (Quantity in 60 kilogramme bags)

Season 1976/77	Railway Trucks	Kenatco Lorries	Transocean (U) Lorries	Sullivan Lorries	Total
Oct-Dec	344	297	1	-	642
Jan-Mar	4,532	1,176	10	1,025	6,743
Apr-Jun	10,411	22	432	899	11,764
Jul-Sep	5,595	54	9	1	5,659

Source: CMB, (1976/77, condensed from Table 111F).

N.B: It was pointed out that at the seasons’ average price, the loss amounted to about \$ 94m, of which \$ 79m was by rail.

During the subsequent period of October 1978 to September 1979, there was a total loss of 895 bags of 60 kilograms each by rail and 121 bags by Kenatco, with a grand total loss of 1,016 bags (CMB, 1978/79)⁵

⁵ Coffee thefts through Kenya and the possible involvement of Kenya officials and the ‘Ngoroko’ was raised (see Asiimwe, 2002: Chap 3).

The lowest strata of *magendoists*

The trader 3 (T3) were followed by the T2 low scale *magendoists* at the grassroots, most of whom used bicycles. The T2 operators were in most cases medium peasant producers and petty village commodity traders. Being this low in the *magendo* social structure, most T2 *magendoists* did not operate within the framework of powerful networks within the regime and they incurred the regime’s repression. Some prominent T2s

were, however, part of the village level groups of the regime's social bases or related to a bigger-connected actor within the higher groups through social relations like in-laws (interviews, *magendo* respondents, Mukono, 1998).

Respondents pointed out that during the *magendo* period, there were few petty-tin/bicycle traders (T2) freely buying coffee in villages as it was very risky for such a category. In areas distant from L. Victoria the few petty-tin/bicycle T2 operators were mostly linked to the clandestine grassroot coffee buying networks of well connected or daring medium T4 *magendoists* and errant army officers-cum-*magendoists*. In this case, the T2 worked for a commission; they were not an independent 'class'.

Many T2 *magendoists* who were in cycling distance from the lakeshore dared to undertake intermittent independent *magendo* operations. These braved riding to buy coffee piecemeal from producers who made *kasse*¹, which they sold directly to smugglers as independent intermediaries. Some of these started by taking producers' coffee on credit, which availed them start-up capital. Producers referred to them as *abaana orabavubuka* (youthful stamina). Some of these 'boys' (T2s) were allegedly unscrupulous, taking coffee from producers on credit and returning with faked stories of loss to cheat the producers. One such operative pointed out that since *magendo* was illegal, some would take advantage to cheat, as producers had no recourse to justice (interviews, Mukono, 1998).

In Mukono, some medium T2 petty *magendoists* from as far as the eastern border areas with Kenya used to come in search of coffee. A former *magendo* operative told of how they would come from as far afield as Busia and Mbale. He described their swift operations thus: "We would come in a train, enter villages, briskly buy tins of *kasse* (hulled coffee), pack it in sacks, return to the station and depart" (Respondent, Mukono, 1998). These small-scale border community smugglers ferried coffee across to Kenya by cycling and head portage. This was said to have led to the proliferation

of numerous secret caravan footpaths (*panyas*) astride the Kenya-Uganda border (interviews with *magendo* operators, *Sunday Vision*, 9(42), 8 October 2000).

Closely related to the T2 *magendoists* were the underclass of the *magendo* social structure, the trader 1 (T1) category that was popularly (sometimes pejoratively) called *bayaye* or *balebeesi* (riffraff brokers). Unlike the T2s, the *bayaye* were less associated with the production sector, these were mostly urban and village trading centre-based unemployed youths, school dropouts, lumpens, street hawkers, touts and hangers-on (Green, 1981: ii; Mamdani, 1983: 54). They were generally mobile and instrumental as informers and in what was called "chasing lines" (pursuing an economic venture) within quasi patron-clientele frameworks with bigger medium *magendoists* whom they often referred to as *parto*⁶, *omuggaga* (the rich one). Speculative trading, swift and highly risky business ventures, hoarding to create scarcity and push-up prices, getting commodities from one place and selling them exorbitantly in deficit places (*kusammula*), were the major activities of the *bayaye*, thus reproducing *magendo* (interviews with traders, Mukono, 1998).

Many of them were occasionally engaged by the bigger medium (T4) *magendoists* as in casual labour relations, to errands of secretly collecting coffee from specific big producers, a co-operative or private store for a commission. Of the *bayaye* activities, Amin's Minister of Trade observed that: "...they are the ones who draw-up plans for smuggling, and now they have reached a point of even smuggling coffee and other goods out of Uganda" (*Munno*, 67(95), 1976: 4). The Assistant District Commissioner of Kyagwe (now Mukono), was reportedly "disturbed" by the active involvement of the *bayaye* in smuggling and advised them to instead engage in agricultural production (*Voice of Uganda*, 1(1259), 1976: 3).

6 *Patro*, derived from the French word *patron* meaning boss/ chief. However, the relationship between the *magendoists* and the *bayaye* was not necessarily a patron-client relationship. Sometimes the relationship was of employer-worker nature, and there were also quasi-independent *bayaye* operations as can be adduced from some of their activities.

The petty magendoists' methods of processing coffee

The petty *magendoists* processed coffee for smuggling using various small-scale means. The petty coffee-producing households which participated would properly dry small amounts of coffee cherries, which they pounded with pestles in huge locally made wooden mortars. While pounding, the mortar would be placed in a shallow hole dug in the ground to absorb the noise as a “silencer” for fear of being heard and arrested. At this level, there was heavy reliance on household labour, with women and children mainly grinding, pounding, sorting and winnowing the coffee. Men mainly took the coffee to the shores of L. Victoria for sale (interviews, producers and traders, Mukono, 1998).

Alternatively, *kiboko* was ground on either a household grinding stone, flat rock, cemented ground (*olwaazi*)⁷, or hardened earth. In another method, a hole was made through a dry wooden log. Another hard piece of wood would be moulded to loosely fit through the hole in the log. This approximated a wooden coffee huller. Positioning the hollowed log horizontally, *kiboko* was filled in the space between the hole and the inside wood. By rolling the inside wood with a handle fixed on one of its sides, it hulled the coffee (*kiboko*) inside. The resultant hulled coffee was called *Kasse or Clean*, and the smuggling period was referred to as “*ebiseera bya Kasse*”, (the period of *Kasse*) (interviews, producers and traders, Mukono, 1998).

At a higher level, the big coffee producers who participated and some T3 category of *magendoists* had more *kiboko* for ‘processing’, which led to hiring casual labour to supplement that of their households. Such labourers were, on average, paid US\$100/ to pound a sack of approximately 60 kilogrammes of *kiboko*, which often yielded one tin of *kasse*. Processing a lot of coffee meant increased risks, as these categories were not necessarily properly connected. For this reason, coffee was often dried in bushes and forests within the vicinity of the household, and processing was done at night under moonlight or using lanterns. Most of these petty smugglers were in walking or cycling distance of the lakeshore (within a radius of approximately 40 km). They could therefore hire porters and cyclists to ferry *kasse* at night. *Kasse* bundles (*bifuluusi*) would first be hidden in bushes and swamps near the Lake while owners ascertained the presence of buyers and negotiated better prices (interviews with traders, Mukono, 1998).

Some medium *magendoists*, for example, in the T3 category, bought hand coffee hulling machines, which were locally fabricated in places like Katwe, a popular artisanal suburb of Kampala City. While emphasising the hulling machine’s efficiency, one former operative showed us his machine (Plate 1) and told us how he was once arrested with 12 bags of *kasse* which he had hulled with it. He said that he had earlier loaded a lorry full of *kasse* at Kiwangula, which his brother had taken to Kiyindi lakeshore.

⁷ During the 1960s, each household was required to dry its coffee on cemented ground (locally known as *olwaazi*); a wire mesh or carpets. As enforcement of such regulations declined during the weak regime of Amin, some producers used the *olwaazi* to grind coffee for smuggling.

Plate 1: The locally fabricated coffee hulling machine and demonstrating how it operated



Source: Field Photographs, 1998.

The low-ranking errant soldiers and security agents cum *magendoists*

It was not only the high-ranking army and security officers alongside the *mafutamingi* who engaged in *magendo* operations. Alongside the smaller categories of *magendoists*, some elements among the lower ranking soldiers and security personnel got involved in *magendo* related activities directly or through family members and friends. This was also against the background of the ‘economic war’ scarcities and pressures, which had eroded their fixed salaries. Such soldiers used their guns and risked stealthy ‘wild cat’ operations as accomplices. Such operations included escorting smaller *magendoists* or killing rivals of powerful operators for a fee (interviews with *magendo* operators, Mukono, 1998). Such *magendo* related activities of the low ranking soldiers were possible owing to the functional weakness of the Amin regime that could not easily discipline them.

Government’s response to the lower ranking soldier’s involvement in *magendo* depended on a soldier’s position and relationship to the socio-political bases of the regime; appreciation of the low salaries and ‘economic war’ pressures and the need to ensure loyalty. According to respondents, it was mainly some soldiers from Amin’s Nubian and Kakwa ethnic groups and Muslims who could easily get involved in the *magendo* operations (interviews with *magendo* operators, Mukono, 1998). Otherwise, the regime was officially against the *magendo* operations of the lower ranking soldiers generally, as they undermined the resource interests of the top operators. As a result, many medium and low ranking soldiers who were not associated with the regime’s socio-political bases feared to get directly involved in coffee smuggling *magendo*. Amin occasionally: “cautioned some hopeless characters in the Uganda Armed Forces to stop threatening members of Uganda Co-operative Unions...” (*Voice of Uganda*, 11(258), 1977:

1). Brig. Ali Fadhul also warned smugglers and “bogus security men who escort smugglers”, that they would face the Military Tribunal (*Voice of Uganda*, 11(80), 1977: 3). Fadhul further cautioned: “people who pretended to be security officers and harass farmers and take their coffee to smuggle it to neighbouring countries” (*Voice of Uganda*, 11(217), 1977: 1). The then Governor of Eastern Province also pointed out that to the “bewilderment” of other soldiers and civilians at the border, some senior military officers escorted smugglers up to exit points (*Munno*, 68(11), 1977: 4).

Some of the low ranking soldiers sometimes grumbled over the ‘business’ operations of their ‘authorised’ colleagues. In March and April 1974, for example, Gulu Air Force Base soldiers and Officers were reported to have complained about some soldiers: “...for spending more time in business than on military duties” (*Voice of Uganda*, 30 March & 20 April 1974).

Both the ‘authorised’ and errant medium and lower ranking soldiers and security officers *cummagendoists* and their civilian associates could harass producers at the grassroots, co-operative and coffee factory officials and confiscate coffee for smuggling. These activities were often executed under the cloak of the anti-smuggling campaign. In this context, Doornbos observed that: “Many peasants were not spared the cruelty and harassments of marauding soldiers, who could confiscate their supplies or make it impossible to work on their land” (Doornbos, 1987: 12-13). Jørgensen adds that such operators were free: “to loot, smuggle and extort with little fear of being disciplined by superiors and no fear of civil courts” (emphasis original, Jørgensen, 1981: 275). A respondent narrated that: “They would bring a vehicle with guns to the store and command you to lie down. They would then load the coffee and go” (Respondent, Mukono, 1998). A former storeowner narrated that he would weigh producers’ coffee, then hurry home as to dilly-dally around the store could lead to being shot death (Respondent, Mukono, 1998). Another

recalled of how once, an army truck got stuck after loading coffee from Nakayaga Coffee Factory and the soldiers fled (Respondent, Mukono, 1998). Such soldiers were most likely the ‘unauthorised’ smugglers.

Of such ‘unauthorised’ soldiers who were mostly drawn from the state’s social bases, respondents believed that they operated under a powerful organised racket for earning money. Most *magendoists* could also use such soldiers depending on the position and connections of a given *magendo* actor. A *mafutamingi* or *T4magendoist* would, for example, operate with a Military Governor or top commander (*ekikonge*)⁸. Assured of the protection, the operative could even use gazetted landing sites, public roads and vehicles with little fear. One respondent held that when a vehicle of such a smuggler approached an army roadblock and those on guard noted its number-plate, they would remove the crossbar for it to pass unchecked. It was also possible to retrieve their vehicles in case of apprehension (Respondent, Mukono, 1998).

Respondents maintained that those who did not have connections with such soldiers used head portage or bicycles (interviews, *magendo* operators, Mukono, 1998). Otherwise, as one respondent emphasised that one would rake/check the area (Respondent, Mukono, 1998). Another respondent said that: “We bribed them (soldiers). Sometimes they came and told us to give them a certain amount of money to let us go (smuggle)” (Respondent, Mukono, 1998). One respondent described one of the situations:

I would agree with their “boss” (commander) on the time of passing and he would withdraw (from the roadblock) all the soldiers for a fake meeting. Alternatively, unfriendly soldiers would be temporarily replaced at the roadblock (Respondent, Mukono, 1998).

Some respondents hastened to point out that some of the lower ranking soldiers were vicious

⁸ Ekikonge, (figurative - stump), implied a person who was figuratively as hard as a stump of a tree, strong and not easily pushed around.

as they could waylay the *magendoists* for money on return from Kenya or even be paid by rivals to murder. Other operators said that they feared Amin's soldiers as they were mainly from the north-western ethnic groups, hence less locally integrated, and were considered unpredictable to deal with (interviews, *magendo* operators, Mukono, 1998). One respondent observed: "We who took *kasse* never wanted to expose ourselves to them" (Respondent, Mukono, 1998).

The nexus between the soldiers and the smaller *magendoists* was mostly facilitated by intermediaries who were close to the soldiers, particularly their 'local wives' (concubines), local bar drink-mates and the sub-set of the bayayewho were known as *balebees* ("hangers-on", "brokers") who connected for a fee. Representative responses were for instance thus: "The *balebeesi* would tell us the amount soldiers demanded, often inflating it to include their commission, over and above their fee" (Respondent, Mukono, 1998). Another respondent said that during the days of Bob Astles, he managed to befriend a certain lieutenant, who was stationed at Kiyindi landing site and was connected by: "brokers who had their headquarters at Buikwe....When I arrived in the town, the brokers told me that there is a good lieutenant who escorts to Kiyindi. I had to change from Kasirye to Kiyindi" (Respondent, Mukono, 1998). However, one respondent observed that *balebees* could be dangerous if by-passed because some doubled as informers of the soldiers (Respondent, Mukono, 1998).

The actors on the Kenya side of the *magendo* arena

On the Kenya side, a *magendo* parallel chain for coffee that was smuggled from Uganda and Tanzania became significant, and often operated under the guise of the official Kenyan coffee-marketing channel. The *magendo* channel equally comprised a hierarchy of differently positioned intermediary actors. Respondents maintained that President Jomo Kenyatta's government often turned a 'blind eye' to some

Kenyan *magendoists* most of whom were from his Kikuyu ethnic group, the Somali and Indian business groups (interviews with *magendo* operators, Mukono, 1998). At the top of the *magendo* chain in Kenya were business interests of the powerful well-connected and dominant groups in the Kenyan State (Asiimwe, 2002: Chap 3). Also at this level were powerful Indian business groups that were opposed to Amin's regime since the expulsion of Asians in 1972 and British companies, all with international connections. Mamdani, for instance, alluded to the behind the scenes 'long hand' of the British monopolies and interests operating alongside the powerful and influential actors in the Kenyan regime who orchestrated policies like the 'coffee squeeze' (Mamdani, 1983: 100).

Regarding the powerful and influential actors in the Kenyan *magendo* arena, the Minister of Finance, Brig. Moses Ali, illuminated that it was difficult to eradicate smuggling of Uganda's coffee when Kenyan ministers with powerful financiers were deeply involved (Munno, 68(109), 1977: 1). The Sunday Nation also reported that high level civil servants and Members of Parliament in Kenya were involved in the lucrative smuggling of coffee from Uganda into Kenya (Voice of Uganda, 1(1262), 1976: 1). Avirgan and Honey reiterated:

In Kenya the coffee racket involved a variety of businessmen and government leaders. Naming names is difficult, but knowledgeable Nairobi sources say these included members of Kenyatta's "royal family" as well as police officers, customs and port officials, and businessmen of all races-Europeans, Asians and Africans, and of the latter particularly those from the politically dominant Kikuyu tribe. Even some of the Ugandan exiles in Nairobi were said to have been involved (Avirgan & Honey, 1982: 13).

Most *magendoists* on the Kenya side, particularly those that were not directly linked to the politically powerful actors, often operated under the guise of the official channel and required institutional cover, in form of documentation like permits. As a result, such actors operated

through networks with some accomplices in the Kenyan government machinery and institutions. It was, for example, reported that well-connected Kenyan *magendo* operators used permits that were issued by the Kenya Coffee Board (*Voice of Uganda*, 11(2), 1977:1). For example, in 1977, the police in Mombasa intercepted 235 tons of coffee estimated at £500,000, which was about to be shipped out of Kenya on false customs documents. The coffee was suspected to have been smuggled into Kenya from either Tanzania or Uganda (*Voice of Uganda*, 11(186), 1977: 1).

Many lower Kenyan intermediary smugglers came through L. Victoria as it was reported in the press: “These Kenyans have shown great interest in crossing Lake Victoria with the sole purpose of buying Uganda coffee even at such a high price that an ordinary Ugandan cannot afford (to refuse)” (*Voice of Uganda*, 11(214), 1977: 1). A military survey of islands in Lake Victoria purportedly discovered well-armed Kenyan smugglers who sometimes came as near as Namanve forest near Kampala to smuggle Uganda coffee (*Voice of Uganda*, 11(214), 1977: 1)⁹. Some of these Kenyan coffee smugglers were arrested and later pardoned by President Amin (*Voice of Uganda*, 11(339), 1978: 1).

Some Ugandan political exiles in neighbouring countries were reported to have been involved in the coffee smuggling. It was recorded that exiled President A. M. Obote had what he called a “navy”, comprising six small boats based in Mwanza, Tanzania. Under the guise of operating a commercial fishing business, it was maintained that in reality, the fleet, “... engaged in a far more lucrative business, that of coffee smuggling from Uganda to Kenya”. The proceeds financed political, guerrilla operations and personal expenses (Avirgan & Honey, 1982: 38).

Government anti-smuggling policies against smaller *magendoists*

This section argues that the government undertook anti-*magendo* policies, which were mainly directed at the smaller *magendoists* who were undermining Amin’s revenue interests, those of his repressive regime and the ‘authorised’ actors like some elements among the inner circle of top commanders and ministers. However, it is maintained that the regime was functionally weak to fight and eradicate *magendo*. This was because the regime relied on decrees and the repressive machinery to enforce law and order. There was no legislature, the judiciary was in paralysis and the police was too weak, hence the functional capacity of the regime was weak. In this respect, Kasfir observed: “The capacity of Amin state’s apparatus to take any action requiring more than short-term coercion had steadily declined” (Kasfir, 1983: 86).

The suppression of *magendo* and maintaining ‘law and order or enforcement of discipline’ lay within the precepts of Decree 7 of 1972, The Robbery Suspect Decree, which gave soldiers and security officers license to kill. Decree 26 of 1972 (Armed Forces Powers of Arrest Decree) empowered soldiers and prison officers to arrest anyone without a warrant (Jørgensen, 1981: 275). Decree No. 8 of 1972 undermined the established *corpus juris* in relation to checking the excessive extra-judicial powers of security personnel while executing the above decrees. The decree stated:

Notwithstanding any written or other law, no court shall make any decision, order or grant any remedy or relief in any proceedings against the government in respect of anything done or omitted to be done for the purpose of maintaining public order or public security in any part of Uganda or for the defence of Uganda or the enforcement of discipline or law and order or in respect of anything relating to, consequent upon or incidental to any of these purposes, during the period between the 24th day of January 1971, and such date as the President shall appoint (*Transition*, 1975: 11).

9 Namanve forest lies to the east of Kampala City - Mukono District

On the basis of the above decrees, army officers were empowered to try “economic related crimes” such as smuggling. Military tribunals were accordingly established in 1973 under Decree No. 12/1973. As the major *magendo* unfolded with the 1975 boom, an Economic Crimes and Trials Decree was promulgated on 25 March 1975. It stated in part that:

[A] Person, whether a trader or not, commits the crime of smuggling and stands to be tried under this decree if he takes out of Uganda any goods in commercial quantities without a licence. Anybody, whether a customs officer or a member of the security forces whose duty is to prevent smuggling, does not use due diligence but just stands idle, as a result of which a person takes out goods without a license, he too commits an offence and is liable to be tried under this decree. Gifts and personal effects in reasonable quantities may be taken out without a licence (*Voice of Uganda*, 1(718), 1975: 1).

Under this decree, the government established a special tribunal namely, “The Economic Crimes Tribunal”, for the trial of what they regarded as “certain crimes considered detrimental to the economy”. These were classified as embezzlement, corruption, overcharging, hoarding, smuggling and stealing foreign exchange. Death by firing squad was the maximum and five years imprisonment was the minimum sentence for smuggling, corruption and stealing foreign exchange. As *magendo* heightened in 1977, the Economic Crimes Tribunal Decree was strengthened through an amendment to the effect that:

[W]here a person transports by whatever means any commodity mentioned in the schedule to the decree, towards a certain direction within Uganda, this direction being different from the proper destination of such a commodity, such a person will be deemed to be attempting to smuggle such a commodity and shall be subject to the same punishment as a smuggler (*Voice of Uganda*, 11(16), 1977).

Prominent on the Economic Crimes Tribunal was its Chairman, Lt. Col. Juma Ali and Capt.

Sebi Ali (Uganda Government (1994): 203). These particular officers were from Amin’s north-western and Muslim social bases.

Respondents pointed out that it was only the *magendoists* who were known in ruling circles that were not committed to the Military Tribunal or taken to Makindye or Nagulu (interviews, respondents Mukono, 1998)¹⁰. In contrast, the petty, unknown or poorly connected *magendoists* and their institutional accomplices were often committed to kangaroo courts of the Tribunal, where summary death sentences were passed and executed by firing squad (interviews, *magendo* operators, Mukono, 1998). One case that typified the fate of the “unknown, or poorly connected smugglers” involved Galiwango Francis of Uganda Railways and Maiso William Tabakasa, a customs officer who allegedly connived with Kassim Saad, a Kampala businessman to smuggle sesame (sim-sim), coffee and beans, which they had hidden in the basement store (*Voice of Uganda*, 1(961), 1976: 1). When they were committed to the Military Tribunal, the summary nature of their trial epitomised the poor manner in which ‘justice’ was dispensed by the army, which was bestowed with judicial powers. The Tribunal Chairman, Lt. Col. Juma Ali (Butabika), in part judged as said:

Galiwango, you are a person who wants to destroy the Railways Corporation and you have been trying to confuse members of the tribunal. You have done something wrong, you should just admit it and this is not your first time to smuggle goods to Nairobi and Mombasa, you must have been doing this for a very long time. You have been stealing everyday but today God got tired of you and that is why you are here. We do not convict someone who has not committed an offence because we want only the truth in this court. We do not want lies and God does not want lies; He wants the truth and nothing but the truth. You were smuggling goods out

10 Makindye Barracks was renowned for torture and summary executions of the regime’s opponents. Nagulu was the headquarters of Kassim Yusuf Obura’s Public Safety Unit (PSU), the regime’s most notorious torturing and killing machine. After the fall of Amin, Obura was sentenced to death for his PSU crimes and hanged.

of this country and that was why you were arrested and brought here. The three of you conspired to commit this offence of smuggling and you are an employee of the Railways Corporation. You will be example to the rest of the clerks who are working with the Corporation... I was not there when you stole these goods and yet you are asking me to be lenient with you. I sentence you to death by firing squad. The sentence will be carried out near the place where you are working for all the employees of the railways to see and take you as an example (UG, (1994): 231).

The Minister of Provincial Administration, Brig. Ali Fadhul and Bob Astles, a British special advisor to Amin, were the most prominent in the anti coffee smuggling crusade. This was despite some respondent's claim that Brig. Ali Fadhul's own factory sold them coffee for smuggling (respondent, Mukono, 1998). “Major” Bob Astles, a confidant of Amin since the Congo gold smuggling scandal in the early 1960s, held the portfolio of Senior Security Advisor to President Amin, and an anti-smuggling squad was established under his command, with powers to shoot on sight (*Sunday Vision*, 9(42), 8 October 2000: 25).

For curbing the *magendo* activities of the smaller actors, Amin ordered soldiers to tighten security along Uganda's borders (*Voice of Uganda*, 1(1263), 1976: 1). He further authorised Military Police Officers to arrest anybody found smuggling even if it was a Minister, Brigadier, Colonel or President's relative (*Voice of Uganda*, 11(9), 11 January 1977:1). Some landing sites on L. Victoria like Nakaziba were closed by Brig. Ali Fadhul who pointed out that whereas there was no sign of increased fishing activities in places and Islands which he had visited, fishermen had been making: “very big boats and new landing places”. He, therefore, concluded that the big boats must have been for smuggling rather than fishing. He ordered people to keep away from the area around Nakaziba (*Voice of Uganda*, 11(218), 1977: 1).

Further measures to eliminate coffee smuggling included decreeing against possession of dried

unhulled coffee (*kiboko*). Brig. Fadhul once told producers that: “...whoever would be found in possession of dried coffee in his home after 4th April 1977”, would be treated as a coffee smuggler and tried by the Military Tribunal (*Voice of Uganda*, 11(80), 1977: 3). Then Fadhul intercepted 26 bags of coffee reportedly destined for smuggling across Lake Victoria (*Voice of Uganda*, 11(212), 1977: 1). This time, Brig. Fadhul directed coffee producers in Kyagwe (present Mukono District) to take all their coffee to primary society stores “immediately”. He warned that anybody found with coffee three days after the warning would be “dealt with severely”. Each producer's coffee was to be recorded in the presence of an area chief. He promised them payment: “...when funds for the new buying season are released” (*Voice of Uganda*, 11(212), 1977: 3). In September, Fadhul repeated the caution against possession of dried coffee and directed all producers to sell all their coffee within four days, and that: “any farmer who will be found with dry coffee will be dealt with accordingly” (*Voice of Uganda*, 11(218), 1977: 1).

The hierarchy of the regime's agents up to the grassroots was supposed to implement this anti-smuggling policy. In the June 1977 coffee season, a District Commissioner directed that all coffee producers under his jurisdiction had to be registered in order to keep track of each one's sales to the primary co-operative societies. Any producer who took less than his estimated harvest was to be sued (*Munno*, 68(136): 1977). Respondents in Mukono talked of Alai, (popularly remembered as Kakono, whom they claimed was a Nubian from Amin's ethnic group), as having been the most feared anti-*magendo* operative at the grassroots (interviews, producers and traders, Mukono, 1998). Of his operations, one respondent narrated that sighting a hulled coffee seed around a coffee store was sufficient basis for Alai to confiscate the whole stock of coffee and take the suspect to Nagulu¹¹ (Respondent, Mukono, 1998).

11 Nagulu was one of Amin's most feared army barracks that was notorious for torture of suspects.

Amin's regime, errant agents and *magendoists*

Green depicted *magendo* as an immoral, dangerous and evil system and cautioned that: "The 'godfathers' of *magendo* have much to lose from greater knowledge of their activities.... It is only fair to warn that researching – or seeking to break the power of – Uganda *magendo* has not been, is not and will not be a safe activity" (Green, 1981: i; 44-47). *Magendo* can best be understood as an arena of inter-'class'/group struggle between the top and smaller *magendoists*, and also among the differently positioned groups/'classes' over coffee which was the major resource at the time. In the first case, there were the resource interests of Amin and his constrained military regime. Secondly, there were the inner-circle high ranking commanders and ministers. Thirdly were the *mafutamingi* and 'authorised' provincial level commanders, governors and security agents. These were against the smaller *magendoists* who were undermining the resource interests of the top strata (*Sunday Vision*, 9(42), 8 October 2000: 25). In this regard, the powerful and well-placed actors who were associated with the socio-political bases of the regime dominated, while the weaker and unknown were harassed into risky, unpredictable and costly operations in which they could either gain or lose the coffee or their lives.

The regime's repression of *magendo*, which was epitomised by Bob Astle's anti-smuggling squad mainly focused on the smaller, poorly connected and unknown *magendoists* particularly in the T4 group and lower strata. Most respondents had scaring memories of Bob Astles whom they referred to as "Bob". One respondent exclaimed; "*Haaaaa...to be arrested by Bob, you would be taken to Nagulu together with your kasse. That would be your end*" (Respondent, Mukono, 1998). Respondents narrated stories of how "Bob's anti-smuggling boys" who used speedboats while their boss hovered over Lake Victoria in an amphibian helicopter, unleashed unprecedented terror on smaller smugglers, real or imaginary, including fishermen. They

claimed that Bob was so callous that he could land the helicopter on a suspected sailing boat, pressing it until it got immersed (summary of interviews with former *magendo* operators, Mukono, 1998; *Sunday Vision*, 9(42), 8 October 2000). Bob Astle's suppression of smaller actors diverted attention from the *magendo* operations of the major large-scale actors like the *mafutamingi* and errant functionaries of the Amin regime, who also wanted to eliminate smaller competitors. As Avirgan & Honey observed:

Greedy government officials wanting to monopolise the illicit trade, particularly in coffee, moved in to eliminate small-time operators. To this end, Amin's British-born security advisor and dirty-tricks expert, "Major" Bob Astles, formed the "Anticorruption Squad", a Mafia-style strong-arm organization used to stamp out private enterprise in coffee smuggling in order to consolidate the profitable racket in the hands of a few government officials. Astles' agents patrolled Lake Victoria in speedboats, intimidating, arresting and, not infrequently, killing fishermen suspected of smuggling (Avirgan & Honey, 1982:6).

The arena was also characterised by struggles, competition, intrigue, conning, thefts and losses between the differently positioned *magendo* operators (summary of interviews with former *magendo* operators, Mukono, 1998). A specific *magendoist's* connection to a given centre of power circumscribed the nature of his/her operations and power over rival actors. Mamdani elucidated that: "A *mafutamingi* competitor employed against his *mafutamingi* rival the very instruments the *mafutamingi*, as a class, directed against the people: the State Research Bureau (SRB), the Public Safety Unit (PSU)¹², the army, the prisons and even the firing squads" (Mamdani, 1983: 53). Jamal observed that: "Thus *magendo* was a preferential freeing of the markets, its distinguishing feature being not free markets, but illegality, breakdown of law and order, and corruption" (Jamal, 1991: 324).

¹² SRB (State Research Bureau) and PSU (Public Safety Unit) were espionage and torturing organs of the Amin regime.

The intra/inter “class” rivalries sometimes degenerated into brutalities as typified by a case, in which an unidentified man with a six-inch nail driven into his eyeballs was discovered on the Uganda–Kenya border. *The Standard* reported that; “The cause of the vicious death is believed to be a fight sparked off by arguments over the price of the smuggled coffee” (*The Standard*, 18 January 1977). The scene of the murder was Chepkube, described as: “...a hot bartering ground for smuggled Uganda coffee” (*Voice of Uganda*, 11(20), 1977: 1).

In the competitions, some connected medium actors could hire errant soldiers to eliminate rivals or settle longstanding vendetta. Former operators held that some magendoists indulged in intrigue and conspiracies with soldiers and security operatives to eliminate or undermine rivals. A respondent narrated how his colleague lent money to other smugglers, and on failure to reimburse, the debtors hired soldiers who shot him dead (Respondent, Mukono, 1990). Another respondent claimed that his better-connected rivalling neighbour reported him to soldiers yet he also hulled! Consequently, the respondent was arrested with eighteen 60 kg bags of *kasse*, whereupon he paid a bribe of U. Shs. 100,000/-. He narrated that later at 2.00 p.m., his unsatisfied rival induced another group of soldiers to re-arrest him, to whom he gave U. sh. 150,000.00. As Bob Astles had earlier burnt his coffee *en route* to Kenya, he became bankrupt and ceased operation (Respondent, Mukono, 1998).

While in Kenya, the poorly connected Ugandan *magendo* operators remained insecure and often lost their coffee or even lives. Respondents harped on harassment by the Kenyan police and other security personnel who often demanded bribes. Respondents said that sometimes after the transactions, some Kenyan coffee buyers would conspire with their security agents, waylay the Ugandan *magendoists* to steal the money they would have been paid for the coffee. In this case, the Kenyans would have the coffee and their money back. Such conspiracies in Kenya,

sometimes involved some well-connected Ugandan *magendoists* in pursuit of eliminating rivals (Interviews, Mukono, 1998 and a Kenyan national from Kisumu). Respondents observed that as *magendo* was illegal, in the case of loss, there was no recourse to legal redress in Kenya (interviews with *magendo* operators who took coffee to Kenya, Mukono, 1998). One respondent observed: “It would be a loss, so long as they don’t kill you” (Respondent, Mukono, 1998).

The foregoing has explored the repression and fierce competition between the differently positioned actors in the *magendo* arena. In addition to the regime’s repression, some elements in the government machinery who strayed into the *magendo* arena as actors or accomplices of some dominant actors could misuse state power to brutalise other operators in the arena. This was more so against the background of Decree No. 18 of 1972 and a weakened central control. A combination of the regime’s repression and powerful actors made the *magendo* arena particularly dangerous and costly for the poorly connected and ‘unknown’ actors.

Conclusion

Magendo was a contested arena, with differently positioned actors that operated with different power. During the Amin regime, coffee was the major resource around which the state and different actors contested for control and appropriation. The state which was under an international embargo needed the resource, and so did Amin and inner-circle state functionaries. These used the state machinery to repress and eliminate the “un-known” actors in the arena. The *magendo* arena, therefore, presented a scenario of struggle between the differently positioned actors, who were all competing for the coffee resource. As for the ‘un-known’, involvement in coffee smuggling was a highly risky venture, from which many lost their lives. Transportation of coffee to the lakeshore or border for smuggling was highly risky and unpredictable for the “un-known” actors,

and their success depended on networks and connections to specific actor in the hierarchy of centres of power. Whereas the well connected *magendoists* could move large quantities of coffee without much ado, and make successful and profitable operations, most poorly connected smaller *magendoists* engaged in medium scale, speculative and adventurous operations in which they lost or profited. Comparatively, a number of petty T2 and T1 smugglers who were near L. Victoria operated on foot and bicycle, with better manoeuvrability owing to the petty quantities of coffee involved. In the final analysis, the Amin state was weak to harness the parallel “illegal” systems like *magendo*.

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Righting Resource-curse wrongs in Uganda: The Political Economy of Oil Discovery and the Management of Popular Expectations

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the political economy of oil discovery and the management of popular expectations associated with oil-related development dividends. The paper is located in the resource-curse discourse. We interrogate the claim by sceptics that the ingredients of the ‘resource-curse’ are all in place in Uganda. This is contrasted with government’s optimistic view that the oil will be a developmental blessing, not a curse. Our main finding is that the optimistic view is premised on shaky grounds. The claim that oil will be a developmental blessing collapses disastrously in the light of compelling evidence of systemic official corruption. It is this worry that has triggered anxieties over the unequal oil contracts, which appear to disproportionately favour oil companies vis-à-vis government. We strongly recommend renegotiation of the oil contracts, backed by more accountable governance of the oil-rich state and economy of Uganda.

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Introduction

This paper discusses the development opportunities and challenges associated with the recent discovery of commercializable oil in Uganda. Our motivation is simultaneously theoretical and pragmatic. Theoretically, resource abundance often times begets a resource-curse, that is, the tendency for resource-rich countries to attain poorer developmental outcomes than resource-poor countries (Auty, 1993; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Practically, oil development in Uganda appears set to create winners and losers. Four categories of political economy winners are spelt out in Uganda's Oil and Gas Policy: the central government; the oil companies; the local governments of the oil-rich areas; and private land owners. The oil-rich lands have not been nationalized to make all Ugandans winners. Bunyoro-Kitara Kingdom (hereafter: 'Bunyoro Kingdom') also complains that it has been left out. Yet, it has a historical and cultural claim over the oil-rich lands. Sections of the local community, whose environment could be contaminated by oil-spills, are also concerned that no context-specific environmental safeguards have been developed.

More importantly, concerns have been raised over the production sharing agreements (PSAs). Signed between Uganda and the oil companies, the PSAs have been a 'closely guarded secret' (Lay et al, 2010: 5).¹ Philip Daniel of the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department asserts that the PSAs favour Uganda vis-à-vis the oil companies.² In his view, the Mining Act is likely to guide the proposed petroleum law, and the oil revenue sharing formula is likely to be: 80 percent for Uganda; 17 percent for the oil companies and 3 percent for the landowners. This suggests that Uganda will obtain the lion's share.

However, Lay et al (2010) reject as untrue Tullow Oil's claims that its contracts are the world's 'best deals' for the host government. According to Lay (2010), the oil companies will reap 'as much as 35% return on their capital investment, that is, three times what is internationally recognized as fair profit.' Recent press reports have also dampened popular expectations. Ojambo (2010), for example, laments that Uganda will get only '15% of oil when production starts.' The lion's share will arguably go to the oil companies and land owners.

It is the object of this paper to examine the degree to which government is managing the positive expectations *and* the anxieties over what could go wrong. The paper is located in the resource-curse debate. We interrogate the claim by Lay (2010) and others that the ingredients of the 'resource-curse' are all in place in Uganda. This will be contrasted with government's view that the oil will be a developmental blessing, not a curse. Our ultimate goal is to contribute to the righting of resource-curse wrongs in Uganda.

The information presented in this paper was collected via a critical review of published literature, government documents and press reports. These were augmented with primary data collected via interviews with leading politicians, top bureaucrats in the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, and leading researchers. We also interviewed the top officials of Bunyoro Kingdom. Additionally, we held focus group discussions with fishing communities in Kyehorro where Tullow is undertaking oil exploration. We completed our fieldwork with in-depth interviews with Tullow and Heritage Oil & Gas Co.

The paper begins by highlighting the evidence of oil discovery. It then historicizes the discovery and conceptualizes expectations management. It goes on to shed some light on the resource-curse. The aim is to explain why resource abundance is a blessing to some countries and a curse to others. The paper locates the oil question in the Ugandan political economy. It then outlines

1 Under pressure from the opposition parties, civil society and other stakeholders, the Uganda government availed copies of the production sharing agreements (PSAs) to Members of Parliament. However, the MPs were strongly urged to keep the information confidential.

2 Remarks made at the National Seminar on Managing Oil Revenue in Uganda, Munyonyo Commonwealth Resort, Kampala, July 8-9, 2008.

the anxieties and expectations of different stakeholders – the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); Bunyoro Kingdom, the district local governments, and the community. The paper ends with an outline of what needs to be done differently to immunize Uganda against the resource-curse.

Evidence of Oil Discovery

No commercial oil was flowing at the time of fieldwork in 2008 and no oil revenues are expected until after 2013. No company or state official knows exactly how much oil Uganda has, because of the incomplete exploration work. However, great expectations have emerged since Hardman Resources Ltd (acquired by Tullow in 2007) made oil discoveries in the exploration blocks of Waraga 1, Waraga 2 and Mputa in Hoima District (Midwestern Uganda) in June 2006.³ In October 2006, Uganda's longest serving president, Yoweri Museveni (1986 – to-date), held a national thanks-giving prayer whose aim was to thank God 'for having created for us a rift valley 25 million years ago;' for the successive layers of vegetation that metamorphosed into oil; and for giving 'us the wisdom ... to discover this oil' (Uganda Watch, 2009).

Since 2006, the exploration activities by Tullow and other oil companies have led to major discoveries across the Albertine Graben, stretching from Block 5 (bordering Sudan) through Blocks 2 and 3 (Lake Albert basin) to Block 4 in the Lake Edward basin (Table 1). In February 2007, the Kingfisher well in Block 3A was confirmed to have 200 million barrels oil. In March 2007, Heritage Oil Company announced the results of its scientific tests on the Kingfisher well. The three intervals that were tested (ranging between 2,260m and 2,367m) had resulted in an overall cumulative maximum flow rate of 13,893 barrels of oil per day (bopd). Tony Buckingham, the CEO of Heritage, jubilated:

The cumulative flow rate of 13,893 bopd from Kingfisher well has surpassed our expectations. The test results indicate the outstanding potential of the Kingfisher discovery... This is a very exciting time for Heritage, as these [discoveries] could transform this company' (Tullow Oil, 2007: 1).

But Kingfisher was only part of the story. In August 2008, oil was discovered in the Kasamene well, with confirmed high flow rates. In December 2009, Heritage announced a large oil discovery at the Buffalo-Giraffe exploration field, which is 9,000 square kilometres in size. This was perhaps 'the largest onshore discovery in sub-Saharan Africa' (Pagnamenta, 2009). Paul Atherton, the chief finance officer of Heritage, described the Buffalo-Giraffe field as 'unquestionably the largest onshore discovery made in sub-Saharan Africa in at least 20 years, possibly ever' (Pagnamenta, 2009: 1). All the 18 wells Heritage drilled in the basin had produced oil. Atherton's remarks fueled great expectations: 'Clearly the entire basin is full of oil... It is a world-class discovery, the most exciting new basin in Africa in decades' (Pagnamenta, 2009: 1).

By the end of 2009, about 2 billion barrels of 'oil equivalent' were estimated to exist in Uganda (NPA, 2010).⁴ Some experts argued that this 'could be just a tip of the iceberg' (Xcroc, 2009: 3). It is not precisely clear how much of Uganda's oil is recoverable. But one thing is certain: the country is set to join the world's top 50 producers of oil. According to Sally Kornfeld, a senior US Department of Energy official, Uganda's 'reservoirs are incredible' and 'might rival Saudi Arabia' (Xcroc, 2009: 3).⁵

3 Uganda's Petroleum Exploration and Production Department (PEPD) has split Uganda's oil-rich Albert Rift into nine exploration areas, namely, Blocks 1, 2, 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D, 4A, 4B and 5. See Table 1.

4 This is the combined amount of oil and gas so far discovered.

5 This claim needs independent verification. Saudi Arabia has the world's largest proven oil reserves estimated at 260 billion barrels, or 25 percent of the world's proven reserves. It has the world's largest crude oil production capacity of about 11 million barrels a day.

Table 1: Exploration Blocks in the Albertine Graben, Uganda

Block	Exploration Area	Location	Operator	Partners	License Date
Block 1	Pakwach Basin	Victoria Nile Delta & Albert Nile	Heritage (later acquired by Tullow)	Tullow	1 July 2004
Block 2	Northern Lake Albert Basin	Mid to North-east of the lake	Tullow	--	8 Oct 2001
Block 3A	Semliki Basin	Southeast of Lake Albert	Heritage (its 50% interest acquired by Tullow, 2010)	Tullow	8 Sept 2004
Block 3B	Semliki Basin	Southeast of Lake Albert	Open	--	Returned by Heritage in 2005
Block 3C	Semliki Basin	Southeast of Lake Albert	Open	--	--
Block 3D	Semliki Basin	Southeast of Lake Albert	Open	--	--
Block 4 A	Lake George & Kazinga Channel	South of Lake Albert	Open	--	--
Block 4B	Lake Edward Basin	Southwestern Uganda	Dominion (100%)	--	27 July 2007
Block 5	Albert Nile Basin	Albert Nile	Neptune	--	c2006; extension: May 2010

Source: Data Base of PEPD [Petroleum Exploration and Production Department], Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development.

Pre-colonial and Colonial Roots of Oil Discovery

An important problem posed by the ‘recent’ discovery of oil in Uganda is the issue of attribution. Who should be credited for discovering the oil? This paper argues that oil discovery in Uganda has been a process, not an event. As Professor Kasozi (2010) notes, the claim that oil in Uganda has just been ‘discovered’ is grossly inaccurate. Oil in the Lake Albert basin was really discovered by the native people of Bunyoro Kingdom.⁶ The Banyoro natives observed the oil seeps in the

⁶ At the height of its might, Bunyoro-Kitara Kingdom controlled virtually all the territory between Lake Victoria, Lake Edward, Lake Albert, parts of eastern DRC and north-western Tanzania. The empire declined from the mid-sixteenth century and expanded again in the seventeenth to mid-eighteenth centuries. Bunyoro was a centre of innovation. It developed lucrative salt works at Kibiro on Lake Albert, innovative ironworks that produced tools for production and warfare, and backcloth-making. Bunyoro also developed a standing army (Abarusuura). In the late eighteenth century, it declined due to internal weaknesses. Buganda (originally Muhwahwa, a county of Bunyoro) rebelled and, in the late eighteenth century, seized Kooki and Buddu regions from Bunyoro. Around 1830, Tooro also rebelled. To the south, Nkore (originally Kaaro Karungi of Bunyoro) and Rwanda rose into rival kingdoms of Bunyoro. By the time of British colonialism, Bunyoro was rapidly reclaiming its territories under the charismatic leadership of Omukama Kabalega (Nyakatura, 1973). This process was halted by the alliance of British colonial troops and Buganda. The alliance committed grave human rights abuses (such as the killing of about 2 million people) in Bunyoro. The discovery of commercializable oil is likely to reposition Bunyoro as a key player in the national political economy.

Kibiro-Butiaba areas long before the advent of British colonialism in the nineteenth century.⁷ The problem with the Banyoro discoverers is that they observed the oil seepages without confirming the recoverable supplies.

Notwithstanding the limitations of the native discoveries, local knowledge became the basis for oil prospecting under the colonial government. John Wayland, a geologist, explored the Lake Albert area in 1919. He 'recorded 52 hydrocarbon occurrences around Lake Albert' (Kasozzi, 2010). In his 1920 paper and his 1925 report: *Petroleum in Uganda*, Wayland (1925) categorized the discovered substance as 'petroleum'. His work did not determine the existence of commercializable oil; but it generated great interest in Uganda's petroleum.

In 1920, five oil companies obtained exclusive rights to prospect for oil.⁸ None of them confirmed the existence of commercially viable oil. But interest in the oil industry grew. In 1936 and 1937, the Investment Company of Johannesburg was granted a license to prospect for oil over an area of 2,574 square miles. The company studied the rocks in the Albertine Graben, drilled two wildcats (potential oil wells) but failed to strike commercial oil. The company gave up in 1940. World War II interfered with oil exploration. However, technocrats of the colonial state scrutinized the geological data collected by the 'unsuccessful' companies. This data pointed to the existence of commercially viable oil. The Geological Survey Department continued prospecting for oil and produced several reports on Uganda's oil. Uncertain of the recoverable oil supplies, the colonial state suspended oil exploration in 1951.

The 1980s saw renewed interest in Uganda's oil. In 1983, under the government of Milton Obote II (1981-1985), an aeromagnetic survey

was conducted over the Albertine Graben. This survey increased Uganda's stock of knowledge on the existing hydrocarbons. The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 1985 was enacted to regulate oil exploration and extraction.

The overthrow of Obote in 1985 did not kill the interest in the oil. President Museveni confesses that soon after capturing power in 1986, he learned about the Albertine oil when Shell BP and Exxon approached him, lobbying for exploration rights over the Lake Albert Basin. Their problem was the timing. The oil companies faced Commander Museveni who, in the 1980s, had a strong sense of economic patriotism. Fresh from a bruising guerrilla war (1981-86) that propelled him to power, the new leader was cautious:

I ... called in the civil servants and mining scientists, first, led by Mrs Janet Opio, who was the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Water, Lands and Mineral Resources. I inquired from these civil servants whether there were people, in the whole of the Ugandan system, that were knowledgeable about petroleum. They told me that there was a petroleum expert in the Bank of Uganda. I requested them to bring me that expert. The 'expert' came one evening. First of all, he was not a Ugandan; he was a Ghanaian; and most amazingly, he was not a scientist at all. He was an economist who worked in Bank of Uganda on import papers dealing with petroleum products.⁹

The President refused to sign contracts with Shell BP and Exxon, suggesting the role of economic nationalism in righting resource-curse wrongs: 'I had nobody ... who was knowledgeable [about] petroleum issues, and I did not want to sell Ugandans interests at all.' To prepare for oil development, government sent Ugandans abroad to pursue first degrees in geology, physics and chemistry. The aim was to prepare them for graduate studies in petroleum sciences. By 2006, Uganda had a core team of

7 Henry Ford Mwirima, in his 2008 *Demystifying Oil Exploration in Uganda* argues that oil was discovered by the natives in 1909; but he does not cite the source of his evidence.

8 The companies were W. Brittle bank; Chijoies Oil Ltd; Lord Drogheda Syndicate; Messrs Bird and Co.; and Messrs E. S. Grogan and Co.

9 Museveni, in *Afrol News*, Uganda Becomes Oil Producer, <http://www.afrol.com/articles/21834>, accessed 15 May 2010.

25 professionals, 20 of them with Master of Science degrees in oil-related disciplines. It is this team that conducted the aeromagnetic and seismological studies that greatly improved Uganda's stock of knowledge, culminating in the 'discovery' of commercializable oil in 2006 and beyond.¹⁰ The process has, at best, been cumulative and, at worst, incrementalist. But how is Uganda managing the multiplicity of expectations and anxieties associated with oil discovery?

Conceptualizing Expectations Management

Expectations management is one of the inescapable challenges in modern governance. Expectations can be explicit or implicit, clear or fuzzy (Ojasalo, 1999). They can be realistic or unrealistic; evidence-based or opinionated. The literature identifies three major expectations management strategies – *laissez-faire*, exaggeration (or 'overselling'), and underreporting (Lindstadt and Staton, 2007: 2).

The *laissez-faire* strategy involves granting citizens the right to think, say or publish whatever they wish. In a technical field, such as oil exploration, the 'popular' cum-journalistic views associated with a *laissez-faire* strategy are largely inaccurate (as in the claim by the Ugandan press that oil discovery in Hoima has resulted in 'land grabbing' by top army generals). This inaccuracy is largely attributed to the weak flow of information from government to the citizens; from technocrats to politicians; and from knowledgeable civil servants (who are, by tradition 'tight-lipped') to the journalists. Uganda's politicians and technocrats need to know that an information vacuum will certainly get filled with something, however accurate or otherwise.

The second strategy that has been commonly used is exaggeration. Also known as 'overselling', this strategy is largely used by

populist politicians. Their aim is to mobilize political support, get elected and/or survive in political office. The risk lies in raising unrealistic expectations – such as the possibility of using oil revenues as a substitute for graduated tax.¹¹

The third expectations management strategy is underreporting. This is commonly used in advanced democracies where empty political promises are punishable via political withdrawal of votes. Underreporting or what Lindstadt and Staton (2007: 2) call the 'downward management of expectations' involves raising 'cautious optimism.' It involves simultaneously mobilizing public support for the system and communication of the challenges at hand. It requires sophisticated political skills (comparable to those of Barack Obama in his 2008 struggle for the Democratic presidential nomination). Such skills are important because unmet expectations may backfire. They may trigger massive withdrawal of support and create doubts about the competency or honesty of the leadership. According to Lindstadt and Staton (2007: 2), the downward management of expectations is possible or even profitable. 'By setting expectations low enough, officials can protect themselves against unanticipated failures and take advantage of unexpected successes.'

Positive and Negative Expectations

People's expectations exist in two distinctive forms: the positive and the negative. In the case of oil discovery, the positive expectations are really hopes that the precious resource and the 'windfall' oil revenues will deliver substantial social, economic and infrastructural improvements. In the case of Uganda, some top politicians claim that poverty will be history once the estimated \$2 billion in oil revenues begin flowing each year. Certain national, local

¹⁰ The scientists also drafted Uganda's policy on petroleum exploration and conducted negotiations with foreign companies. Their technical role has been positive; their ability to negotiate flawed.

¹¹ Officially, Uganda abolished graduated tax in 2005 in the run-up to the 2006 elections in which opposition leader Dr. Kizza Besigye threatened to capture state power from Uganda's perennial president, Yoweri Museveni. In reality, the sales tax which was imposed on virtually all consumer goods and the Local Service Tax (introduced in July 2008) seem to have the same effect as graduated tax. This suggests that graduated tax did not really end. It only changed form.

government and community-level stakeholders are nursing hopes that a dense road and railway network will be built; education and health institutions will become world-class; and that household incomes will dramatically rise. Those that are tired of donors' economic management lectures are sighing with relief. They hope the oil revenues will finance Uganda's national budget and liberate the country from donor-dependence.

However, negative expectations (or anxieties) also abound, particularly over the high level of systemic corruption, which puts Uganda closer to resource-cursed Nigeria than resource-blessed Botswana or Norway. Thus, while optimists celebrate Uganda's likelihood of becoming an OPEC powerhouse, sceptics urge caution. If the systemic corruption in Uganda's public office is not disabled, oil discovery will beget a resource-curse.

Understanding the Resource-Curse

The term 'resource curse' was coined by Auty (1993). But what it refers to, that is, the tendency of resource-rich countries to have weaker economic performance than resource-poor countries is not new. The 'paradox of plenty,' as the resource-curse is often termed, is embedded in the age-old maxim: *Necessity is the Mother of Innovation*. Resource-poor countries are forced to innovate and attain economic viability. By contrast, resource-rich countries suffer the paradox of plenty and remain poor. In simple terms, the resource 'curse' is a situation whereby abundance of tradable natural resources (such as diamonds, gold or oil) paradoxically leads to economic stagnation, the death of other traditional and non-traditional exports such as agricultural and manufactured products, and conflicts over the allocation of resources.

The resource curse is associated with eight distinctive problems. First, is the national risk of entrenching a primary commodity economy that is dependent on God-given (or 'natural') advantages. Yet, globalization not only spells doom for economies that are 'stuck in the

Garden of Eden' (Kiiza, 2006b: 8): it calls for the structural transformation of the national economy into a high value-added industrial and information economy.

Second is the problem of repositioning government as the key driver of growth (to the detriment of the private sector). Third, is the erosion of citizens' duties and obligations such as payment of graduated tax (because government is expected to use 'windfall' revenues to finance public services). Fourth is the problem of political instability (as conflict-prone Nigeria and DRC illustrate). Fifth is the problem of 'leakages' or corruption, which is common in resource-rich countries (such as Nigeria) that have weak institutions of governance. Sixth is the risk of entrenching authoritarian rule or unaccountable governance.¹² Seventh is the risk posed by oil-related activities to people's health and, in particular, the damaging effects of oil-spills on fisheries and the environment. And eighth is the problem of exaggerated expectations. Knowledge of large revenues typically puts pressure on governments to spend. If this happens, fiscal discipline is breached to the detriment of long-term economic management.

The Economic and Political Science Views

Two variants of the resource-curse hypothesis exist – the economic and the political (Di John, 2007). The former is couched in the language of 'rent-seeking'; the latter revolves around the 'rentier state model.' The economic argument is that oil abundance (in developing economies) typically generates valuable rents that tend to trigger violent forms of rent-seeking – or 'greed-based' insurgencies (Collier et al, 2004). Oil is particularly found to be relevant in secessionist wars. Oil abundance helps predict the type of war, secessionist or non-secessionist that a resource-abundant country is likely to suffer.

¹² During our field interviews, anxiety was expressed over the 'secrecy' surrounding the licensing process and the signature bonuses; the level of corruption in public office; the poor quality of roads works and infrastructural investments; and the exclusion of different stakeholders (such as Bunyoro).

The political science viewpoint revolves around the rentier state theory of governance and the associated level of accountability of the rulers to the citizenry (Karl, 1997). The claim is that when states gain a large proportion of their revenues from external sources [such as oil exports or foreign aid], there is reduced necessity of the rulers to levy domestic taxes. Three things happen. Oil states tend to be weak states with weak domestic institutions. For one thing, oil states 'have less need to create strong bureaucracies to raise revenue' (Di John, 2007: 292; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Second, resource rich states tend to have limited capacity – or will – to create strong armies. As a consequence, they tend to be vulnerable to insurgency. Third, the leaders tend to be less accountable to their citizens. By extension, the probability of official corruption and authoritarian rule tends to be high in resource-rich countries (such as Nigeria, DRC or Uganda).

The economic and the political economy perspectives of the resource curse are united by one common denominator. And that is the view that abundance of natural resources 'causes poor growth and raises the incidence, intensity and duration of conflict' (Di John, 2007: 961). This appears to be a critique of the theory of comparative advantage. Economists inspired by Smith and Ricardo argue that resource-rich countries (such as USA, Congo and Uganda) have an advantage over resource-poor countries (such as Japan or Mauritius). The resource-curse proposition turns this view on its head. The claim is that natural resources may be more of a curse than a blessing (Auty, 1993; Sachs and Warner, 1995).

Some researchers uphold the resource-curse hypothesis. In their 2004 study of 161 countries and 78 civil wars over the period 1960 – 1999, Collier et al (2004), for example, observe that natural resource dependence – measured as a ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP – is significantly associated with the likelihood of civil wars. Three conclusions emerge from this study. Resource dependence increases the

likelihood of conflict until the resource-GDP ratio is 32 percent; beyond this, it diminishes the probability of conflict. Second, an increase in resource dependence from zero to 32 percent tends to increase the likelihood of civil war from 1 percent to 22 percent. Third, the abundance of natural resources, particularly oil, in the export basket significantly increases the likelihood of secessionist wars. According to Ross (2004) 'there is good quantitative evidence that oil exports are significantly associated with the onset of civil wars' (quoted in Di John, 2007: 962).

Key Weaknesses of the Resource-Curse Argument

The resource-curse argument misses one key point, namely, that the real source of the 'curse' is *not* natural resources. It is economic *and* political mismanagement. This arises from weak state capacity to use 'windfall' revenues to build developmentalist institutions (such as roads and railways). It arises from weak domestic capacity to govern the national economy for long-term development. The 'curse' also arises from the inability to transform the national economy from primary commodity production to higher value-added industrial and information activities. Indeed, evidence shows that the link between oil and political violence is a result (*not* of resource abundance per se) but poor (read 'commodity-driven') economic growth, high corruption and authoritarianism (Wright and Czelusta, 2002). By implication, resource abundance begets poor performers in some cases, and good performers in others.

The 'Worst' and the 'Best' Performers

The abundance of oil, diamonds and metals in DRC, Angola, Nigeria and Sierra Leone has blocked, rather than promoted, economic transformation. Political stability has also suffered as rival claimants to the political economy have disagreed *violently* over the allocation of the abundant resources. In other words, resource abundance has been a curse rather than a blessing for these countries. By

contrast, countries such as Australia, USA, Botswana, and Norway have benefited from natural resource abundance. Norway, for example, was one of the poorest countries in Europe in 1900. In the 1960s, Norway still lagged behind its Scandinavian neighbours in GDP per capita and other economic indicators. By the 1990s, Norway had overtaken Denmark and Sweden. Today, Norway is one of the world richest and well-governed countries, with some of the best human development indicators.

In Africa, Botswana is roughly comparable to the world's best performers (such as Norway). When Botswana obtained independence from Britain in 1966, it was the third poorest country in the world (Tregenna, 2003; Kiiza, 2006b). This was arguably because of *ineffective* British colonialism (details in Kiiza, 2006b). The country had just 12km of paved road and two secondary schools. Only 100 Botswana had completed secondary school and only 22 had graduated from university (Acemoglu, et al, 2003: 1). Additionally, Botswana was a commodity (or 'cattle') economy with limited postcolonial growth prospects.

With the discovery of diamond at Orapa (1967) and the subsequent opening of Juaneng diamond mines (1982), Botswana's growth prospects changed dramatically. Between 1966 and 1974, Botswana was one of the world's fastest growing economies. Real GDP growth averaged 16 percent between 1970 and 1974. Between 1975 and 1989, rapid growth continued. By the 1980s, mining had replaced cattle as a leading economic sector. Domestic savings started to exceed investment. Government ran budget and trade surpluses. The ratio of government revenue to GDP was a superb 50 percent (about double the African average) and peaked at 64 percent in 1988 (Tregenna, 2003). In 1997, Botswana graduated into a middle income economy.

Today, Botswana's GDP is over \$14 billion and per capita income is \$8,800. The level of infrastructural development is also high. Botswana now has 888km of railway and 10,217km of roads (with 5,619km paved and the

rest unpaved). The country's socio-economic indicators are also impressive, save for the AIDs crisis¹³. Botswana has one of the highest foreign exchange reserves in the world (Jefferis and Kelly, 1999: 212). At a time when most African countries have a huge debt burden, Botswana's foreign debt is only about 14 percent of GNP. The country has no internal debt and is a net exporter of capital.

How does one explain the economic record of resource-rich Norway and Botswana in comparison with resource-rich disasters (such as Nigeria)? And what lessons of good practice can Uganda draw from both effective and ineffective performers?

Why Some Gain and Others Lose: The Case of Norway

Leading researchers are increasingly adopting a new research agenda on resource endowments. The key question is no longer 'how' natural resources often harm the economy but *why* some countries gain, while others lose (Mehlum et al, 2006). Why does resource abundance deliver positive developmental outcomes in some countries and economic failure in others?

The answer arguably lies in cross-national differences in the quality of domestic institutions. Resource-rich countries that have a malfunctioning bureaucracy and insecure property rights tend to attain lower growth outcomes and more violent conflicts than those that have high quality (Weberian) systems of public administration and predictable/reliable property rights institutions. In other words, institutions matter. When the domestic institutions are 'grabber-friendly,' the benefits of resource abundance are reaped by a few state elites in alliance with foreign (oil) companies.

¹³ In 2001, Botswana had the highest rate of HIV infection in the world: 250,000 of its 1.6 million people were infected and 50% of the population between 25-29 years were dying of AIDS. In 2002, an ambitious campaign was launched that provides free anti-retroviral drugs to anyone who needs them. By March 2004, Botswana no longer had the highest infection rates in the world. But with 37.5% of the population infected, the country is in trouble.

The nation as a whole benefits when domestic institutions are development-enhancing.

Norway's ability to avoid the resource-curse is attributed to the country's initial conditions' and the institutions that were put in place (Larsen, 2006). By the time the extraction of oil started in the early 1970s, Norway was not just a developed economy with per capita GDP of over US\$10,000 (PPP); it was (and continues to be) 'a highly egalitarian society that prides itself on being that' (Larsen, 2006: 628). In other words, egalitarianism was socially embedded.

Second, Norway was a mature democracy with a deep-seated culture of accountability. Norwegian politicians hardly posed any risk of looting public resources. Nor was illegal rent-seeking entertained. This left open only the possibility of accessing resource-revenues through legal channels (such as lobbying Parliament for tax relief or wage increases). Third, Norway forged a tripartite social contract between capital, labour and state elites. This social contract, which is central to Scandinavian welfare capitalism, resulted in the institutionalization of equitable distribution of wealth as a societal norm. Norway's distributive justice was in turn made possible by national norms that protected citizens against the vagaries of free markets, or *de-commodification* (Esping-Andersen, 1990). De-commodification refers to 'the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation' (Kiiza, 2006a:271). This system enabled Norway to avoid conflicts over distribution. As Larsen (2006: 269) states:

When the public sentiment is one of satisfaction with and acceptance of the way society is organized, each individual feels less inclined to participate in conflicts such as strikes, sitdowns, or walk-slows. In Norway, laborers appeared content with the visible economic growth, knowing that profits would be ploughed back into growth. The perception was that resource revenues were used to the benefit of all, in investments, technological advance, and education.

Fourth, Norway institutionalized the rule of law and developed a swift judicial system to detect, determine and deter theft of official resources. As a consequence, illegalities such as grabbing of collective wealth via corruption, theft or misreporting is relatively infrequent in Norway. Fifth, Norway created a special Petroleum Fund and accumulated reserves abroad. These initiatives enabled Norway to avoid the negative expectations from oil abundance.

To what extent do Uganda's 'initial conditions' (at the time of oil discovery in the 2000s) and institutional credentials approximate those of Norway in the 1970s?

The Case of Uganda

Uganda is substantially different from Norway. Where Norway was an advanced economy with per capita GDP of over \$10,000 in 1970, Uganda currently has \$ 1000 (PPP). Where Norway was a stable democracy at the time of oil discovery, Uganda is a fragile democracy that only reintroduced competitive party politics in 2006 after 20 years of 'no-party democracy.' Where Norway forged a social contract between the rival claimants to the political economy, Uganda has not. Norway had institutionalized a system of welfare capitalism that guaranteed peoples' right to equitable growth, and to the basic necessities of life. By contrast, Uganda has institutionalized neoliberal economics characterized by rapid growth (estimated at 7.3 percent in 1992-2009). However, the rapid growth is highly inequitable signifying the exclusion of a substantial proportion of the people from the fruits of growth (Uganda, 2010).

Most importantly, Norway institutionalized the rule of law and minimized official corruption. By contrast, Uganda suffers deep-seated official corruption (with Transparency International naming the judiciary and Police as some of the most corrupt institutions in the country). While President Museveni has recently committed himself to fighting official corruption, Uganda's corruption scandals such as the theft of the Global

Fund (for Aids, Malaria and Tuberculosis), the GAVI Funds, the alleged looting of resources from DRC – all suggest that a lot needs to be done to prevent the grabbing of oil revenues via corrupt practices.

Take the case of signature bonuses. DRC caused the oil companies to pay \$3.5 million in bonuses upon signing a PSA for its Block 1 in 2008. Uganda got laughable bonuses of \$200,000 and \$300,000 for Block 2 and Block 3 respectively. According to Lay et al (2010: 6-7), Uganda's ministry for finance denies knowledge of where the signature bonuses went. This has fueled suspicion that the tiny signature bonuses were stolen. It raises questions over government's intention to use the larger oil revenues for national, as opposed to predatory, purposes.

However, not everything is negative. State officials reported that government will use the exhaustible oil resource to build inexhaustible economic capabilities. Three priorities were specified. First, the 'early production agreement' reached between Uganda and the oil companies (particularly Tullow) prioritizes the construction of a mini-refinery to generate 50-100 mega watts of thermal electricity using Heavy Oil Fuels (HOF). The electricity will be added on to the national grid. All Ugandans will benefit. However, electricity will remain costly and below the national requirements (Interviews, Tullow, 6 June 2008). The second priority is the financing of the *National Development Plan*, 2010/11 – 2014/15 (NPA, 2010). The third is the refining of 5,000 barrels of oil per day to produce diesel and paraffin. The aim is to cut Uganda's import bill of paraffin and diesel by 50 percent.¹⁴ The ultimate goal is to improve the political economy.

Oil Discovery and Uganda's Political Economy

Over the last 24 years of NRM rule, Uganda has made important economic strides (Kuteesa, et al, 2010). Between 1992 and 2009, GDP grew

at a high rate of about 7.3 per cent. According to the Governor of the central Bank of Uganda, Tumusiime-Mutebile, 'Real output is now three and a half times greater than it was at the start of the 1990s. Private investment, in real terms, rose six-fold in this period, while exports of goods and services, in dollar terms are now 16 times larger' (Monitor, March 30, 2010).¹⁵ The proportion of income-poor people has declined from 56 percent in 1992/93 to 38 percent in 2002/03 and further down to 24.5 percent in 2009/10 (Uganda, 2010).

The devil is in the detail. While there is general improvement (with 7.5 million Ugandans below poverty line in 2009/2010 compared to 8.4 million in 2005/06 (see Table 2), the evidence shows that Uganda is still a poor agrarian economy. Over 80 percent of Ugandans live in the rural areas primarily as small-holder agriculturalists using primitive technology – the hand-hoe. Several stakeholders have been near-spectators in Uganda's 'impressive' economic growth. For example, about 46 percent of northern Ugandans are still below poverty, largely because of the 20-year civil war, which only subsided three years ago.

In Bunyoro, income poverty in 1992/93 was comparable to that of northern Uganda. Poverty in Bunyoro decreased by nearly 35 percentage points between 1992/93 and 2002/03; and about 8 percentage points between 2002/03 and 2005/06. However, the people of Bunyoro perceive themselves as one of the poorest in Uganda. They have a poor road network, no railway line at all, poor social services, no quality polytechnic or government-funded University, no high value-added manufacturing industries and hardly any access to electricity. Most Banyoro are poor small-holder agriculturalists.

¹⁴ Currently Uganda uses about 10,000 barrels of petroleum products per day. The mini-refinery was supposed to be operational by 2009. This did not happen.

¹⁵ Ugandan officials and their World Bank partners have till recently been celebrating Uganda's rapid growth of 6.5 per cent between 1992 and 2008. The average figure for that period has been revised to 7.3 percent. Certain MPs complained. The poverty-stricken people they represent do not 'feel' the rosy economic growth reported by technocrats. The MPs tasked the executive to prove that the figures are not 'simply cooked up' (Monitor, March 30, 2010).

Table 2: Poor Persons (in millions), 2002–2010

	2002/03	2005/06	2009/10
Uganda	9.81	8.44	7.51
Residence			
Rural	9.31	7.87	7.10
Urban	0.50	0.57	0.42
Region			
Central	1.67	1.30	0.87
Eastern	3.19	2.45	2.20
Northern	2.90	3.25	2.84
Western	2.06	1.44	1.60

Source: Based on Uganda, 2010: Table 6.13, page 80

Bunyoro's current scenario contrasts with the precolonial situation where the Banyoro were proud cattle-keepers or skilled artisans (annually producing and exporting over 1,000 iron implements in the interlacustrine region). The discovery of oil in Bunyoro has reignited hopes of restoring the glory of Bunyoro-Kitara.

Primary Commodities

A key challenge for Uganda is the dominant role of primary commodities in the export basket. The country's total exports undoubtedly increased from US\$171 million in 1992 to US\$478 million in 1999 and \$2.8 billion in 2009 (NPA, 2010). However, the structure of exports changed superficially from traditional *commodities* (coffee, tea, tobacco) to non-traditional *commodities* (fish, cut flowers, and maize). This signifies no fundamental change in the economy. Oil discovery is raising new concerns. Will Uganda shift from farming to oil production (crude oil), both of which

are characterized by low value-addition? Put differently, will oil give Uganda false confidence and entrench a primary commodity economy?

Oil Discovery and the Quest for Democracy

One of the greatest concerns is whether or not oil revenues will entrench authoritarian rule. When the NRM party captured power in 1986, it imposed restrictions on rival political parties. The claim was that multiparty competition was a virtue of Western industrial societies where parties represent distinct social classes. By the early 2000s, however, momentum for political pluralism was building up (Kiiza et al., 2008). In the run-up to the 2006 elections, the NRM re-introduced multiparty politics, thanks to sustained pressure from opposition parties, donors and some reformists among the ruling elite. The NRM apparently adopted multi-party politics only in a manner that would enable it to retain power.

The question is whether or not oil discovery will stifle Uganda's embryonic democracy. Skeptics argued that authoritarian rule is likely to be entrenched. The ruling elites are arguably unlikely to handle over power, even if they lose elections. Others hypothesize that competition for state power will increase as opposition groups 'seek their turn to eat'. Yet others claim that rival claimants to state power might make generous electoral promises (such as direct oil-cash transfers to households). While this seems to make sense in corruption-ridden countries (such as Uganda), the cash transfers are a disincentive to productive work. Cash transfers also risk entrenching a dependency mentality, which will be unsustainable when oil dries up (in 50 years or so). Clearly, then, governance is central to the different stakeholders' anxieties and expectations.

Anxieties and Expectations of Different Stakeholders

This section briefly looks at the anxieties, expectations and/or demands of different stakeholders, beginning with those of the DR Congo.

Congo's Anxieties over Cross-Border Oil

Government interviewees reported that some of the oil wells lie across the DRC–Uganda border. This has raised DRC's anxieties that Uganda could exploit DRC's oil. To minimize conflicts, a joint Uganda-Congo exploration agreement was signed. The problem, it would seem, is that Uganda is ready to develop its oil basins; DRC is, 'perhaps ten years behind' (Interviews, July 2008). According to a top PEDP technocrat,

Congo's anxieties are uncalled for. The oil basins we intend to develop are entirely inside Uganda. Second, Congo's leaders have visited Uganda and received explanations from us on the facts and progress we have made. We have shared technical information, and reassured DRC that we have enough oil to build an oil industry without touching theirs (Interviews, July 2008).

A conflict analyst at Makerere University suggested that Congo's concerns might be associated with the 2001 and 2003 UN Reports that implicated top Ugandan state elites in looting DRC's minerals.¹⁶ The Congolese seem to be worried that history is about to repeat itself just across the Uganda-Congo border (Interviews, August 2008). These cross-border anxieties could trigger violent regional conflicts if they are not managed well.

Demands of Bunyoro-Kitara Kingdom

Bunyoro Kingdom officials expressed concern that the National Oil and Gas Policy does not define Bunyoro as a *direct* beneficiary of the oil wealth. The Kingdom argues that it has existed for over 1000 years, and is entrenched in the Constitution of Uganda under Article 246. According to a top Kingdom official Bunyoro-Kitara historically and culturally 'owns the land where oil has been discovered in Hoima, Kibaale, and Buliisa districts' (Interviews, June 2008).

Kingdom officials argue that the Banyoro have suffered neglect since the advent of colonialism in the 1890s. They trace their marginalization to Omukama [King] Kabalega's anti-colonial wars against British troops and their Buganda Kingdom allies. According to a key informant:

Colonialists conducted an extremely barbaric war. They dismantled our progressive cattle economy, ironworks, and textile [bark-cloth] industry. In

16 The Report of the UN Panel of Experts, April 2001 indicates that Uganda, like Rwanda, appropriated DRC's resources. Rwanda benefitted directly; Uganda did not. Trading as Rwanda Metals, the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) made an estimated \$250 million in 18 months (enough to finance RPA's war in the Congo). In Uganda only the top state elites allegedly benefited (as individuals). But Rwanda and Uganda were not alone in the 'dock'. In October 2002, the UN Panel accused 85 western companies of breaching OECD standards through their activities in DRC. Trade in tantalum (refined coltan) was a case in point. Tantalum (which costs \$100 a pound), is a key component in the manufacture of mobile phones (Nokia, Ericsson, etc) and computer chips (from Intel to Sony stereos and VCRs). The process of mining coltan in DRC had social effects 'akin to slavery' – using forced labor, prisoners, smuggling, and murder. Some western countries (UK, USA, Belgium, Germany) reportedly lobbied to have their 'national' companies removed from the 'List of Shame.' See Declan Walsh, [UN cuts details of Western profiteers from Congo report](#), *The Independent*, October 27, 2003.

the name of vaccination, our cattle were injected with lethal substances that destroyed thousands of our herds. Through a scorched-earth war strategy [which involved burning people's houses, destroying the productive economy, and looting cattle and other movable wealth], the Bunyoro economy and society were impoverished. We will use our share of oil revenue to re-develop and revive our economy and society (Bunyoro Interviews, July 2008).

Our key informant made specific reference to the land question in Bunyoro in comparison with Buganda:

Buganda was permitted to have mailo-land; Bunyoro was not. Mailo-land grants, as you know, were huge colonially sanctioned holdings measured in square miles. If the Bunyoro land where oil has been discovered was in Buganda, it would be under the mailo-land system. It would directly benefit the Buganda Kingdom [which is still a large land owner] or individual Baganda landlords. Our case is different. Our land was either declared 'public land' and appropriated by the central state or, customary land, which remained largely unregistered. These historical injustices against Bunyoro should be redressed (Interviews, July 2008).

A focus group participant who came from Kibaale District (where there are raging land conflicts between the *Bafuruki* (immigrants from Kigezi in southwestern Uganda) and the Banyoro natives) expressed hawkish sentiments. According to him,

The colonial state grabbed from Bunyoro the Seven Lost Counties – Buyaga, Bugangaizi, Buhekura, Orugonjo (Singo), Buruuli, Bulemezi (Kayunga), and Bugerere. These were donated to Buganda Kingdom. The administration of Buyaga and Bugangaizi was returned to Bunyoro in 1964; but the land remained in the hands of Baganda absentee landlords. This historical anomaly cannot continue. All our Lost Counties should be returned. Bunyoro did not sign the 1900 Uganda Agreement under which the Lost Counties were donated to Buganda. We are not bound by the Agreement. Now is the time

for the Banyoro to reassert their collective and group rights. We either share the oil wealth or cause chaos (Interviews, June 2008).

Another study participant expressed loss of trust in the ruling elites for whom 'thousands of Ugandans shed their sweat and blood' [during the 1981-86 guerilla war that brought President Museveni to power]. He hastened to add:

The current government, for which some of us shed blood to bring to power, has not helped us. It's not ours. There is conspiracy on the part of government to rob us of our wealth. There seems to be a sinister, secret plan to rob Bunyoro of its wealth, including the oil-rich land and the oil itself. Certain state officials allege that we, the Banyoro, are cowards – should we fight to prove that we are the Abanyoro, that is, respected chiefs who have the power to fight for our rights? Should we prove that Kabalega's spirit of resistance flows in our blood? Where are the brave heroes of Bunyoro? We are going to fight. Bunyoro is so poor and marginalized that even the Orukurato [Bunyoro Parliament] cannot sit for lack of money (Hoima Focus Group Discussion, June 2008).

Bunyoro Kingdom articulated six top demands that should be financed using the Kingdom's share of oil revenue. First is infrastructure (mainly tarmac roads throughout Bunyoro and a railway network). Second is the improvement of primary and post-primary education, backed by the establishment of quality polytechnics and at least one Bunyoro University teaching oil-related courses. The aim is to prepare Bunyoro's children to compete with the best and brightest in the job market. Third is job creation for the natives. Fourth is affordable electricity (once thermal electricity is generated using heavy fuel oils). Fifth is representation on the Governing Boards of the oil companies. The claim is that: 'Resource extraction without representation is tyranny' (Interviews, June 2008). Sixth is the need to strengthen people's culture to mitigate the social evils (associated with migration, prostitution, and HIV/AIDS) that may come as a result of oil development.

Skeptics have expressed reservations on the developmental role of Kingdoms. The main concern is that *Omukama Tagarukwamu!* [The King's directive is final]! In other words, monarchies are not necessarily accountable. We asked the Prime Minister of Bunyoro to comment. He conceded that monarchies, at some point in their evolution, were arbitrary, not just in Bunyoro, but in Europe and elsewhere in the world. The present-day *Omukama* has 'developed two ears and one mouth. He listens patiently before speaking or, taking action' (Interviews, July 2008). The *Omukama* has arguably learned the unalterable law of civilization: Change, and only change, is a constant. Thus, the Kingdom, which historically had sovereignty over all the oil-rich lands, has now expressed willingness to be accountable for the revenues received.

Expectations of District Local Governments

The district local governments (LGs) that have jurisdictions over the oil-rich areas expressed optimism that oil revenues would boost LG finances and reposition LGs as key actors in local economic development. The LG share of oil revenue will arguably be used to (a) protect the environment, particularly the fragile ecosystem in the Albertine Graben; (b) embark on planned urbanization; (c) develop infrastructure, particularly upgrading the district dirt-roads, health centres, and schools; and (d) embark on the non-oil economic sectors such as rural industries, bio-fuels and the service-sector investments that will offer auxiliary services to the oil economy. Like the Kingdom officials, they are worried that failure to use oil revenues to promote local development might breed bitterness among the community. This could trigger Nigeria-like armed conflicts. The Deputy Chief Administrative Officer of Hoima affirmed his determination to 'use the oil revenue to deliver local economic development.' This would arguably immunize Bunyoro against the

Nigeria-like resource-curse (Interviews, July 2008).¹⁷

Expectations and Demands of Communities around the Oil Wells

The local community in Kyehorro and other fishing villages reported that oil discovery was a mixed blessing. Geographically, the Lake Albert basin is in the Western arm of the great East African Rift Valley. It was a hard-to-reach area prior to the discovery of oil, thanks to the steep escarpments on both the Ugandan and the DRC border. There were no access roads, and no telephone masts for mobile phones. Water-borne diseases were high, thanks to the poor supply of toilets and health facilities. School children could hardly stay in school due to the lucrative fishing activities on the lake, worsened by the lack of good quality schools in the vicinity.

With the discovery of oil, these are beginning to change. The roads opened by the oil companies (in partnership with local governments) have dramatically made the fishing villages accessible. We observed businesspeople's trucks that had moved right to Kyehorro village to purchase fish. Improved access simultaneously lowered the price of foodstuffs in Kyehorro village and increased the price of fish by over 100 percent (between 2006 and 2008). This boosted household incomes. Tullow had sunk boreholes, built a maternity clinic, and renovated at least one primary school in the village. Murram runways for small planes were also built to ease travel between Kampala and the Albertine Graben. Telephone companies were also busy erecting telephone masts. Our focus group discussants reported dramatic improvements in the standards of living. However, we observed

¹⁷ The district technocrats were concerned that consultations during the formulation of Uganda's Oil and Gas Policy were 'superficial and 'last-minute' – something that should be avoided in the preparation of the petroleum law. Second, the corporate social responsibility of the oil companies has resulted in the construction of schools, health units or boreholes. But these are not integrated with the district plans. Nor do they have a share of the district budget. Thus, sustainability will be a problem once the oil companies withdraw support. Third, while Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) were carried out; they were 'a matter of formality' and failed to take into consideration critical issues like catering for the water catchments areas in the hinterland.

slum-like dwellings, unplanned settlements and poor drainage in Kyehorro village, suggesting that a lot had to be done to promote local development.

Anxieties emerged when Tullow declared a section of Lake Albert a 'no-go-area' for fishermen and women. John Okumu, a local fisherman, narrates his anxieties:

When Tullow moved its exploration drill right on the lake, access to our fishing grounds was interfered with. This problem lasted for a few weeks. Our fear is that when oil development starts, we might be ordered to move away from the lake. Yet, most of us dropped out of school. I left school in 1989 when I was 10 years. I was in primary four. I don't have any skill apart from fishing. I have two wives and 12 kids. The lake is our 'bank' as a family and as a community. What shall we do if we are blocked from this lake? If oil development interferes with the trade we inherited from our great grandparents, what shall we do for a living? (Interviews, July 2008).¹⁸

Anxieties have also arisen over the risk of oil spills that could suffocate fish to death, or cause irreversible damage to the lake, the fishing villages and surrounding environments. The risk of environmental damage (comparable to the BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill of April-June 2010) is high. Uganda's institutions and enforcement mechanisms are deemed to be incapable of preventing environmental damage, or responding to the crisis once it happens. The main demand of the fishing-community leaders was that oil development should not compromise their right to life. For the fishing communities, this means the right of access to the lake.

Anxieties over the Production Sharing Agreements

18 The natives of Buliisa district especially the Bagungu (in Block 2) also complained that the Bararo herdsmen were evicting them from their customary land. Some of the herdsmen were armed with assault rifles reserved for the army and were perceived to be 'fronts of top politicians seeking to grab our oil-rich land' (Interviews, July 2008). Government denied that top politicians were involved, and promised to relocate the herdsmen elsewhere in the country.

In December 2009, PLATFORM (a UK-based environment and governance watchdog) published the draft copies of Heritage's 2004 Block 3A PSA, Dominion's 2007 Block 4B PSA, and Tullow's draft PSA for Block 2 (see Table 1). PLATFORM (2009) subsequently corroborated their evidence with off-the-record government interviewees and a loose minute signed on 2 September 2004 by Kabagambe Kaliisa of the ministry for energy. The conclusion was that the draft PSAs are 'indeed very close, if not identical, to the signed PSAs' (Lay et al, 2010: 4).

Three categories of anxiety have emerged over the PSAs. The Uganda government will receive 'between 47.4% and 79.5% of revenues, depending on the price of oil, size of fields, development costs and other factors.' This is 'below the 80+% regularly trumpeted by the government and the oil companies' (PLATFORM, 2009: 1). Second, the contracts promote corporate greed, not national development. 'In the most likely scenario, Tullow Oil could make a 30-35% return on its investment,' which is rated as 'excessive profit-taking at the expense of the host government' (PLATFORM, 2009: 1). Third, Uganda is receiving a worse deal than, say, the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq, which is not even a recognized state.

Most damagingly, the PSAs have a controversial 'stabilization clause.' Article 19 requires the Ugandan government to compensate oil companies for any future change in the law that affects company profits. In the wake of the damaging oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico, British oil giant BP (under pressure from President Obama) agreed to pay the \$20 billion into a claims fund. The fund will compensate shrimpers, restaurateurs, and other local people affected by the oil-spill. Under Uganda's stabilization clause, government can neither demand for, nor enforce, environmental safeguards or clean-ups (precisely because these will reduce the companies' profits). Worst of all, the stabilization clause legislates

against renegotiation of the oil contracts. This is an encroachment on Uganda's sovereignty. It is antithetical to the patriotism Commander Museveni exuded soon after capturing power in 1986.

For the skeptics, Article 19 seems to set the stage for an oil-curse in Uganda. The stabilization clause questions the patriotism and/or competence of the experts who negotiated the PSAs on behalf of Uganda. Some interviewees alleged that certain state elites have either acquired, or been promised shares, in the oil companies. If this happened, a good contract for the oil companies would be profitable for selected state elites (as individuals). [We lacked the time and resources to verify the validity of this claim]. Skeptics also argue that the high levels of official corruption (the Global Fund, the CHOGM loss of Shs 500 billion in shoddy deals, and several direct and indirect donations to the cronies of the ruling party) give little hope that the oil revenue will not be stolen.

According to Lay (2010), the ingredients of the resource-curse 'are all in place: contract secrecy, government corruption, commercial disinformation campaigns, with environmental protection ignored, and a simmering border dispute with the Democratic Republic of Congo frozen rather than resolved.' This echoes Karl's (1997: 213) view that 'the pre-existing political, social and economic institutions available to manage oil wealth' matter. In other words, the quality of governance matters.

Lay et al (2010: 33-34) seem to summarize the views of skeptics: 'The honest reality is that [oil development in] Western Uganda is most likely to exacerbate poverty, distort the Ugandan economy ... increase human rights violations, entrench the power of military forces, escalate tensions across the border with Congo, create new health problems for local communities, increase both international corruption and revenue mismanagement, reduce Uganda's

wildlife stocks, and pollute the land, water and air.' In sum, the risk of an oil-curse is real.

How is government responding to the multiplicity of expectations and anxieties associated with oil discovery?

From Exaggeration and Laissez Faire to Cautious Optimism

The Uganda government has repeatedly criticized comparisons with Nigeria, Angola and other resource-curse countries. It has raised expectations that Uganda will be Africa's new Norway. Some technocrats agree. Tumusiime-Mutebile, for example, affirms Uganda's state capacity to manage the oil revenues (on account of the technocrats' ability to manage macro-economic stability since 1992).¹⁹

The government originally used exaggeration and/or a laissez faire strategy to manage people's positive expectations. The president, for example raised people's expectations when he emphatically argued, as early as 2006, that Ugandan oil will be a blessing, not a curse:

There is a lot of nonsense that the oil will be a curse. No way! The oil of Uganda cannot be a curse. Oil becomes a curse when you have got useless leaders, and I can assure you that we don't approach that description even by a thousandth of a mile... The oil is a blessing for Uganda and money from it will be used for development.²⁰

On 9 October 2009 (Uganda's 47th Independence Day) the president asserted that: 'No one, in Uganda or internationally, can now doubt the country's steady and deliberate path to a middle-income country status in the near future,' thanks to the discovery of oil.²¹ A year earlier, the president had announced that Uganda will not export crude oil (Juuko and Odomel,

19 Remarks made at the National Seminar on Managing Oil Revenue in Uganda, Munyonyo Commonwealth Resort, Kampala, July 8-9, 2008.

20 See IOL, South Africa, Uganda Announces Oil Discovery, http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=68&art_id=qw1160371442337B225, accessed 31 May 2010.

21 Uganda Media Centre, Independence Speech, 9 October 2009, <http://www.mediacentre.go.ug/details.php?catId=6&item=634>, accessed 15 May 2010.

2008). A refinery will be build. Uganda will export value-added products and reap greater export earnings.

Government technocrats have increasingly abandoned the *laissez faire* strategy (which is consistent with the traditional civil service) and adopted the strategy of cautious optimism. For example, Kabagame-Kaliisa of the ministry for energy affirms that Uganda has excellent chances of developing its oil industry. He nevertheless cautions that the country needs a huge sum of US\$8 billion, which ‘the licensed oil companies are unable to raise.’²² Alan Gelb (former World Bank Chief Economist) also advises that building oil refineries is costly. It is constrained by a huge price-tag, small profit-margins on finished products, and unwillingness by local people to have a refinery in their neighborhood.

Lawrence Kiiza dampens popular expectations even further. According to him, some popular expectations are premised on wrong petroleum economics:

If the cost of oil is US\$100 a barrel, and the oil companies announce the discovery of 1 billion barrels of oil, most Ugandans think the government will earn 100 X 1 billion, or US\$100 billion. This is definitely a lot of money. But it is based on faulty petroleum economics. The discovery of 1 billion barrels does not necessarily mean all of it will be recoverable. Second, the cost of oil exploration, extraction, development and transportation needs to be estimated and subtracted from the gross oil sales.²³

Other experts have damped people’s expectations by warning that oil could lead to the displacement of “private sector-led growth” with a state-driven economy. Some warned against the Dutch Disease effects of

oil revenues.²⁴ Others cautioned that Uganda’s fledgling democracy could descend into an overt dictatorship as predatory political elites position themselves to loot like Mobutu of DRC.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the political economy of popular expectations *and* anxieties associated with oil discovery in Uganda. Several conclusions emerge. First, the false expectations, anxieties or accusations largely arise from the secretive and *laissez faire* strategy that government has predominantly used to manage people’s expectations. No serious justification has been found for the high level of secrecy. While no government disseminates all state secrets to the public, basic information, which is not injurious to national security, should be shared out. We accordingly recommend substantial improvements in the flow of information.

But that is not all. The people’s anxieties appear to spring from the past record of corruption – such as the Global Fund saga and the Shs500 billion that was lost via shoddy CHOGM deals. This must be addressed. The deep-seated corruption and the weak institutional credentials of Uganda have led some to expect that nothing will change when oil revenues begin flowing. For reasons of path dependency, a substantial section of people expects oil revenues to be swindled by a few state elites. It is this worry that has triggered anxieties over the unequal oil contracts which disproportionately appear to favour oil companies vis-à-vis government. We strongly recommend renegotiation of the oil contracts.

To immunize Uganda against the resource-curse, a culture of equitable or ‘shared’ growth (comparable to Norway) needs to be the

²² Uganda needs this money over the next decade to finance continued drilling, field appraisal, and the construction of a refinery, storage facilities, a power plant and transmission lines. Energy-pedia, 18 February 2010, <http://www.energy-pedia.com/article.aspx?articleid=139078>, accessed 3 June 2010.

²³ Remarks made at the National Seminar for Managing Oil Revenue in Uganda, Munyonyo Commonwealth Resort, Kampala, July 8-9, 2008.

²⁴ The Dutch Disease gets its name from a phenomenon that affected Holland in the 1960s following the discovery of natural gas reserves. This led to the collapse of manufacturing and other sectors. Dutch Disease is the recession that hits other sectors when one industry or economic activity dominates, or increases its export-share. Dutch Disease typically results in the appreciation of the value of the currency, rendering manufacturing and other domestic activities costly (relative to other countries) and therefore less competitive in international markets. Jobs in manufacturing might migrate elsewhere.

developed. For this to happen, government needs to build new institutions (such as an oil company) and revive old or dying developmentalist institutions (such as Uganda Development Bank and Uganda Development Corporation). These institutions should be used to channel oil revenues into development infrastructure that will stay long after the oil wells have dried up. Different stakeholders have emphasized permanent roads and railways, high quality health and education services, polytechnics, and universities. Uganda must use the exhaustible oil wealth to create inexhaustible development capabilities. Concrete development is the only sure way of fortifying Uganda against the Nigerian resource-curse.

We hasten to add that developing an oil refinery is costly. Yet, the competitive global markets are merciless to primary commodity exporters. Uganda should invest in strategic cost-benefit analysis; *strategic* in the sense of transcending conventional economic wisdom (which narrowly focuses on short-run profit maximization). Strategic cost-benefit analysis should analyze the economic, social, and environmental costs of enabling Uganda to acquire refinery capability. The claim of low profits on refined petroleum products must be weighed, for example, against the opportunity of using oil to build high value-added petrochemical industries (that manufacture plastics, detergents, solvents, elastomers and fibers such as polyesters). It must also be assessed in the light of the commercial value of virtually all the petroleum products – including the light distillates (such as gasoline); middle distillates (kerosene, diesel); and heavy distillates or residuum (heavy fuel oil, lubricants, asphalt). Asphalt (bitumen), for example, might have low export-value; but it has huge developmental significance since it can be used to build durable tarmac roads. This would make oil a development blessing for most Ugandans.

Finally, the historical injustice committed against the people of Bunyoro should be addressed. *Okalya dda kadda dda* is a famous

Luganda maxim. It literally means: grave historical errors can never be buried and forgotten. They invariably keep resurfacing. The perennial issue of Bunyoro's Seven Lost Counties and other cases of historical injustices against Bunyoro should now be addressed. To avoid Nigeria-like violent conflicts, which would create a lose/lose situation for the oil companies, the government, and Ugandans at large, Bunyoro Kingdom should be given a reasonable share of the oil revenues. [Some technocrats suggested that 8-10 percent would be reasonable]. We nevertheless urge caution. The Kingdom must not be given a blank cheque. Great care should be taken to ensure that the oil revenue is used for development. Government must insist on investments in primary and post-primary education, polytechnics, tree farming, or community enterprises which will benefit all Banyoro, not just the Kingdom elites.

None of the above will be possible unless official corruption is disabled. None will be possible unless accountable governance gains traction at the central state, local government and Kingdom levels. Stakeholders in the oil economy need to ensure that the quality of governance improves. But civil society cannot fold hands and wait to lament over mismanaged oil resources. Civil society organizations and all stakeholders need to understand one thing. Power concedes nothing unless there is pressure. The people must therefore organize and demand for proper use of oil resources. Righting resource-curse wrongs is not just desirable. It is possible.

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Modernity: Foundation for Universal Environmental Degradation

*Kamanzi Adalbertus**

Abstract

This article has as main aim the examination of how modernity, through the revolutions in thinking about nature and economics, has led to exploitation of nature. In answering the question as to how the ethos of modernity has influenced the environmental degradation processes, the article argues that while the Baconian revolution inspires the push towards “discovering the plots and secrets of nature” and the eventual mechanistic vision of reality, the Smithian revolution, ceremoniously introduces and intensifies the notion of economics as wealth generation and the eventual invisible-hand-spirituality of economic operations which lead to the endless struggle and competition for growth. Modernity, instead of liberating humanity, as a basic premise of reason, submerges humans into environmental chaos. The article, however, suggests the deconstruction of the exploitative environmental ecosophy and construction of an environmental-friendly ecosophy by getting into the altering and self-sustaining processes of modernity.

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Introduction

Ever since the Brundtland Commission of 1987 that defined sustainable development in terms of environmental sustainability, there has been a lot of effort geared towards environmental rehabilitation. What is intriguing, however, is the realisation that the rehabilitation processes are slow, and according to some, the environmental situation seems to be worsening. This article is a reflection on the question as to how human beings came to live disastrously with the environment. The main argument developed in this article is that modernity, with its universalising character and through the Baconian and Smithian Revolutions, evolved into an ethos that was responsible for environmental exploitative practices. The Baconian revolution inspired the push towards “discovering the plots and secrets of nature” and the eventual mechanistic vision of reality incarnated in Newtonian physics; the Smithian revolution ceremoniously introduced and intensified the notion of economics as wealth generation and the eventual invisible-hand-spirituality of economic operations which led to the endless struggle and competition for growth.

The article begins with a section that describes the Baconian and Smithian Revolutions. It goes on with the description of the modernity ethos, followed by the environmental exploitative practices, as a result of the ethos. The article winds up arguing that modernity has resulted in a complex exploitation web of production and consumption, a kind of new sense of social order, characterised as new technical order and new form of hyper-civilisation, with human beings assuming power over the rest of nature. The article gives a way out of this complex web by suggesting a deconstruction of the exploitative ecosophy and construction of an environmental-friendly ecosophy.

Modernity and the Environment

The focal point for modernity is reason, whose high point in the history of western ideas was the epoch following the Middle Ages in

Europe, the period of Enlightenment: the age of the glorification of reason. According to Kant (1971:54), modernity brought and emphasized the role of reason through the use of courage in utilising one's own understanding.

A question is, however: if modernity has to do with the West, how did the rest come to be influenced by it? This question brings us to one of the chief characteristics of modernity, the universalising and totalising character whereby it “imposes itself throughout the world as a homogeneous unity, irradiating from the occident” (Baudrillard 1987:63). In this characteristic, two revolutions are vital: the Baconian and Smithian revolutions.

Baconian Revolution

Francis Bacon (1561-1626), an English thinker, emphasized the belief that people were servants and interpreters of nature, that truth was not derived from authority, and that knowledge was the “fruit of experience”. In his *Novum Organum*, he influenced the acceptance of accurate observation and experimentation in science. He maintained that all prejudices and preconceived attitudes, which he called *idols*, must be abandoned, regardless of whether they were the common property of a people due to common modes of thought, or the peculiar possession of the individual; and regardless of whether they arose from too great a dependence on language, or from tradition. Bacon's ideas are significant in the development of empiricism.

Bacon is a fruit of the attitudes and thoughts of nature's subordination in the Western worldview that dates from ancient times. In the early days of development of Western thinking, Aristotle, in his *Politics*, already suggested a hierarchy: “... hence it is similarly clear that we must suppose that plants exist on account of animals ... and the other animals for the sake of man...” (Gruen & Jameison 1994:19). He is a fruit of the biblicalism of the Judeo-Christian tradition that, in a way, suggests the subjugation of nature: “... Rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of air and over every living creature that moves on the

ground” (Genesis 1:28). Living in a period of the reformation and renaissance, a period that is characterised by the tension between a god-centred and world-centred understanding and interpretation of the world, Bacon’s philosophy of nature seems to be divinely-founded, with human knowledge and technology continuously charged with acquiring power to subdue nature so as to overcome human problems, desires, and needs. Jung (1991:7) comments:

Bacon’s conception of philanthropia is an anthropocentrism pure and simple. For it is predicated upon man’s absolute knowledge and mastery of nature justified on the grounds of the biblical mandate. As the holy inquisition of nature leads to philanthropia, the Bible mandates that nature with “all her children” be bound and enslaved to serve man to achieve “the fructifying and begetting good for mankind.

For Bacon, nature should be bound into human service. It is in this bending of nature to human utility that nature loses its sacrality. While before Bacon, the relationship between human beings and nature was characterised by an “I-thou” ethic, which was in many times dominated by propitiation before any act of using the “thou”, Bacon’s transformation resulted into an “I-Other” ethic of legitimated domination of the “I” over the “Other”. According to Spedding *et al.* (1870:20)

The new man of science must not think that the inquisition of nature is in any part interdicted or forbidden. Nature must be bound into service and made a slave, put in constraint, and moulded by the mechanical arts. The searchers and spies of nature were to discover her plots and secrets. ... Only by digging further and further in the mine of natural knowledge, could mankind discover that lost dominion (of nature).

Merchant (1992:41-59) explains this phenomenon of transformation as a movement from an organic to a mechanistic worldview. Bacon’s revolutionary thinking had effects on nature. The strong mechanistic worldview, which developed from his proposals to dominate

nature through experimentation, welcomed more explorations on nature for human benefits. This mechanistic worldview set a strong foundation for the Industrial Revolution and cleared any animistic and/or organic assumptions about the cosmos. Another impact of Bacon’s revolution is the understanding of nature in terms of exploitation to serve human life. That is why Glanville (1958:9), following Bacon, commented that the basic objective of natural philosophy was to “enlarge knowledge by observation and experiment ... so that nature being known, it may be mastered, managed, and used in the services of human life”.

Thus, Bacon revolutionised the vision of nature from speculation to experimentation, which alone would not lead to environmental destruction as such. The question becomes, therefore, what happened after experimentation that led to the environmental exploitation? Part of the answer to this question is found in the Smithian Revolution.

Smithian Revolution

Adam Smith (1723-1790), a Scottish philosopher and economist, made an attempt to study the nature of capital and the historical development of industry and commerce among European nations, laying the foundations for modern economics through his *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. Smith divorced the study of political economy from the related fields of political science, ethics, and jurisprudence. He made a penetrating analysis of the processes whereby economic wealth is produced and distributed. He demonstrated that the fundamental sources of all income, that is, the basic forms in which wealth is distributed, are related to money, that is rent, wages, and profits (Kirshner 1997).

Smith was fruit of his historical circumstances. He lived in a time when intercontinental commerce, capitalism, was in full swing. Smith was of the idea that capital was best employed for the production and distribution of wealth, on the one hand, and due to the influence

of Hobbesian thinking on freedom, the production and distribution of wealth was to be under conditions of governmental non-interference or *laissez-faire*, and free trade, on the other hand. The production and exchange of goods could be stimulated only through the efficient operations of private industrial and commercial entrepreneurs acting with a minimum of regulation and control by governments. Smith proclaimed the principle of the invisible hand, whereby the rule of demand and supply was paramount. The idea of *laissez-fairism* implied that any interference with free competition by government was almost certain to be injurious.

Thus, Smith, influenced by capitalism and the Hobbesian philosophy, revolutionised the conceptualisation of economics from management to wealth and its generation, material welfare, and scarce resources, on the one hand, and the centrality of self-interest in the understanding of economics, on the other. Before Smith, the concept of economics was limited to management in the Greeks sense of a science of household management. This understanding of economics coincides with Aristotle's first distinction of economics as *oikonomike*, that is, economics as provision of material needs of the household (Opio 1993:11). After Smith, the face of economics was changed irrevocably.

Smith's understanding of economics was to treat the "nature and causes of wealth of nations ... to enrich both the people and the sovereign" (Jhingan 1975:1)." The centrality of self-interest degenerated into economic individualism, as can be seen from the two passages of Smith himself on the notion of self-interest:

It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard of their interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love ... (Smith 1975:162).

Are the above two paragraphs relevant to the topic at hand?

In his *Wealth of Nations*, Smith advances the same idea by noting that:

Every individual ... neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it By directing his industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was not part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it (Smith 1976:9).

This revolutionised the concept of economics by Smith reflects the art of enrichment (Opio 1996), a concept responsible for economic Darwinism: the survival of the fittest in the economic race. Under modernity, reason

is the source of progress in knowledge and society, as well as the privileged laws of truth and foundation of systematic knowledge (Best and Kellner 1991:2).

It is this kind of thinking that, according to Merchant (1992:58), has led to less and less sensitivity on nature:

Living animate nature died, while dead inanimate money was endowed with life. Increasingly, capital and the market assumed the organic attributes of growth, strength activity, pregnancy weakness, decay and collapse, obscuring and mystifying the new underlying social relations of production and reproduction that made economic growth and progress possible.

We have seen modernity and the environment with respect to the two revolutions. However, a question is: how have the revolutions got into practice? In order to answer this question there is need to get into the ethos of modernity, on the one hand, and the economic systems as practical circumstances of the incarnation of the ethos, on the other hand.

It might not be quite clear how the environment comes into the discourse under the Smithian period. You may wish to relate the economics to the environmental degradation.

Ethos of Modernity

By ethos of modernity, it is meant the underlying values of human conduct and the custom, habit, character, or spirit of the culture based on reason. Modernity is fundamentally an ethos: it is a way of thinking, doing, reacting, and relating with things. It is for this matter that Foucault (1991:39; Ambler 1999:13) affirms that modernity is

... a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at once and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task. A bit, no doubt like what the Greeks called an ethos.

From the environmental point of view, modernity, as an ethos, has been an expression of “the triumph of humanism” (Best and Kellner 1991:112); it is an ethos that has been intensively and decisively homocentric. In explaining the homocentricity of this ethos, I present the homocentric ethos, and the political economic systems of capitalism and collectivism as practical circumstances of the incarnation of the ethos of modernity.

Homocentric ethos

Homocentric ethos refers to values about human conduct whereby human beings are at the centre of everything in nature. According to Devall and Sessions (1985:55),

... contemporary humanistic ethical theory is ineradicably anthropocentric, designed specifically to deal with the problems of human interaction. When the attempt is made to extend this theory to other animals ... they are accorded much less moral consideration than humans.

The homocentric ethos can be broken down into two other elementary ethos: the egocentric and nos-centric. Both words, *ego* and *nos*, are derived from the Latin word, meaning “I” and “We”, respectively. Therefore, ego-centric ethos refers to values about human conduct based on the individual, the “I” ethos; whereas

nos-centric ethos refers to values about human conduct based on the “collection of individuals”, the “we” ethos.

Behind the egocentric ethos are the claims that individuals or private corporations are separate but equal social atoms, and that the good of the individual will consequently and necessarily benefit the society. This ethos seeks the self-realisation of an individual for his/her good or happiness. The modern individual assumes that his/her commitments and responsibilities are determined by his/her own choices. The individual in this sense is a free-floating individual; he/she, then, becomes a prey to his/her own whimsical needs and choices, and a prey, too often, to the media, and more especially the electronic media. He/she becomes detached from the community and engages him/herself in self-constitution. The egocentric ethos is built on liberalism, a grand vision whereby society should be organised on the basis of freedom of the individual from the “institutional interference in the everyday conduct of one’s professional and private life” (Appleby *et al.* 1996:138).

This type of ethics allows individuals to extract and use natural resources to enhance their own lives. Egocentric ethos can be understood as the underlying impulse for the Protestant ethic, whereby an individual is responsible for his/her own salvation through good actions. From the two assumptions of individualism, that is, the individual good as the highest good, and humans as “by nature” being competitive, and therefore, capitalism as the “natural” form of economic system, then the collective behaviour of human groups or business corporations is not legitimate, and ecological effects are external to human economics and cannot be adjudicated (Merchant 1992: 63-70).

Behind the nos-centric ethos is the idea of collectivity. Thus, if the egocentric ethos is based on an individual, the nos-centric ethos is grounded on collectivity. Beatrice and Webb (1942:928) posed a question in: “Yet how can

mankind be improved, or even in any way change without changing its environment?" Changing the environment, they contend, is one of the purposes of governments for the people whom they govern. This reasoning is extremely nos-centric.

The nos-centric ethos is for the maximisation of the social good and the minimisation of the social evil, hence, the maximisation of the wanted and the minimisation of the unwanted. This ethos is today founded on utilitarianism. Utility, according to Bentham (1823:2-3), is a property in any object that tends to produce benefit, advantage, good, or happiness, or to prevent the occurrence of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness. The interest of the community is the sum total of the interests of the individuals in that community, and actions are good in as far as they tend to augment the happiness of the community. For Mill (1957:22-3), something good is related to the general interests of society, the interests of the whole and the good of the whole. Therefore, actions are right in proportion to their tendency to promote happiness or goodness in the society, and wrong in proportion to their tendency to produce the reverse of happiness.

Due to utilitarian motivations, this ethics has permitted the undertaking of various projects, both big and small, with the rationale of greater good for a greater number of people. These projects are the different industrial adventures. The intrinsic value of the exploited nature becomes subject to the instrumental value. Other values, especially those linked with the ecological system, are undermined. Fredrick Engels recalls that "in nature nothing takes place in isolation. Everything affects every other thing and vice versa" (Parsons 1977:178). This means that disruption of something in the ecological system means and leads to the disruption of something else in the very system. But, how has the homocentric ethos manifested itself practically? The answer to this question lies in the economic systems, as incarnations of the homocentric ethos.

Economic Systems and Environmentalism

While the egocentric ethos, characterised by *I-ism*, has been incarnated in capitalism, the nos-centric ethos characterised by *we-ism*, has been incarnated in collectivism. Whereas in the capitalistic system, the market economic systems are dominant, in the collectivist system the planned economic systems are dominant. Both systems, however, have been exploitative of nature.

The dynamics of capitalism for material growth account for nature's inexorable exploitation. Competition within capitalism generates more waste. O'Connor (1990:4) expresses this phenomenon as "the second contradiction of capitalism", the first being production itself. Capitalism no longer promotes durable products, but products which soon become obsolete. Production is for individual consumption rather than the social consumption. An atomistic society, ever striving for the latest product, is created through advertisement. This explains why more people, now more than ever, consume more symbols, that is valuable elements as given by the media through adverts, than products and they are prey to eventual genuine insatiable demands.

This ever-increasing demand for economic growth is more and more disastrous for the environment. England and Bluestone (1973:199) as cited in Gare (1995:83) put it thus:

A private market economy is caught on a treadmill: to forestall unemployment, even higher levels of consumption must be stimulated and ever-higher levels of investment must be forthcoming. The environmental problem is that the presently required future increases in GNP will certainly result in a more rapid depletion of exhaustible resources and will tend to result in more pollution.

The liberal paradigm, with its supposed trickle down effect, rampant innovation, enterprise, and efficiency through the free play of the world market unfettered by any controls, considers environmentalism to be a mere

ideological ploy of critics of the free market system (Bauer 1981:81). The paradigm believes that environmental problems can gradually be resolved through price mechanisms and other economic manoeuvres that could be and could result in environmentally friendly attitudes and praxis.

The moderates of this model see the necessity for the state's regulation of trade through tariffs and subsidies, state intervention in the economy for the provision of basic infrastructures, and indirect support for industry and agriculture. This is because environmental problems are a result of resource misallocation due to improper market regulation. Wilfred Beckerman argues that the environmental crisis results from a misallocation characteristic of enterprises in an unregulated economy because of their associated diseconomies; a failure to correct these diseconomies does not necessarily mean that the growth rate is wrong; slow or zero growth would not prevent misallocation, they would, in fact, make environmental protection more difficult (Beckerman 1974:18-20).

According to Parsons (1977:133),

... Man lives on nature - means that nature is his body, with which he must remain in continuous interchange if he is not to die. That man's physical and spiritual life is linked to nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is part of nature (Parsons 1977:133).

This implies sense of the interdependence of human beings and nature by seeing human beings as part of nature because they are conditioned by it and they conditioned it too. This is an orientation that has remained within the vulgar Marxism and the theory of centralised economic planning. Assuming that there is an absence of independent industrial and financial means for economic growth, and assuming a condition of exploitation by capitalist agents, the remedy for development is to have a centralised economic planning system which can create heavy industry with all the necessary linkages in one integrated and long-range plan, using surplus generated by

collectivised agriculture or primary exports. It is believed that it is only the state that has power to appropriate, concentrate, productively invest, and direct national surplus. This paradigm attributes environmental problems to issues such as poor sanitation and water supplies, bad housing, diseases, and other factors. These are taken as social problems caused by the exploitative nature of the capitalist system.

The contribution of Marxism to environmental issues is related to its critiques on the capitalist system as an agent of environmental degradation. Capitalism is the fetishism of commodities, that is, evaluating things in terms of their exchange or monetary value. Seeing things as commodities mystifies the relationship between nature and people, and eventually all are exploited. It is on this note that Marx (1973:409) says that capitalism creates a "system of general exploitation of the natural and human qualities, while there appears nothing higher in itself, nothing legitimate for itself, outside the circle of social production and exchange."

However, Marx was a critic of the social system that arose from the Industrial Revolution – capitalism; this makes his ethic a critique of human life under capitalism. Thus, his ethic had no room for the premises or conclusions of serious ecological considerations that had a base in ecology itself. This is the reason why Lee (1982:339) states, "I attack the narrow human chauvinism of Marxists which lacks environmental consciousness and concern for other species; I label it eco-imperialism". Thus, Marx's philosophy has one great shortcoming, that is, its confinement to the planet earth and even there to one species, human being (Oruka 1997:247). Oruka (1997:247) contends that

... The ethics of his critique was *Homo sapiens'* traditional ethics, that is, ethics relevant to and usable only within the human species (anthropocentric or homocentric ethics). That ethics had no room for the premises or conclusions of deep ecology or holistic ecology ethics.

In the final analysis, there is no difference between the two economic systems. The centrally planned economy has the unique characteristic ability to mobilise “scarce resources” effectively and to channel them into their most productive long-term uses. This has led to enormous industrial growth in the centrally planned economies of, for example, the former Soviet Union. The rapid growth through heavy industrialisation within the statist paradigm has caused environmental hazards. It is for this reason that Merchant (1992:149) argues:

... state socialist societies have created ecological crises and fostered ecologically destructive policies, as have capitalist societies ... They abuse and deplete nature as do capitalist societies, but do so not because of the profit motive, but because their commitment to full employment stifles appropriate technologies and permits pollution.

And Hunt (1992:131-132), contends that:

... pollution in the Soviet Union is at least as bad as, and in some respects probably worse than, that in the West. - not only the pace but the necessary authoritarian political form of this kind of industrialisation does entail ecological imbalance, just as intimately connected with this, it entails human oppression.

Thus, the ethos of modernity, humanist in nature, has propagated the creation of social conditions under which individuals should be able to bring freely to life their potential creative powers, grounding in human characteristics that are responsible for an impressive historical development: symbolic communication, rationality, creativity, the capacity for autonomous choice, and the cultivation of human senses. Even though this ethos of modernity has a basic moral requirement, which is not only pleasure or material comfort, but also free self-development and self-realisation, the dilemma is to realise these two basic moral requirements without compromising environmental concerns. Not only has modernity led to less sensitivity on nature, but also reason has enhanced the exploitation of nature through productive

mechanisms, as Markovic (1992:130) puts it: “Any capitalist corporation and any socialist enterprise strives toward maximal expansion of material production”. That is why modernity can be termed as a project of rational domination of nature and human beings.

Conclusion

Modernity has resulted in a complex exploitation a web of production and consumption, a kind of new sense of social order, characterised as new technical order and new form of hyper-civilisation. This complex exploitation web has resulted into a transformation of the conception of nature from the living and responsive nature to a dead and inert nature, manipulable and exploitable. The complex exploitation web has impacted on the way human beings have related with the rest of nature: human beings have assumed power over the rest of nature, about which Russell (1988:179) notes:

... love of power, in its widest sense, is the desire to be able to produce intended effects upon the outer world, whether human or non-human ... Every desire, if it cannot be instantly gratified, brings about a wish for the ability to gratify it, and therefore some form of the love of power.

It is this power syndrome that Blumenberg (1983:138) calls “human self-assertion”:

... an existential program, according to which man posits his existence in an historical situation and indicates to himself how he is going to deal with the reality surrounding him and what use he will make of the possibilities given to him.

And this can explain why the prevailing ethos of modernity is basically anthropocentric; modernity cannot survive without exploiting nature through production.

Regardless of the seemingly necessary environmental degradation due to modernity, this article suggests a way to overcome it. It is time to get into the analysis of how modernity has been able to alter the ecosophies of the people

from ecosopies that were environment-friendly to the current ones which are exploitative. This implies getting into the processes of modernity altering local ecosophies, on the one hand, and processes of modernity sustaining itself with an exploitative ecosophy, on the other hand. Such analysis is important because of its methodological advantage of getting to the root causes of the environmental problems based on the discourses, on the one hand, and addressing the root causes by trying to build on another more friendly discourse to the environment.

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Planning for Lake Tourism Development in Uganda: A spatial and Temporal Analysis of Lake Victoria

*Ayorekire Jim & Nyakaana Jockey Baker**

Abstract

Tourism in Uganda has over the years witnessed an increase in tourist arrivals which has resulted in the development of a number of tourist facilities and destinations. Although studies have been conducted to examine the development of tourism in Uganda, limited attention has been given to Lake Tourism, especially with respect to tourism planning from a spatial and temporal perspective. This paper focuses on the Lake Victoria shore region where it identifies the tourism establishments, analyses their spatial and temporal trend and examines the implication on tourism planning of the lakeshore region. Using qualitative, quantitative and geo-spatial techniques data was collected and analysed using nearest-neighbour tool, Chi Square and ANOVA tests. The results indicate that: the lakeshore region has a variety of tourism sites, majority of whom are beach resorts (without accommodation facilities); they have been increasing in number and size over the years; and attract an increasing number of visitors. Spatial analysis revealed that there is a tendency of the sites clustering near the urban than in the peri urban areas. This implies that tourism planning of the lakeshore should ensure that resources are sustainable utilised as tourism 'hot spots' begin to develop around the clustering areas, which are already experiencing an increasing number of sites and visitors. The study recommends a pro-active planning approach, which incorporates spatial and temporal aspects to ensure sustainable tourism development along the lakeshore region.

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Introduction

Lakes and coastal areas form a vital component of the tourism and recreation industry world over. As some of the world's popular destinations, lakes present valuable resources that are utilised for a variety of human activities (Hall and Harkonen 2006, Cooper 2006, Shaw and Agarwal 2007). Academic interest in lake tourism has been limited compared to others forms of tourism, due to its elusiveness and lack of a definite definition and separate statistics that detail the nature and characteristics of the visitors and tourism sites. As a result lake tourism development and management is considered to be complex with a wide array of actors and varied interactions between social systems and environmental processes operating at different spatial levels. However, the notion of complexity should be used to help understand tourism growth and to improve the practical management approaches that need to be adopted (Shaw and Agarwal 2007).

Lakes are vulnerable to change by forces both external and internal to tourism. Tourism management and planning in lake regions is crucial given that the lacustrine environments are ecologically sensitive and demand high levels of management and coordination between users (Cooper 2006). The impact of tourism on the lake environments is mainly a function of the visitor numbers, type of activities they engage in and the nature of the lake environment itself. The impacts have been substantial along lakes in the peri urban areas of large urban populations and in lake areas within day-tripping distance from the urban conurbations (Hall and Harkonen 2006). This therefore highlights the need for more specific research, focusing on lake tourism, since it represents destinations under unique circumstances. Research on lake tourism has been carried out in North America (Hall and Harkonen 2006) and Europe (Shaw and Agarwal 2007), but literature on lake tourism planning and development is still limited (Ryhanen 2001) especially in developing countries.

Lake Victoria: A Tourism destination

Lake Victoria which covers an area of 68,800 km², is the largest lake in Africa and the largest tropical lake in the world, with an average depth of 40 meters and a shoreline length of 3,440 kms. The lake is shared by three of the East African countries: Uganda (45%), Kenya (6%) and Tanzania (49%). With approximately 30 million people living within its catchment area (Ntiba *et al.* 2001), people carry out a number of economic activities (fishing, agriculture, forestry, transport and tourism). The lake's natural resources in terms of its waters and immense biodiversity base, serve not only the people of East Africa, but also the world in general.

Over the years a number of tourism establishments based on beautiful lake scenery, rich bird and animal diversity and diverse luxuriant vegetation have been developed along the shores and on various islands. They comprise beaches, resorts, hotels, camping sites, botanical gardens and conservation areas with activities ranging from water jet skiing and canoeing to sun bathing and nature walks. Tourism, like the other economic activities, (fishing and agriculture) is threatened by unsustainable use of natural resources which has led to overfishing, water pollution (from industries, urban waste and agriculture sources), wetland reclamation, invasion of noxious waterweeds and other associated problems (Ntiba *et al.* 2001, LVEMP 2005). To address these challenges, trans-national bodies have been set up to coordinate resource use and management among the three countries. They include Lake Victoria Environment Management Programme (LVEMP), Lake Victoria Local Authorities Cooperation (LVRLAC), Lake Victoria Fisheries Organisation (LVFO) and Lake Victoria Development Programme initiated by the East African Community (EAC). These bodies carry out research, coordinate and monitor resource utilisation for fishing and agriculture and very little on tourism. There is need for reorienting the research focus to include tourism and this

paper attempts to do that by undertaking a spatial and temporal analysis of tourism development along the shores of Lake Victoria in Uganda so as to inform tourism planning.

Tourism Development: Spatial and Temporal perspectives

Spatial distribution is described in various forms by different authors (Getz 1987, Smith 1995, Gunn 2002, UNWTO 2004, Arthur 2006) and they all agree that it is about the location of objects, facilities, flora and fauna, relative to each other and within a given space. A variety of methods have been developed to help measure and examine spatial patterns in tourism. They comprise Defert's Tf ('Tourist function') Compactness Index; Nearest-neighbour analysis; Spatial Association Index, Peaking Index; Tourism Attractiveness Index and Geographic Information System (GIS). Tools have also been developed through which planners can address geographical issues related to location and trend of tourism establishments through time and space (Smith 1995, Bahaire and Elliott-White 1999, Hall and Page 2003).

On the other hand, temporal trend is described as the chronological occurrence or change of phenomena or an event over time. In tourism, temporal trend analysis mainly focuses on tourism performance over time in terms of the number of established tourism sites; tourist numbers over time (arrivals and departure); tourist estimated expenditure; jobs, income, and tax revenue generated (Gunn 2002, UNWTO 2004, UBOS 2005).

Understanding spatial-temporal trends at different places around the earth has deep meaning for tourism and its planning since it offers information about relative distances, ratios, density of objects per unit space and influences level of capital and labour investment, marketing and promotional structures (Williams 1999, Gunn 2002). Spatial and temporal planning strategies are needed to help determine the nature, pace and trend

of tourism development. Planning also helps to separate incompatible tourism uses, relieve pressure on sensitive or already degraded sites in a given area (Sharpely 2005), such as the Lake Victoria shore region.

A review of tourism statistics collected in Uganda reveals that emphasis is mainly limited to international tourism arrivals, total revenue generated, employment and level of planned investment in the tourism sector (UIA 2005, UBOS 2006). The tourism data collected does not cover the entire range of tourism aspects such as: destination categories and characteristics; their temporal trend and spatial distribution; multiplier effects and leakages from the economy among others. A countrywide tourism baseline survey carried by the Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry (MTTI 2002) collected information on accommodation establishments but even then some information was incomplete with gaps on the spatial distribution and temporal trend, an aspect this paper addresses with specific reference to the Lake Victoria shore region.

Study Area

The study was conducted on the northern shores of Lake Victoria (Fig. 1), in the districts of Kampala and Wakiso with emphasis on tourism sites in Makindye Division, Entebbe Municipality and lakeshore parts of Wakiso district located between Kampala city and Entebbe municipal town. Owing to the luxuriant tropical vegetation (ranging from medium altitude evergreen forests to savannah woodland), and the scenic undulating landscape with broad valleys mostly occupied by wetlands (that provide habitat for a variety of plants and animals), the lakeshore region has over the years witnessed increasing establishment of beaches, hotels, camping sites and some conservation areas. These attractions and facilities have made the lakeshore a favourite destination for visitors especially from the adjacent urban and peri urban centres.




Figure 1: Map of Uganda, lakeshore study area and tourism sites (Source: Generated by the study)

Data Collection methods

A multifaceted research design was employed to collect both qualitative and quantitative data by applying geo-spatial techniques and undertaking a cross-sectional survey. Topographic maps of Kampala, Kajjansi and Entebbe (1:50,000) and aerial photographs were used to identify the location of tourism sites. In order to determine the precise location of the tourism sites, a handheld Global Positioning System receiver was used to record the coordinates of each site during field visits. In an Arc View 3.3 GIS environment, a study area map (Fig. 1) was generated showing exactly where each site is located. Using the generated map and topographic maps of the region, distances between each site were calculated and later used to carry out a spatial analysis.

Questionnaires, interviews and documentary review, were also employed to collect data from a variety of respondents about the nature and temporal trend of tourism in the lakeshore region. 109 residents who included community leaders (local council chairpersons) and opinion leaders, around the destinations, were purposively selected and interviewed. They

were considered key informants since they were expected to be knowledgeable about development of tourism in their locality and have the ability to express the collective views of local residents.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key respondents who were purposively sampled. They comprised 12 destination managers, 6 district and municipality local government officials and an official from each of the following: MTI, National Environment Management Authority (NEMA), Nature Uganda (a nature conservation NGO) and Lutembe Tourism Community Based organisation.

Data Analysis

The Linear nearest-neighbour analysis method (Smith 1995, Pinder and Witherick 1975) was used to identify and analyze the spatial pattern of the tourism facilities along the lakeshore region. This method which uses linear distance measurements along highways, rivers, coast and shore lines was more appropriate for the Lake Victoria shore region since the other methods

(Defeat's Tourist Function, Compactness Index and Spatial Association Index) do not provide for linear measurements.

Using both the topographic and GIS generated maps, distances were measured from one tourism site to the next along the lakeshore. The linear nearest-neighbour ratio (LR_n) analysis formula ($LR_n = d_o/d_r$) was used to obtain the nearest-neighbour ratio values which were later used to determine the spatial distribution (clustered, uniform or random) of tourism sites.

Data from questionnaires and interviews was analysed using SPSS 10.0 to generate descriptive results in form of frequency tables, cross tabulations and graphs. Chi Square method was used to establish difference in respondents' views on spatial distribution and temporal trend. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to establish difference in the overall mean of respondents' views.

Content analysis was used to analyse secondary data from the District Development Plans and Environmental Reports.

Results

Categorisation of tourism developments along the lakeshore region

Over the years, different tourism sites have been established along the lakeshore region. However, they have not been categorised due to lack of a comprehensive national tourism sites classification system in Uganda. In order to classify the tourism sites, this paper used a set of attributes based on the characteristics of the studied sites had in common. The attributes included type and number of accommodation units, and the range of facilities and services offered. Based on these attributes, the sites were broadly categorised into; beach hotels, beach resorts, conservation sites and camping sites. The beach resorts were further categorised into those with or without accommodation facilities (Table 1).

Table 1: Categorisation of tourism sites

Category of sites	Names of sites in each category	Criteria used for categorisation	
		Accommodation	Facilities / services
Beach Hotels	-Munyonyo Commonwealth Resort * -Imperial Botanical Beach Hotel -Imperial Resort Beach Hotel	Above 50 rooms	-Hotel Restaurant & bar - 24 hour hotel room service -Conference Halls -Swimming pool -Children's play park -Leisure gardens - Indoor sports facilities
Beach Resorts with accommodation	-Lutembe beach* -Ranch on the Lake* -Nabinonya beach* -Ssesse Gate way Beach -Anderita Hotel - New Beach	Less than 50 rooms	- Room service - Garden bar & restaurant -Children's play area -Camping - Picnic grounds
Beach Resort without accommodation	-Gaba beach -Lido beach -KK beach -Entebbe Sailing Club -Water Front Club -Garuga Golf and Country Club -Kisubi Beach -Victoria Café -Aero Beach -Penile Beach Restaurant	No accommodation	-Garden bar & restaurant - Picnic grounds -Children's play area
Conservation sites	-Botanical Gardens -Uganda wildlife Education Centre (UWEC) **	Limited accommodation	-Garden bar & restaurant -Nature walk -Bird viewing - Plant and Animal viewing (with information labels and interpretation centre)
Camping sites	-Kaazi camping site -Kisubi camping site -Kitubulu camping site	Camping tents	-Self Catering services - Guided walks

* Site with cottages **site with a hostel

From the above categorisation, the majority of sites (41.6%) are beach resorts (without accommodation), 25% are beach resorts (with accommodation), 12.5% are beach hotels, 12.5% are camping sites and 8.4% are conservation areas. An analysis conducted on the specific types of accommodation revealed that the majority of the sites have cottages (41.6%), followed by tent camps (33.4%) and hotel rooms (25%). On the size of land owned, beach resorts (without accommodation) and camping sites (54.2%) occupied less than 2 hectares while beach resorts (with accommodation) beach hotels and conservation areas (33.3%) occupy 9 and above hectares.

Spatial analysis of tourism sites

The Linear nearest-neighbour analysis (Smith, 1995) method was used to determine spatial distribution pattern (clustered, uniform or random) of sites along the lakeshore. The linear nearest-neighbour ratio (LR_n) analysis formula, - ($LR_n = d_o/d_r$), was applied basing on the number of sites and lakeshore distance.

$$LR_n = d_o/d_r$$

Where LR_n - Nearest neighbor ratio

L - length of line (lakeshore)

n - number of observed points

$$d_r = 0.5[L/(n-1)]$$

$$d_o = \sum \text{distances} / n$$

Measurements for 'L' which is length of line (lakeshore) under consideration was 106.8 km's, and 'n' the number of observed points (tourism sites) was 24.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Therefore } d_r &= 0.5 [L/(n-1)] \\ &= 0.5 [106.8/(24-1)] \\ &= 0.5 [4.64] \\ &= 2.32 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} d_o &= \sum \text{distances} / n \\ &= 106.8 / 24 = 4.45 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} LR_n &= d_o/d_r \\ &= 4.45/2.32 \\ &= 1.9 \\ LR_n &= 1.9 \end{aligned}$$

The nearest-neighbour analysis contends that: a ratio greater than 1.0 indicates a tendency towards uniform spacing (dispersal); a ratio equal to 1.0 indicates a random distribution pattern; and a ratio less than 1.0 indicates a pattern tending towards clustering. Using the LR_n significance testing graph, a value of 1.9 for 24 observations falls within the range that indicates uniform or regular spacing of the tourist sites along the lakeshore region.

However, much as the ratio indicated a regular spacing of the sites, critical observation of the sites on the map (Fig. 1) as well as in the field, revealed that there is, in fact, some variation in the regular pattern. The sites near major urban areas of Entebbe and Kampala tend to be regularly spaced but very close to each other. For instance, the average distance between the sites in Entebbe Municipality and Makindye Division is 0.79 km and 1.87 km respectively. However, as one moves away from the urban area, the distances between the sites along Lake Victoria shore increases, with an average distance of 11.47 km. Furthermore, observation from the field indicated that in some parts of the lakeshore with regularly spaced areas, there are new planned tourism developments with sites already demarcated, and in some cases landscaped.

Temporal analysis of tourism sites

In order to understand the temporal context of tourism development, the paper analyses the number of established sites, visitors received, and the physical growth (expansion) of the sites.

Number of tourism sites 1965 - 2010

Using a questionnaire administered to the site managers and verified from secondary sources, data when sites were established were collected covering the period between 1965 and 2010 (Figure 2).




Figure 2: Number of tourism sites along lakeshore, 1965 – 2010*

* 2010 figure is a simple estimate derived from the project proposals submitted to NEMA (as per 2006) for approval and field observation of new sites being established

The results in Figure 2 indicate that, five sites existed between 1965 and 1985, with only one site established by 1985 to make a total of six sites. However, the number of sites more than doubled to 13 by 1995 and the trend increased steadily up to 25 in 2005. This trend indicates a steady demand for lake tourism products and rapid development of tourism in the lakeshore, which is projected to keep increasing in 2010.

Number of visitors

Due to poor record keeping and/or reluctance of some site managers to allow access to the available records on the number of visitors received (both day and overnight), the visitor trend was established qualitatively through interviews with the site managers and residents neighbouring the various sites (Table 2).

Table 2: Responses of site managers and neighbouring residents on the trend of number of visitors received at the sites

Site category	Respondent category		Site has had an increasing number of visitors over the last 10 years									
			NR	SD	D	N	A	SA	Total	X^2_{obs}	df	P
Beach hotels	Site managers	f	0	0	0	0	1	1	2			
		%	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.9	5.9	11.8			
	Neighbouring residents	f	1		1	2	6	5	15			
		%	5.9	0.0	5.9	11.8	35.3	29.4	88.2			
	Total	f	1	0.0	1	2	7	6	17			
		%	5.9	0.0	5.9	11.8	41.2	35.3	100.0	0.715	5	.982
Beach resorts with accommodation	Site managers	f	0	0	1	0	1	2	4	6.215	5	.286
		%	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.0	1.8	3.6	7.1			
	Neighbouring residents	f	2	1	2	6	31	10	52			
		%	3.6	1.8	3.6	10.7	55.4	17.9	92.9			
	Total	f	2	1	3	6	32	12	56			
		%	3.6	1.8	5.4	10.7	57.1	21.4	100.0			
Beach resorts without accommodation	Site managers	f	0	0	0	0	1	3	4	2.735	5	.434
		%	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.8	11.5	15.4			
	Neighbouring residents	f	0	0	1	1	13	7	22			
		%	0.0	0.0	3.8	3.8	50.0	26.9	84.6			
	Total	f	0	0	1	1	14	10	26			
		%	0.0	0.0	3.8	3.8	73.1	19.2	100.0			
Conversation Areas	Site managers	f	0	0	0	0	2	0	9.1	0.489	5	.434
		%	0.0	0.0	4.5	0.0	0.0	4.5	15.4			
	Neighbouring residents	f	0	0	0	0	16	4	20			
		%	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	72.7	18.2	90.9			
	Total	f	0	0	1	0	18	4	22			
		%	0.0	0.0	4.5	0.0	81.8	18.2	100.0			

Abbreviations: NR-None response; SD-Strongly disagree; D-Disagree; N-Neutral; A-Agree; SA-Strongly agree, X^2_{obs} - Observed chi square; df-degrees of freedom; P-Level of significance. Chi Square value is significant at $P < 0.05$

The response pattern in Table 2 reveals that the sites are receiving an increasing number of visitors. Moreover, considering the levels of significance (P), results indicate that the observed chi square values (X^2_{obs}) were all below levels of statistical significance. This means that there was no significant difference in the way

both site managers and neighbouring residents reported about the increase in visitors received over the years at beach hotels ($X^2_{obs} = 0.715$, $P = 0.982$); beach resorts-with accommodation ($X^2_{obs} = 6.215$, $P = 0.286$); beach resorts-without accommodation ($X^2_{obs} = 2.735$, $P = 0.434$); and conservation areas ($X^2_{obs} = 0.489$, $P = 0.434$).

The table further indicates that conservation areas and beach resorts without accommodation were receiving more visitors than beach hotels and beach resorts with accommodation.

Physical growth (expansion) of sites

This paper qualitatively analysed the rate at which the sites have been expanding in size. Residents neighbouring the sites and site managers were asked whether the sites had expanded in size over the last 10 years (Table 3).

Table 3: Responses of site managers and neighbouring residents on physical growth trend

Site category	Respondent category		Site has physically grown/expanded over the years since its establishment									
			NR	SD	D	N	A	SA	Total	X ² _{obs}	df	P
Beach Hotels	Site managers	f	0	0	0	0	1	1	2			
		%	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.9	5.9	11.8			
	Neighbouring residents	f	1		1	2	6	5	15			
		%	5.9	0.0	5.9	11.8	35.3	29.4	88.2			
	Total	f	1	0.0	1	2	7	6	17			
		%	5.9	0.0	5.9	11.8	41.2	35.3	100.0			
Beach resorts with accommodation	Site managers	f	0	0	1	0	2	1	4	0.536	5	.970
		%	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.0	3.6	1.8	7.1			
	Neighbouring residents	f	0	1	11	4	27	9	52			
		%	0.0	1.8	19.6	7.1	48.2	16.1	92.9			
	Total	f	0	1	12	4	29	10	56			
		%	0.0	1.8	21.4	7.1	51.8	17.9	100.0			
Beach resorts without accommodation	Site managers	f	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	9.504	5	.223
		%	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	7.1			
	Neighbouring residents	f	0	0	1	1	18	2	22			
		%	0.0	0.0	3.8	3.8	69.2	7.7	84.6			
	Total	f	0	0	1	1	19	5	26			
		%	0.0	0.0	3.8	3.8	73.1	19.2	100.0			
Conversation Area	Site managers	f	0	0	1	0	0	16	4	12.320	5	.202
		%	0.0	0.0	4.5	0.0	0.0	4.5	15.4			
	Neighbouring residents	f	0	0	0	0	16	4	20			
		%	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	72.7	18.2	90.9			
	Total	f	0	0	1	0	16	5	22			
		%	0.0	0.0	4.5	0.0	72.7	22.7	100.0			

Abbreviations: NR-None response; SD-Strongly disagree; D-Disagree; N-Neutral; A-Agree; SA-Strongly agree, X^2_{obs} - Observed chi square; df-degrees of freedom; P-Level of significance. Chi Square value is significant at $P < 0.05$

The response pattern (Table 3) reveals that all the site categories have been expanding physically since their establishment. Conservation areas and beach resorts-without accommodation experienced the highest level of physical growth compared to beach hotels and resorts-with accommodation. There was no significant difference in the way both site managers and residents reported about the physical growth trend of beach hotels: ($X^2_{\text{obs}} = 0.715$, $P = 0.949$); beach resorts with accommodation ($X^2_{\text{obs}} = 0.536$, $P = 0.970$); beach resorts without accommodation ($X^2_{\text{obs}} = 9.504$, $P = 0.223$); and conservation areas ($X^2_{\text{obs}} = 12.320$, $P = 0.202$).

Tourism planning in lakeshore region

Consulting both secondary and primary sources, the study identified that tourism planning in the lakeshore region is carried out at three levels: central government; local government; and site levels. At the central government level, planning is mainly influenced by the National Tourism Policy (2003 –2015) which puts emphasis on ensuring that tourism forms a basis for protection of environment and develops in a socially and culturally acceptable way, both in and outside protected areas. The policy guidelines have however not yet been fully implemented in the lakeshore region due to limited institutional capacity. At the local government level, the three-year development plans of Makindye division, Wakiso district and Entebbe Municipality were analysed and results indicated that no specific focus was given to tourism as a sector. No particular management and planning standards existed to ensure sustainable tourism development apart from some environmental and development control aspects that could indirectly influence sustainable tourism development. At the site level, planning is mainly carried out according to the preference of individual site management since no tourism specific standards or criteria exist for site design, architecture, height of buildings, landscaping etc. Site management simply draws up building plans that are submitted to the local government authorities for approval.

When interviewed, 83% of the site managers highlighted the need for specific planning to offer guidelines for tourism development in the lakeshore region. Indeed interviews with local government officials revealed that there is inadequate tourism planning in the lakeshore region which gives room for unplanned and unsustainable tourism developments.

Discussion

The spatial and temporal analysis of sites in the lakeshore region indicates that tourism is steadily developing in terms of number of tourism sites established, visitors received, and spatial (physical) growth. The spatial distribution is regular but with the rate of increase in the number and size of tourism sites, the pattern is tending to a clustered distribution pattern especially near Entebbe Municipality and Kampala (Makindye Division). The close proximity of sites is resulting into tourism 'hot spots' along the lakeshore region. The large urban population, infrastructure (good road network, communication) and availability of services such as piped water, public transport, and the police, are among the factors that have favoured areas in urban regions to have a high tourism potential. As a result, the sites near urban areas have increasingly attracted visitors irrespective of their proximity to each other. These findings are consistent with Plog's (1973) theory, which suggests that resorts tend to develop more close to major population areas (generating regions), than to distant remote areas. Majority of tourists prefer to travel short distances to take holidays, than to travel to isolated attractions which requires more time and effort (Gunn 2002). Indeed majority of visitors to the lakeshore sites are nationals and day visitors who mainly travel over the weekend for leisure, spending an average of four to seven hours.

The increase in the number of sites and their physical expansion imply that more and more of the physical environment resources (vegetation, wetlands, and soils) and the related scenic landscape along the lakeshore are being exploited. More space has to be

created in order to develop more facilities to cater for the increasing number of visitors. This implies more visitor density and pressure on the physical environment at the sites in particular and the lakeshore region in general. Although all categories of sites were reportedly expanding, faster growth was reportedly taking place at beach resorts without accommodation. They form the majority of the sites hence their fast growth implies greater consumption of resources and occupation of more space.

The temporal and spatial characteristics of sites have implications on the planning and development of tourism along Lake Victoria shores. From the spatial and temporal analysis, it can be predicted that tourism 'hot spot' areas in the lakeshore region are likely to become more clustered and eventually congested in the near future - as existing sites expand and as new sites are established in undeveloped sites between the existing ones. Evidence in the 'hot spot' areas shows that potential sites are already fenced off and in some cases landscaping is already underway. However, such close proximity is a potential recipe for depletion of the natural resource base that supports tourism. Clustering would imply that the sites compete for the available space and tourism resources so as to have an edge in serving and attracting more visitors. This may result into over-utilisation of the resources and, if not controlled, degradation of the environment in general and the physical environment in particular. The physical environment is even more adversely affected because it is not only *within* it that the sites are established, but also *from* it that most resources (e.g., water, building materials) are obtained. To establish a tourism site one has to clear the natural vegetation, landscape the area, and cover natural space with buildings. It also implies using more resources from the natural environment to erect and maintain the sites.

Clustering is not necessarily detrimental since the natural environment can be conserved and fully appreciated with proper spatial planning (Goeldner and Ritchie 2006). Gunn (2002) and

Papatheodorou (2004), argue that clustering of tourism sites has greater promotional impact and justifies the provision of infrastructure (roads, sewage systems) and services (power, police and fire protection). The aforementioned benefits from clustering are realised if there is systematic planning, strict development monitoring and adequate resources to provide the facilities and services when needed. Results of this study reveal that this is not the case in the lakeshore region. The existing facilities and infrastructure such as roads, sewage and solid waste management systems are already under great stress from increasing urban population. Clustering of tourism sites, which implies more visitors, will obviously exacerbate the situation and most likely cause serious damage, especially to the physical environment. As a result, inadequate planning in the lakeshore region would eventually translate into poor tourism performance. In agreement with Sharpely (2005), in such a scenario, there is need to emphasise planning strategies that encourage tourism development in some areas while relieving pressure on sensitive, congested or degraded sites. Indeed, the spatial distribution of lakeshore sites in areas distant from the urban regions, offer an opportunity in which future lakeshore tourism developments can be directed to. Equally so, some tourism sites in the 'hot spot' areas can be encouraged to shift to more spacious regions.

Conclusion and Recommendations

For sustainable tourism development to be achieved in the lakeshore region in Uganda, there is an obvious need for comprehensive tourism planning which incorporates spatial and temporal aspects among others. Planning is urgent considering the fact that tourism in the region is mainly nature-based and the lakeshore region is ecologically sensitive. With limited comprehensive tourism planning in the lakeshore region, spatially and temporally uncontrolled tourism developments will lead to over competition and over-utilisation of the physical environment resources. Environmental

degradation in this region would imply destruction of the very natural environment that supports the existence of tourism.

There is need for pro-active tourism planning to ensure that tourism development enhances rather than jeopardises the efforts to achieve sustainable tourism development in the lakeshore region. In order for achieve this, the paper recommends comprehensive, regular and accurate collection of site and visitor characteristics data, that is vital in measuring and managing limits of capacity and use intensity (UNWTO 2004). The central and local governments in the study area should strengthen their planning and development control over tourism developments along the lakeshore. Spatial and temporal aspects should be considered as vital ingredients in informing tourism planning so as to achieve sustainable tourism development. Research on more variables - beyond those identified in this paper – should be carried out to develop a more comprehensive spatial and temporal data base that can always be referred to when planning for tourism in the lakeshore region.

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A Critical Analysis of Religious Pluralism as a factor in the Regional Integration Process and its Implication for Leadership

*Catherine Jendia**

Abstract

The paper discusses Religious Pluralism as a factor in the Regional Integration Process in East Africa. The region is fast becoming a terrain of encounters among religions.

The paper discusses the question, how can the religious pluralism in East Africa tap into positive advantage to enhance development goals? The purpose of this paper was to examine the religious factor in fostering or hindering mutual coexistence in the re-emerging East Africa Community.

The research employed qualitative approach using Rapid Participatory Appraisal (RPA) involving review of existing documentary sources including books, internet sources, articles and journals. The findings inform leadership of the significant role religion plays in the integration process and makes two vital recommendations.

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Introduction

According to Ritze (2007) pluralism is defined the condition of living amid diversity and also to a positive appreciation. Religious pluralism then is the coexistence of people with diverse religious beliefs and values while appreciating religious differences and similarities. With revitalization of the East African Community (EAC), the notion of living together is fast becoming a reality in the region. However, in the social context the concept of pluralist living bringing together diverse religions and cultures has not been adequately addressed. Therefore, the focus of the paper is religious pluralism in the context of the emerging East African Community. The major argument of the paper is that religious pluralism is a bench mark for peaceful coexistence in the EAC because it transcends simple tolerance to acceptance and recognition in the transition process to regionalism. It is my view that the religious factor in the regional integration is critical and should therefore be examined in view of living together. The study makes two assumptions: (1) religion can impact development in society positively or negatively. (2) Religious leaders and religious organizations serve as a significant tool for creation of public awareness on issues critical to East Africans living together in one region. However, it is important to understand the background to the regional integration now in course in East Africa to gain insight into the context in which the problem of religious pluralism is being discussed here.

Background to East African Integration

According to the World Bank (2008) the population of EAC member countries would amount to over 124 million. That is, the population of each individual county would be as follows: Burundi: 8 million, Kenya (39 million), Uganda: 32 million, Tanzania 37 million) and Rwanda: 8 million (Ngowi, 2002). Since 1999, efforts by regional leaders and governments have focused on formation of a community. The EAC member countries aim at living together economically, politically, and

socially. However, the current EAC evolved from the East Africa Organization which was established between 1961 and 1967. From 1967 to 1977 Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania became the East African Community (Ingrid, 1970, p. 4). Having collapsed in 1977, the dream of an East African Community (EAC) was revived in November 30th, 1999 with the signing of a treaty by the three parliaments in the region. The treaty came into effect on July 7th 2000.

Goals and Objectives

The EAC joins other regional grouping in Africa such as Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) etc to build peace and political stability through economic collaboration (Muuka, 1998, p.1). The main goal of the EAC is economic, social, political transformation and development in view of eradicating poverty. That is to say, the integration and economic collaboration is a means of achieving economic growth which in effect would improve the standard of living of the people by facilitating a development process that is economically, socially, politically, and ecologically sustainable within their borders and collectively in the region (EAC Secretariat, 2001, p. 1). Thus, the formation of EAC was out of need and recognition that industrialization requires larger market in order to better attract and guarantee foreign investment necessary for economic growth and prosperity at national and regional and internationally level. It is in this context that the specific objectives of the EAC are outlined here below:

1. To develop policies and programs to widen and deepen cooperation among partner states politically, economically, socially and culturally as well as developing partnership in research, defense and security, and legal and judicial affairs.
2. To establish one customs union and a common market leading to monetary union and political federation in order

to enhance and regulate industrial, commercial, infrastructural, cultural, and political relations among member states.

3. To achieve sustainable growth and development of member state through Promotion of balanced and harmonious development, strengthening and consolidation of harmonious development on areas agreed upon in order to improve quality of life of the people of East Africa. Further more sustainable growth would be realized through utilization of natural resources and ensuring environmental protection, strengthening and consolidation of the existing ties between partner states politically, economically, socio-culturally, and traditionally. Again sustainable growth would be achieved by mainstreaming gender in all programs and enhancing the role of women in development culturally, socially, politically, economically etc while promoting peace, security, and stability among member states. Finally, development would be achieved through strengthening and enhancing partnership with private sector and civil society (EAC Secretariat, Nov. 1999).

For human societies and polities to live together, there has to be certain agreed upon standards to enable peaceful coexistence. Therefore, the EAC governments formulated three main principles: (1) mutual trust, political will and sovereign equality; (2) peaceful coexistence and good neighborliness; (3) peaceful settlement of conflicts in the region; and (4) good governance, principles of democracy, rule of law, accountability, transparency, social justice, equal opportunities, gender equality recognition and protection of human rights.

Harmonization of Policies

For the people of East Africa to live together, it was necessary to harmonize selected policies. Therefore, policy harmonization was effected in specifically eight selected areas including transport and communication. By a tripartite agreement on road transport and inland water

ways ratified in 2000, cooperation of member countries is ensured in transport activities (Annual Report, 1998/99-1999/2000, pp.27-31). Another policy issue was the need for cooperation in trade. Thus for purposes of trade cooperation, the EAC worked to create a customs union which would lead to establishment of common external tariffs to replace the varied internal tariffs in each individual country. In EAC, women comprise about 50 % of the total population constituting 60-70 % of the workforce. Majority of them engaged in agricultural activities. Hence policies on gender program had to be developed.

The important role women play in the economic, political, and social development was underscored by an EAC treaty (Annual Report, 1998/1999-1999/2000). This calls for the need for perceptual and attitudinal shift wherein women would be viewed as significant partners in the regional development processes. However, the glaring fact is that women despite their numbers face challenges of inequitable access to and control of economic and social resources and benefits accruing from development ((Annual Report, 1998/99-1999/2000, p. 28). With reference to the integration, a policy was formulated on development of institutional and legal framework. In this regard various sectoral committees were created to oversee utilization of resources in the EAC such as Energy, Lake Victoria Development program, Tourism and wild life conservation, inter-parliamentary committee for East Africa, gender and community development, trade, industry, and investment, etc. Other areas of policy harmonization are: Agriculture and animal husbandry; Health sector—Aids and sexually transmitted diseases, infectious diseases, research, policy and health systems. An Act on fisheries recognized the Lake Victoria Organization (1994) elevating it to an institution in the EAC which would implement regional collective strategies and action plans to ensure sustainability of fishery industry in the Lake Victoria as well as policy on environmental and natural resources.

Thus the regionalization process in EAC is in line with wider globalization processes, that is, larger scale integration into world market now being experienced on planet earth. Therefore, the EAC is seizing a golden opportunity to become an integral part of economic, political, and social developments in the emerging new world order. Becoming a regional community increases the region's capabilities to mobilize resources and harness opportunities of an expanded market such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). How do these policies impact on the discussion of religious pluralism?

Problem Statement

The problem of study is that the regional integration now taking place in East Africa appears to address the holistic development needs, that is, economically, socio-culturally, and politically. However, there is an apparent vacuum evidenced by the silence on existence of competing interests represented by pluralism. The region has a wide range of diversities: religious, ethnic, political, cultural as well as ideological variations. In this paper, the study looks at religious pluralism in the context of East African Community which seems inadequately addressed as indicated by lack of regional literature on the subject of research. This suggests that majority of people in East Africa are at cross roads with regards to role played by diverse religious groupings and their influence on the integration process.

The study attempts to answer the following questions: (1) What is the role of religion in the integration process? (2) Under what conditions does pluralism thrive?

As Rafashekarmaintained (1986:57), the concept of pluralism is multilevel. Studies have shown that structurally a society essentially comprises competing interests or complementary spheres including government, religion, and ethnicity.

In the context of Uganda from colonial era up till the 1980s, religious pluralism was restricted. It should be recalled that for a long time largely three mainstream religions, that is, Islam, Christianity, (Catholicism and Anglicanism) and African Traditional Religion, were recognized with privileges to overtly operate and recruit because it was easy for the state or government to control their involvement in the development processes including politics. Therefore, depending on whether the involvement is positive or negative, a political intervention could be applied e.g. warning, silence, disperses, a shutdown or even death of leading personalities. In a pluralist dispensation, there cannot be a state backed religious monopoly such as observed in the DRC during Mobutu regime, Rwanda, Burundi, etc.

Indicators for Religious Pluralism in the East African Region

The relationship between religion and state involvement can be measured by indicators some of which are discussed below:

1. Increased dialogue and cooperation between regional leaders and religious leaders. A clear example is the Juba Peace talks between the Lords Resistance Army of Joseph Kony and the Government of Uganda. The Religious Leaders such as the award winning Bishop John Baptist Odama and others like Desmond Tutu of South Africa interacted closely with the government leaders such as Rukutana Rugunda, Norbert Mao and other regional leaders such as Mozambique's Joaquim Cezano and Ryek Machar among others. Other examples include National prayer days such as those at the close of the year organized by Pastor Wilson Bugembe and others demonstrate the level of dialogue and cooperation among regional leader and religious leaders.
2. Increased regional identity and relationships and diminished tribal and

ethnic attachments. I had an opportunity to this indicator in February 2010 on a brief travel to Kenya before the launch of the EAC common Market in July 2010. It is gratifying for citizens of the region to enjoy a hustle free travel in the member countries. The ease of travel in the regional has greatly increased a sense of belonging and regional identity giving hope for diminished tribal and ethnic attachments.

3. Improved living standards due to affordability of goods and services resulting from reduction in prices of commodities and increased income levels. However, the affordability of goods and services remains to be seen by majority of East Africans. In case of Uganda, the ushering in of EAC has not benefited the common person as yet. For example basic commodities such sugar, rice, soap are very high to mention but a few. More than 65 % of the people cannot afford meat and fish. Water is expensive and many poor working persons cannot afford the use of electricity even in towns like Kampala ,forcing many people to commute on foot to and from work. The Uganda government cannot even maintain national fuel reserves in Jinja causing transport rates to be hiked much to the detriment of the general public. For example, the price of 3,500 from 2500 and public transport has risen from 100,000 to 2,000 Ug. Shillings in and around Kampala in most places.
4. Increased stability, peace and security as resulting from effective resolution and management of conflicts. The active involvement of regional leaders like Yoweri Museveni and Daniel Arap Moi and political institutions such IGAD in peace building processes in Sudan and efforts to resolve cattle rustling by

government of Uganda, Kenya, and Sudan are cases in point.

The Religious Situation in East Africa

Having identified the indicators for measuring pluralism in East Africa, it is important to discuss the religious situation in the region. This section looks at the three mainstream religions established in East Africa, namely African Traditional Religion, Islam and Christianity. African scholars such as Boahen (1990) observed that traditional religion has experienced serious attacks by combined activities of Islam and Christianity whose objective was to change or eliminate African Culture in order to bring development. It is important to note that African culture is intertwined with religion resulting in conflict of values and interests. Specifically the issues of contention include belief in spirits, supernatural forces, gods and cults, witchcraft and sorcery, sacrifices, taboos, rituals and ceremonies of the rite to passage including circumcision of males and females. Boahen (1990) maintained that the Christian missionaries preached against and attacked strongly African Traditional Religion and spiritual leaders such as priests, magicians, rainmakers, diviners and kings (p. 217. Consequently, the influence of traditional religion was greatly weakened.

According to Ngowi, (2002) Rwanda is 94 % Christian. Catholics and Protestants are rated 50 % and 44 % respectively while Muslims are rated at 5 %. The remaining 2 % are adherents to traditional religions. However, many believers from the mentioned faiths readily incorporate aspects of traditional religion into their practices such as belief in the Supreme Being and ancestral spirits. He also observed that Islam is rapidly growing in Rwanda in the aftermath of 1994 genocide. The conversions to Islam is a means of purification and getting rid of stigma by the groups and individuals blamed for the atrocities committed which claimed over 500 people (Ngowi, 2002, pp.1-3).

In Burundi, majority (60 %) of the population are Catholics, 5 % are Protestants and 10 % are Muslims. The remaining 25 % are believers in traditional religion. Following the fall of the Jean-Baptiste Bagaza regime, religious restrictions were imposed. Consequently the Catholic Church was banned from active operation. However, in 1987 President, Pierre Buyoya lifted the ban resulting in the restoration of religious holidays such as Christmas and Easter. Today the leaders of major religion enjoy a lot of respect (Wikipedia, 2001, p. 1).

Holger et al (1995) observed that in the 1930s and 1940s, religious associations in Kenya and Uganda like the East Africa Muslim Welfare Society (EAWS) by the Ismaili community of Aga Khan were a force to reckon with. Not only did the Muslims gain a voice but also attained recognition of Islamic laws and government approval of Muslim schools and related activities (p. 27). However, the resultant split in the leadership led to increased factionalism, which still repeats itself now and again. The recent (2008/9) clashes for religious supremacy among Muslims led by Mufti Sheikh Shaban Mubajje and Mufti Sheikh Kigongo Yusuf in Uganda are a case in point.

After independence, the East African governments needed to increase their control of society, hence it was necessary to unify religious minorities into more centralized organization. It is clear that the creation of supreme councils for Muslims in the region such as National Association of Muslims (NAAM) in Uganda and Baraza Kuula Wa Islamu (BAKWATA in Tanzania. The social attitude of Muslims could be regulated through BAKWATA and NAAM national councils. This was also an opportune moment because Muslim values and interests could be promoted at a larger scale at national levels in the region. However, the supreme councils did not integrate every Muslim faction especially those that had international networks, for example, Qadiriyya, Sunni, and Shia among others and they remain a challenge to EAC (Holger et al, 1995, p.27). It was relatively easy

to regulate the Catholic Church with its well clearly laid organizational structure as well as the Anglican Church. Today, even the “born again churches” (Pentecostal) have their own national organizations. This means that there has been a continuous struggle for political support and influence among religious groups in order to gain increased access to resources (funds, jobs, power, etc) in return for political compliance. The Ugandan experience illustrates that Anglicans have enjoyed greater influence with the state than their catholic counterparts (Holger et al, 1995, pp. 25-27).

Conditions Necessary for Growth of Religious Pluralism

The study reveals that religious pluralism is no longer an option but a duty for regional leaders and the peoples of East Africa in view of the wide diversities of cultures, languages, religions, and political affiliations. Religious pluralism is a process that evolves gradually. For religious pluralism to thrive, certain conditions must prevail, namely, dialogue and accommodation and hospitality. Dialogue is defined as a way by which persons or groups of different persuasions respectively and responsibly relate to one another in order to bring about mutual enrichment without removing essential differences between them (Marty, 2005, p. 88).

Marty maintains dialogue is a fundamental principle that supports the growth of religious pluralism. There are three key things: conversation, listening and asking questions. In conversation both verbal and attitudinal approaches used involving listening, sharing ideas, and working together even as real differences and tensions are evident. The parties involved participate as equals. Dialogue then is a conscious process in which the interested parties seek to give and to take without recourse to coercion and harassment. Accommodation calls for willingness to be sociable and receptive not only to people of whom we have preference for but even to those who might represent different religious, ethnic, color, language, etc. This is

because, quite often, expression of hostility and indifference are aggravated by fear of the unknown.

The assertion that pluralism is good for the EAC is in line with Mamdhani (1993) who contend that plurality should include social and ideological aspects in addition to political and economic expressions which must be guaranteed by constitution, making pluralistic existence a constitutional right for all citizens (p.51). The constitutionalization of social pluralism calls for recognition of the rights of autonomous associations with specific reference to local communities organized at local levels as popular legislators. The Constitution also provides for inclusion of historically disadvantaged minorities such as youths, women, civil groups (trade, cultural groups, cooperatives and unskilled workers, (Uganda Constitution, 1995). Therefore it is possible to build a strong EAC on the bases of social and ideological pluralism.

Furthermore, the paper recognizes that religious and political pluralism are not at par in the region. That is to say each of the individual countries is at different stages of development. A religious person or believer is primarily a human being who is required to play a variety of roles in the society, some of which may be conflicting in nature. The individual constitutions of governments in the EAC provides for certain freedom including freedom to worship. This means that religious leaders cannot be harassed openly instead their support may be sought.

Finally, the study reveals that more and more religion encourages more dialogue among the people including conflict situations. The view that the religious factor affects all aspects of life is supported by Olupona (1992, p. 1). Hence the leaderships of religious institutions and organizations could play a significant role in the social integration. The Acholi Religious Peace Initiative organization which did a commendable job to bring the Lords Resistance Army of Joseph Kony and Government of Uganda together is a case in point.

Implications of Religious Pluralism to Leadership in East Africa

The leadership in the EAC needs to recognize the need for social change and the significant role the religious leaders and followers could play in the taking the transformation process of the region to higher levels. This suggests that the political leadership in EAC needs to build a strong partnership with religious leaders because both aim at achieving peaceful coexistence among the diverse religious and social groups. Therefore close collaboration of leadership with religious groups would make it easier for the government of EAC to gain greater support of big majority of the population. From the study, regional development needs to be all encompassing religiously, economically, socially, politically. This is in line with Julius Nyerere's argument (1978) that in order for development of men and women, the region shall be one and social justice shall replace the current oppression and inequalities (p. 217).

Conclusion

In conclusion, the major finding from the study indicates that religious pluralism is good for the region because the religious factor permeates all aspects of a society. The study has observed that the people of East Africa are divided among diverse religious groups with each faction exercising great influence over its followers. The significance of Religious pluralism it has great potential to divide or unite communities. Therefore if not handled properly by leaders religious pluralism could be misused for sectarian purposes, making difficult the achievement of regional unity. Hence EAC leaders need to address question of religious Pluralism in order to put into positive advantage. It is hoped that as the region's identity increases perhaps tribal and ethnic tendencies which have fragmented some of the partner states especially in Uganda would reduce significantly. A strong partnership with multiple leaderships of religious groups would make it possible for the EAC to achieve some of its objectives already discussed in the background to the study. The indicators

discussed in this paper provide the EAC with means of gauging growth of religious pluralism in the region of East Africa. Finally, the paper conclude by making two recommendations.

Recommendation (s)

The study recommends that:

1. The government of EAC needs to nurture and strengthen pluralism and to particularly harness religious pluralism because of the high authority and wide influence the leaders command in the community.
2. Dialogue which is characteristic of religious pluralism would regularly support negotiation resulting in reduction in conflicts in the region and increased peace and stability.

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Language Policy for Radio in Uganda and Tanzania: Public Sphere or 'Public Sphericules'?

*Monica B. Chibita & Njonjo Mfaume**

Abstract

This paper places in historical context Tanzania and Uganda's broadcast language policies. The paper further examines the role of language policy in enhancing radio's potential as an arena for political expression in Tanzania and Uganda. It takes cognizance of the apparent tension between fostering a national public sphere and creating room for emerging public sphericules, often based on linguistic or ethnic loyalties. The paper is informed by document review and over 40 in-depth interviews with academics in the humanities, media and language policy experts, the media, local leaders, media owners and managers, civil society and members of the public both in Tanzania and Uganda. The interviews were conducted at different times over a period of five years (2004-2009). The paper concludes that there are definite benefits accruing from a definitive language policy that privileges one of the indigenous languages for public communication as demonstrated in the case of Tanzania. However, this works well where there is some form of consensus on the selected language. It proposes that a case be made for a multi-tier language regime that caters for efficient communication from the governor to the governed, allows the governed to debate important issues among themselves and also to respond to the governors,, and enables the citizens to remain globally relevant. The issue therefore becomes not public sphere OR sphericules, but public sphere AND sphericules.

Keywords: democracy, public sphere, public sphericules, radio, language policy

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Introduction

Radio in sub-Saharan Africa has over the last two decades been acclaimed as *the people's medium* (van de Veur 2002, Bourgault 1995, Daloz and Verrier-Frechette 2000, Mwesige 2009). A number of factors have aided radio's rise to this position. Literacy rates in most sub-Saharan countries remain below average. In addition, many of the print media are still published in the colonial languages so they only serve a small elite. The majority of the population cannot afford to buy those print media that are available in the local languages. While television has to a large extent served as an entertainment medium, out of the reach of many rural populations because of its cost and its reliance on electricity, radio is relatively affordable and transcends literacy and language barriers. Most significantly, the liberalization of the broadcast sector and advances in communication technology in the 1990s have given ordinary people more access to the airwaves than they ever had when radio was solely under the control of government. The advent of FM station has localized broadcasting. The public (or state) and community media in particular tend to operate in a wider range of indigenous languages than their commercial counterparts. New radio genres like call-in talk shows enable people to express their political views and challenge their leaders with a directness previously unheard of.

Consequently, radio has the capacity to enable the continent's majority rural and illiterate populations to participate in public debate on important issues affecting their everyday lives. Quite often in sub-Saharan Africa, radio's role has been seen more as a conduit of pre-packaged information. Rarely is radio viewed by political leaders as an arena for contestation of ideas and political visions, representations and identities. This has informed the debate on the deployment of the regions' many languages on this medium. Language policies on the continent have been varied, ranging from the vague to the concrete depending on the political circumstances.

This paper examines the role of language policy in enhancing radio's potential as an arena for political expression in Tanzania and Uganda. We place this in historical context, highlighting the resultant features of the two countries' broadcast language policies, and their citizens' responses to them. Furthermore, we debate language policy for radio bearing in mind the apparent tension between fostering a national public sphere and creating room for emerging public *sphericules*, often based on linguistic or ethnic loyalties.

The paper is informed by over 40 in-depth interviews with academics in the Humanities, media and language policy experts, the media, local leaders, media owners and managers, civil society and the members of the public both in Tanzania and Uganda. The interviews were conducted at different times in the two countries over a period of five years (2004-2009).

Doing Politics On Radio: The Language Factor

A common language can play a key role in binding a nation together. At the same time, the indigenous languages cannot be summarily dismissed as a political inconvenience because they are vital in the formation of political and cultural identities. One of the things that distinguish radio from, say, the print media and television is its capacity to multi-track with languages. Depending on which policy route a country takes, radio has the potential to contribute greatly to the growth of a “unified” public space, or to a number of public spaces for debate on issues of common interest in different African countries.

In the above context, a discussion of the key concerns in the process of negotiating official and unofficial language policy becomes relevant. Uganda's and Tanzanian's leaders have had to make decisions on language policy bearing in mind the competing imperatives of balancing radio's role in binding individual ethnic communities together, breaking barriers across ethnic communities and keeping citizens

relevant in a fast-globalizing community. Faced with these concerns, Tanzania opted to legislate that there would be two languages of broadcasting: Kiswahili and English. Uganda, on the other hand, has debated the issue of language for decades without articulating a clear policy on language in the broadcast media. What policy there is, therefore, is gleaned from the Education language policy, draft documents and practice.

Language policy priorities in the African context

According to Ricento (2000:10) the earliest works in Language Policy and Planning were influenced by the discourse of decolonization and state formation. As such, some scholars in discussing language policy for the media in post-colonial sub-Saharan African countries have favoured an approach that involves promoting a privileged public language or group of languages. By implication, this has meant limiting or denying recognition to other languages (Patten 2001). However, as Fardon and Furniss (2000:3-4) have observed,

To broadcast in one language is to fail to broadcast in another, and that is always taken as a message. Because the message of language choice may be divisive, a particular array of languages used on air may function as a symbolic mark of inclusion into a state, region or nation.

Scholars like Mazrui (1996), Pawlikova (1996) and Mohochi (2003) maintain that the selection of a unifying language is a priority for constituting a much-needed national political space in a postcolonial African context. While the majority of sub-Saharan countries inherited centrally controlled media systems, they also inherited linguistically heterogeneous political entities. Thus a unifying language was seen as the glue needed to bind the post-colonial nation together.

Mazrui (1996) contends that language policy for the broadcast media in this context is important for the involvement of citizens in public affairs and policy-making at various levels. In aid

of achieving a “national public sphere”, he advocates downplaying both the colonial language and the majority of the indigenous languages. Instead he argues for the use of one indigenous language in public communication. In East Africa, this model, to a large extent, underlies broadcast language policy in Tanzania, where most broadcasting is in Kiswahili.

The above position has merit, to the extent that political leaders need an efficient way to address their citizens, and that the citizens need a language to communicate across ethnic groups. However, it risks over-emphasizing a single, unified “communicative space” as the sole focus of language policy. Radio then is seen as a “notice-board” for one-way communication from governor to governed. Mazrui’s perspective also focuses on the media’s role in political as opposed to other forms of communication. However, citizens need to reflect their cultures, and enjoy and challenge a wide range of others. Radio audiences should be able to express themselves on developmental issues in languages that make the most sense to them. They should also be able to receive diverse, wholesome and relevant entertainment in these languages. Optimizing radio in this way may be hampered by a policy that enforces the use of one language for radio with the aim of creating a unified “public sphere.”

However, the advocates of the Tanzanian model argue that the promotion of Kiswahili over the indigenous languages has helped Tanzanians live peacefully with each other. They note that they are the only country in East Africa that has not had a war since independence. Kiswahili has become a *lingua franca* and the majority of Tanzanians speak or understand it. The shared language, they argue, has helped inculcate feelings of “brotherhood” among the people. Mugyabuso (2009), for instance, observes: “It is rare in Africa to find a country that is united at the linguistic level...Swahili is a defining factor of nationhood for Tanzanians”. Others point out that Kiswahili has given Tanzanians a sense of identity. They add that because of Swahili,

labour mobility and inter-marriage have been enhanced, minimizing differences even further. This, they argue has strengthened nationhood.

Language policy and the notion of the public sphere

The notion of the public sphere popularized by Jurgen Habermas (1989) has come to define discussions of the democratic role of, especially, the state controlled and public media. Habermas, in his study of 19th century post-feudal European society, conceived of the public sphere as a space "...where private people come together as public and discuss matters of common concern" (1989:27).

Dahlgren (2002:195) sees the public sphere as:

...That realm of social life where the exchange of information and views on questions of common concern can take place so that public opinion can be formed.

He adds:

The public sphere 'takes place' when citizens, exercising their rights of assembly and association gather as public bodies to discuss issues of the day, specifically those of political concern.¹

Habermas' understanding of the public sphere though has some more specific characteristics. He sees the public sphere of civil society as a section of the population separate from, and antagonistic with the state, and identifying with each other on the basis of common (predominantly bourgeois) interests. Habermas (1989) recognizes that first the press, and then the newer forms of media (like radio and television) played a significant role in the process of public opinion formation in modern (post-feudal) Europe. Although the press had started off merely as carriers of basic information (mostly

about domestic affairs and business), it had evolved to the role of an amplifier for bourgeois economic interests, and finally to originators of public opinion.

Habermas' fundamental assumption about the ideal role of the media in the democratisation process, it should be noted, is rooted in classical liberal theory. Consequently, he places great emphasis on the centrality of rational critical thinking and debate, along the lines of the marketplace of ideas (Habermas 1989:3; 248; Dahlgren 2002:195). According to the classical liberal logic that underlies Habermas argument on the role of rational critical debate in democratization, if people have free access to information, and different perspectives are allowed to compete in the 'market place of ideas' the best idea will eventually triumph. Citizens will thus prepare themselves to participate in the political process and to make informed political decisions. For Habermas, such critical debate is not only the reason for the existence of the public sphere; it is also the way public opinion is generated.

While Habermas' theory of the public sphere still represents an important contribution to theories of the media's role in the democratization process, his conceptualization of the bourgeois public sphere, as well as the conditions of its 'decline' has received much criticism. Thompson (1995:255-258) presents one of the most concise summaries of the key shortcomings in Habermas' theory. He argues that Habermas in discussing the bourgeois public sphere ignores other public spheres that existed parallel to it at the time, along with their cultural forms, notably those constituted by the working classes. Thompson further posits that Habermas was insensitive to the exclusion of women from the bourgeois public sphere. This may have been linked to stereotypes that linked rational critical debate to males alone.²

¹ Many critics have rejected this apparent limitation to "specifically those of political concern," arguing that it leaves out entertainment programming which constitutes a key aspect of the modern public sphere and is significant for important issues such as identity formation (See Berger 2002; Goldsmith Media Group 2000; Fraser 1992). Critics have also challenged the accuracy of linking the public sphere necessarily with "common" concerns (See Berger 2002:30 and Thompson 1995:253).

² This is significant given that opportunities for learning a language other than one's mother-tongue is often linked to a formal education access to which, in most African contexts, tends to favour males.

Thompson further argues that in his account of the decline of the public sphere, Habermas assumes that audiences are passive consumers of elite ideology. This thesis, though supported by key work within the Frankfurt school, (for example, Adorno and Horkheimer (1972)) to which Habermas subscribed, has been challenged especially within cultural studies circles. Thompson concludes that a more historically grounded and empirical analysis of reception processes is likely to demonstrate that audiences have more power than they are given credit for to use and interpret media content (not dupes) hence the need for a more empirical and historically specific approach.

Habermas, perhaps due to his grounding in Enlightenment thought, in both the *Structural transformation of the public sphere* and in his later work (Habermas 1992) argues for what Thompson (1995:256) has called “a discourse-based theory of democracy in which questions of a moral-practical character can be resolved in a rational manner.” Habermas’ critics argue that the degree of pluralism of thought that characterizes modern society makes this consensus-based model untenable. They add that with the structure of modern-day societies, where centralized autocratic power and linear systems of government have been weakened, it is difficult to achieve consensus on any matter of “national” interest through face-to-face public debate (Berger 2002: 31). The decentralized nature of the modern media and their place in opinion-formation only serves to compound this situation. Berger points out further that in reality, and particularly in the African context, debate is only one way of mediating political activity, and perhaps not even the major one.

Habermas idealises the 19th century fora that he dubbed “public sphere” which organized regular debate among ordinary people as long as they were male, educated and owners of property. In the course of their discussion, all social difference was bracketed³; laws of the market

³ Social differences were recognized in these fora, but they, ideally, were not allowed to come in the way of members’ participation in free expression and debate within the public sphere.

and laws of the state were temporarily suspended and topics normally out of bounds were open to discussion. Habermas holds this up as the ideal space for the enlightened independent formation of public opinion as a tool for holding the state accountable (1989:37).

The “public sphericules” option

Some critics of the Habermasian notion of the public sphere, “...where private people come together as public and discuss matters of common concern” (1989:27) have instead advocated, or admitted the presence of, multiple *sphericules* (Ekeh 1975, Willems 2007 cf. Gitlin 1998) as more viable democratizing sites, particularly in the African context. Ekeh, for instance, grounds his argument in the understanding that colonialism created a situation in Africa where even though the postcolonial state would want to assume one unitary public called “nation”, there are in fact multiple publics. Language and ethnicity have been central to the consolidation of these publics and a lot of “politics” takes place in these *sphericules* rather than in an imagined “national public sphere”. In the African context, language policy for broadcasting therefore can ill afford to ignore these.

Gitlin (1998) analyses the metaphor of the public sphere pointing out that it is typically presented as singular (*the* public sphere, not *a* public sphere), perfectly symmetrical (implying absence of differences) and consistent, “with each point equidistant from the centre.” Speaking from an American perspective, Gitlin acknowledges that the ideal Habermasian public sphere is both overrated and unattainable. He argues that to support a democratic system based on rational deliberation, [members of] the public need access to information and the opportunity to deliberate over matters of common concern.

The unitary public sphere is weak, riddled with anxiety and self-doubt, but distinct communities of information and participation are multiplying, robust and brimming with self-confidence (Gitlin 1998:170).

Gitlin attributes this to the advent of the computer and the growth of cosmopolitanism in America, and proposes that we instead think about these new communities as "*public sphericules*" (1998:170-173).

According to Gitlin, though, for the *sphericules* to be adequate as democratizing sites, there would need to be fair distribution of communication resources to ensure justice. There should also be absence of deep divisions (1998:173). In other words, if only the elite have access to the opportunities for deliberation created by technology, democracy would not be served. Similarly, if there were deep differences based on class, ideology (or in the case of Uganda and Tanzania, ethnicity), and there was no opportunity for negotiating compromise across these differences, democracy would not be served by the plurality of the *sphericules* either.

Language policy for the broadcast media and particularly for radio then becomes an important aspect of what kind of contribution these public *sphericules*, built around opportunities for public communication, can make in the democratization process. It becomes evident that a viable language policy for broadcasting is not as simple as it may appear. This raises a number of questions: What would it take to have a viable, relevant and unified public sphere? Would such a sphere be desirable? Could this sphere alone be capable of addressing matters across ethnic boundaries and linking up with the global community? Would there still be a role for [ethnic] *sphericules* fostered by indigenous language radio? Could these in any way link up with the "unified" [national] public sphere? What kind of language regime for the media would then be needed to facilitate this? The following exploratory examination of the context of broadcast language policy in Tanzania and Uganda as well as responses to it from a cross-section of citizens of the two countries provide some preliminary answers to these questions while possibly raising others.

The Context Of Broadcast Language Policy In Tanzania

The East African coast, where Kiswahili developed and became a *lingua franca*, is inhabited predominantly by the Bantu ethnic group. Kiswahili therefore has evolved as a Bantu language, though it has been enriched with vocabularies from many other languages, particularly Arabic, German and Portuguese. The specific years when the language started are debatable. Kiango (2005: 157-158) notes that from about 1800 to 1850 Arab Trading Caravans from the Coast penetrated the hinterland in search of ivory and slaves. These caravans involved the Swahili people from the Coast who were taken as porters or caravan leaders. This way, Kiswahili spread into the hinterland where the caravans passed or established their camps. Missionaries also led to the spread of Kiswahili into the hinterland as they needed a language that could be understood by converts and they chose Kiswahili (Kiango, 2005:158).

Language and colonial rule in Tanzania: 1884 –1961

German rule in Tanganyika started in 1884. Kiango (2005:158) observes that by then Kiswahili had already spread to many parts of the country. The Germans initially tried to use German in administration and education because they associated Kiswahili with Islam and with the potential of uniting the indigenous people against their rule. The policy, however, was fiercely opposed and failed. Many Tanzanians saw the German language as a vehicle for spreading Christianity and they resented this.

According to Kiango (2005:158 -159), having failed in their initial policy, the Germans resorted to Kiswahili, using it for the administration and making it the medium of instruction in Primary Schools throughout the country. Rubagumya (1990:6) argues that these two measures encouraged the spread of the language even farther into the hinterland.

According to Gibbe (1983:49) and Abdulaziz (1980:143, cited in Kiango 2005:160) the British, **after they were granted mandate to rule Tanganyika in 1919**, maintained Kiswahili as a medium of instruction in primary schools and as a subject at the secondary and tertiary level of education. They also replaced German with English in the administration of central government, local administration and the local courts.

Language in Tanzania's independence struggle

In 1954, a political party, TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) was formed to fight for independence. Julius Nyerere, the party leader saw Kiswahili as an important weapon for mobilizing and uniting Tanzanians from different ethnic backgrounds. Siwa (2009:4) notes that Nyerere gave Kiswahili a special place and role in the TANU constitution and developed, promoted and popularized the language.

After independence, in 1961, a number of measures were taken to promote Kiswahili. In 1961 Kiswahili was declared the national language and official language. English was declared the second official language in 1962. Kiswahili was made the sole medium of instruction at the primary level. It was also used as the medium of instruction in adult literacy campaigns. Institutions were created to promote Swahili, including The Directorate of Culture and National Language, The National Swahili Council (BAKITA) and The Institute of Kiswahili Research (TUKI).

Recent data shows that Tanzania has over 120 languages, categorised into two major groups, Bantu and non-Bantu. According to Encyclopedia of the Nations, (<http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Tanzania-ETHNIC-GROUPS.html>), the Bantu group is the largest, estimated to comprise 95 per cent of the population. The largest ethnic group is Sukuma, with close to 15 per cent of the population, while the major non-Bantu people

are the Maasai who are Nilotic speakers.

The Tanzanian broadcasting landscape

The first radio station in Tanganyika, Dar es Salaam Broadcasting Station (DBS), was established in 1951. Later in 1955, DBS was expanded and transformed into Tanganyika Broadcasting Service (TBS). On July 1st, 1956 the autonomous body, Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation (TBC) was established as a statutory body with the aim of providing public service of broadcasting in the territory.

After independence in 1961, TBC continued to operate on a public broadcast model. On July 1st, 1965 the government dissolved the TBC through an Act of Parliament to form Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam (RTD) arguing that Radio is an important asset in educating the people and therefore should be under the control of government.

The adoption of the Arusha Declaration in 1967 which spelt out Principles of Socialism and Self-reliance, led to the adjustment of the objectives of RTD in line with the new policy. From then on, Radio was regarded as a key instrument for political and social mobilization and the establishment of socialism. Television, on the other hand, was considered an unnecessary luxury likely to aggravate division between the rich and the poor.

By the mid 1980s, the Tanzanian economy was facing severe economic crisis and could no longer resist the international pressure to abandon socialistic policies in favor of a liberalized market economy and political pluralism. In April 1992, Tanzania adopted a multi-party political system and a year later became one of the first African countries to allow private broadcasting.

Radio One Stereo and *Radio Tumaini*, both established in 1994 became the first two privately owned radio stations. Currently, there are over 70 private radio stations countrywide. The first three television stations in mainland Tanzania, all privately owned, were registered

in 1994, while the state-run Television ya Taifa TVT (now Tanzania Broadcasting Corporation TBC) was launched in 2001. Zanzibar already had a TV station established in 1972.

The Tanzanian broadcasting media scene is now dominated by few major private corporations such as IPP Media Group, African Media Group and Sahara Communication. There is also a government entity, TBC which owns a number of radio channels and one TV channel. TBC is said to be in transition to become a public broadcaster. Community broadcasting remains a struggling sector and has only had a small impact. Several religious institutions also own radio and television stations which they use in propagating their faiths while a number of cities, municipal towns and district councils have also started their own TV and radio stations.

The development of policy on broadcast language in Tanzania

It took 36 years after independence for Tanzania to have a language policy. The policy was developed in 1997 and it came as part of the Cultural Policy developed in the same year. The policy pronounces Kiswahili as the national language and encourages individuals and organizations to publish and disseminate Kiswahili literature. It should be noted that the policy also recognizes vernacular languages. It states that people shall continue to use and be proud of their vernacular languages and vernaculars shall be used as resources for the development of Kiswahili. Furthermore, the policy encourages researching, writing, preserving, publishing and disseminating in the vernaculars and translating them into other languages as well as making dictionaries and grammar books.

Regarding foreign languages, the policy makes English a compulsory subject in pre-primary, primary and secondary education levels and encourages it in higher education. In addition, the teaching of English is to be strengthened while the teaching of other foreign languages is also encouraged. The policy provides for

Kiswahili to become a medium of instruction in education and training at all levels and makes Kiswahili a compulsory subject in pre-primary, primary and secondary education. It provides that Kiswahili shall be encouraged in higher education.

Dennis Maira, a resident of Dar es Salaam, however, points out a gap between policy and practice:

While Kiswahili is claimed to be the national language [sic] and both English and Kiswahili are described as the official languages, the fact remains that Kiswahili is the spoken language and English the written language. Most vital documents in government and private business are written in English and all the talking are [sic] done in Kiswahili. This is a recipe for a failing language policy.

The Cultural Policy offers guidance on matters of language in general, but the Information and Broadcast Policy specifically deals with the use of the different languages of Tanzania in broadcasting. In Section 2.3.2, the Information and Broadcasting Policy states that languages to be used in mass media shall be Kiswahili and English. Again, in Section 2.7.3 the policy comes out specifically to point out that, languages of radio and television transmission are Kiswahili and English.

Furthermore, the Information and Communication Technology Policy (ICT) – 2003 states that the Government will encourage the wider use of Kiswahili in developing local content in order to promote local culture, attract local end users as well as the Tanzanian Diaspora (Section 3.9.4).

Following the enactment of Tanzania Broadcasting Services Act 1993, the Ministry responsible developed regulations that would guide broadcasting content. Among other aspects, the Broadcasting Services Regulations (2005) lay down rules regarding languages to be used in broadcast. Part III (programme content) in Section 15 states that:

Every free-to-air licensee shall-

- (a) Ensure that only official languages, namely Kiswahili and English are used for all broadcasts except where specific authorization has been given to use non-official languages.

Thus although Tanzania has liberalized its broadcast sector, its broadcast language policy envisages a unified space for public communication engendered by, primarily, the use of Kiswahili.

The Context Of Broadcast Language Policy In Uganda

According to the most recent population census (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2005: viii), Uganda has an estimated population of 24 million people. More recent accounts indicate that this has risen to over 30 million in the last eight years. Twelve percent of these live in the urban areas while the rest live in the rural areas. Uganda is made up of four broad linguistic groups, the Bantu, Eastern Nilotic, Western Nilotic and Sudanic. There is limited mutual intelligibility within languages in each group, and none across the four groups.⁴ According to the Summer Institute of Linguistics (<http://www.ethnologue.com/show-country.aspx?name=UG>), there are at least 36 different languages spoken in Uganda. Other accounts put this number at between 37 and 60. It should be noted however that it is difficult to distinguish between language and dialect in some instances. The most recent census (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2002:12)⁵ puts the number of distinct ethnic groups at 56. English is the official language and Kiswahili the second official language. Luganda is the mother-tongue of the largest number of Ugandans (16.9%)

⁴ See Ladefoged, P. Glick, R. and Crier C. (1968) <http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED024920.pdf>. Accessed on 8th September, 2010.

⁵ It should be noted that two clusters, the Bakiga, Batooro, Banyankore and Banyoro and the Banyole, Basamia and Bagwe speak languages with a high level of mutual intelligibility and have been treated as two instead of 7 language groups for purposes of broadcasting on the state media. This fact however rarely comes out in debate on which languages are most widely spoken.

⁶, (UBOS 2002; <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ug.html>). However, Luganda is still largely unintelligible to the non-Bantu populations of Northern and Eastern Uganda.

Uganda was a British colony between 1894 and 1962, governed under Indirect Rule. During this period, there were two forces of specific relevance to the evolution of language policy: the Baganda ethnic group, which served as the closest ally of the colonial government, and the Catholic and Protestant Missionaries. The Baganda were used as agents of the Indirect Rule project (Karugire 1980, 109-116, Kabwegyere 1995, 61-67, Mamdani 1997, 109-137). The Christian missionaries had a vested interest in which languages played a central role in Uganda's affairs because this had a bearing on their evangelisation mission (Kabwegyere 1995, pp. 188-197). The country was dogged by inter-ethnic and inter-religious wars particularly in the 1940s and 1950s. The country is currently divided into 111 districts, most of them corresponding to an ethnic or sub-ethnic group.

Language and colonial rule in Uganda

As Ugandans began to demand independence in the 1940s, keeping their independence ambitions under check became a major colonial project. The British maintained the dominant local languages in each region of the country as the languages of official business only at the local level. English was the official language as well as *de facto* national language. This was partly in order to combat any efforts by the different ethnic groups to cooperate with one another in the independence struggle. The indigenous languages were permitted as media of instruction in the lower levels of primary school but English remained a compulsory subject and took over as medium of instruction

⁶ It has been argued, however that some mutually intelligible language blocks like the 4Rs (Runyoro, Rutooro, Runyankore and Rukiga) may compare favourably with Luganda in terms of numbers of speakers.

latter part of primary school. Kiswahili evolved to become the language of the forces and of trade.

Under this arrangement, the only Ugandans who were fully included in public debate at the national level were the elite, who, given their privileged position, had little motivation to represent the interests of their respective local "sphericules" at the national level. This contrasts sharply with the Tanzanian experiences where it is estimated that over 95% of the population have facility with Kiswahili and ideally⁷ the capacity to participate in public debate with the same ease at the local and the national level.

The colonial language policy in Uganda thus served to maintain separate development in the different regions (Kabwegyere 1995, pp. 144-145). English which, was the official language of business and debate, tended to be a privilege of the colonial masters and those Ugandans with a Western education. The average Ugandan at the district was limited by language to discussing the local politics of his or her respective district or ethnic group. Over the years, this kind of language policy had the effect of widening the gap between the elite and the rest of the Ugandan population and confounded any attempt to imagine a "Ugandan public sphere". Consequently, as Kabwegyere (1995, pp.190-197) has observed, public debate in Uganda has typically been conducted at two separate levels, one dominated by the elite and often conducted in English, and another dominated by the remainder of Uganda's population and conducted in the indigenous languages.

Language in Uganda's independence struggle

As in the case of Tanzania, the indigenous language media played a significant role in the independence struggle. Although there was a vibrant indigenous language print media at this time, though, there was only one broadcast

outlet, the state broadcaster. In the absence of a common language, only select area languages were used regularly on the Uganda Broadcasting Service. Most other broadcasting was in English.

Under colonial rule, the indigenous language newspapers addressed class issues to do with land privileges and the role of Europeans and Asians in the local economy (Gariyo 1992:2). In the 1930s, Ugandans' escalating demands for participation in the economy and in the political affairs of their country were channeled through newspapers like *Gambuuze*, *Baana ba Kintu*, *Uganda Voice*, *Tuula Nkunonyole*, *Buganda Nnyaffe* and *Matalisi*, most of which were in Luganda. These contributed to the political consciousness and action of the 1940s and 1950s that culminated in the formation of the first national party (the Uganda National Congress (UNC)) and finally Uganda's independence on 9th October, 1962. As tensions between the British and the locals grew, the local press continued to publicise the views of their political backers and to highlight perceived colonial injustices using the indigenous languages. The state broadcaster, established in 1954, however, was constrained as it was bound to reflect positively the policies of government.

Post-independence language policy

After attaining independence in 1962, the country experimented with a multi-party democratic system which lasted until 1966/1967 when the then Prime Minister, Dr. Apollo Milton Obote, abrogated the constitution, abolished the traditional kingdoms, declared himself president and declared a state of emergency (Karugire 1988, p. 58; Kabwegyere 1995, pp. 210-214). This allowed Obote to rule by decree until he was overthrown by Idi Amin Dada in a coup d'état in 1971. By this time, not only were basic freedoms eroded, the country was greatly polarised along ethnic and religious lines.

Amin's era was followed by a period of political instability characterised by multiple changes of government and gross abuse of human rights

⁷ One notes that even though the majority of Tanzanians have a degree of facility with English, there may still be disparities in levels of analysis of issues of national importance.

(Karugire 1988, pp. 86-95). Between 1979 and 1985, there were at least four changes of government. The current National Resistance Movement government came to power in 1986. This followed a five year guerrilla war against the governments of Dr. Apollo Milton Obote⁸ (1980-1985) and Gen. Tito Okello Lutwa (1985). These had been preceded by two Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) administrations, one led by Professor Yusufu Kironde Lule and another by Godfrey Binaisa (between 1989 and 1990). Ethnic tensions underlay each of these changes of government.

Notwithstanding these political upheavals, one of the achievements of independence was the steady increase in the number of languages used on state radio. English, Kiswahili, Luganda, Runyoro/Rutooro/Runyankore/Rukiga and Luo came on board basing on demographic factors, being the most widely spoken languages in the different regions. However, at some point this system broke down. All *UBC* senior staff interviewed stated that most of the remaining 16 languages currently on air have come on board through various forms of political pressure from members of parliament, ministers or pressure groups from different parts of the country.

Among the reforms introduced by the NRM government after 1986 was the promulgation of a new democratic constitution in 1995 that was the culmination of a broad consultative process. As part of this process, the NRM government had mandated a Constitutional Commission Chaired by Benjamin Odoki to explore the prospects for the emergence of a national language. The Odoki Commission proposed that Kiswahili, Luganda and other area languages should be promoted, envisaging that 'in the course of time one of them will emerge as the National Language.' They also recommended that English remain the official language (Uganda Constitutional Commission 1992:79). However, when the recommendations of the Odoki Commission were sent to the Constitutional Assembly, the latter voted to make Kiswahili the national

language. This decision caused such acrimony in the legislature where powerful anti-Kiswahili forces were at work that the decision was eventually withdrawn⁹.

The 1995 constitution (29(1) (e)) guaranteed freedom of association, expression and the press, thus improving the environment for the operation of a liberalized media. The NRM government also introduced a system of participatory politics at the grassroots consisting of five tiers (from RC1 to RC5)¹⁰ (Mamdani 1997, pp. 215-217; Golooba-Mutebi 2004). A combination of these reforms seems to have sown the seeds for a new and pluralistic radio culture with great potential to contribute to Uganda's nascent democracy.

Although the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (1995) recognises the existence of the different indigenous languages, it does not name a *national* language. Rather, it states:

The official language of Uganda is English. (6 (1-2)). Subject to clause (1) of this article, any other language may be used as a medium of instruction in schools or other educational institutions or for legislative, administrative or judicial purposes as may be prescribed by law.

Kiswahili was made the second official language by an amendment of the constitution in 2005 but still no national language was pronounced. Politically explosive debated centering on the roles of Luganda and Kiswahili in the public domain has accompanied any attempt to legislate a national language.

Education language policy

The Education sector is the only sector in Uganda with a coherent, written down language policy. The policy is a slight improvement on the colonial one. According to the government White Paper (1992), both indigenous Ugandan languages and Kiswahili are to be taught in primary and

⁸ Having been ousted by Idi Amin in 1971, Obote had managed to stage a come-back in 1980.

⁹ See Chibita M. B. (2009) for a comprehensive discussion of the language debate at this stage in Uganda's history.

¹⁰ RC was short for Resistance Council, conforming to the name of the ruling National Resistance Movement.

secondary school. Ugandan languages should be taught as a subject throughout the primary school cycle. Each region is to select a language to be used as the medium of instruction for the first four years, after which English takes over. The selected Ugandan languages to be used as media of instruction are the area languages: Ateso/Akarimojong for the North East, Luo for the North, Luganda for the Central region, Lugbara for the North West and Runyakitara for the Western region. These become optional subjects after the fourth year of primary school and are not examinable at the Primary Leaving level. Kiswahili, on the other hand, is given special consideration both at the primary and secondary cycle and is examinable at both levels.

In Tanzania, using Kiswahili as a vehicle, the political leadership has succeeded in rallying together a sense of "nation" that appears to transcend not only ethnic groups but also social classes (Vavrus 2002, p. 375-376) and to provide for the evolution of a public sphere in some form. This is not the case in Uganda where the very issue of what comes first: ethnic or "national" (meaning Ugandan) identity is contested. Not surprisingly, public debate on language in Uganda has seldom dwelt on the role of the different languages in enabling all Ugandans to optimise radio for political participation. This could be because the majority of Ugandans have never seen a need to rally together as a nation since the British policy of indirect rule had encouraged a more insular approach to politics. It could also be that the current two-tier language "policy" which makes a small elite proficient in English while the majority operate mainly in their indigenous languages suits the political leadership.

Uganda's political leaders occasionally demonstrated by conduct that they see the elite as the citizens that they need to primarily address themselves to on matters of national political development. This has implications for what policies are promoted as well as for who participates in debate on issues of national

significance via the broadcast media. Particularly in a context like Uganda's, therefore, a diverse media landscape has the potential for including more people in debate on issues both of a local and of a national interest. Language policy can contribute significantly to the diversity of this landscape. Similarly, policy that looks beyond the pragmatic value of a unifying language to peoples' deeper communication needs could enrich the Tanzanian broadcast media landscape.

The Ugandan broadcasting landscape

Broadcasting in Uganda was a state monopoly until the early 1990s. In 1993, the NRM government liberalised the broadcast sector, opening up for numerous privately owned stations to be licensed. The former *Radio Uganda* and *Uganda Television* were converted into the Uganda Broadcasting Corporation (*UBC*) by an Act of Parliament in 1995. The *UBC* now broadcasts in 24 languages including English, Kiswahili and Luganda. Although the Act declares the *UBC* a public broadcaster, the *UBC* is fully government owned and controlled and continues to operate as a state broadcaster (Mwesige and Ouma 2008; Lugalmi and Mwesige 2010:128).

According to the Uganda Communications Commission (<http://www.ucc.co.ug>), as of February 2009, there were 181 registered radio stations. Nearly 123 of them were on air. Forty six of these were based in the capital city and the rest in a few of the other metropolitan centres throughout the country. Most of the privately owned FM stations either broadcast in English and/or Luganda, or one of the major, commercially viable languages from the region that they serve. The latter include Lwo for the northern region, Luganda for the central and eastern regions and the mutually intelligible Runyoro, Rutooro, Runyankore and Rukiga, also known as "the 4Rs" for the western region. With this arrangement, many of Uganda's languages are typically only heard on state radio for a few minutes every week and some not at all on any of the commercial media. The latter

prefer to concentrate on a few, commercially viable languages. There is a sprinkling of financially constrained community radio stations whose potential is greatly curtailed by the pressure to survive. These tend to broadcast almost exclusively in the indigenous language/s of the region where they are located.

The evolution of broadcast language policy in Uganda

According to Ateker Ejalu (2005), a former minister of information, when the British Colonial government set up the *UBS* in 1954, the goals were 'to educate Ugandans on British colonial policy, relay news from the UK, entertain British citizens living in Uganda and discourage what the British called harmful (pagan) practices.' The broadcasting service, was also put in place to 'combat harmful pro-independence propaganda' as well as encourage the growth of cash crops. By 1957, there were eight languages on air on the state broadcaster (including English Luganda, the mutually intelligible Runyoro/ Rutooro/ Runyankore Rukiga, Ateso, Lwo, Lugbara and Hindustani (Turyamwijuka 2004).

There was limited participation of the ordinary Ugandan in the broadcast media and using the local languages was seen as crucial mostly in as far as it enhanced the diffusion of the colonial government's goals. Ejalu notes that the British attack on African culture in Uganda, unlike, for instance in Kenya and Tanzania, was 'benign and subtle.' The British in Uganda were, therefore, willing to let the indigenous languages co-exist with English. Thus colonial language policy, though for the most part unwritten, was inclined towards linguistic heterogeneity in order to reach the majority of Ugandans with the colonial agenda without encouraging them to mobilise around a common language. Thus linguistic diversity was encouraged as a safeguard against collective integration. According to Ejalu (2005), therefore, as demands for independence intensified, the colonial policy of permitting as many local

languages as possible on the broadcast media became "a crusade" as the colonial government sought to counter independence rhetoric by any means available¹¹.

At the time Uganda's got independence on 9th October, 1962, the British colonial government did not have a written policy on language use in the media. The local languages that got adopted by the state broadcaster came on board one by one, first basing on demographic considerations, and later through political pressure.

The new Draft National Broadcasting Policy (Uganda. Directorate of Information 2004) remains silent on language except for requiring all stations to be linguistically relevant in their areas of broadcast. Even though it is understood that Uganda's state radio has the mandate to reach as many Ugandans as possible in their indigenous languages, neither the Minister of State for Information nor any government official interviewed could put their finger on a concrete, written language policy for the broadcast media.

After independence, there was a steady increase in the number of indigenous languages on state radio. Kiswahili, Luganda, Runyoro/Rutooro/Runyankore/Rukiga and Luo came on board basing on demographic factors, being the most widely spoken languages in the different regions. However, at some point this system broke down. All *Radio Uganda* staff interviewed stated that most of the remaining 16 languages have come on board through various forms of political pressure from members of parliament, ministers or pressure groups from different parts of the country. As one senior radio producer interviewed put it, "often the issue is resolved by the Minister before it gets to parliament.... At the bottom of this is the need for politicians to talk directly to their people, says one senior producer." *UBC* radio currently broadcasts in 24 languages including English (cf. Turyamwijuka 2004:4).

11 Cf. Chibita, M. (2006). Indigenous language programming and citizen participation in Uganda's broadcasting: an exploratory study., University of South Africa

Political leaders and the citizenry: different communication visions?

Political leaders in Tanzania and Uganda recognize the importance of language policy in effective broadcasting as well as in governance. However, the focus in either country, at least with regards to the broadcast media, appears to be principally on radio meeting the instrumental needs of governance. Language policy efforts in the case of Tanzania have focused "mobilizing" and "addressing the masses" rather than "empowering" ordinary citizens to address their leaders. The priority, nurtured by Nyerere's socialist policies, has been how to get Tanzanians to "speak with one voice" and minimize contention. Ugandan governments' highest priority has been finding a "unifying language" although they have not succeeded in translating that into policy for the broadcast media.

In the case of Uganda, no common language of broadcasting has emerged. Even though the "policy" has by default permitted broadcasting in a range of indigenous languages, a broader diversity that relates to enhanced presence and participation for as many citizens as possible on radio does not seem to have been the priority. Rather, it appears as if Ugandan leaders have looked at indigenous language radio stations as conduits of government policies and programmes to a largely illiterate public. At another level these radio stations have been seen as responsible for diffusing anti-government "propaganda" and sowing discord.

Government has let the agency of media owners and advertisers dictate the use of different languages on radio, as long as vital public information is available in English on all channels. In a way therefore, Uganda's multilingual broadcast language "policy" seems to have arisen out of serendipity rather than design.

This "policy" is problematic for a number of reasons. Since only a small percentage of Ugandans understand or speak English, there is

a need to avail information and facilitate debate on issues that concern ordinary Ugandans in as many of the indigenous languages as possible. This would enable the majority to participate in policy formulation and to hold government accountable. In the absence of this, a gap is created (or exacerbated), between the small elite that have facility with English, and the majority who can only participate meaningfully in radio using an indigenous language.

Besides, unlike Tanzania, there is no one indigenous language in Uganda that all non-English speaking Ugandans could benefit from. Most issues that are raised in the broadcast media therefore have increasingly tended to be raised amidst insular, ethnic undertones. In the worst case scenario, the governors could become insensitive to the real needs of the majority because the latter have no avenue for expressing themselves adequately in a collective way. This can result in government "scratching where no one is itching" in its other policies.

The current broadcast language policy also makes it difficult to have a semblance of a simultaneous national debate on any issue. In a recent debate preceding the passage of a bill on land rights and tenure in Uganda, for instance, radio stations serving different ethnic groups discussed the bill focusing on parochial rather than national interests. No clear consensus emerged on the national land question, i.e. on what kind of land policy would be in the best interest of all Ugandans. As a result when the bill was passed a section of the Baganda ethnic group, for instance still condemned it as an unfair bill and vowed to challenge it at an opportune time.

As a further illustration, Uganda has been involved in a process of regional integration with Kenya, Tanzania and lately Burundi and Rwanda. However, it has been difficult to discuss the pros and cons of this move as a nation. Such situations appear to justify the need for a common language (or languages) for public communication.

Even though public debate on the issue of language in the public domain has been focused on the selection of either Luganda or Kiswahili as official or national language for purposes of “uniting”, others in this debate have argued that this is beside the point, as *one* language does not necessarily make for unity. It should also be noted here that although Kiswahili seems to be the most likely choice from the point of view of Uganda’s political leaders, it is not a native language of any Ugandan ethnic group, and has in the past met with fierce resistance especially from the powerful Baganda ethnic group.

The following perspectives on language policy from Tanzanians and Ugandans throw some light on the range of opinion that may exist on language policy which is presumed to be based on consensus and goodwill. They also provide pointers to often ignored communication needs as well as some possibilities for future policy.

Public responses to language policy: Tanzania

Asked whether Tanzanians have accepted their language policy willingly, the majority interviewed say they have. Most of them have nothing but praise for Nyerere, who they see as the architect of the Tanzanian nation. Abdallah Katunzi, Assistant Lecturer at the University of Dar es Salaam says:

The majority of Tanzanians living in rural areas have no problem with the policy – the use of Kiswahili. For most of them, Kiswahili was their second language and hence the straightforward choice for a national language. As of now, Kiswahili is widely spoken as the first language to most young people.

For Ayub Rioba, Lecturer at the University of Dar es Salaam and Media Expert and Chairman of the Media Institutions of Southern Africa-Tanzania Chapter (MISA-TAN), the question of willingly accepting the policy or not does not even arise. The fact is that Tanzanians are using Kiswahili and it has “united the elite and the common man.”

However, some respondents in Tanzania point out contradictions in the policy. For instance, they argue that emphasizing Kiswahili over all languages including English puts Tanzanian children at a disadvantage in the global economy, and point out a tendency among the Tanzanian elite to send their children to school in Kenya and Uganda where English is the medium of instruction from mid-primary to tertiary level. They also note that political leaders (including the president) often switch between Kiswahili and English while addressing the public, well knowing that the majority of Tanzanians are not conversant with English and are more comfortable with Kiswahili. This to them is a sign that leaders have not willingly accepted the priority that the policy gives to Kiswahili.

The more purist Tanzanian interviewees on the contrary argued that English is a hindrance to the acquisition of knowledge because both teachers and students are not doing well at mastering it. They therefore advocated the adoption of Kiswahili as a medium of instruction in secondary schools and higher learning institutions. Nevertheless, they argued that English teaching be strengthened, albeit only as a subject, not as a medium of instruction. This school of thought is advanced mainly by the National Swahili Council (Baraza la Kiswahili la Taifa-BAKITA) and the Institute of Swahili Research (TUKI). This is significant given that language policy in education has a bearing on what languages are deployed in the media.

What the interviews in Tanzania seem to reveal is that although the majority of Tanzanians are comfortable accessing radio in Kiswahili rather than their indigenous languages, there are still some who think they lose something by not according the indigenous languages more prominence in the public domain, and particularly in radio, and in education. The tension is between how to “talk” together as Tanzanians without losing touch with ethnic roots or with the outside world. Nevertheless, one notes that the majority of interviewees said

having Kiswahili as a “unifying” language has been a positive experience for Tanzanians.

Public responses to language policy: Uganda

Asked to comment on the importance of a “unifying language” for the broadcast media in Uganda, one respondent had this to say:

Nation-building is not about uniformity. It is about sharing goals. It is to do with social and economic objectives... with concretising the pillars. A common language is just an added advantage... What makes a nation is the collective heritage of the people. To forget your language would be to abdicate your heritage. ...Besides there are certain things that cannot be translated (Charles Peter Mayiga, Spokesperson for the Buganda government, 2005).

Mayiga’s response typifies a relatively large proportion of Ugandans’ views on the issue of language policy. It also demonstrates how emotive the issue has become. Proponents of this position cite countries like Burundi, Rwanda and Somalia that have been bedevilled by civil strife in spite of having one language. The Ugandan context suggests that the indigenous languages cannot be relegated to the background in conceiving of a viable language policy.

The indigenous languages make it easier for politicians to communicate with the electorate. Political mobilisation in a setting as multi-lingual as Uganda’s would be difficult without the indigenous languages since the alternatives (English and Kiswahili) are each spoken by a minority. Manuel Muranga (2005), professor of Ethno-linguistics at Makerere University¹², had this to say: ‘Throughout our history, the languages of Uganda have been political factors. Whoever dares to do politics must address the language question.’

Muranga adds:

When politicians go to camp upcountry in their home areas they are expected to be able to speak the local language.

¹² Professor Muranga has since become the Principal of Bishop Barham University College in Uganda.

The argument is: ‘if you don’t speak our language you don’t represent our interests.’ In addition, many of our people have original opinions but they cannot express them well in English. They can only do this in the vernacular. If you deny the people the opportunity to express themselves in their mother-tongue, you are muzzling them. They do not feel free enough. Besides the few who know English are not necessarily the wisest or most creative (Muranga, 2005).

According to Nsaba-Butuuro (2005), former Minister of State for Information, Office of the President, it is when a national programme is conducted in a local language that listeners “feel a part of the national vision.”

The following comment from Wambede (2005), the District Information Officer in Mbale at the time of the interview, summarises what many see as the democratic significance of indigenous language broadcasting:

When the programme is in Lumasaba (the majority local language in Mbale), you get very good points that come from people who have not gone to school. The audience of radio is in the rural areas. Here real people talk to their leaders... The media has a very big role especially in our area here. Print circulates only among the elite, and the majority of ordinary Ugandans are illiterate. Radio broadcasts in languages they understand so they pay more attention.

The arguments for maintaining a variety of indigenous languages on radio also raise the fact that with relatively high levels of illiteracy particularly among women, broadcasting in the indigenous languages enables people to access information about employment opportunities in an oral medium in a language they can understand fully. This policy was also seen as important for the preservation of individual cultures as well as the promotion of local talent. As one video producer based in Kampala (2006) put it: “It is difficult to be creative in a foreign culture.”

There is less certainty among ordinary Ugandans, though, about the political efficacy

of their participation on radio, even in their own languages. Interviewees at the community level pointed out that they think government does not take the broadcast media as seriously as it does the print media. Their explanation for this is that the print media are read by the elite, and government fears the elite more than they fear the ordinary people because the former are more likely to challenge government programmes through sustained debate.

It should also be noted that the majority of interviewees, particularly outside the Central region of Uganda, said if a unifying language for radio had to be selected then it had better be Kiswahili-which they perceive as politically neutral, rather than Luganda. For historical reasons, most Ugandan governments have also preferred Kiswahili to any indigenous language for similar reasons. Idi Amin declared Kiswahili the national language in 1972 though he did little to operationalise this. The NRM government has promoted Kiswahili to the level of official language. The government of Uganda (Uganda. Policy Review Commission 1992:15-21) comes out clearly in favour of promoting Kiswahili rather than any of the indigenous languages for official use. Indeed, government presents Uganda's linguistic multiplicity as an obstacle in the way of Uganda's achieving 'rapid universal and democratised education, literacy for all, intellectualisation of all peoples as well as the attainment of the much needed national unity' (Uganda. Policy Review Commission 1992:15; cf. Chibita 2006: 144). It presents Kiswahili as the best "neutral" alternative to the selection of a potentially polarizing indigenous language.

Perhaps because of fearing to deal with the tensions that result from seeking to balance diverse linguistic interests, the government of Uganda expresses support for the use of African languages (such as Kiswahili) as national media of communication and, (as much as possible), media of instruction. Government also, in the Education White Paper, asserts its determination to prevent the development of a national language policy that is based on, and

is likely to promote in society the problems of "emotionalism, sectarianism, reactionary prejudices and inflexibility, and therefore likely to hinder progress."

The NRM government's pro-Kiswahili policy has met with resistance particularly from the Baganda ethnic group. Consequently and for purposes of maintaining peace, the NRM government has had to continue offering lip-service to the indigenous languages in the short term. At present, it is difficult to put a finger on what the Ugandan government's policy on language in broadcasting is. It can however, be discerned from the Education Policy, from politicians statements and from conduct that the government would like to promote Kiswahili in the long run as Uganda's "unifying" language.

The position of English as official language and medium of instruction is considered, both by government and the Ugandan public, as non-problematic. In the short term, the most commercially viable indigenous languages continue to be used widely in the broadcast media with little central guidance. The less commercially viable languages get a token representation on the state and community media. Attempting to regulate them is considered too politically explosive to be worthwhile. By default, their use continues to be regulated by the market, with the state broadcaster seeking to reduce the number of languages they broadcast in and the private-commercial media each concentrating on one or two of either Luganda, the 4Rs or Luo.

Conclusion

The Tanzanian broadcast language policy experience suggests that there are definite benefits accruing from a definitive language policy for the media that privileges one of the indigenous languages for public communication. These include a sense of "one-ness," enhanced efficiency in administration, a greater likelihood of developing a coherent "national" body of literature, and opportunities for evolving a public sphere with a national character. However, this

seems to work best where there is some form of consensus on the selected language, and where the selected language is native to the country in question. Besides while it works well in fulfilling the more national political objectives, it seems to leave some gaps as far as expression and debate at the micro level is concerned. The Uganda *laissez-faire* approach to language policy for broadcasting on the other hand seems to leave too much agency to media owners who are likely to be motivated by the commercial rather than the political viability of different languages.

The question this raises is: does it have to be the Tanzanian model (leaning more towards the Habermasian conception of the public sphere) OR the Ugandan model (potentially at least, tending towards Gitlin's public sphericules idea)? Could a case be made for a multi-tier language regime that caters not just for efficient communication from the governor to the governed, but also allows the governed to debate important policy issues among themselves and also to "get back" to the governed in languages that make the most sense to them? Such a policy could also ensure that citizens remain globally relevant through the promotion of a global language such as English. Radio would then be more likely to serve not just as a conduit of pre-packaged information but also as a viable and inclusive arena for contestation of cultural, political and other identities and opinions. Such a policy would require a careful harnessing of the different tiers of broadcasting (state, commercial and community) to ensure that minority opinions and identities do not get drowned out in the pursuit of a national identity. All this would require a careful deployment of the indigenous languages, Kiswahili and English. As far as language is concerned, therefore, maybe the issue would not be public sphere OR public *sphericules*, but public sphere AND public *sphericules*.

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